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Darshana
International

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DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

AN

International Quarterly

COMPILED

OF

Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical Research, Religion, Mysticism & Sociology

पुस्तकालय
गुरुकुल कांगड़ी

MORADABAD *(INDIA)*

Volume IV January 1964 Number 1

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Dedication

This issue of the *Darshana International* is very solemnly and respectfully *DEDICATED* to the memory of late lamented John F. Kennedy, the last and the youngest American President ever elected, who in his short regieme before his martyrdom made a great name in the present history of the world, and who was successful in getting the world-tensions and incipent wars averted, who was greatly responsible in bringing Russia and America closer and who loved peace and freedom for the entire world, and from whom the world expected a new type of leadership for the welfare of mankind, and who is now among the great immortal martyrs of the world, like Socrates, Christ, Lincoln, and Gandhi, who were killed because they loved Truth, Justice and Peace.

Prof. J. P. Atreya
Managing Editor 'Darshana International'
MORADABAD (India)

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Obituary Note on John F. Kennedy

Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, born May 29,1917, Brookline, Mass. bon of Joseph P. and Rose (Fitzgerald) Kennedy; educated at Harvard University, B.A. cum laude, 1940; London School of Economics, 1935, Secretary to United States Ambassador in London, 1938; served in U.S. Navy; 1941—45; Lieut. Naval Reserve Reporter, 1945; elected to both Congress (1947—49). He become a Senator in January 1953 and in 1956 he sought Nomination as a Vice-President of the United States and in 1960 he was Awarded Purple Heart; Navy and Marine Corpse Medal; chosen one of the ten outstanding young men of 1946 (Junior Chamber of Commerce;) Author: *Why England Slept*. 1940.

He was elected the President of the Republic of United States of America in November, 1960. Formerly he was a Senator. He won over his opponent Vice-President Richard M. Nixon. In his election speeches he had appealed for a new forward looking leadership and for a more effective use of country's human and economic resources. In his inaugural speech as the President he set a tone of youthful energy and dedication which marked his administration. He said, "The torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans. He also said that America would bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty." And he gathered around him in his Cabinet and White House advisors, a group of top level officials in the country. All of them and he himself were notable for their openness to new ideas and their readiness to take vigorous action. To remove unemployment in such regions as coal mining districts of Pennsylvania and West Virginia a new act called the Area Development Act was passed which empowered the Federal Govt. to help the distressed, to start new industries, and build the means of public facilities. Another law was made by which low-income employees were to be trained for better jobs with pay during the period of training. Pension law was liberal ised to ensure social security. A great housing programme was introduced to lodge at low and reasonable cost elderly families. A great advance has been made in his regieme to eliminate racial discrimination, wherever it existed in the States. Segregation of Whites in schools and hotels was removed, and a large number of Negroes were appointed on high Government posts. In his foreign policy he stood for help in maintaining and achieving democratic form of Govt. He made the greatest effort to avert war and to establish peace in the international field. He declared, "To those nations who would make themselves our adversary, we offer not a pledge but a request: that both sides begin a-new the quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction....Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate". The serious si-

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tuation that had developed in connection with Cuba before Kennedy took over, was very peacefully and amicably solved by him. Very good relations were established with Latin America and goodwill visit was paid to Latin America by President and Mrs Kennedy in 1961. Lot of financial aid was given to the countries of Latin America which helped them in building roads, homes and schools and improved the lot of the farmers and teachers. In Africa the freedom of Congo was safeguarded by the American aid and the United Nations' military action. In his regience the Laotian and Viet-Nam problems were also solved. In Europe the problem of EastGermany and West Berlin, which threatened great rupture between Russia and Western Powers(American, British and French),was very sagaciously approached and rupture was avoided.Thanks to the co-operation of the Russian Premier Khrushchove that Kennedy succeeded in getting a nuclear test explotion ban treaty signed by several great powers of the word. In March 1961, President Kennedy initiated Peace Corpse, the purpose of which was to 'serve people less privileged than themselves and to express the bonds of brotherhood that unite all peoples.'Members of the Peace Corpse do voluntary service in other countries as nurses, surveyors, teachers, sanitation specialists, mechanics and farm aides. He travelled a lot far good will, peace and friendship in the world and visited for this purpose England, France, Canada, Austria, Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, Germany, Berlin, Italy, Costa Rica and in the Caribbean Islands. Such a great national and international work was done by the late lamented Kennedy in such a short time. Alas, he was too good and too great to escape the evil that is rampant in the world. May God give Peace and Comfort to his noble soul. As Indians believing in rebirth we pray that he may be again born on this earth to complete the work of word peace and world brotherhood in which he believed.We offer our most heartfelt condolences to Mrs.Kennedy who co-operated with her husband in creating a climate of goodwill and friendship all over the world.

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EPITAPH

I

It happened in the bright afternoon
Of a day that Texas will remember longer than the Alamo.
After the would-be backfire, the "Oh, no !",
The head cradled for the last time.
Two priests with him at the end of promise.

Numb with loss the millions knew
That safety was a myth, that fantasy came true.
Each, for an instant, faced his own mortality.
Nor wealth nor power did prevail and all precaution was absurd.

II

Oswald immortalized his reaching out,
His need for contact with the alien world.
He dealt with shadows, insubstantial fragments of his own surmise.
He went through notions of cynic-revolutionary
And agony attended his antagonisms.

Conceived in hope, unconsciously performed,
He did destroy the image of his own despair.
He killed the self he could not be
And violently his presence finally
Made a difference to the world.

III

She sits like stone after the television.
I cannot find her in the flat grey world of death.
I cannot feel what she endures,
And yet alive I would reach out to dim that distance.

A gun or presidential power are ways of making contact,
Destroying and creating images of our own brief circumstance.
More symbol now than real,
Aware and sensitive to time, yesterdays are history or rhyme.
The blind behaving now,
The serial program of our days makes do a ritual.
But ritual is never shared,
And each alone we sense a loss that is our loss,
Our despair, and eventually our death.

Richard H. Dana

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May we see for a hundred years !
May we live for a hundred years !
May we hear for a hundred years !
May we speak for a hundred years !
May we remain free from misery for a hundred years !
And again so for another hundred years !

(Yajur Veda XXXVI-24)

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And

Prosperous New Year

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FOURTH BIRTHDAY OF DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

By God's Grace, Friends' co-operation, Contributors' Voluntary articles, Subscribers' money, patrons'loans and readers' appreciation, the *DARSHNA INTERNATIONAL* has completed three years of its existence. We are very grateful to all who have helped us in any way to run this journal.We have specially to thank Shri Kowtha Suryanarayan Row, and his Swadharma Swaarajya Sangh, the founders of the International Academy of Integrating Bharatiya Culture, Varanasi, for giving us a loan without interest for publishing the journal and to Prof. Humayun Kabir, the Central Minister formerly in charge of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, for having given us a donation of Rs. One Thousand for the same purpose. Our American friends who are on our editorial Board have been helping us as usual without any slack in their love and enthusiasm for *Darshana*. One of them has vigorously defended in his editorial article, "Why should there be *Darshana International*" the existence and policy of the journal. Others have been expressing their appreciation of *DARSHANA* in their unasked for letters,now and then received by the Managing Editor. We get very encouraging letters from the readers of the journal, many of whom become quite impatient when it is lost on the way or is delayed in reaching their hands. Here are a few extracts as samples. "There must be hundreds of people anxious to see publication of *Darshana* continue." [R. Powell] "I sincerely hope that *Darshan* is prospering" [Albert van Aver] Although the journal is being published with a great financial loss, the publishers and editors are not yet desperate. They are hopeful and optimistic about the future of the *Darshana International*. The General Editor, Dr. B. L. Atreya, in spite of his financial resources being very limited has been bearing almost the entire deficit of the publication of the journal. We cannot thank him too much. The only satisfaction the publishers and the editors feel in continuing the journal is that it has done something, however little it may be, in bringing about an international intellectual co-operation. To quote one of our American editors, from a letter,he has addressed to some influential and affluent men in India,"

"*Darshana*" has been performing outstanding cultural service along many lines. At the same time it has been helping to promote a large measure of good will and international understanding among scholars here in the United States through the themes which it emphasizes in its pages and the splendid, educational idealism shown by its editors. It is likewise serving to bring real distinction and culural eminence to Indian scholarship, through the inspiring leadership which it so clearly demonstrates. I can honestly state that Americans look with favor upon the interdisciplinary functions served by "*Darshana*" and are impressed with the quality of its contributions. It is of high quality and serve social and educational values both domestically and internationally."

May the *DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL* become more secure and better in quality during its fourth year.

Moradabad
Jan. *1964*

J. P. Atreya
Managing Editor of theDarshana International

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EDITORIAL

An Invitation to World Psychologists and Philosophers

The main cause of all our present-day troubles is that we have much knowledge of the things around us but and very little of ourselves. We are greatly ignorant of what we are in our entirety, what our potentialities and possibilities are, what we should rightly strive for, and how we should live properly. We are satisfied with the little knowledge biology and modern experimental psychology have given us about human nature, and we overlook and disregard all that the psychologists and mystics of ancient and medieval times of the East as well as of the West had discovered about man by their introspective, meditative and intuitive methods of investigation. And, it is very unfortunate that on the basis of our peripheral knowledge of ourselves we live only a surface life. Our ethics, sociology, politics, administration, law, personal, and social and international relations; nay even our religious and domestic life, all are based on the surface view of man, with the consequence that there is too much of strife, hatred, enmity, craze for wealth, power and position, and war cold and hot in the world today, more than it was ever before in the history of the world. The only panacea for all the evils rampant in the world today is a complete understanding of man and his potentialities, and his real relations with the world around him. In this age of science, this knowledge has to be acquired scientifically, and co-operatively.

To know man entirely and fully we need observation of all possible types and kinds of men, and particularly those men who differ much from the common man, whom we falsely regard as the 'normal' man. The more a man differs from the ordinary and common men, the more interessting and important he is for the study of the psychology of man. The great contributions that Depth Psychology has been able to make to human psychology is due to the study of the abnormal, the diseased the insane, the crazy, and the unique and exceptional types of men. The great contribution Psychical Research(now called Para Psychology in some circles) has made to human psychology is due to its observation of the rare, odd, and ordinarily unintelligible personalities called mediums. There is no doubt that the contemporary craze of some psychologists to search for mystics and yogis will in course of time prove greatly beneficial to human Psychology, by adding to it the knowledge of other and higher dimensions of man than hitherto known to depth psychology or to para psychology. In fact all kinds of psychological freaks and puzzles and enigmas are assets to psychology and much more attention should be given to them than to the ordinary human samples. It should be regarded as a sacred duty of every man to bring to the knowledge of great psychologists such human freaks or oddities wherever or whenever they are observed so that they may be studied before they come to

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normalcy either by treatment or in course of time.

Here we very earnestly invite the attention of the world psychologists, parapsychologists, depth psychologists and philosophers to study a great psychological freak, which is a great puzzle and enigma to us, and which, when properly studied and understood is likely to throw great light on the nature of man. It is not a hearsay case. We have observed the case ourselves, and the case is already under the observation of some literary scholars. It deserves, however, a greater psychological attention and study. Hence our writing about it. We owe our first acquaintance with the case to our friend Dr. Rangra of the Education Ministry of Central Government of India and to the Vedic Anusandhan Samiti, 94, Sarojini Market, New Delhi –2 (India), which has done a lot of spade work in this connection. This Samiti (Committee) has already published *A short Biographical Note on Brahmachari Krishna Datta* in English and some of the wonderful utterances of him in Hindi in two small volumes. It has tape-recorded no less than 80 utterances of him made under very strange conditions to be mentioned below. I am very grateful to the above mentioned agencies through which I came in touch with the wonderful case.

The case in brief is this: An illiterate, uneducated and a rustic village boy born in a very low cultural stratum of Hindu society, who never came in contact with any contact with scholars or books, when lies down on his back utters in the finest 'Vedic' accent numerous '*Veda-Mantras*' (Vedic Hymns) for a long time and then utters speeches on the topics connected with the hymns or on other highly important philosophical and religious topics in pure and Sanskritised Hindi for an hour or so. The phenomenon stops the very moment he turns his lying body right or left. While uttering the Vedic Hymns or the speeches his head constantly keeps moving from right to left and *vice versa*. Before going to lie on his back he knows nothing, and on getting up after turning aside he is completely ignorant of what he is going to speak or what he has spoken. All that happens independently of his conscious mind. And no trace of memory is left of what has been uttered. Hundreds of such utterances have been heard by people and many of them have been tape-recorded. The references in the utterances are to ancient Rishis and their pupils, and the personality assumed in the trance is that of a Rishi.It is a case very similar in effect to that of Rosemary in England, studied by Howard and Hulme and published in *The Ancient Egypt Speaks* and *After Thirty Centuries*. It deserves at least as much attention if not more.

Here is the story of this great medium, Krishna Chandra, who is called Brahmachari Krishna Chandra by people because he has not married and probably does not want to marry. Krishna Chandra (originally Kishan Chand)was born in at a village,Khurrampur Salemabad,near Muradnagar, in the district of Meerut,Uttar Pradesh State, India,not very distant from Delhi, the capital of India, in a Hindu weaver family. Both the parents

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were quite illiterate and too poor to send the boy to school. When he was an infant of 6 months his neck was often seen oscillating sideways. At the age of three or four years, when he was hardly able to speak his mother tongue which was coloquial Hindi, he started muttering and uttering some strange language which neither his parents nor neighbours could understand. It happened so often that his parents got worried and began to consult people for his treatment. Many physicians and magicians were consulated in vain. At the age of 9, still uneducated and illiterate, he was employed to help Chowdhury Khachera Mal and Sri Indraj Singh Tyagi in their work of farming and in tending their cattle. Several times they found him lying in the fields in a particular posture (on his back) and speaking in unusual manner for hours together. He would stop only when he or somebody else turned him on his side. Thinking that he was possessed by some evil spirits, he was put to torture and was given severe beatings by his father. Thus the first fifteen years of his life passed in his village,doing all sorts of jobs in farming and animal husbandry. Once, when he was in his sixteenth year, and was uttering speeches which no body could understand, he was given severe beating by his father. This enraged the boy, and he left home in disgust; and began wandering about to get himself cured of his supposed disease. Krishna-Chandra went to a Sadhu, who he thought, would cure him. The sadhu who lived at Hastinapur demanded Rs. 400/- from him for his treatment. Having nothing to pay, the young boy promised to sell himself to the sadhu for any work or service. But the sadhu did not agree. In anger, he beat the sadhu severely, and fled away from him. He then came to a village Barnava, in the district of Meerut,and there, he stayed with Shri Dharma Veer Tyagi. His trouble still continued. But now, those people who heard him speak while asleep began to respect him; and he came to be known as a Mahatma (Saint) and was surrounded by villagers round about the village of Barnava. While staying at Barnava he went to visit a village where it was believed the Kauravas of the *Mahabharata* had built a *Lakshagriha* (house of lac) to burn the Pandavas(a story of the *Mahabharata*)After return from there his utterances became very systematic and pointed. Since then he has been addresing his speeches to one Mahananda who often puts questions which are very appropriately answered in the speeches. Krishna Chandra has a fascination for Vedic Yajnas (sacrifices) and requests people to arrange for the Vedic Yajnas. At his request a great Yajna named *Rasthra Vijaya Yajna* (Sacrifice for National Victory) and *Chaturveda Parayana Yajna* were performed in Barnava, in November 1962, and they cost about Rs. 6000/-

On December 28, 1961 Krishna Chandra came to Vinayanagar,New Delhi for the first time and gave his lectures in trance under the auspicies of the Arya Samaj Vinaya Nagar,almost daily for a period for a fortnight. Now these lectures are often delivered in Delhi under the auspicies of the Vedic Anusanhdān Samiti, at various places and they are in-

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variably recorded. We have had the pleasure of hearing him utter some speeches. The procedure he follows is the following: He lies down on his back on a cot placed on a platform and visible to all spectators and audience.He seems to go to sleep.After 15-20 minutes he begins to oscillate his head sideways and his hands are folded at his chest; and then the recitation of hymns in a Sanskrit like language and in Vedic like style begins to take place. This recitation continues for about 10-12 minutes. After that is over an apparently learned speech in good Hindi is delivered on the topics touched in the mantra like hymns recited by him. As already said, the speeches uttered are generally addressed to Mahanand and author of the speeches is hinted as some very old Rishi who has personally known and seen the great historical and mythological figures like Harish Chandra, Ram Chandra, Valmiki, Shri Krishna, and Veda Vyasa and others. The usual duration of the lecture is about 45 minutes. After the lecture in Hindi is over he again recites some "Veda Mantras" for about 5 minutes. He then takes a sideway turn and becomes normal. He does not remember any thing of his lectures and hymns after becoming normal. The hymns uttered by him in the form of 'Vedic' hymns and with the 'Vedic' accent are however not found anywhere in the existing *Vedas*.

This psychological freak is now in his 24th year and is still illiterate and rustic. In his normal life he can hardly pronounce Hindi and Sanskrit words properly and write his name and address in Hindi correctly. His parents and all the members of his family are illiterate and uncultured. He is prepared and willing to undergo any observation and psychological tests. We invite the attention of the world psychologists and investigators to study him.

B. L. Atreya

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND FRENCH AND GERMAN THINKERS

T. G. KALGHATGI

Introduction

It has been said that east is east and west is west, and 'never the twain shall meet'. This Kipling's phrase had a political background in the belief in the Whiteman's burden civilizing the other people.

But the study of the development of human thought has shown that progress is not a monopoly of any country or race. Course of history has not made any distinction in the peoples of the world. There have been contacts between different cultures. Contacts on the basis of communication and commerce have probably preceded the philosophic influences on one another.

Historical

Greece and India : The same can be said of the ancient Indian philosophy in its relation to western thought. For instance (i) there is evidence to show that there were cultural contacts between ancient India and the ancient Greece.

While the opinion that Greeks have been influenced by the Indian thought has been frequently held, it is not so often urged that Indian thought owes much to Greek speculation.[1]

So far as Greek philosophy is concerned philosophic discussion cannot be traced earlier than 6th century B.C. Thales, the first philosopher one of the seven wise men, predicted the eclipse in 595 B.C. Two men after Thales influenced Greek philosophy later—Pythagoras and Socrates. The 6th century B.C. was just the beginning of western philosophy and not the development of philosophic thought. But Indian philosophy had already matured at that time.

Ancient Indian and Greek philosophies exhibit striking similarities. Ovphic cult is essentially non-helemic. Idea of liberation of the soul is primarily oriental. Bunnet accepts the striking similarity between the ovphic beliefs and those prevalent in India. Zeller admits that idea originated in India though he thought that Greeks got it from Persia.

In ancient Greece, it was an accepted belief that journey to the East was necessary for the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom. Democritus had travelled to Egypt and Persia. Pythagoras might have contacts with India. His philosophy looks essentially Indian. There is evidence to show that, there were cultural contacts between the two countries at that

1. Garbe : "Philosophy of Ancient India." Ch. III

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time. At the time of Alexander the Great Indian beliefs and Indian fables made their appearance in the West[2].

We are told that Aristotle had asked Alexander to find out the state of knowledge among Indians. Aśoka sent missioneries to the Mediterranaen countries at a time when Buddhist influence was prominent in India.

Therefore, unless we are to assume that resemblence in philosophies were mere accidents, it would be reasonable to suppose that Indian influences in Greek thought were by no means slight, as Indian phiosophy had already attained some degree of progress at that time. [3]

In the middle ages the contact was slight. They were the dark ages. A new era of contact was started with the discovery of India by Vasco De Gama in 1498. Gradually, increasing interest began to be taken by the westerners in Indian life, thought and literature. In understanding Indian thought. and translating the ancient classical texts by eminent scholars from different countries like England, France, Germany, Holland, America and Russia, the Germans have taken the lion's share.[4]

Indologists

Warren Hastings, the founder of the British rule in India gave in fact the fruitful stimulus for the study of Indian literature. The first Englishman who acquired knowledge in Sanskrit was Charles Willkins. William Jones published his English translation of Śakuntala in 1789. It was translated in German by George Forster in 1791. It inspired men like Herder and Goethe.

It is said that *Yajurveda* was first translated into French in 1778 and in German in 1779. Voltaire seems to have been aware of this translation. The German poet Frederic Schlegel learnt Sanskrit at Paris under the guidance of Alexander. Hamilton translated Sanskrit manuscripts into German. His brother Wilhelm Von Schlegel was the first professor of Sanskrit in Germany. His teacher was La Chezy, the first professor of Sanskrit in College De France. Frederic Schlegel said in his letter to Goethe that he turned to Asia in order to bring to light that which was forgotten.

Willhelm Von Humboldt was inspired by the *Bhagvadgītā*. He writes 'it is perhaps the first deepest and the loftiest thing the world has to show (1927). Hegel criticised the work. Humboldt wrote that,however indifferent he might be to Hegel's judgement, he greatly valued the Indian philosophical poem and he was grateful to Providence for having permitted him to live long enough to become acquainted with this book.[5]

The *Upaniṣads* were translated into Persian first and from the Persian into Latin. A French scholar Perrou translated the same into French

2. Glasenapp Von (H) : Article in the "Universitas" Vol. IV No. 3. 1961.
3. "History of Philosophy" East and West. Vol. 1 Introduction.
4. Winternitz (M) : "A History of Indian Literature. Vol. I. Translated in English." 1927.
5. Winternitz (M) "History of Indian Literature." Vol. I p. 18.

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under the title '*Ouphekhat*'. German philosophers like Schelling and Schopenhauer became enthusiastic for Indian philosophy by means of the book.

Eugene Burnouf, with the help of a few pupils like Rudolf Roth and Max Muller brought to light a vast study of Vedic literature and started the investigation in Buddhist literature.The investigation of Buddhist literature has been greatly encouraged by the Pali Text Society, under the guidance of Rhys Davids. Similarly eminent Indologists like Herman Jacobi Buhler, Glasenapp and others in Germany and Renou Lenumer and others in France have devoted themselves to the study of Jaina literature and philosophy. Many more can be mentioned.

Influence by Indian Thought

It is difficult to say how far Indian thought has influeuced the western thinkers specially French and German. We are told that Voltaire and Kant were the first to obtain a fair though rather imperfect ideas by Hindu theolcgv.[6] Philosophic thought has developed in some way on similar lines. The echoes of Nāgārjuna and Śaṁkara in the philosophical moods are heard in Plato, Spinoza, Bradley and Bergson[7] although the extent of the influences cannot be known at the present stage of the knowledge of history. In the nineteenth century Europe became more aware than formerly of Indian philosophy, both ancient and modern.[8]

We may, here consider the impact of Indian philosophy on German and French thinkers like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson and Romain Rolland.

Schopenhauer : Schopenhauer's philosophy is peculiar.He was a Pessimist and fully academic like Kant and Hegel. His father was a Voltarian. His mother was a lady of literary taste. She wrote books and was mostly in the company of men of letters. But young Schopenauer did not like his mother's behaviour. His low opinion of women was partly due to his quarrels with his mother.

At Hamburg he came under the influence of Novelis and Hoffmann from whom he learnt to admire Greek thought. Frederic Schlegel influenced him in his admiration of Indian philosophy. He was immensely influenced by the *Upaniṣads*. It has been the solace of my life, he said it will be the solace of my death'[9].

Schopenhauer acknowledged these influences—Plato, Kant and the *Upaniṣad*. He disliked Hegel and called him 'that intellectual caliban'. 'I cannot see', he writes, 'that between Kant and myself anything has been done in philosophy' [10] He disliked christianity and preferred Hinduism and Buddhism.

He said that the philosophers placed the essence of mind in thought and consciousness. But that was a radical error ! However, consciousness

6. Glassenapp Von (H) Article in "Universitas. Vol. IV No .3, 1961.
7. Radhakrishnan (S) : "Indian Philosophy," . Vol. I. p. 37
8. Russell (B) : "History of Western Philosophy" (1947) p. 746
9. Schopenhauer : Preface to the "World as Will and Idea."
10. Schopenhauer : 'The World as Will and Idea. Vol. I p. vii

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is the surface of our mind of which we only know the crust. Under the conscious intellect is the conscious or unconscious will, a shrine, a persistent vital force, a spontaneous activity, a will of imperius desire. The intellect may seem at times to lead the will, but only as a guide leads his master. The will is 'the strong blind man who carries on his shoulders, the lame man who can see'. The analogy is very much like that given in the *Sāṁkhya* School. Desire is strong. He calls man a metaphysical animal. To convince a man one must appeal to his self interest, his desire, his will. Intellect is subordinate and instrumental to desire.No one is more liable to mistakes than he who acts only in reflection. In this we are reminded of Freud's analysis of forgetting. "Character lies in the will and not in the intellect'. It is continuity of purpose. Even the body is the product of will. The blood pushed in by that will which we vaguely call life build its own vessels. Therefore will is the essence of man.

In understanding nature on this basis we find that force is the form of will. Aristotle was right when he said that there is a power within that moulds even form, in plants and planets, in animals and men.The use of the will is to live and its eternal enemy is death.

In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* we get the emphasis in the will as the primary force. All things in life centre in will consist of will and abide in will, Heaven and earth are willed.Water and fire are willed. Rainfalls through the will of heaven and earth meditate on will and he who meditates on will as Brahman[12] is lord and master as far as the will reaches.

Ranade compares this passage with the emphasis on will that Schopenhauer laid. According to these doctrines the whole world seems to be filled with the force of will what apears as motivation in human beings is the same as what appears as stimulus in the vegetable life and as mechanical force is the inorgnic world. [13] Schopenhauer was possibly attracted towards these Upaniṣadic teachings.

we appear to be separate individuals in space and time. This is an illusion. Space and time are the veil of māyā—illusion hiding the unity of things.—This is a characteristic of Vedantic influence.The principle of individuation creates the illusion of separateness due to the individuals subjective apparatus of spatio-temporal perception.

Russell says that we might,so far,except Schopenhauer to identify his cosmic will with God and teach a pantheistic doctrine not unlike Spinoza's in which virtue would consist in conformity with the divine will. But at this point his pessimism leads him to a different development[14].

Cosmic will is evil. It is the source of endless suffering. Suffering is essential to all life, and is increased by every increase of knowledge. Life is evil because pain is its basic stimulus and reality. Pleasure is

12. Chandogya Upanishad. VII.
13. Ranade, R. D. ; "A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy.Psychology in Upanishads
14. Russell (B) ; History of Western Philosophy. p. 783.

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negative—a mere cessation of pain. Therefore the end of life is freedom from pain. Here, we are reminded of the Buddha's teaching of the four noble truths—*Dukkha* to *dukkha nirodha.*

Life is evil because,(i) as soon as want and suffering permit rest to a man,ennui is atonce so near that he necessarily requires diversion[15] in more suffering,higher the organism the greater is the suffering and life is war.The total picture of life is almost too painful for contemplation. Therefore, he that increaseth knowledge increaseth suffering.

The Buddha preached the doctrine of'*Sarvam dukkham*'in his first sermon at Banaras.

But there is a way out, and that is the cessation of life, which is also the cessation of suffering. Schopenhauer found this in *Nirvāṇa* which he interpreted in negative terms. Although he did not grasp the full meaning of *Nirvāṇa* as presented by the Buddhism,he had imbibed the spirit of the Buddha's teaching in that the cause of suffering lies in desire(*taṇhā*) which is aptly interpreted as craving. The less we exercise will the less we suffer 'Reduce your desire'was the primary way out of the impasse of life, as the Buddha taught. Schopenhauer says that Buddhism is the highest religion.

Schopenhauer seems to have been impressed by the ascetic mysticism. The good men will practise complete chastity,voluntary poverty,fasting and self torture.The aim is to break down the individual will.To those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this our world, which is so real, with all its sins and milky ways—is nothing. Russell says that there is a suggestion here that the Saint sees something positive which other men do not see but there is no where a hint of what it is, and I think the suggestion is only rhetorical[16]. However,it would not be unreasonable to suggest that Schopenhauer was here influenced by the lives of Indian *Ṛiṣis* more specially of the *Sthitaprajñas.*

Nietzsche

Schopenhauer's primacy of will has been held in one form or another by many modern philosophers notably Nietzsche and Bergson.

Nietzsche was a sick philosopher who yearned health,power and superiority, that which he lacked—a compensatory function indeed.

Frederic Nietzsche was born in 1844 of the old clerical family in Prussian Sexony. He was weak in health.He lacked physical vigour and mental balance. He died insane.He was profoundly influenced by Schopenhauer and Wagner,and illness was his third master.He seems to have been influenced by Indian philosophy although there are no specific references about it.

Nietzsche was against religion that practised kindness and piety, He was against christianity.Buddhism and Christianity, he said are both 'nihilistic' religions in a sense that they deny any ultimate difference between one man and another. But Buddhism is much less objectionable of

15. Schopenhauer - 'World as Will and Idea' 1 No. 2
16. Russell (B) 'History of Modern Philosophy' p. 785.

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the two "The New Testament is the gospel of the compltely 'ignoble species' of man" Christianity aims at taming the heart of man, which is a mistake. A wild beast has a splendour which it loses when it is tamed.

Nietzche preached the rise of Superman. Zarathustra, the prophet, assembled the higher men high up in his mountain cave, those who have suffered under the presumption of democracy. He explains the rise of the Superman. Nietzsche makes a distinction between master morality and slave morality Energy, intellect and pride make the Superman. The function of the masses, the rattle is to obey while the duty of the masters is to rule. He condemns democracy as a mania for counting noses. He wanted to build a vision of power of aristocracy . The common men are only meant as instruments to the rise of Supermen, as the rising plant in Java is supported by a tree which dries up for the sake of the survival of the plant.

Nietzsche hated sympathy as an element slave morality. Russell has imagined a conversation between Nietzsche and the Buddha on this problem. The Buddha would want to save the poor and the miserable through love; while Nietzsche would condemn this attitude as inspired because suffering is necessary for the common man.

Russell says 'I agree with Buddha as I have imagined him.....' I dislike Nietzsche because he likes the contemplation of pain, because he erects conceit into duty, because the man whom he admires are conquerers whose glory is cleverness in causing man to die.[17]

There is little doubt that Nietzsche was aware of some Schools, of Indian philosophy through translation in German and through Schopenhauer. But how far he was influenced by the ancient Indian thought and the distinctions of aristocracy in the '*varṇāśrama*' it is difficult to say.

Bergson (Henri)

Bergson was influenced of the primacy of will presented by Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer emphasized the possibility of making the concept of life more fundamental and inclusive than that of force and Bergson took up this idea and converted a sceptical world to it by the force of his sincerity and eloquence.[18]

Bergson was born in 1859 in Paris of French and Jewish parentage. In 1907 he won international fame by his **Creative Evolution.**

Bergson's philosophy is dualistic. The world is divided into separate portions, life and matter. Matter is that something which the intellect views as matter. The whole universe is the clash of two opposite motions —life which climbs upward and matter which falls downwards. Life is one great force one vital impulse given once for all from the beginning of the world. It struggles to break way through the resistence of matter and gradually using matter subordinates it.

Evolution is not merely mechanical nor merely teleological, it is truly creative, like the work of an artist. We are here reminded of the Jaina dis-

17. Russell (B) 'History of Western Philosophy' p. 800.
18. Will Durant (Pellican) 'The Story of Philosophy'. p. 49.

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tinction between *Jīva* and *ajīva* and the *Sāṁkhya* theory of evolution, although in the *Sāṁkhya* views matter is active and not passive while conciousness that is *puruṣa* is passive.

The distinction between intellect and instinct is fundamental in his philosophy. Intellect cuts reality into pieces and gave a nuclear picture of reality. It is characterised by the natural inability to understand life. Intellect is the power of seeing things as separate from each other. Instinct and intuition are opposed to intellect. Instinct at its best is called intuition. 'By intuition', I mean, he says, 'the instinct that has become disinterested self conscious capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely' Intuition grasps reality in its essence.

Here we can say that there has been some likeness between the distinction of intellect from intuition and analysis of the distinction between the two that we get in Śaṅkara and other monists in Indian philosophy. We cannot establish with certainty any definite influences that Indian philosophy had on Bergson. Bergson, it appears, was favourably impressed by the development of Indian philosophy in ancient times.

Romain Rolland

Now we come to Romain Rolland. He was a great thinker of the present century, though he was not included in the galaxy of acadmic philosophers. There is evidence to show that Romain Rolland had great regard for Indian philosophy and his world view was greatly influenced of ancient Indian thought. As a young man Romain Rolland first read about India when he came across a translation of Kalidas's work and also of the *Gītā*. In his diary he writes, 'In the depth of my heart lies the divine self—the idea that corresponds very much to Hindu thought'. In 1958, he expressed profound admiration to Asia in his letter to Losetee Padoux. The real spirit of India was revealed to him when he read the extracts of *Gitanjali* and when an article in India written by Anand K. Kumarswami was dedicated to him in 1913. In 1916 Tagore attacked western materialism in Tokyo, and Romain Rolland wrote in his letter to Tagore that he agreed with Tagore in his views. He latter, took up the misson of interpreting India to the West.

He was profoundly influenced by Mahatma Gandhi, because he thought that Gandhi is the one who practised non violence in social and political fields. Romain Rolland was a humanist and was interested in self realisation through the increase of virtues. He turned towards India and Asia because he found that there he got the solace of his life.

But in his preface to the book on Vivekananda he says that he was not influenced by Indian philosophy. It may be that similar thoughts have occurred to him. It may be that his deeper interest in the spirit, his knowledge of Indian thought and his zeal to spiritualisation of the modern western civilization combined to produce a profound influence in his thought. A detailed study of this problem is desirable and necessary.

The impact of Indian literature and philosophy on western thought has been considerable. Western literature has also been influenced. It

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may not be possible to get conclusive evidence in these cases. However, similarities between the different schools of philosophy in India and the works of western thinkers can be shown. For instance :—In 1791. George Forster translated Kalidas in German. Goethe read it. Schlegel, Herder and other poets greeted the translation. There was considerable influence of Buddhist and Vedantic thought on literature. Le Conte de Lisle presented the gist of Vedanta philosophy in his poem *Bhagavat*.Novelists like Stephen Zweig,Bernard Pierre and Paul Morand,and essayists like August Wilhelem and Schlegel were also influenced.

In the western world other than France and England comparisons have been made between the philosophies of Sāṁkhya and Santayana Śaṅkra and Bradley and others.

Conclusion

However, the cultural contacts between India and the western world have been wholesome. In fact, we have come closer so as to forget the barriers that lay between the two worlds.Goethe heralded the way for future cooperation between the East and the West, and said. 'Orient and Occident can no longer be disconnected. Heavenly and earthly things cover such a wide field that the realm of the spirit can only be fully grasped through the efforts of all beings combined.[19]

Romain Rolland said, 'For the soul there is neither West nor East. They are only its garments' Contrary to Kipling's views, the East and the West have met.

And, philosophy knows no frontiers. We come across in every tradition distinction,between Reality and Apperance the pure and empirical ego and betwee intuition and intellect.[20] Philosophy is not merely to reflect the spirit of age but also to lead us forward. Its function is creative. It must inspire us with the faith to sustain the spirit, to subordinate the rational, racial and religious divisions to the ideal of humanity 'Philosophy is nothing if not universal in scope and spirt.'[21]

19. As quoted by Glasenapp (Von H) Article in Universitas 1961 Vol. IV No. 3
20. Radhakrishnan (S) ; History of Philosophy-Eastern and Western, Vol. II.
21. ibid p. 448.

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CREATIVE EVOLUTION AND SOCIAL VALUES

BERNHARD MOLLENHAUER

IT is generally agreed that evolution pervades the realm of life and mind. "All reality," says Bergson. "is tendency, if we agree to mean by tendency an incipient change of direction.....This reality is mobility. Not things made, but things in the making, not self-maintaining states but only changing states exist." Some writers claim that creative evolution does not pervade the whole of reality but is the rule of life and emergent values whose pulsating flow escapes the analysis of scientific thought and logical concepts, yet may be truly grasped in that quality of intellectual sympathy, or intuition, which identifies itself with the flow of reality and looks at nature from within. Advancing in the direction of intuition we approach a duration in the essence of nature,comparable to the consciousness we have of our own inward growth, which progressively unfolds and intensifies itself and whose limit must be eternity.Not conceptual completed eternity, which would be not unlike an eternity of death, but an eternity of life. It is claimed that mechanism is the rule of matter and that repetition is the characteristic of materiality,—the polar opposite of life and spontaneity.Another school of thinkers claims evolution for both life and matter and would discard mechanism in favor of free non-mechanical agents. No doubt very few scientific workers regard mechanism as incompatible with the novelty involved in evolution.A simple experiment may illustrate the possibility of transition to novelty with emergence of new and unforeseen qualities within the sphere of mechanism.If hydrogen and oxygen are subjected to an electrical discharge within a closed tube they combine and pass into water.Here is an example of directional change through causal law and mechanism.

Evolution in matter is necessarily different from evolution in biological realms. In the former the children of the star dust present no problem of inheritance and, unless destroyed by accident, survive the whole process as stellar spheres. In the latter it is the species only that survives and growth is conditioned by an inner reaction to environment.Evolution in both life and matter is consistent with mechanism but our knowledge has not bridged the chasm between the organic and the inorganic. There is an increasing mass of evidence in favor of the evolution of complex forms from simple beginnings, but we are still in the dark as to the causes of evolution.

Some writers, with an eye for the dramatic, describe the evolution of man as the "will to power" and see no progress of mankind as such through history. The emergent values of truth and civilization are brushed aside or explained away by their lowly origins. But is not the lilly rooted in the earth ? They would have us believe that peace, now sum-

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moned Cinderella-like,and courted by a war-weary world can be no more than lady for a day, that to bring peace is to reverse the entire trend of history, and nature of man. There is, of course, much truth in this but let us not forget that many early races were unwarlike and practised mutual aid, that war is not the justifiable fate of man. Even primitive man is a complex creature in whom light and darkness are strangely mixed. The elements of human culture began, not with the plow and the sword as popularly supposed, but still earlier with the dawn man whose remarkable gifts are beautifully illustrated in certain phases of Paleolithic art. Love of beauty and a dawning sense of mith in the primitive mind were potent factors in social evolution. But the idea of free individuality, so axiomatic with us, was beyond the grasp of early races, and it is said that to this day primitive languages lack terms to express clear self-consciousness. It is a crude myth that the first society was formed by aggressive individuals who made laws to bridle the weaker ones. In fact as Sir Henry Maine points out, custom and tacitly accepted usage long preceded deliberate law making. Apparently primitive man proposed no laws and claimed few or no rights for himself as distinct from his family and clan. Lawmaking and the formation of civic organizations mark a later stage of social evolution.

Long be for Homer in the Nile Valley early men reached such remarkable heights, not because of his belligerant qualities but because his gentler and more spiritual qualities had greater survival value. For these we remember him, Not until later in their history was their warlike activity extensive. The Egyptians seemed ever dreaming of that "land which loves the silence", making immense preparations for the Life Beyond. Faces of the statues the Egyptian made of his various gods have a patient serene expression. Man unconsciously makes God in his own image. The rise of civilization is closely bound up with the values of religion. The decline of these values has precipitated the crisis of our time. We see governments enlisting all the services of science and yet repudiating all the values and human insights of civilization that made the rise of science possible. This is the unique tragedy of our time.

Aristotle begins his famous "Metaphysics" with the observation: All men are by nature actuated with the desire for knowledge. "In the history of his thought man and his environment have formed either a unity or an opposition, more often an opposition. But fundamentally human nature and the nature of the world go together as Spinoza visioned it. A true philosophy will not allow us to think of nature as inimical and sheerly alien to man's values and responses. But the Hellenic-Christian tradition with its emphasis on social values and the dignity of man faces the negations of left wing Existentialism. In modern literature there is tendency to exalt the unconscious at the expense of reason and dwell on the problems of the "lost self," its despairing confusion and anguished contemplation of Nothingness. To such small measure Western man

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is brought when he loses sight of the Hellenic-Christian conception of the dignity of man with its high value on man as thinker. Human life and the emergence of mind with its thirst for truth, reality and self fulfillment have their own validity and reveal nature as fully and more so as do atoms, plants and animals.

"Even the stone would become a doorstep; and all things strive after the divine," remarked Aristotle.

But from a purely scientific standpoint such an observation is on par with the rapt vision of the poet who gives to airy nothing a place and local habitation. For viewed through the glasses of science nature knows no values. It speaks a hundred languages, to the bee it is a fairyland of blossomed rose, to the beast of burden something else, to man it reveals itself in still another way. Why should man's valuation be more valid than that of any other creature ? Is not his whole existence like a wink in the eye of eternity ? So it appears to science for whom the single cell is not more or less important than the complex organism, simply different. To a botanist a fine plant is not intrinsically better than a weed, to be strictly scientific. For to speak of one plant being better than another, or a complex form of life more "evolved" than a cell is tacitly to introduce a standard of worth, or value, and cease to be a passive spectator. Now to subordinate one's likes and opinions humbly and be an impartial onlooker is an ideal condition for pure research. Yet to be a scientist is not to be completely passive and indifferent, for he necessarily takes an affirmative critical attitude in shifting his data. A standard of truth is a necessary part of his equipment. Now to apply a standard of truth to nature is to illuminate and shade our picture of reality. It is to abandon the neutral, passive and therefore narrow view of nature. A narrow specialist may try to do this and such pedants Goethe had in mind when he said, "Gray is all theory, and green is life's golden tree." We live in a world of facts, laws and values. And the latter are not without an eternal significance for there is a sense in which values may condition the survival of things in the later stages of evolution. John E. Boodin in *REALISTIC UNIVERSE* says: "If there is a conscious power that exercises selection in the larger universe, then survival in the whole of existence as well as in the world of human control, may depend upon its value fitness—its harmony with an ideal constitution."

We live in a flux of sensations and become rational beings in transcending the chaos of perception. We place a world of thought over against the chaos of sense thus creating a rational world common to all of us. There must of course be an inherent rationality in nature and another way of putting it would be to say we as rational beings share a community of interpretation. We see nature through the qualifying medium of our spiritual organization and so know it only in its relation to consciousness. Kant and the great Scottish thinker James Ferrier meet on this point.

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Time is an element of reality most intimately linked with our inmost being. Our sensations and thoughts are ordered under the form of time. Subjective experiences are unilinear;the time process is their only dimension.It was the great insight of T. H. Green that our knowledge of nature involves a spiritual principle that is not the product of evolution,materially conceived.Recently not a few outstanding men of science have recognized the immense significance of mind in evolution. A noted astronomer observed the universe is more like a thought than a machine. But we do not grope for occult qualities; science is not going mystical. To say the values of truth,beauty and religion are grounded in a reality more fundamental than our fleeting impressions is to recognize that the unity of and nature does not demote man but gives nature a heightened significance. In the light of its more luminous reality man need not grovel in Existential despair,rather he should pitch his philosophy in a higher key. We find in nature a rationality akin to mind;for it is our world and in a sense depends on us.Yet it has a stubborn independence, a demand to remain true to itself in spite of how much we may grasp of it.

If,then, we speak of a will in the universe we do not mean to personify it. On the contrary we must accept it as the expression of impersonal Law which makes no exceptions and grants no favors. Its will is not a mystical longing in the atoms,or a reasonless striving which emerges in life as the will to power. It is something more akin to the ideal necessity we find in a work of art. The analogy is illustrated in the words of Hugo Munsterberg:

"I hear a melody;it gives me pleasure,just as I like the taste of a sweet fruit. The liking of those tones is a personal taste; someone else may like better a melody of stronger rhythm. That personally I have at present just a longing for this sad little melody cannot have more than an individual, personal meaning. It is a fulfillment of personal desire, and yet no one can hear the melody without being aware that another kind of demand is fulfilled therein which is independent of my personal present feeling. As that melody approaches its end,the player is no longer free in his choice of the last notes. we may never have heard it before, and yet we feel that those first tones seek just his last tone. They long for it. The melody is not complete without it.Those tones themselves desire that end and whether I care to hear music now or not,I must subordinate myself so far that I must want that closing of the melody, as the demand lies outside my personal wishes. Those first tones have the right to demand that last one.Not I will it; but they will it;and as such a melody, with its own eternal rights, sounds endlessly around us the universe itself."

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IS MAN A RATIONAL ANIMAL ?

KONSTANTIN KOLENDA

I

ONE of the significant phenomena of our age is the persistent attack on the Aristotelian definition of man as a rational animal. Not that this phenomenon is entirely new. Ever since Democritus attempted to reduce the human soul to fine and nimble atoms, thus accounting for all mental processes in terms of material movements, the view of man as a rational animal has been controversial. The controversy was kept alive by such formidable thinkers as Epicurus, Lucretius, Hobbes, Condillac, LaMettrie, Feuerbach, to mention but a few. More recently, the outright mechanistic accounts of dogmatic materialists were supplemented by the subtler views of economic and cultural determinists. The Marxist view interprets all human behavior in terms of economic forces. The more inclusive view of cultural determinists,represented today by Leslie White, still sees man's behavior as thoroughly determined by his biological make-up and the patterns of his culture. Even though there is an enormous philosophical distance between the crude mechanistic accounts and those based on economic or cultural determinism, all of them reduce man to a being in whom a pre-existing concatenation of forces does its inexorable and inevitable work. If rationality, of a sort,is admitted into this context, it is always given a purely instrumental function; its task is to take cognizance of the forces operating in and on the organism in order to allow their fullest expression. Thus White sees man as catalyst through whom the impersonal forces of culture do their work.

But that is not all. The assault on the Aristotelian definition of man is reinforced by an attack from another direction. It seems that even the Marxist's or the culturologist's view is too rationalistic, for it assumes that the messages of biology, of history, or of culture come through. But they don't, at any rate not always. And the fault rests with the receiver. Al least this is what we are told in a flood of recent literature, factual and fictional, in which the irrationality of man's behavior is traced to the malfunctioning of the inner side of man—call it soul, mind or catalyst.

Thus, while in the past the skepticism about the role of reason in human behavior stemmed mainly from the study of biological, economic, or cultural conditions, this skepticism is increasingly nourished today by the discoveries of depth-psychology. The essence of these discoveries is that there is a discrepancy between the consciously held interpretations of one's behavior and the actual causes of that behavior. In order to protectitself immediately against unpleasant and disquieting facts,the human psychesets in montion processes which,although hidden from the agent's

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consciousness, nevertheless effectively determine his behavior. Clinical practice discloses how prolific the inner psyche can be; there is a whole new vocabulary designed to identify various mechanisms of unconscious motivation, such as denial, displacement, isolation, rationalization, and many others. In addition, we have the testimony of many other sensitive students of human behavior who are impressed by the ubiquity of a phenomenon labeled by Sartre as *mauvaise foi,* which may be translated as bad faith or self-deception. In Chapter II of his *Being and Nothingness* Sartre describes and analyses actions in which a person pretends to himself that he is not doing what in fact he is doing.

These discoveries about the inner life of man have become commonplace. Cumulatively they have helped to undermine the myth that the mind of man is a brightly illumined chamber in which everything is transparent and accessible to the light of reason. At the same time they tended to reinforce the skepticism about man's rationality. By now the case against Aristotle seems formidable indeed. It may appear that human behavior can be fully explained in terms of biological, economic, cultural pressures, or of the more subtle and complex mechanism of psychological forces. But if so, what is the point of defining man as rational animal ?

II

An interesting example of dissatisfaction with Aristotle's definition of man is found in a recent article by Professor E. J. Lemmon, of Oxford.[1] Professor Lemmon contends that the view of man as a rational animal could be held only when certain facts about human behavior were suppressed or not properly acknowledged. Take for instance, the so-called problem of *acrasia.* This Greek word translated as incontinence or weakness of the will, refers to the instances of acting contrary to one's own conviction of what is the right thing to do. Lemmon observes that many philosophers have found this phenomenon puzzling. Socrates appears to have denied that it is even possible and claimed that whenever a man fails to do what he knows he ought to do he is merely mistaken or deluded about what he should do. Aristotle had considerable difficulty in explaning how a man could know what he ought to do and still not do it. A contemporary ethical philosopher, R. M. Hare, also finds the occurrence of acrasia paradoxical; a man who assents to an "ought" statement taken as a value judgment cannot fail, according to Hare, to act in accordance with that statement.

Why should the occurrence of acrasia appear puzzling to philosophers ? To this question Lemmon gives the following answer.

> I suspect that behind this philosophical amazement that there should be such a phenomenon as acrasia lies the Aristotelian (or Socratic) picture of man as a rational animal. How this definition could survive the millions of counterexamples during the two millenniums remains mysterious, unless it has simply flattered the race.[2]

1. Moral Dilemmas. "The Philosophical Review", April 1962.
2. Ibid , p. 144.

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Lemmon's conclusion seems to be that if we take the counterexamples seriously we will no longer make the philosophical mistake of defining man as a rational animal. He adds in parentheses that it would be better to define man as "that tragic animal who is sometimes capable of thinking rationally but in general incapable of acting so."

It is important to note that for Lemmon the occurrence of acrasia **alone** is sufficient to reject Aristotle's definition. One may find this questionable. But Lemmon's case can be strengthened by adducing all the arguments mentioned at the outset. Furthermore, there is a special reason why the occurrence of irrational behavior is particularly damaging to the view of man as a rational animal. In irrational behavior, especially in acrasia, there is at least a recognition of the possibility that man **could** act from reason, had he sufficient will power to resist temptations or to control his subconscious. This is what makes man tragic. He has the capacity of acting rationally, but somehow, he "does not quite make it," he falls victim to impulses which his reason condemns, alas, unsuccessfully.

III

It is a matter of some importance to determine the precise intent of arguments which question human rationality. Do they intend to show that the element of reason in human behaviour is simply non-existent? Do they imply that all human action can be traced back entirely either to non-rational or irrational causes, or to a combination of both? It is unlikely that they intend to go that far. Professor Lemmon, for example, concludes his article by urging that the moral philosopher should get out of his corner and move "back into the familiar but forgotten Socratic position of trying to answer the ever-present but ever-changing question: how should a man live?"[3] But how are his conclusion and his appeal possible? To what human capacity is this appeal addressed?

It can hardly be denied that much of human behavior manifests the operation of biological, economic, cultural, subconscious forces. To point out and to describe their presence is a service toward better understanding of man. At the same time we ought to make sure that the conclusions we draw do not on preselected and arbitrarily delimited evidence. One may choose the criteria of rationality in such a way as to reduce the class of rational animals to zero.

Professor Lemmon's argument appears to be an extreme example of such procedure. He obviously overstates his case. Consider how stringent are his criteria for membership in the class of rational animals. Apparently the beings who manifest acrasia in there behavior do not qualify. But this is a gross exaggeration. It is undoubtedy true that all of us are occasionally or even frequently victims of acrasia, but is this a sufficient ground for denying that we are rational? We could perhaps use the presence of **habitual** acrasia, for example, as a criterion of irrationality. But from this it, does not follow that the necessary condition of rationality is

3. Ibid., p. 158

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the total absence of acrasia from our behavior. It may be difficult to decide just how often a man may afford acting from acrasia without running the risk of losing his membership in the class of rational animals. He surely would be excluded if he always acted from acrasia, i.e., never did what he thought he ought to do and always did what he thought he ought not.Such a person would not remain an agent for very long: he would be rightly considered insane or totally irrational and would be treated accordingly.

The question which Lemmon's procedure provokes is this: are we entitled to label human beings as rational animals in the light of the fact that much of human behavior stems from non-rational or irrational causes? This question, I believe, can be answered in the negative only if we (1) do not care to specify the extent to which non-rational or irrational factors are present in human behavior, and (2) fail to take into account further facts about human beings. In a way(1) depends on (2); if some human actions cannot be adequately explained by reference to the combination of of non-rational or irrational factors, then we would need to take into account other relevant factors.Consequently,we should turn our attention mainly to condition(2).

It appears to me that we can make an indefinite number of additional true statements about human behavior each of which will have a bearing on the question whether the label"rational animal"is applicable to man. I believe that these statements would at least provide counterevidence to the contemporary tendency to emphasize the irrational side of man (vide for example,the title of a recent book by William Barrett: *Irrational Man*). Our objective should be to offer a characterization of man which is faithful to all the facts. Whether these facts are best summed up in a defining label "rational animal" ,or by some other label, is a purely verbal matter. My main concern is to warn that our skepticism about or even the outright rejection of the Aristotelian definition of man should not blind us to many important facts about human experience.

What are these facts ? To offer an adequate statement and description would require much space and time. In this short paper we must limit ourselves to a brief, provisional mention of facts frequently ignored.

First of all, I would contend that every sane human being retains a degree of capacity for objective self-appraisal. This capacity can be brought to bear on all of the factors which influence human behavior, including those to which our classical materialists and cultural determinists assigned the dominant role: biological and psychological drives, economic needs, social pressures, cultural demands. The point is that a man can be aware of any of the forces, hereditary or environmental, which impinge upon his existence and clamor for recognition in his actions. Any of these factors may move us to action. A pang of hunger may

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stir us to look for food, a fit of anger may prompt us to strike a blow at an offender, a fear of ridicule may restrain us from wearing an old-fashioned hat, a hidden persuasion may seduce us into smoking Salem cigarettes instead of Marlboros, an ambition or a desire for prestige may send us status-seeking, a respect for a moral rule of the community may keep us from breaking it.

Influences of all of these types vie for our attention and recognition and must be included in any fair description of factors which influence our behavior. It is a proper task for psychological and social sciences to study and to report the relative weight of specific factors in our behavior and to correct our misapprehensions whenever they occur. But it is in principle possible for us to know those influences for what they are, namely biological promptings, psychological reactions, social or moral demands. In fact, it is the objective of behavioral sciences to keep us informed about the actual facts of our situation. We can and try to know the role and the weight of various promptings to action. This we can do either in prospect, while weighing the alternatives, or in retrospect, while analyzing past actions. Normally, both the prospective evaluation and retrospective insights contribute their share to our decisions and actions. The factors expressed in our behavior may often be very complex, but even then we can appraise them with some degree of objectivity.

It is often claimed that Freud, by calling our attention to some non-rational or irrational factors in our psyche, has actually made it possible for us to be more rational. If we are more realistic about the true nature of our psyche we may, for just that reason, be more realisic and more rational in our decisions. What we have here is a new application of the old Socratic ideal of self-knowledge. For to know that we are often subject to acrasia, or self-deception, or unconscious motivation, may be a great gain. One of the consequences of this knowledge may be a greater tendency toward soul-searching and self-scrutiny. Being aware of our susceptibility to irrational promptings, we may try to guard against them more carefully.

Secondly, in addition to this capacity for objective self-appraisal, there is also the tendency to condemn and the desire to escape irrational action. While it is not true that man is fully rational, neither is it true that he accepts with equanimity his irrational behavior. We may not be ably to avoid acrasia, but we may recognize it, either in prospect or in retrospect, for what it is: a violation of our own rational counsel. Our susceptibility to irrational promptings is usually parallelled by the desire to avoid and to control them. The knowledge of this susceptibility should not—and I would claim, in general does not—stop us from trying to face our problems as rationally as we can. As Spinoza observed centuries ago, it is possible for man to transform a passive, victimizing emotion into an active, liberating one.

Thirdly, I would like to call attention to a phenomenon which is completely left out in any materialistic, culturological, or ego-centered acc-

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ount of human behavior, namely the capacity of human beings to act morally, i. e., out of respect for general desirability of certain ends. It is instructive to remember in this connection that the legal determination of a man's sanity turns on his ability to distinguish right from wrong. To deal with this aspect of human behavior would take us far afield. But we may be assured that a theory which ignores it altogether is guilty of a glaring omission. It hardly can be denied that human action is frequently motivated by genuine respect for moral principles and the common good. The capacity to recognize and to act for the sake of generally desirable ends cannot be left out of any account which aims at truthful characterization of human behavior.

To point to some actual rational capacities of man is not to close one's eyes to the presence of contrary capacities. Kant was aware of this. Perhaps we can understand better in what way the adjective "rational" is applicable to man if we remind ourselves of the distinction which Kant introduced when he tried to analyze the meaning of the adjective"moral". Kant thought it important to distinguish between morality and holiness. To be holy is to be in actual possession of moral perfection. Angels could be said to be moral in this sense ; their very being, their pure nature insures them against committing moral transgressions. Angels cannot fail to be moral. But not so man. For him morality is always a task to be faced because of the potential opposition of inclinations to the moral demand. Indeed, Kant concluded that the adjective "moral" can be applied only to a being who is in principle capable of acting immorally,i. e., contrary to dictates of morality.

It seems to me that a similar distinction should be made with respect to the word "rational". Man is not rational in the sense in which a holy man is moral. He is not rational in that sense, because he is constantly subject to the assault of biological, economic, and social pressures, and not infrequently to more subtle internal promptings of bad faith or acrasia. To demand that he be rational in that sense is equivalent to requiring that a moral creature be holy. But this is to demand too much. Even the "rigoristic" Kant did not ask for that much.

We should not forget that in Aristotle's defininition the adjective"rational" qualifies the noun "animal". The ascription of rationality to man is meaningful only against the background of non-rational or irrational promptings. If such promptings were not present, or if they were ineffacatious; there would be no occasion for us to apply the adjective "rational" to an action, because there would be nothing with which such action could be contrasted. Consequently, to call attention to the presence and to the frequent efficacy of non-rational or irrational causes of behavior is not to disprove the claim that man is amenable to reason. We need not and should not interpret the adjective "rational" as excluding the possibility of ever transgressing against the dictates of reason. This would be analogous to confusing "moral" with "holy".

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IV

Our main concern so far has been to present a more balanced picture of human behavior by listing some types of capacities which may be labeled as rational and which are often manifested in action. If we grant that these capacities exist and are made use of, we are also admitting that man is at least in part, or at times, rational. This admission in itself would be sufficient to make clear that to characterize man as essentially irrational, or tragic, or depraved, is to indulge in exaggeration, perhaps for rhetorical purposes.

Are we then to adopt a noncommittal, neutral view and simply say: man cannot be defined as either rational or irrational, because he exhibits both traits in his behavior ? Although this undoubtedly is a true description of man, it still leaves out something important. It is this: to the extent that a man is rational he cannot be neutral about the extent to which he acts irrationally. To be even partly rational is to be in a position to recognize which aspects of one's behavior fall outside one's rational control. But to recognize that this is so and to remain completely unmoved by this fact is to indicate that one's recognition was spurious. For reason is not an impartial spectator; it is partial to its own verdict. Could it be otherwise ? Reason which is not true to itself, in thought and in action, would be purely epiphenomenal and would make no difference in a person's behavior. But then rationality could not be ascribed to that person, even in part.

That reason is to understood in the normative and not merely in the descriptive sense has been clearly recognized by Plato in his tripartite analysis of the soul. Reason is not only a part of human endowment, it is also that part which is entitled to rule in virtue of the fact that it recognizes itself as superior to other aspects of human nature. It seems to me that this is also the way in which Socrates and Aristotle understood man to be rational. It is hard to believe that they, careful students of human nature, simply failed to notice the occurrence of acrasia.[4] This becomes especially doubtful wnen one recalls how unflattering was Socrates' estimate of the motivation of multitudes. But there is no doubt that Socrates and Aristotle held up rationality as an ideal to be strived for, even though it is seldom achieved in actuality.

The normative, practical dimension of rationality was effectively, brought out in some writings of William James. We may adopt James way of speaking and refer to rationality as an option, frequently a live option, as in the case of the option of staying alive in the world threatened by nuclear weapons. Confronted with the two contrasting attitudes towards life, optimism and pessimism. James refused to embrace either because both claimed too much. The optimist is assured that all obstacles

4. Acrasia was no secret to every deep student of human nature. Cf. St. Paul in 'Letter to the Romans'. Ch. 7, verse 15- 'I do not understand my own actions. For I do not what I want. but I do the very thing I hate.' Also Ovid- 'Video meliora proboque , deteriora sequor.' (Metamorphoses 7. 20-1).

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and dangers are not significant enough to cause substantial worry about the final outcome of things.The pessimist is convinced that the irrational forces are bound to prevail in the end.

One could imagine James replying to them as follows; "What makes either of you so confident about your claims? Have you explored the human enterprise exhaustively enough to be so certain of its outcome? I am not denying that either of you has much evidence to support his conclusion But both of you have left out something important, namely, man's capacity to recognize his situation for what it is and to act upon it. For my part,I am of the opinion that the steps which man could take may contribute to his future history. And I know that my commitment to what seems desirable is one of the factors of change. This factor will make a difference, even in the face of ultimate defeat, should it occur. But as long as there are efforts afoot, in me and in others, to prevent this defeat, it is not inevitable". In sum, for James human rational ideals are not bare abstract possibilities. "They are grounded, they are live possibilities, for we are their live champions and pledges..."[5]

Perhaps James' melioristic faith strikes us today as too optimistic after all. Perhaps his tender-mindedness is too unrealistic for us who are toughened by more pessimistic developments of recent decades. But his argument is still valid. Every attempt to educate, to reform, to exhort,to persuade, to adopt a principle or a goal of action presupposes that human beings can direct their action with conscious, deliberate intent.Even the close students of irrational factors in human motivation pin their hopes on the capacity of man to rise above these factors. In a recent paper "The Unacceptability of Disquieting Facts"[6] a psychiatrist, Lester Grinspoon tried to estimate the effects on the people of USA if they really faced the existing danger of nuclear war. He did not exclude the possibility that if they were clearly confronted with this danger "they would embrace some program or activity which they believe is capable of altering the unacceptable facts."[7] Dr. Grinspoon did not venture to predict that this would happen. On the contrary, he warned that the anxiety resulting from the confrontation with the unpleasant fact could result in unrealistic maladaptation. But the fact that he left the matter open, to be decided by the decision and action of each individual,points to the possibility that on the issue of war or peace reason; which should prevail,may in fact do so. It will, if, in Jame's words, we choose to be its champions and pledges.

5. 'Pragmatism', p. 185, Meridian Book.
6. Presented at the Philadelphia Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, December 27, 1962
7. Ibid . p. 16.

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MARY BOOLE : And the Pattern of a Group

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BLODWEN DAVIES

ONE of the realizations that will emerge out of the twentieth century maelstrom of human experience is that the human mind is reaching levels of consciousness, in massive numbers, which were, even a century ago;open only to rare individuals. The faculty of inspiration, when it functioned,marked a man as a seer or a prophet, to whom others went reverently for enlightenment.Now inspiration,intuition, thinking are some of the things we need so desperately that we are invoking them as aids in getting us out of our moral, economic, political, religious and philosophical crises.

In one sense much of our confusion seems to be due to an overabundance of creativity, or at least novelty. So many people, in many places, are pouring out theories concepts and ideals through our lines of communication, the printing press, radio and television, that they are inundating us. Keeping order in the archives of modern thought is a profession in itself. Back of this proliferation of ideas, in this amazingly articulate era, in every part of the world,must be some basic evolutionary trend which we have not as yet grasped. We have not yet produced the catalyst which will reduce this fantastic harvest of human effort to its essential form, to the archetypes for our future.

One thing we are beginning to recognize and that is the historical group which, across time and space, is entrusted with introducing new ideas, new patterns of thought, on which the future,in some special area, depends. Thus we can trace groups of poets, groups of dramatists,groups of musicians who have created great eras which changed the course of human history. These are not necessarily groups of one exact period, of one nation, or of one race. These groups are subjective, often very loosely associated exoterically, but fed by the same springs of purpose,wisdom and of intelligent activity.These people sometimes implement each other's work from generation to generation, and create a specific movement and provide specific changes in the trends of human thought.

It is a group such as this whose story I will tell briefly, because its enterprise covered two centuries and it is bearing fruit today.

I begin this tale with a sixteen year old boy, who had become a cadet in the service of the East India Company, in 1806, and boarded a sailing ship for India. His niece, Mary Boole, writing of him a century later, said that he went "ignorant, unspoiled and fresh". His first reaction to the great and strange country where he was to make his home for forty years, was to seek out teachers who would instruct him

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in as many of the languages as possible, so that he could communicate freely with those with whom he was to work.In the pursuit of these skills of communication he made a friend of a learned Brahman who must have found the boy's mind of an unusual quality for he initiated him into the ancient wisdom of the relationship of man to the As-Yet-Unknown. He did not teach him the rituals of his own religion but instead disclosed to him the essential factors in all true religions, the means by which finite man could hold communion with the Infinite. Mary Boole told the story in a long letter to Sir Jagadish Chandra Bose.

The English boy, George Everest, after ten years in India, where in his leisure time he had taught himself mathematics from a few available books, become an assistant to Col. W. Lambton, who had founded the trigonometric survey of India. Seven years later he succeeded Col.Lambton but shortly afterwards went home to England for two or three years to bring himself abreast of the latest knowledge essential to him as survey or and geographer. In time he reorganized the survey and in 1841 he completed his work, in the Himalayas. Eventually in recognition of his scientific work, the world's highest mountain was re-named for him, Mount Everest, in what Mary Boole called a strange kind of vandalism. But his greatest memorial was something few people now are aware of, the great meridional arc from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas by which he made his calculations, something unsurpassed in the annals of science.

Yet it is not his scientific work as surveyor-general of India, for which he was knighted, that interests us most. His role in this story is concerned with the ideas he carried back with him to England, first in 1825, and again later on his retirement in 1844. In 1825 he enthralled a younger brother, who had just become a country parson in the Anglican church, Thomas Everest. He did two things to his brother's thinking, he infected him with a love of mathematics and also with a profound interest in the mythology of northern Europe, particularly the Scandanavian. A few years later the young parson published a paper in which he maintained that words like God, Theos, Odin, had meanings which were intended to symbolize spiritual vitality available to man. Everest made two young friends, one was John Herschel, the son of the astronomer who discoverd Uranus, and the other Charles Babbage, who was to be a celebrated mathematician and who created probably the first instrument of automation, now in a London Museum, which was to do the mechanical chores of mathematics. They, in turn, were deeply influenced by the esoteric knowledge that Everest imparted to them. Through this channel the ancient wisdom of India poured into scientific west.

Another who was drawn into this group was Augustus de Morgan, who sponsored the publication in England of *A Treatise on Maxima and Minima* by Ram Chandra, to make known to the west some of the achievements of the Hindu mind. Later Sir John Herschel introduced *Brahma Siddhanta*, the work of Brahmagupta, an Indian astronomer of the seve-

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nth century, to the west. All of these men, and later many more, knew the need for the recognition of the powers of oriental thinkers and the values that could emerge from one type of mind complementing the other. British mathematical thinking was at a low ebb and the light from the east was essential if scientific awakening was to be accomplished.

While Everest was teaching himself mathematics in India, there was born to a poor shoemaker in Lincoln a son, George Boole. The Booles were proud of their craftsmanship, because for generations they had been known as the best thatchers and "the most reading men" of their part of the country. George's father, too, although a shoemaker, kept abreast of the science of his day by reading in the little leisure time he had. George Boole had a good mind but no means of getting an education for a profession. After he had gone through the national school, at sixteen he became a teacher in a private school. At twenty he established his own school. He was interested in many aspects of science but fewer books were required to learn mathematics than anything else so he trained himself, as a mathematician, with the few precious shillings he could spend on education.

Boole was only seventeen when he had an experience that shaped all the rest of his life. Walking across a field in deep thought one day, he apparently experienced illumination, or what R.M. Bucke called "cosmic consciousness". It had a shattering effect on the boy, because ever afterwards he was concerned not only with understanding it, but with knowing how to help others who might be thrown off balance by the impact of the experience. Boole felt it was a religious experience and naturally he equated religion with a church and considered entering the ministry. However, he at last made a friend of a very learned Jew in whom he confided. He learned from his new friend much the same as George Everest had learned from his Brahman friend, that he had come by chance upon the results which could be achieved consciously and deliberately as taught by the Jewish as well as other mysteries.

The enlightenment that had come to George Boole revealed to him that the human mind works in two ways: the outer mind deals with experience and facts concretely but there is an unconscious mind stored with the knowledge of the experience of all human history. Man must learn to move from one mind to the other, there must be a kind of pulsation, an alternation, in which there is an interplay between the inner and the outer mind, and in that play there emerges creative thinking. In time Boole worked this out as an equation on which he based his logic. He took each subject on which he was thinking, and devoted to it all the reason at his command. This was his universe of thought for the time being. Then having done the work, he moved on to the absolutely opposite or polar area of thought, seeking to find not the differences but the points of contact, the possible harmony between the two apparently opposed areas of thought. By moving into the larger universe of thought

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and rising above the divergences, the thinker achieved a synthesis, the new thing which he was seeking. In later life he devoted much time to a study of the trinity as expressed in all the great religions. His methods, Mary Boole explained, worked by triangulation. as it is known in surveying. "It depends on the psychological law that man's brain is an implement which has the property of revealing new truth by the process of fixing attention on two truths, or aspects of truth, previously known, between which there exists some link of connection, the nature of which is not exactly known...The (Boole) Method is to set brains vibrating with the simultaneous consciousness of two groups of facts, **free from any hamper from any opinions as to the nature of the connection between the two groups**, and start them investigating the nature of the connection". This process produced "unconscious cerebration" or the "inner vision" which we value as inspiration, intuition or creative thinking. Actually Boole's Laws of Thought were a restatemant of one of the oldest laws of the creative human mind.

Boole was only twenty-four, poor and self-taught, when he published his first rather crude statement in the Cambridge Mathematical Journal in 1839, "The Theory of Analytical Transformations", It was 1854 before he published his "*Laws of Thought*". He had created a basic equation on which his theories were elaborated. This equation was $X + (\text{not} - X) = 1$. But Boole himself was never able to express in words the universal religious symbolism in his work, and he saw his work applied as a great contribution to mathematics and logic but without any understanding of the psychological re-statement which he intended it to be. Yet Herbert Spencer said that in the investigation of the laws of thought, the application to logic of methods like those of mathematics, constituted a step far greater in originality and importance than any taken since Aristotle. Bertrand Russell regarded *The Laws of Thought* as the first book on mathematics. Much of the progress in science in our day is in debt to Boole.

At thirty-four Boole was appointed first professor of mathematics at the new Queen's College University of Cork and there he worked and taught until his death, in 1864.

Meantime Thomas Everest had married and in 1832 his daughter, Mary Everest, was born. He soon realized that the child had a most unusual mind and he began teaching her mathematics when she was six years old. The family lived some years in France. Her father engaged a country school master, who was also a fine mathematician, to tutor her, since French mathematics was far in advance of English methods at that time. The only time he had available was from six to eight in the morning. So in the bleak cold winter dawns the eight year old child was up and awaiting her teacher, eagerly absorbing all he could teach her.

Ten years later when Mary was eighteen, and back in England, her father looked about for a tutor to advance her understanding of mathe-

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matics. That was at the time when George Boole had worked his way in to such recognition that he was appointd to Queen' s College. ButThomas Everest asked him to take his daughter as a private student before his departure. Ths recognition between the two was instant and warm. Boole was half way through his work on the manuscript of *The Laws of Thought*. One day he ventured to show it to Mary Everest. To the joy of each of them she at once saw the total significance. Mathematics and her uncle's teachings on the underlying truths of all great religious thought had prepared her to recognize one of the most important contributions to modern science. Here was the first western attempt to bring together into a unity of truth, the sciences and religions of the world. And only a few minds then saw its significance.

They were so completely responsive to each other that they talked of marriage but Boole, who was nearly twice her age,would not seriously consider it. They agreed to be friends.

The course of studies over, Boole left for Ireland and they did not meet for several years. Boole then heard she was ill and in trouble and he went to see her. Suddenly marriage seemed the natural course, and a few months later Mary Everest became Mary Boole.

In the nine years they had together Mary Boole worked with him in preparing his work for publication. She had the capacity to simplify and clarify his thoughts and to aid in their expression for reception in the scientific world. She established communication between the man of genius and the public. She consciously and deliberately began the role of what she called a lens by which many lines of thought could be brought into sharp focus. She drew together the components of many creative workers, and her own work was not passive for she made great contributions of her own in clarification and application.

When she was young widow with five small daughters, she had to earn a living for them all.Sometimes she taught,sometimes she acted as secretary to men likeJames Hinton.But always she was writing and searching for contributions to the main theme of creative psychology.

It was in this way that she came upon an old book in a second hand bookstore,on the origins of despotism. It was in French and signed only with the initials N.BThe author ascribed the power of despotic control of nations and other groupings of people,such as church institutions, to rigidity of thought. By indoctrination, people were shackled by one point of view, rigid and authoritarian. She had to search for the identity of the author. Even the Librarian of the British Museum Reading Room had no knowledge of him. At last she learned that he was Nicholas Boulanger, a famous French engineer, who had been the spur to the French Encyclopaedists. His mind had been turned to new——or very old—modes of thinking by access to information about American Indians. Then he had turned to oriental patterns of thought. Boulanger never allowed his manuscripts to be published but they were circulated among the Encyclop-

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paedists. Mary Boole says: "If they were the fathers of modern French science, Boulanger may be called its grandfather." As soon as he died his books began rolling off the presses in Paris, London, Amsterdam and Geneva. But mysteriously they disappeared and Boulanger was almost forgotten. The Jesuits had been bitter foes of the Encyclopaedists and Mary Boole believed there had been a conspiracy to buy and destroy Boulanger's books as they appeared.

Meantime Boole's *Laws of Thought* appeared in 1855, still shrouded as a scientific text book. But the next year there appeared in France a book called *Logique* by Pere Alphonse Gratry. By happy, chance it came into the hands of the Booles and was received with great joy George Boole found in it the exact expression of the very ideas which underlay his *Laws of Thought* and which he once put into words to his wife, that "no state of mind is more religious than a humble desire to follow the truth in any direction in which it may present itself.

Gratry had been in a situation similar to Boole's but in reverse. Boole found that his work was regarded as purely a tool for mathematics and logic and his religious implica ions ignored; Gratry found his scientific implications ignored and his work regarded only as a book of devotions. Yet the books were two sides of one coin.

In fifty-two years of her widowhood Mary Boole devoted herself, unremittingly, to the embodiment of these contributory factors in an a practical and intelligible form which could be uesd to revolutionize education of children for the modern world. She lived to be eighty-six and died in 1916.

Her work was not to die with her. Great quantities of her writings had been published, in book form, in magazine and newspaper articles, in the press of many lands. A few years before her death a copy of her *Preparation of the Child for Science*, published by Oxford University Press, came by apparent accident—it was intended for some one else—into the hands Ethel Dummer.She was the next and very important link in this chain of events. She, too, was a lens, although she did not refer to herself in this way as Mary Boole did. But in a revealing sentence in a letter to Dr. O. L. Reiser in 1941, she said : "My husband called me a switch-board, and I am still that, just making connecting links."

She was a very remarkable woman,the daughter and the wife of wealthy Chicago bankers, who by self-effort and a great heart, had come abreast of Mary Boole and her group. She was a non-conforming individual,with an excellent education and able to explore all the component parts of the lively new social sciences. Her husband had original ideas about the education of small children, he believed that a child learned with its whole body, and that a child's future could be fixed by the treatment it received before it was eighteen months old. This was the period of the last quarter of the 19th century when, as Mrs. Dummer said, "Surely in my own generation there were many blinded by the

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sunshine of their own lives." But she went out into the shadows to work for retarded children, delinquent children, women in the criminal courts and above all, a new view of education for the future as the prevention of the warping of human nature. She lived as long and worked as devotedly in the service of humanity as Mary Boole, and died in 1954.

Ethel Dummer's plan was to learn the fundamental of a social problem, and then explore all the contemporary sciences for indications of work that could solve the problem. Then she would invite a group of creative workers, from various disciplines, to meet and discuss the problem and pool their ideas on the solution. Her own story has not yet been told, except far too modestly in her little book *Why I Think so : The Autobiography of an Hypothesis.*

In Mary Boole she realized a great forerunner and in time she sponsored the publication of Mary Boole's collected writings,in four volumes, which appeared on the hundredth anniversary of her birth, in 1831.

In her constant search, Ethel Dummer came upon a publication by Dr. O. L. Reiser, *The Biological Basis of Religion.* She wrote the young philosopher and their friendship and correspondence continued as long as she lived. In 1941 she asked him to go to Chicago as her guest, and to meet a few others she felt were thinking in the same general area, One of these was Dr. Milton Singer, who translated Gratry's *Logic.*

A year later, when he published *A New Earth and a New Humanity* Dr. Reiser devoted a chapter on Scientific Mysticism to his evaluation of the Boolean theories.

"There is no question," he wrote.of the importance of Boole's *Laws of Thought* for logic and for mathematics.Boole's work is the foundation of the calculus of classes and thus much of modern symbolic logic rests upon his discoveries...For George Boole logic is concerned with the mental processes involved in reasoning as these may be represented by symbolism. No explicit statement is given of the metaphysics (theory of nature) which lies behind the symbols used in reasoning. A metaphysical basis for George Boole's logic was provided by Mary Boole."

Later he adds:

"The scientific mysticism we are proposing is not structurally accidental. Like Korzyski's time binding formulation and the spiral theory of progress of Mary Boole, it is integral to the view here being propounded. The religion of Scientific Humanism calls for a cultural synthesis on universal scale, and if this is to be attained,scientific Humanism will have to provide a unification of Oriental and Occidental civilization.Only through a synthesis of the **mysticism** of the Orient with the **scientific temper** of the West into a scientific mysticism can a truly global culture be envisaged and ultimately attained."

The meridional arc of time,stretching from a sixteen year old English clerk landing in India in 1806 to Dr. Reiser's last publication,*Man's New Image of man*, appearing in 1961, had made possible the survey of new

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levels of human consciouness. All through the ages of human evolution some here and there had recognized the unexplored world of the human soul, and millennium by millennium, lonely men had reported on the unclaimed world. First man had to realize he had a mind, and that it was controlled by laws of thought. Then he had to realize that how he used his mind—or allowed other people to use his mind—was of supreme importance not only to himself but to all his fellow men.

This group was one of countless groups who toiled at the search for truth all through our history. What they learned in the last two centuries since Boulanger stated that despotism lived on dogmatism, is among our tools today, in facing our problems of human responsibility. Our's is the first era in history when the unity of humanity becomes not a vision or a dream, but the hard fact in politics, and economics as well as philosophy.

If we look around we will find more groups of this nature working in every segment of human life.

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IMMANUEL KANT AND EPISTEMOLOGY OF MODERN SCIENCE

ERNEST W. DEWEY

It has been a general contention of many critics of Kant that his intention was to give philosophical systematization to Newtonian natural science. If this contention is true, it would appear that the doctrines of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" must suffer the same fate as that of superseded Newtonian physics.[1] The development of non-Euclidean geometries has given rise to even more serious criticisms of Kantian thought. H.J.Paton, for example, questions the contribution of Kant on the grounds that "in the Kritikhe he assumes geometry to be Euclidean, and assumes also that Euclidean geometry is necessarily true of the physical world."[2] This view is also expressed in the commentary of Norman Kemp Smith when he says:

> But from the time of Kant's adoption, in 1770, of the critical view of space as being the universal form of our outer sense, he seems to have definitely rejected all such possibilities.* Space, to be space at all, must be Euclidean; the uniformity of space is a presupposition of the *A Priori* certainty of geometrical science.[3]"

These are important and far-reaching assertions. If they are truly valid, it would appear impossible to legitimately argue that Kant's position could be viewed as consistent with modern scientific theory or method to any significant degree.

It is the opinion of the author, however, that the foregoing criticisms go beyond the exeplicit meanings of Kant, and moreover, are not in conformity with the implicit spirit of Kant's critical works. Kant does not exclude the possibility of new geometries; nor does he exclude their applicability to phenomena. The possibility of new developments in mathem-

1 Dampier, Sir William, Cecil 'A History of Science.' (Cambridge : The University Press, 1949) p. 194
Margenau, Henry, 'The Nature of Physical Reality.' (New York : McGraw, Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950) p 144
Danto, Arthur and Morgenbesser Sidney, "Philosophy of Science. (New York : Meridian Books. Inc., 1960) p. 319
Smith, Norman Kemp, "A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' (London : Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1923) p.96ff

2 Paton, H- J., 'Kant's Metaphysics of Experience.' (New York) : The Macmillan Company, 1936) p. 161. See also Smith, Norman K. 'op cit., p. 118. "Euclidean space, Kant implies, is given to us as an unyielding form that rigidly resists all attempts at conceptual reconstruction.'

3 Smith. N.K., 'op. cit.,' p. 117

* Smith is here referring to Kant's earlier views concerning the possibility of non-Euclidean spaces.
See also Danto, Arthur and Morgenbesses, Sidney, 'op. cit.,' p. 319

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atics would certainly not be excluded,since these would be arbitrary constructions of the mind, that is,a priori concepts.The application to space is an empirical question of whether or not the new mathematical concepts describe or conform to phenomena. There is no application to the "actual space of the physical world," or things-in-themselves.[4] Finally, the author intends to argue that both Kant's basic thesis and the spirit of his approach are remarkably consistent with the approach of modern science.

KANT'S ARGUMENT

"Nature," says Kant, "is the EXISTENCE of things, so far as it is determined according to universal laws. Should nature signify the existence of things IN THEMSELVES,we could never cognise nature either A PRIORI or A POSTERIORI."[5]It is impossible that dissection of a priori cepts could reveal the nature of things in themselves. It is not what is contained in our a priori concept of the thing but what is actual in the thing, determined in its existence outside our concept, which we seek. It is equally impossible to cognize the nature of things in themselves a posteriori. "For, if experience is to teach us LAWS, to which the existence of things is subject, these laws, if they regard things in themselves, must belong to them OF NECESSITY even outside our experience. But experience teaches us what exists and how it exists, but never that it must necessarily exist so and not otherwise. Experience therefore can never teach us the nature of things in themselves."[6]

Kant's argument is that space is presupposed in the perception of phenomena and therefore cannot be derived inductively from that perception.[7] Thus it is space that makes phenomena possible, space as a necessary a priori condition for the existence of all appearances to outer sense.[8] Fundamentally this represents a synthesis of the opposing views of Newtonian physics, which maintained that space must be conceived as infinite, self-subsistent, and eternal; and, the views of Wolff and Leibniz who held that space was a confused abstraction of relations in phenomena as experience.[9] The first view leads eventually to self contradiction,the second denies to mathematics validity in the world of spacial bjocts. Kant as mediator, rescues space by making it a condition of our-

4 Kant, Immanuel, 'Critique of Pure Reason '(New York: The Macmillan Company 1949) 2nd Edition, Revised. Trans. by Max Muller. pp. 231-232.

5 Kant, Immanuel, 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic.' (London: Macmillan and Co., 1889) Trans, by Mahaffy, J.P. and Bernard. J.H. p. 49

6 Kant, Immanuel, 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic'' pp. 49-50

7 Kant, Immanuel, 'Critique of Pure Reason,' p. 21

8 This is the central theme of the Aesthetic, along with the exposition of time as the form of inner sense. See also Kant's 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic.' 'They did not recognise that this mental space makes the physical space, that is, the extension of matter, even possible; that this pure space is not at all a quality of things in themselves,but a form of our sensuous faculty of representation...'p.41

9 Kant, Immanuel, 'Critique of Pure Reason.' p. 20 'Space does not represent any quality of objects by themselves, or objects in their relation to one another;.....' Also pp. 224-225. 'That which space and time seem to possess as proper to themselves and independent of things, he (Leibniz) ascribed to the confusion of these

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eknowledge of appearances.[10] Our knowledge of space itself is pure intuition, never sensed or perceived. As Cassirer points out:

> In Kant's thought, "pure intuition" plays the role of a definite fundamental METHOD OF OBJECTIFICATION; it coincides in no way with "subjective," i.e., psychologically experienceable time and space. When Kant speaks of the subjectivity of space and time, we must never understand experiential subjectivity but their "transcendental" subjectivity as conditions of the possibility of "objective," i. e., of objectifying empirical knowledge.[11]

Epistemology thus serves to denote the methodology of the cognitive processes; methodology which serves also as the presupposition which prevails in our theories about the world of experience. The fundamental principle of this presupposition, the principle of causality, Kant has to defend against Humean skepticism. Experience, Hume argued, cannot furnish us with causal connection in nature, but Kant argues that if this were the case, we are left with "nothing but a long habit of finding something true, and hence of holding subjective necessity to be objective."[12]

Experience is, in reality, more than this; it is no aggregate but a system of sense-impressions, a system resting of objectively valid and necessary principles.[13] Kant says:

> I therefore first tried whether Hume's objection could not be put into a general form, and soon found that the concept of the connexion of cause and effect was by no means the only one by which the understanding thinks the connection of things A PRIORI, but rather that metaphysic consists altogether of such connections. I sought to make certain of their number, and when I had succeeded in this to my expectation, by starting from a single principle, I proceeded to the deduction of these concepts, which I was now certain were not deduced from experience, as Hume had apprehended but sprang from the pure understanding [14]

Understanding for Kant is functioning of the categories: the empiri-

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concepts which make us mistake what is a mere form of dynamical relations for a peculiar and independent intuition, antecedent to things themselves.'

10 'Appearances' as used here, in no way refers to what is illusory or dependent for its existence upon perception by some individual, but to that which is the only valid object of knowledge for Kant.

11 Cassirer, Ernst, 'Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity.' (Chicago. The Open Court Publishing Co., 1923) Trans. by William C. Swabey & Marie C. Swabey pp 451-452ff. See also Kant, Immanuel, 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic. p 64

12 Kant, Immanuel, 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic. p. 29

13 'The notion of causal laws must be included in the analysis of physical object propositions, otherwise there is no distinction between science and fairy tales, or between genuine perceptions and dreams. For in any case a physical object statement does not mean merely that I have certain sense-data, it means at least that other normal human observers would perceive the same object; i.e., under similar conditions, have similar sense-data, otherwise I am not talking about physical objects but only about my own private experiences. Ewing, A.C. 'Kantianism 'Twentieth Century Philosophy,' edited by Runes. Dagobert D., (New York; Philosophical Library. INc .1947) p.257

14 Kant, Immanuel, 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic. p. 9

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cal rules of nature are particular instances and applications of these a priori principles of the understanding. Thus the conditions of possible experience and the universal laws of nature are one and the same.[15] Rules of the understanding are not derived from nature, but prescribed by a legislative understanding to nature, Kant aimed to keep human knowledge close to experience and to limit it to the conditions of possible experience.

Although Kant was always a philosopher of the a priori, a priori knowledge disclosed no distinctive and independent realm beyond experience. It is for Kant rather an element in the make-up of empirical knowledge; an element having significance and utility only in the process of experience. The conclusion of the Transcendental Analytic summarizes this position: "With us understanding and sensibility cannot determine objects, unless they are joined together. If we separate them, we have intuitions without concepts, or concepts without intuitions,in both cases representations which we cannot refer to any definite object."[16] In themselves, the concepts of understanding are mere logical functions; only in empirical use do they have purpose.

The a priori space of Kant is affirmed as the condition for physical theory, but Kant sets up no "preestablished harmony" between Euclidean geometry and the structure of "space itself." Indeed as far as empirical thought is concerned, no geometry, Euclidean or non Euclidean, has any meaning in referring to its space as "real" space.[17] Einstein's theory of relativity has stripped from space and time the last remnants of physical objectivity. Here I am in agreement with Cassirer when he says :

> For the new theory, on the contrary, true objectivity never lies in empirical determinations, but only in the manner and way, in function, of determination itself. The space and time measurements in each particular system are relative, but the truth and universality, which can be gained nevertheless by physical knowledge, consist in the fact that all these measurements correspond mutually and are coordinated with each other according to definite rules.[18]

The mechanical view of the world,thus,can no longer be considered a privileged system of coordinates but one system in an unlimited number of justified systems. The applicability of any of our propositions of pure geometry does not rest on any direct coincidence between a priori geometrical postulates of the mind and the empirical manifold. What we have is different kinds of geometry and different kinds of space. The Euclidean "intuition" of Kant implies an equally Euclidean space, as known by that intuition. Kant does not,so far as the author can determine,deny the possibility of different pure intuitions or their differing implied spaces. H. J. Paton sees this position as virtually impossible "unless there can

15 Ibid., p. 78
16 Kant, Immanuel, 'Critique of Pure Reason.' pp. 210-211
17 Cassirer, Ernst, 'op. cit., p. 433
18 Ibid., p. 381

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be one fundamental intuition of space (or of space-time) such that all others are intelligible only in relation to it."[19] It seems Paton is saying that the different kinds of space must be connected with ane another via an intuition of "real" space, in order to maintain Kant's theory in a modern form. He (Paton) cites Mr. Braithwaite in connection with this point, who suggests "that there is one absolute space-time."[20]

The alleged necessity of accepting an absolute space-time to give Kant's theory a modern form, is untenable on two counts. In the first place, it is difficult to see how we can interpret Kant to fit such a form. The "Euclidean intuition" of Kant determines how we shall know space; it does not pretend to describe the "actual space of the physical world."[21] a" non-Euclidean intuition" would also determine how we should know space, but it too would not, indeed could not, claim to describe" actual space". Its description is limited to its own space, as determined by its non-Euclidean system.

Secondly, modern scientific theory makes no such demands of the Kantian doctrine. As Cassirer points out:

> The structures of geometry, whether Euclidean or non-Euclidean possess no immediate correlate in the world of EXISTENCE. They exist as little physically in things as they do psychically in our "presentations" but all their "being," i.e., their validity and truth, consists in their ideal MEANING. The existence, that belongs to them by virtue of their definition, by virtue of a pure logical act of assumption is, in principle, not to be interchanged with any sort of empirical "reality."[22]

Kant And The Epistemology of Modern Science

The epistemological position of Kant is, of course, a synthesis of the old Empiricist and Rationalist schools. The synthesis of these views by Kant does not seem inconsistent with scientific method or modern theory; certainly in spirit his synthesis is very much in harmony with our present day thinking.[23] We have come to see that both the Empiricist and Rationalist movements have a contribution to make in a functional epistemology for science. The contribution of the Empiricists was to point out that only within experience or possible experience do we have material about which we may legitimately make statements that may be said to be true or false; this is the area of the provable. The error of Empirical thinking rested in its over-zealous enthusiasm inspired by the Cartes-

19 Paton, H.J., 'op. cit.,' p. 161

20 Ibid., p. 162 ff.

21 Ibid., p. 162 ff. Paton says, 'This need not mean that the same geometry must apply to every bit of space, but only that some kind of geometry must do so.' This is a necessity never placed on geometry by Kant.

22 Csssirer, Ernst, 'op. cit.,' p. 433.

23 There are numerous points in the development of Kant's theory that have been legitimately criticized; i. e., his concept of number which he derives from the pure intuition of time, his concept of space as a category does not deny that it might also be a mode of reality; his analogies of Experience are based npon superceded Newtonian laws.

It is the position of the author, however, that these are not criticisms which destroy the spirit and intent of the 'Critique':

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ian method. Its belief in the veracity of sense created an atmosphere for the scientific laboratory, but its belief was a dogmatic deification of "fact." It repudiated the basic problems of epistemology and attributed necessity and universality to judgements derived from the concrete particulars of experience. The damning verdict of Hume was ignored; the result was a naive faith in sense-evidence.

The contribution of Rationalism is the antithesis to the onesideness of naive Empiricism.The Empiricists,who prided themselves on their concrete factual knowledge, who rejected every proof except that grounded in empirical evidence, continued to use undisturbedly the demonstrations, calculations, and formal deductive methods of "mere reasoners."the mathematicians. In the passion of empirical fact-finding, the demand for definition and consistency of terms,precise conception, universal constructs, and variables, was assumed as merely fulfilling the needs of scientific thought.[24] That these symbols of abstractions were nowhere founded on tangible evidence escaped attention in the fervor of the laboratory.[25]This, however,was the coutribution of Rationalism to a scientifically functional epistemology, the contribution of significance and meaning to tangible data. Concepts, such as those of mass, force, energy, the atom, and magnetic or electrical potential are no simple thing-concepts. They are not copies of particular contents given in perception,obviously not reproductions of simple things or sensations dispite the attempts at reduction by extreme operationalists, but, as Cassirer points out, "theoretical assumptions and constructions, which are intended to transform the merely sensible into something measurable..."[26] The basis of measurement thus rests on theoretical presuppositions,a priori postulates of the mind. This is the contribution of Rationalism, i.e,, to furnish the principles hypotheses, and axioms which can organize and give meaning to the data of experience.

The flaw of the rationalistic position was the parochial attitude which denied the function of sense-data as content for the forms of the mind. The contention was that reality could be fathomed by a priori ideas alone. The necessity and universality valid within the a priori system itself, was thrust upon the world of sensible objects.

The functional epistemology of modern science which represents a synthesis of these schools, sees propositions as partly a priori and partly empirical;the mind exercising the organizing function for sense perceptions. As Montague in his classic, *The ways of knowing*, suggests:

> The empiricists acquire the food of science, and the rationalists digest and assimilate it. Without food in the form of new facts and

24 Whitehead, A.N., 'Science and the Modern World.' (New York; Mentor Books, Inc., 1949) p. 17. This was a necessaay stage, says Whitehead, for ...it is difficult for men to do more than one thing at a time.....'

25 Langer. Susanne K., 'Philosophy in a New Key.' (New York · Penguin Books,Inc, 1948) p. 14. 'The few conscientious empiricists who thought that FACTUAL bases must be established for mathematics made a notoriously poor job of it.'

26 Cassirer, Ernst, 'op. cit.,' p. 357

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laws, science would die of hunger,but without the ability to assimilate its laws into its system, science would die of indigestion. If science is to avoid both starvation and dyspepsia she must see to it that she possesses both empiricists and rationalists, both observers and mathematicians. [27]

Essentially,Kant's doctrine is consistent with this modern synthesis of Empiricism and Rationalism,both implicitly and explicitly. For an adquate scientific heory there must be an intelligible relation between pure mathematics and its application to the world as we know it. The basis of such a relation exists in Kant's critical analysis of experience.Kant sought to free the concept of truth from unprovable metaphysical assumptions. The critical concept of the object is given a new positive interpretation in a functional epistemology. However great is the need for modification. Kant's doctrine still demands thoughtful attention.

27 Montague, Wm. Pepperell, 'The Ways of Knowing.' (New York : The Macmillan Company, 1925) p. 130.

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PHILOSOPHY IN THE LIBERAL ARTS CURRICULUM

ARTHUR J. DIBDEN

WHAT is the role of philosophy in the curriculum of a college in the liberal arts tradition? One might preface possible answers by historical accounts of philosophy in centers ranging from Plato's Academy or Aristotle's Lyceum to famous universities in Great Britain, France, Germany, the United States. The present reflections shall emerge, however, from personal perspectives on current situation.

1. In past days, when describable as a philosophy teacher and departmental chairman, I had readier answers. The coffee or committe sessions which stimulated rationalizations for one's own program, the glimpses received at professional meetings about the role of philosophy either as discipline or department, and the reports one might write to the president would probably have pushed me toward claims of philosophy's centrality in a college presumably devoted to intellectual maturation in the pursuit of both knowledege and values. Philosophy's description as rational analysis and constructive reflection could become its prescription for basic criticism and integration in a college program.

In those days also might have been added a mild complaint about what seems philosophy's comparative neglect in administrative support, faculty esteem, and student population explosions. Given that situation I might have included a postscript on the wider import of philosophy's role, as professors can when when given a chance to expound departmental virtues to a dean. There could have been various brave notes on (a) working bonds of a philosophy department with the Humanities, Natural Sciences, and Social Sciences as indicated in such possible courses as a philosophy of Literature, Art, Science, Education, Law, Politics, Democracy, Religion, History, Nature, or man; (b) the contribution to cultural and intellectual history provided by the history of philosophy; (c) the rigor in symbolic systems and perhaps in thinking provided by logic; (d) the way philosophy teachers could clarify so many of the assumptions and concepts loosely used by their college colleagues; (e) the prospects of rational organization of answers to the "big questions" which thinking men seemingly always asked. All of this of course would satisfy one's departmental ego. and no doubt promote ready understanding and reaction among faculty colleagues.

More or less the basis of a brief address at a forum on "The Undergraduate Program in Philosophy" at the Illinois Philosophy Conference, October 20, 1962, Northern Illinois University, De Kalb, Illinois.

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2. Now that I am graying under the labels of academic dean and philosophy teacher, my possible answers lack the support of environmental in-fighting,and empire-building,or the push of single role identification. And when I occasionally attempt to discover for my own satisfaction what might be the principle and scope of departments of English or History, of Psychology or Biology, the problem of the curricular purpose of a philosophy program is almost lost in a flow of jostling aims, entrenched habits, specialized perspectives, and the machinery of schedules and requirements, about all of which my university colleagues could no doubt relate better blood-and-guts stories.

Moreover if a dean as philosopher seeks a conceptual context for curricular deliberations, the meanings of "liberal arts college" and of all the academic disciplines would need to be warmed over and selectively served, so that a philosopher, though no longer king in vision or fact, could at least have a sense of conceptual location in the mesh of academic perspectives and demands. Then he could attempt to locate philosophy's academic role with relevance to his college as well as to a departmental curriculum.

3. But the fusion of the perspectives of a dean and of a philosophy teacher is not always easy.When it once seemed proper to find out what I was teaching. I would collect short descriptions of philosophy. Available were Randall and Buchler's " reflective evaluation, " "Whitehead's "voyage toward the larger generalities," Dewey's "crticism of criticism," Montague's "vision," James' "obstinate attempt to think clearly," Thompson's "the meaning existence has for thought," or Plato's remark that a philosopher is one who desires to discern the truth. Other clues came from substitute terms for philosophy: philosophizing, rational scrutiny, conceptual analysis,dialectic,criticism of crticisms,rational speculation.Perhaps broad traits could be summarized by saying that philosophy means, as distinctive attitude or commitment, a love of wisdom; as typical procedure, an analytic, dialectical inquiry into conceptualized problems; as scrutiny of typical problems, a rational focus on the meaning and criteria of knowledege, value, reality, art, science, religion, history, and other general features of man and his world; as history, the views and works of persons called philosophers.

But how would these phrases solve the problem of the role of philosophy in a curriculum ? While they might provide classroom nuggets or dialectical stimulus, they also indicate the difficulty of uncovering a simple principle which could be turned into a curricular lodestar. Courses in a philosophy department could promote a rational mode of discourse, an examination of concepts in art and science, a study of the history of ideas. But few heirs of empiricism and pragmatism and existentialism would be so rash as to proclaim that only philosophy courses could stimulate thinking, clarify concepts, and interpret values, let alone

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experimentally verify data on which various theorists could reflect. Nor would philosophy teachers have any patented prerogative for analysis and generalization—though of course they may exhibit better rigor and authority. A person working on what is sometimes interestingly called the "philosophy of philosophy" may at least emerge with some neat definitions of philosophy, and be able to join plain John Locke in clearing up more rubbish. But he has not thereby settled all details of the problem of the function of philosophy in a liberal arts curriculum.

In the spirit of Kant's "how is metaphysics possible ?" one might ask how he possibly could solve it ? Perhaps there might be a series of statements about the meaning of philosophy, curriculum, liberal arts, college, higher education, and similar contextual categories in higher education.One might examine what could be called institutional strategy for obtaining the advisable courses and staff. There could be study of the possible development of philosophy courses in high schools, the present situation in graduate schools, and the intervening role to be filled by college philosophy departments. One might even attempt a normative design, such as a college curriculum which a philosopher-millionaire might establish in some as yet unfounded college, and which would deliberately make philosophy central in the whole curriculum. But these possibilities seem more projected task than rational answer. I doubt if a purely rational answer could be given to the initial question.

4. Let us assume for the sake of some explicit directions that a philosophy department should fulfill the role of analysis of basic assumptions and principles not only within the traditional areas of methodology, axiology, and metaphysics but also in related areas within Humanities, Social Sciences, and Physical Sciences, and that it can further serve an important role in study of ideas, in system construction, and in logical analysis. The department would then provide courses in history of philosophy, logic, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, and as many "philosophies of" (at least of Science, Education, Religion) as resources and budgets permit. I would also advocate both independent study and philosophic seminars. Such are the practical and curricular answers I might have attempted as a philosophy teacher within a philosophy department.

As a dean I would be just as interested in the role which philosophic perspectives and methodology might provide in examination of the whole curriculum in theory and practice. Rather complex issues of the nature of cumulative knowledge and its division of labor and possible hierarchy would be involved, as would issues of "non-cumulative knowledge" and values. The declared and the operational goals of the local college would also need consideration. So would decisions about skills significant for a liberal arts college in areas ranging from music and sculpture to physical education and computer mathematics. Are the current divisions and departments through which we work and hold our

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own truly representative of the state of knowledge and of the requisite dialectic about the values appropriate to the modern world ? If we were to begin anew, open both to philosophic history and a contemporary world outreach, what would be the pervasive principles of the organization and allotment of curricular design ? Is philosohhy one such principle ? How would it be distinguished from a possible competing principle of art or science or history ? It seems obvious for instance that an historical perspective could be an organizing principle for almost any area taught in the college from economics to art to physical sciences and mathematics, as well as in the fine arts. Or there is the sentiment expressed by almost every college that certain character traits or citizenship norms are desirable attainments for all students.Another pervasive theme both in the stated curriculum and daily conversation emphasizes the importance of lauguage or other expressive modes for communication and creativity.

In the midst of these organizing principles of history or skills or knowledge or the arts or moral values, could philosophy claim a role as special custodian of another such principle: theory ? I think it could. Such a role for philosophy's expertise in conceptual analysis and theoretical construction, in generalized and abstracted thought,might be sought through traditional compartmentalizations and through departmental power thrusts; or it might explore a freer, wider, inner penetration of knowledge and value, wherever available. In the first instance, philosophy's advocates could assert its role through definitions of philosophy and related concepts, and then seek enhancement of this role on the practical level of striving for attractive teachers, budgets,and curricular requirements which bring in satisfying numbers of students. But some philosophers might see themselves marching to a different drummer. They may so examine the curriculum of a given college or university that significant rational direction and allocation could justifiably be acclaimed of the whole academic program and its parts.They could readily join in inter-departmental seminars or general education experiments.They would pursue the way of wisdom wherever they are.

By thus serving others would philosophy also best serve itself ? To be sure, its departmental identity might almost disappear in the process; and professional theorists might become scattered throughout the remaining domains of the academic program. But if wisdom flourished, should a lover of wisdom despair ? Perhaps under some new label of general critic of education or science or the arts the relocated philosopher could attain enough status to keep his children in sneakers almost as expensive as those in the mathematician's family. And surely he could serve education as advocate of a generalized intelligence in many domains of knowledge and concern.

Both a philosophy teacher and a dean might wonder, however, where the future philosophers would come from or whether new additions,

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fresh from graduate school, could stand the shock of a liberal arts college so dedicated to philosophy that it no longer has a philosophy department. Nor do I know whether the peripatetic thinker would find rational communion among those who are strong in the faith of their specialities and rather suspicious of professors shaped by a different culture.

One conclusion seems permissible. The role of philosophy in a liberal arts curriculum is to keep its head—and produce philosophers, under whatever sky.

THOUGHT-POWER

The essence of the individual is its imagination (*sankalpa*). Whatever it imagines within itself that is soon realized in the objective world. Every individual realizes all its desires through its own power. In every individual exists this kind of power which ultimately is a power of consciousness. Whatever and whenever a man imagines intensely, he experiences in actual life. As water assumes the form of an eddy so whatever a pure mind desires to experience that becomes a reality. Success is achieved only through one's own efforts repeatedly performed. Sufferings multiply by leaps and bounds, on account of the folly of mind and they vanish like ice before the sun by its own efforts. The mind creates the body for the realization of its own desires, as a silk-worm constructs a cocoon around itself. If there is peace within, the whole world looks cool and pleasing, but when the fire of desires burns within, the world appears ablaze to us. When one's mind is perfected, the whole world appears to him to be full of nectar, just as to a man putting on a pair of shoes the whole earth appears to be covered with leather. The mind is the nave of this wonderful wheel of the world which deludes us by its movements. When, with intelligence and effort, it (the mind) is stopped from moving (i.e., from desiring, willing, thinking, imagining etc), the wheel of the world is stopped.

From Yogavāsiṣṭha—

(**B. L. Atreya** : *The Essence of the Yogavāsiṣṭha* pp. 38 39)

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THE CRITERION OF ADEQUACY IN WHITEHEAD'S SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

D. F. GUSTAFSON

IN elaborating his speculative philosophy in *Process and Reality*[1] Whitehead went to considerable lengths to specify the criteria or standards which he believed his system ought to meet. The philosophical construction of a scheme of ideas, he believed, must be coherent, logically consistent, applicable, and adequate. In this paper I wish to examine the last two of these criteria in detail. In particular, my thesis is that Whitehead and many of his interpreters and critics are mistaken in their belief that there can be a test of adequacy for a speculative or metaphysical system such as the organic philosophy.

There are two general types of argument by means of which this thesis can be supported. The first is to argue that the test of adequacy cannot be sufficiently clarified, as a test, so that one is always in doubt as to whether or not it has been met. The second consists in arguing that the concept of a test of adequacy for a metaphysical system is itself incoherent on the grounds that the nature of the system to be tested precludes such a test or the conditions for such a test. Namely, it precludes the non-trivial sense of adequacy required for a test of adequacy. Both of these arguments seem cogent to me, but since the second type makes the stronger claim, in that it denies that there is a procedure answering to the 'the test of adequacy,' I shall begin with it.

I. Whitehead claims that a successful speculative philosophy must be applicable and adequate. Both applicability and adequacy are explained by means of the concept of interpretation. By the latter Whitehead means "that everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall have the character of a particular instance of the genral scheme." (4) And, he continues, 'applicable' means that some items of experience are thus interpretable, and 'adequate' means that there are no items incapable of such interpretation. "(4) The interpretation of Whitehead's categoral scheme requires, therefore, that items of exeperience (such as the evjoyment or perception of a work of art, the willful performance of an act, or the object of thought) should be describable by means of the notions of the categoreal scheme. Whitehead concludes:

> The adequacy of the scheme over every item does not mean adequacy over such items as happen to have been considered. It means that the texture of observed experience, as illustrating the philosophical scheme, is such that all related experience must exhibit

1. All page references are to the American edition of 'Process and Reality,' Macmillan, 1929.

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the same texture. (5, Antique mine.)

Whitehead's statement of the criterion of adequacy suggests, then, that one should attempt to apply the categoreal scheme to "items" which are not considered in the construction of the scheme itself. We may formulate the test of adequacy as: Every item of experience, every fact, must illustrate the generic features (or at least some of the generic features) expressed by the categoreal scheme. I shall argue that this test, on Whitehead's own grounds, cannot be given a definite, non-trivial sense, and consequently there can be no criterion of adequacy. The argument will require a brief examination of several of Whitehead's technical notions.

The categoreal scheme, Whitehead holds, specifies a set of general nations which are necessarily presupposed in experience. (27) One such notion is the Ontological Principle stipulates that in order to explain anything whatever,from the most important of human experiences to happenings in far off galaxies, one must appeal either to the character of some event or actual entity influencing or ingredient in the happening in question or to the actual occasion which is that happening.[2] A reasoned account of any happening must show how that happening is a consequence or instance of some actual entity or set of entities. An actual entity or occasion is, in Whitehead's system, an occasion of experience. In this respect Whitehead, in agreement with Hume, believes that "nothing is to be received into the philosophical scheme which is not discoverable as an element in subjective experience," (253) that is, discoverable as an element in the becoming of an actual occasion.Whitehead's principles require, therefore, "that apart from the experiencesof subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness. "(254) or, as Whitehead writes in another context, "The metaphysical first principles can never fail of exemplification. We can never catch the actual world taking a holiday from their sway." (7)[3]

It follows from these principles and the generality of scope which is their nature, that one should not be able to specify or identify any item of experience or fact which is not already understood as illustrating the philosophic scheme. For what is not so understood is nothing. Every item of experience just is an instance of the scheme or it is nothing. No item of experience is describable in system-free concepts.

A necessary condition for the test of adequacy, however, is that some items of experience must be identifiable or describable independently of the generic categories of the organic philosophy. In order to raise the question of adequacy it must be possible to identify the item of experience which is to serve as the test case. But according to Whitehead, in

2. See pp. 36-37, 382.

3. See also p. 17 where Whitehead writes, ...every proposition proposing a ct, must in its complete analysis,propose the general character of the universe required for that fact. There are no self-sustained facts floating in nonentity,'

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order of anything to qualify as an item of experience it must already exhibit the "texture" of experience "as illustrating the philosophic scheme." (5) Thus either no item of experience can be specified which could possibly count as the test case or the scheme cannot fail to be adequate, in that what it does not illustrate cannot qualify as a possible contrary instance to the scheme. If the former, the system itself precludes a necessary condition for the test of adequacy and if it is in the latter sense adequate **no matter what**, its adequacy has been trivialized.

The same results follow more directly from a similar consideration. The categoreal scheme is designed to provide those generic notions descriptive of every concrete fact. According to the organic philosophy concrete facts are actual occasions. That is 'actual occasion' always designates some concrete fact and vice versa.[4] Accordingly, the question of the descriptive adequacy of the scheme in regard to some concrete fact or type of concrete fact cannot legitimately be raised, since apart from the descriptions provided by the principles and categories of the scheme there is no way of indicating what the scheme is supposed to describe. If the test is expressed in terms of descriptive adequacy over concrete facts, then the scheme cannot fail to be adequate, for what it fails to describe is not a concrete fact or actual entity, and hence not a contrary instance to the scheme. Again, however, the adequacy of the system has been trivialized.

The conclusions to be drawn from these arguments is that there can be no test of adequacy in a non-trivial sense of adequacy. The system is either coherent or it is not. There can be no question of its truth or adequacy, since the conditions for such a test are precluded by the system itself.

II. Suppose, contrary to fact, that there could be such a test. Could one ever be assured that the criterion of adequacy had been met?

Let us assume that the supposed test of adequacy is of the form: Every meaningful synthetic statement in English is translatable into a corresponding statement in the language of the system. (The restriction to synthetic statements is merely a convenience.) Call this formulation AT1. If 'translatable' has a definite sense in AT1, it must not be markedly different from the sense this term has in other familiar contexts. Translation of common English sentences into logical notation is at least in most cases, a clear and precise procedure. Part of what is meant by 'translation' in this context is that the sense or the referential meaning of just **this** sentence is rendered into canonical form to the exclusion of other senses or meanings of other sentences. The same sort of exclusiveness is involved in the translation of a sentence from one natural language to another. Accordingly, if AT1 is the proper form of the test of adequacy for the organic philosophy, then the translated

4 As Whitehead says, "The final problem is to conceive a complete (πρωτος) fact. We can only form such a conception in terms of fundamental notions concerning the nature of reality." Adventures of Ideas, Macmillan, 1933, P. 203,

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sentence in the test must be equivalent to and "say" no more and no less than the test sentence. An improper translation is precisely one which does not have these features. If these are not necessary features of AT1, it is indeed difficult to see what AT1 could require.

Can such a translation be relatively unambiguously carried out in the case of Whitehead's speculative system ? Normally translations are made with the aid of dictionaries and explicit rules. An immediate difficulty in the present case is that neither of these aids is provided by Whitehead's system. For example, when and under what conditions are 'actual occasion,' 'nexus,' 'proposition,' and 'society' proper translations for the ordinary expressions which refer to persons, place, and things ? At least a highly probable answer is that there are no procedures which one can follow, and hence that AT1 cannot be applied.

This difficulty might be countered with the assertion that a close study of Whitehead's texts, supplemented perhaps by one's own inventiveness, would yield a list of correlation statements such that the names or referring expressions for ordinary objects could be rendered in Whiteheadian language. Some such model as the following might be suggested: objects-x are to be referred to as "nexus, S, of actual occasions with dominate eternal object, r." The exact form of the model is irrelevant so long as it qualifies in a rough way as a correlation statement.

As least three related problems arise with respect to this reply. First, 'S' and 'r' must also be correlated with ordinary expressions by means of other correlation statements. Secondly, even if we grant that such correlation can be made, it is not clear that we would be able to do more than render universal or general propositions. Thus, 'Stones are heavy' might be somehow formulated as 'if any nexus (or is it society ?) of actual occasions has a dominating eternal object definitive of stones, then it will also be characterized by the ingression of the eternal object, heaviness, into the occasions which constitute it,' Further difficulties, however, would arise with general sentences containing relational expressions, such as, 'Stones are heavier than feathers.' Thirdly, even if we could formulate an indefinitely long list of correlation sentences for names or nouns and adjectives, we would only have succeeded in providing an extensional equivalence, not the sort of intensional equivalence or synonomy required for translation of natural languages. But these are problems on which I cannot elaborate here. They do pose obvious and, I think, insurmountable difficulties for AT1.

AT1, however, may not be the proper form of the supposed test of adequacy. A second possible form is: Every matter of fact, event, or state of affairs must be describable by means of the systematic terms of the organic philosophy (AT2). This formulation of the criterion of adequacy immediately opens the door for the argument of Section I above, namely, that on Whitehead's own authority, nothing is to count as a matter of fact, event, etc., for which a place has not already been made in

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the systematic notions of the organic philosophy. As was argued in Section I, this removes a necessary condition for the application of the test of adequacy and hence for the application of AT2. There can be no test cases for AT2; hence AT2 cannot be applied, much less applied unambiguously.

III. If these arguments are correct, the implications for the critical evaluation of Whitehead's philosophy are important. Whitehead's interpreters have been primarily interested in the meaning and coherence of his view; in many cases they have explicitly postponed the question of its truth or adequacy.[5] If my arguments are sound, the question of adequacy must be abandoned altogether.

Among Whitehead's interpreters William Christian is one of the few to give careful attention to the question of adequacy. Christian's view rests on his distinctions between three sorts of discourse he finds in Whitehead's later work.[6] These are the presystematic, the systematic, and the postsystematic. At the presystematic level, Christian holds, Whitehead is describing the basic data which he believed it is philosophy's business to explain. At the systematic level Whitehead is developing his own scheme of explanatory categories, and at the postsystematic level he is explaining the basic data in terms of these categories. Thus Christian writes, "...the final test of a speculative system like Whitehead's beyond the internal tests of self-consistency and coherence, is adequacy to all our experience. How might this sort of test be made?"[7] In answer to the latter question, Christian suggests (1) that some fact or set of facts must be described independently of the system, and (2) that a postsystematic description of the fact described according to (1) must "adequately express the fact we mean to state."[8] (An example of (1) is "Stones do not act;" and an example of (2) might be 'Stones do not have subjective aims, for stones are enduring objects and only actual entities have subjective aims.") However, if the arguments in Section I above are sound, the distinctions upon which (1) and (2) rest will not hold. Specifically, all non-systematic statements are suspect. As Whitehead himself writes, "there are no brute, self-contained matters of fact, capable of being understood apart from interpretation as an element in a system."(21) If there are no legitimate non-systematic statements, then Christian's formulation of the test of the adequacy cannot be carried out.[9]

5 See A.H. Johnson, 'Whitehead's Theory of Reality,' Beacon Press, 1952, pp. x, 6, 197-199 Ivor Lecler, ,Whitehead's Metaphysics,' Macmillan. 1958, pp. x, 39,50; William A. Christian, 'An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics, Yale, 1959, pp. 4-5, 412-413.

6 See Christian's 'Some Uses of Reason, in 'The Relevance of Whitehead,' ed. I. Lecture, Macmillan 1961, pp. 47-89, and his 'Interpretation,' p. 3.

7 'Some Uses of Reason,' p. 78.

8 Ibid, p. 78

9 Christian uses the same or a similar set of distinctions in a recent reply to some of my criticisms of his interpretation of Whitehead's notion of causal objectification. See my "Christian on Causal Objectification in Whitehead," 'International Philosophical Quarterly, December, 1961. and Christian's reply in the same journal, May, 1962.

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It should also be noted that Christian's statement of the test of adequacy is of little help. In answer to the question: How might the test of adequacy be made? his main reply is that it is made by determining whether or not statements like (2) **adequately expresses** those like (1). But it is just the notion of adequate expression that is unclear in the translations required by the test of adequacy. Christian's attempt to state and clarify the test of adequacy has not been successful.

IV. In conclusion I have tried to establish, first, that in the case of Whitehead's speculative system, there cannot be a test of adequacy. Secondly, even if we suppose that such a criterion is possible, there remain insurmountable difficulties in its application. Indeed, the best attempt to date to formulate such a test and show how it is applicable has failed. In view of these conclusions it is perhaps appropriate to suggest that we are left with the possibility of an aesthetic judgment of the system, and more importantly, the test of its consistency and coherence. There can be no question as to its truth or falsity.

Life's Highway

All That is exists in one great interpenetrating Sea of Life.

As we give room, as we wish others well, we free their life currents as well as our own.

Good Will frees us to move in harmony. This is the Basic Law behind "Do unto others as you would be done by," "Give, and it shall be given, (or done) unto you."

We have falsely thought of "goods and chattels" as gifts. The true giving is of Good Will, and all else is contained within it.

It is scientifically true—that going in Good Will—all moves in harmony, and harmonizing avenues are made for you as well. You can go out on these with safety.

These Free Roads of the Universe were created by *your will for the good of all others.*

Thus is the Law of Balance—fulfilled.

Vida Reed Stone

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THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SOCIAL WORKER IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

ARTHUR LAPAN

THE nuclear age is an age of terror. Its terror is due, in the first place, to the factors which actually increase the chances of nuclear war, in the second place to a sense of impotence in coping with these factors, and also to the potential magnitude of nuclear destruction.

As for the factors which actually increase the chances of nuclear war, these include such things as the conflict between the Communist and the free world, the proliferation of nuclear arms and the possibility of accident.

The second source of terror, the sense of impotence, stems from the fact that the ordinary citizen has no decision when the issues of nuclear war or peace arises. In power elites, as in the ordinary citizen, a sense of impotence is also created by the mere fact of contemporary social change which they frequently cannot foresee or control, and which may effect what they deem to be the "balance of power" (changes like revolutions and scientific and technological breakthroughs).

Certain theoretical considerations also contribute to a sense of impotence. Some people attribute war to political anarchy, which they identify with the institution of independent sovereignty, and conclude that unless there is world-government, the chances of war breaking out are very great. [1]But they are not sanguine about establishing such a world-government. Others, starting with the same premise, argue, that even if a war broke out and we survived, the age of terror would not abate; many sovereignties would still obtain and war would ensure sooner or later. Some few, still arguing in the same way, say that even a world-government would not guarantee perpetual peace since change is ubiquitous and from time to time generates civil wars (dual sovereignties)—although what a revolution would be like against a world government possessed of nuclear weapons I do not know.

People, and to an even greater degree governments, are in a constant and major self-contradiction with regard to defense and this, too, creates in them a sense of impotence and anxiety. For on the one hand they feel that without more and more nuclear arms they will have to surrender their sovereignty (so that this overriding self contradiction is also implicit in plural sovereignty); but at the same time such means of defense may be no defense at all since they may spoil annihilation and sharpen rather than allay terror.

1 For a good discussion of the relationship between political anarchy and war, see 'The Federalist Papers,' Hamilton, Madison & Jay. The context is different but the principle is clearly defined.

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Then there are those who contend that our economy makes for war,[2] It cannot function, they say, without enormous Federal outlays and these outlays can be obtained from Congress and accepted by the public only in the name of defense; but the emphasis on defense, they feel, creates a dynamic towards military involvements which will eventually issue in nuclear war; and this, too, they feel they cannot control.

The magnitude and character of nuclear destruction are, of course, the primary sources of terror. Some fear mankind may be wholly destroyed, others only in part,[3] but all agree about the horror; and the uncertainty about the extent of destruction only intensifies anxiety.

The whole recent history of the Western world also reinforces the terror of the nuclear age, a terror, to be sure, which is qualitatively different,indeed in some ways even incommensurate with the traumas which preceded it. The first and second wars, the great depression, the concentration camps, the loss of a sense of direction (a phenomenon embracing religion, morality and philosophy as well as social, economic and political changes),the surrender of freedom, these have merged into and intensified the terror of the nuclear period.

2. Many people try to avert their minds from this terror but that does not abate it, so that the social worker's first responsibility is to bring people to face it and its sources lucidly, to formulate clearly the questions implicit in it, explore meticulously relevant facts, evaluate responses to it and come to decisions.

Now this does not necessarily mean that the social worker's responsibility is to engage in social action in the traditional sense (by probing the causes of an ill and eliminating them) since he and the people he is working with may come to the conclusion that catastrophic nuclear wars cannot be averted. Nonetheless, the responsibility of the social worker is still to bring people face-to-face with the problems of the nuclear age so that they think them through.

Why ? Why, it may be asked, should people grapple with the fact of catastrophic nuclear wars if they were to conclude that nothing can be done about them ? The answer, I think, is that even if they were so to conclude they would still have to ask: how are they to live now in the light of such a conclusion ? Life would compel them to make some sort of response to such a conclusion.

For example, people who concluded that catastrophic nuclear wars will occur might seek to distract their minds by burying it in immediate tasks or in 'kicks'; but they would to that extent cease to be conscious

2 Fred J. Cook 'The Warfare State.' Also, there's an interesting article on 'Disarmament and the Economy' by Ben B. Seligman in the May, 1963 issue of Commentary. Seligman concludes,however,that with adequate economic planning and will, we can disarm without an economic debacle.

3 Herman kahn in 'On Thermonuclear War', Princeton. Uuiversity Press, 1960, discusses different possible magnitudes of destruction. Irving Louis Horowitz in 'The War Game', Ballantine Books, Inc., 1963, does the same from an opposed point of view.

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and this would make them suffer—in the same way that a person who cannot exercise his sight suffers. So that on the one hand they would have to accept their catastrophic conclusion resolutely and on the other ask whether a constructive response to it is still possible(these two things are interrelated for if they cannot respond constructively, they cannot for long maintain consciousness). In the process they would have to entertain and evaluate various alternative responses to the expectation of catastrophic nuclear war, and this process itself is in exercise of responsibility.

What emerges from the foregoing is that there are certain obvious questions of fact (as over against value) regarding the nuclear age about which we must first make up our minds.For example,what are the actual chances of averting nuclear wars ? What are the proposed policies for averting them (such as federalism. neutralism, etc.) and how effective can they be ? What is the relationship between war and revolution and, at the present time, between nuclear war aud revolution ? What are the positions of the Russian and Chinese Communist parties on this question, and of various factions in the West, and what do they portend ? How destructive would nuclear wars be ? Would existing governments survive them, industrial civilization, humanity ? Are there preparations which can be made which would significantly diminish the destructiveness of nuclear wars ? How would fallout shelters affect them, the disperison of industry, the decentralization of government ? What is the relationship between nuclear testing and nuclear war and what are the biological, physical etc.effects of nuclear testing ? What are the plans for abolishing nuclear tests and how effective can they be and why ?

It is clear that the function of the social worker is to help people ask and rationally come to conclusions about questions such as these,and that his primary committment in this process is to 'reality', by which I mean to a seeing of things as they are as over against as we wish them to be or feel they should be. Since this requires knowledge and sober judgment, and hence adequate preparation and dialogue, I think that the organization of study groups by the social worker would best perform this function. If the group is made up of professional people it can lead itself by a different one of its members chairing each meeting; or it might prefer to have someone who has given special attention to these questions with some particular qualification lead the group. A bibliography of books, pamphlets and articles to be studied and discussed should be drawn up by the group; or, again, if it prefers, by someone specially qualified, and the social worker should have proper resources available for the formation of such a bibliography (indeed, a committee of social workers, physicists, etc. might formulate such a bibliography for the use of study groups—and occasionally, of course, the social worker might invite speakers, organize panel discussions, buzz sessions, book reviews and conferences.

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3. The nuclear age was not only born and nurtured in terror, it has also introduced a strong element of doubt into the minds of men as to whether they and their communities have any future at all. But if the destruction of mankind is a real possibility, then doing things for the sake of their consequences becomes less meaningful. The major reason, and this may in any case be the best reason, we may have to do things if because of the value their doing has in the present, that is, for their own sakes.

The present is process, and process, it seems to me, has value only when it is creation.[4] The social worker should therefore intensify his emphasis on creation. As for creation, what is important about that are not the products which have been created or which are being created, since they may disappear together with the human beings for whom they are intended. The process of creation itself is what is important. To be sure, a work which has already been created has the power to awaken another human being, but this awakening is here and now, and is what has value.

Why does process have value only when it is creation ? Is it because creation is an expression of spontaneous impulses ? I would say no, it is spontaneity, but something more is required, namely perception. Man is a perceptive animal and creation is both an expression of man's identity and a fulfillment of it. Where there is process without perception on the other hand, man becomes alienated from himself. This is a positive thing, as lack of growth is a positive thing, involving loneliness and anguish. (Where growth is thwarted, for example, you have no mere privation; the frustration is painful and has pathological consequences.) In creation man affirms himself even in the face of the possibility of his extinction by himself, in the face, that is, of his utter alienation from himself. It is for this reason that creation is so fulfilling because in creation man exercises and maintains his being, that is, his perceptiveness and consciousness.

Creation may be divided into two kinds,creation per se and existential creation. Creation per se refers to the perception of the unity of any entities formerly regarded as strangers to one another, for example. the perception of relationships in pure mathematics hitherto unseen. Existential creation on the other hand, is born of encounter with a particular, unique, present situation in which we ourselves are involved, and which transforms our perception of it, of the world and of ourselves,and sometimes the situation itself. Good examples of existential creation is provided by individuals and peoples who have suffered from some form of injustice and who have probed the sources of their impotence and acted to dispel it and who, in the process, have created or recreated themselves. Such processes are usually marked by their development of profound

4 The nuclear age, and the response to it in terms of different forms of creativity, is discussed by me in two articles entitled "On the present Crisis" in Darshana. January 1962. pp. 68-71. and April 1962. pp, 99-101.

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perceptions by them into themselves and their world.

Social workers have always emphasized creation, not only in special interest groups like dramatic, arts and crafts and painting workshops, but in the very routine of all group activities. They have encouraged the spirit of play, self-expression and spontaneity on the part of members of groups(with a due regard to limits)and free-flowing dialogue. Indeed,the major concern of social workers has been process, and especially process which culminates in insight.Their emphasis upon helping individuals and groups themselves understand and solve their own problems has been nothing else than an emphasis on the development of the creative powers of their clients.

It is therefore only a reaffirmation a traditional function of the social worker to say that it is a responsibility of his to facilitate the creation of a living and constructive response to the nuclear age.His responsibility is to do what he has always been doing but in a new way and in answer to a new and unprecedented challenge. But how is the social worker to do this ? How, precisely, is he to perform his function as midwife so that existential creation in the nuclear age can take place ?

The formation of study groups such as we have suggested is, of course, one way. The responsible exploration of the lineaments of reality is itself a creative process. But the constructive response to those lineaments, particularly when those lineaments carry with them the real possibility of the destruction of mankind, that is another matter. Is such a constructive response possible, and if so, can, the social worker act as midwife to it, and if so, how ?

4. Now in what is to follow I am going to propose certain questions the consideration of which I think would facilitate a creative response to the nuclear age. I do not think these are the only lines of inquiry that can be pursued, nor shall I undertake an answer to them here. Each one of them requires a sustained investigation and some of them need special knowledge. But I shall give the reasons for my wanting these questions to be explored.

A—What is the nature of the creative process and how does it develop ?[5] If our function is to facilitate creativity, it is important that we know what it is. Such insight would direct our professional conduct and serve as a center for evaluation. For example, without proper understanding we mighht stress the incidental but miss the essential, fall into false trails and be utterly unproductive except, perhaps, by accident. Clarity about the nature of creativity would also facilitate communication, for we might use the same word but be talking about different things, and here again the result would be confusion and sterility.

Knowledge of how the creative process develops would likewise confer direction. A period of disorganization or conflict in an individual or

5. There is very little systematic work on this subject. A bibliography listing articles and books dealing with various aspects of creativity would be of real value.

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group may have one appearance taken in itself, quite another taken as part of a total process. In the former they may seem dead-ends (and we may act accordingly), in the latter pregnant with promise. I do not mean to imply, of course, that all disorganization and conflict are part of a creative development, but much of them may be, and in those cases we cannot properly act as midwives (indeed we can only do harm) unless we recognize them as such.

Understanding the vicissitudes and development of the creative process should also help us to determine an individual's readiness or lack of readiness,when to emphasize exercise of will and when to recommend the relaxation of such exercise and freee-functioning. It should make us sensitive to the exigencies of dvelopment, to those slight cues which have to be felt and immediately, almost unconsciously, responded to, in order for the function of a midwife to be performed.

The nature and development of the creative process can be explored through the study of creative individuals and periods. History is, of course, repleate with such individuals and periods and there are numerous opportunities in a social work agency for emphasizing them. But on all such occasions why an individual or movement was creative should be made absolutely clear; and how this individual or movement developed, what challenges they faced, how these challenges came to be, what other responses to these challenges there were, and how their responses differed from those others, these things should be made the center of programming. Programming of this kind would perform a variety of functions simultaneously : it would be significant rather than trivial; would confer insight into the nature of creativity and it would serve as a wonderful example for a creative response to our period.

B The present period is not the only period in which 'the end of the world' has been expected. To be sure, this is probably the only time in which the extinction of mankind has become a real possibility (as far the history accessible to us goes), but it is not the only time that such an eventuality has been anticipated. During the Second Temple in Israel there were increasing forebodings of the end of the world; Christianity was born in such a climate;[6] this fear was widespread during the decline of the Roman Empire; [7] the same thing was true of the waning Middle Ages; [8] and in the Hindi cosmology the world is born and comes to an end not only as among the Jews and Christians,but many times.[9] Doubtless there have been many other peoples who at one time or

6 Frank Moore Crooss,Jr."The Ancient Library of Qumram"Doubleday & Co. Inc. Garden City, N.Y., 1958 pp. 162-173,181-184.

7 Christianity had a great deal to do with the wipespread belief in the end of the worlds. See Gibbon, "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'. Henry Frowde, Oxford Univ. Press. 1903, Vol. II, pp. 25-31

8 Johann Huizinga 'The Waning of the Middle Ages'

9 HeinrichZimmer, 'Philosophies of India', edited by Joseph Campbell. Meridian Books. New York. 1957. pp. 389. 390.

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another have had the same expectations.

The social worker should plan programs in which these periods are compared with one another and with the present. Such a comparative study would give us perspective on our own time; the scope of our alternatives would de widened awakening to the responses of other civilizations. we would be in a better (more objective) position to understand our own responses and those of our contemporaries, and the reasons for them,we would also be better able to define some of the issues involved in the responses to the present-day world; and we should be better able to evaluate some of these responses since we could then study their career and outcome in other periods (in this way some criteria for the evaluation of such responses generally might be developed). In a word, we would set ourselves in a posture of exploration, of learning, of criticism, and such a posture in itself abates terror, since it is constructive and involves the devlopment of perception. It also has as its imminent, and some times self-conscious, goal the transformation of the dead-end of terror into a new vison and a new way of life.

It would be well in such programs to pay some attention to the comparative method itself; to consider when other case-histories are really significant and when they constitute merely spacious analogies; in other words, to consider the rasons for the cautions which have to be observed in the use of this method. We can then as k: what do periods in which the end of the world is anticipated have in common socially and politically ? What were the common responses to them, such as sensate ionalism, the expectation of a Savior or Messiah, scepticism and cynicism etc ? How did the response of Judaism differ from that of Christianity or Hinduism to such expectations ? What perennial issues are involved in these responses ?

C. Another way we can transform the impotence which, in varying degrees, the present crisis generates, is by focusing upon its distinctively creative aspects. Both man's movements into space and the recent growth of physics are movements of discovery. The widening of horizons issuing from them gives us a powerful sense of encountering creation itself.This, to some extent,always happens in genuine discovery.The world appears fresh, there is a sense of wonder. Just the multitude and variety of new facts, sheer enumeration, may do this to us. This sense of wonder may be so great that it may undergo a qualitative change. Instead of wonder at creation, radical amazement at it, we may be filled with a sense of its sacredness. I think that man's present movement into space has this as one dimension. The process of creation also evokes surprise since the new perception presents itself to us, in part, as something found, an illumination, not dictated by intellect or will. There is an unpredictable element about the process and it is this which generates surprise.

One of the results of such movements is that man's image of himself

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changes. He, and the world in which he dwells, diminish in significance. Obviously, this is an extension of the Copernican revolution in which the earth, and therefore man, ceased to be the center of things. This alteration of man's image of himself is, of course, based upon a clearer grasp of reality. It is in no way to be confused with that devaluation of man by himself which has its origin, not in discovery or mastery but on the contrary in failure and frustration.

The social worker ought therefore to properly emphasize the positive aspects of the recent developments of physics and technology and place them in the general contest of man's conquest of the material universe. This offers infinite and obvious possibilities for programming. Too many people have been tempted latterly to decry science and technology altogether for fear of the destructive uses to which they may be put. But this is a form of escapism.

D. The wonder of creation and the greatness of man are only one dimension of scientific and technological discoveries. The other,of course is the sense of man's absurdity since he may use these very discoveries to extinguish himself. The vogue of the absured began before the nuclear age with the first war—indeed it orginated before that—and has expressed itself in theology, philosophy, drama, the novel, etc. people frequently look upon it and upon works informed by it as negative and dangerous. They therefore feel that social work programming should not take cognizance of it. But I question that. Indeed, I think that the absurd ought to be one of the centers of social work programing in the nuclear age.

Recognition of the mind's limits and of its ultimate impotence in the face of the irrational in oneself, in other men or in nature, is usually followed by disorganization and futility.But where the contradiction between reason and reality, between his need for unity and his anarchy, is felt and designated as absurd, this disorganization and futility are transformed into something positive. For by saying that reality is absured[10] (be it biological or political reality) the individual is at the same time affirting the value of reason and of himself.He is at once facing and saying"no" to reality and thus, instead of succumbing to it (which usually follows upon disorganization and futility), he is asserting his identity, and with that, his victory. Indeed the perception of the absurd is itself a discovery, is frought with the unforeseen, and is a process in which we touch the fringes of creation since we have a premonition that new perception will come to light, which they do.

There are rich resources for programming around the 'absurd' and the social worker should make use of them. And when he does

10 An excellent analysis of the absurd is to be found in 'The Myth of Sisyphus' by Albert Camus, translated from the French by Justin O'Brien, New York, Vintage Books, 1959.

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when he and his group see a play[11] of a movie with this theme, or review a novel, he ought to stimulate discussion about it. What is the nature of the "absurd" ? How does it express itself in character,art and action ? How did this attitude develop in the modern West and how is its development to be expressed ? What is the distinction between the views of the religious and aesthetic thikners with regard to the absurd,etc?

Indeed, I think the social worker ought to go further and ask whether the attitude of the absurd is adequate to the nuclear age with its posssibility of man's extinction of himself. Absurdity, it seems to me, requires not only that particular minds be unable to master reality, but also the continued existence of mind. Extinguish all mind and you have a situation which is no longer absurd but which either defies language or, where that extinction is wrought by man himself, is insane. Nor does the possibility that there is consiousness in other universes alter the situation, for those other probable minds have no living relation with our own, and assure our own of no continuity.

As we said, the absurd is born of a contradiction between reason and irrational reality, between man's need for unity and his anarchy. Eliminate the contradiction and you eliminate the absurd. But how can you eliminate the contradiction? Either by denying that the world is inexpugnably irrational (a position held by some philosophers and theologians) or by destroying the other term in the contradicition, reason. Nuclear war threatens to do just this last. With the possibility of man's extinction of himself, the notion of the absurd becomes irrelevant.

What does become relevant is the notion of insanity.I do not want to hold a brief for an organization such as Sane,[12] yet its out look is precisely the right one, I think social workers ought to explore the meanings of the word "insane", its relevance to the nuclear age, its expressi ons in thought, art and action, and its significance for programming.

Recognition that the present situation is 'insane' also helps insure man of his identity. Instead of remaining dumb before the possibility of man's suicide, we are able to break into appropriate speech and hence to fulfill our beings as social animals. The trauma of the idea of nuclear annihilation has the effect of reducing people to silence—and I do not mean that silence which surpasses speech—and hence, in and for itself, constitutes a corrosion of society. The recognition and articulation of the insanity of the present situation, on the other hand, creates community.

E. Another characteristic of the present situation is its indeterminateness. We are not certain that a nuclear war will break out; we do not know whether our system can recover from one or not, or whether civilization will, above all we do not know whether man can survive a nuclear war or a succession of them. In such a context it becomes rele-

11 See Esslin, Martin, 'The Theatre of the Absurd', Garden City, N.Y. 1961
12 See the statements of the society for a Sane Nuclear Policy.

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vant to consider the bearing of the essential outlook of religion on the present situation.

Indeed an understanding and evaluation of the nature of faith, and of different types of faith, and of their differences from other varieties of attitude and response to the indeterminate becomes a requirement of programming. And all relevant religions should be used as resource of such programming. What is the character of the Catholic Jewish and Protestant faiths and what relevance do these have to the nuclear age?[13] Indeed, I would widen this inquiry and include Communism also, which, in one of its aspects can be regarded as a faith, indeed one which is rooted in Judaism and Christianity. So that I would compare and contrast these faiths, with one another to distinguish what attitudes and actions they entail in an indeterminate stiuation such as the present. Hanging over all is, of course, the evaluation of the function of faith generally for the present.

The view of God as being without form, indefinable inexhaustible, indeed incommensurate with any determinations by speech or reason, may also be relevant to the indeterminateness of the present day world, since this view of God or its equivalent, where it is alive, enables us to accept the radically unknown and to respond to it with maximum educability and flexibility. Programming ought, therefore, to explain this view in different religions[14], see why people came to a living acceptance of it, what institutional and other expressions this view has had and how it differs from an attitude which eventuates in a passive, unresponsive surrender to chance.

F. One last area for programming I would like to mention, and I am sure that there are many others, has to do with values and identification. There are some obvious questions about values the present situation raises. One of them is: what ought to be the primary center of our loyalty—the nation, our class, our religion, humanity? Another is implicit in the fact that the present situation is marked not only by the possibility of nuclear extinction, but also by a world wide demand for freedom and justice. The possibility of nuclear extinction makes peace, of course, a primary value, but the demand for liberty and justice sometimes places peace in jeopardy. So that we are driven to ask: which of these in the present day world is primary? [15] What precisely is the nature of peace and what different kinds of peace are there? And we must ask the same questions about freedom.

Another type of question stems from the uncertainty of the future of mankind and from the fact of death. The latter usually stimulates us

13 For the Jewish view, see Alfred Jospe 'On the Meaning of Jewish culture in our time' in the Jewish Heritage and the Jewish student, 1959.

14 This view is central, of course, to Judaism. Comparable points of view are present in other religions. See, for example, Tao Te Ching translated by J.J.L. Duyvendak, John Murray, Albemarle Street, London W., 1954

15 This conflict of values is obviously faced by both the Western and Communist blocks, and will be faced by whatever state acquires nuclear arms.

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to seek some form in which our identity can be preserved, for the most part through the family, or through our nation or through being remembered by our society. Sometimes,of course, this need is met through a belief in immortality. Thus in Israel after the destruction of the Temple the belief in personal immortality came more and more to the fore; prior to that the individual had felt that his identity survived in Israel itself.[16] After the Middle Ages in the West the desire for immortality became more and more supplanted by the desire for fame.[17] Men lived on not because of their good deeds or saintliness but because of their own personal achievements in such things as politics, art, etc.

Needless to say,with the possibility of the extinction of mankind, fame and similar forms of 'survival' become meaningless. Immortality is not credible to many because of the secularization of our culture and the hold of the scientific outlook on many minds which demands that nothing be accepted which is not capable of scientific verification. The question remains,therefore,whether there is anything in the present which is capable of performing the function which fame, immortality, the family and the nation perform.

16 Moses Hess, 'Rome and Jerusalem' translated by Meyer Waxman, New York, Block Publ. Co. 1943, pp. 50-53

17 See Jacob Burckhardt, 'The Civilization of the Renaissance', The Modern Library New York, 1954, pp. 108-115

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A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE NATURE OF SELF

N. V. SUBBANNACHAR

AN attempt at systematic psychological enquiry requires a compr. ehensive view of Man in Existence. An approach to Psychology has to account for man's engagement with himself and his engagement with Existence. This is strictly man's view on life and universe. The enquiry may be started with the assumption that man is the complex of phys. ico-chemical, biological, socio-psychological and psychic factors,—i.e. a dynamism. On this assumption, then, the fundamental principles of various branches of knowledge bear on human life as involved in it. Differentiation and involvement of all known phenomena exhibit a **continuum.** On the continuum of phenomena, Psychology is a distinct dynamism and therefore Psychology comprehends or involves all those phenomena which are actual as its ground and points to certain distinct phenomena in the form of governing principles and potentialities. Since the theoretical perspective or ideological scheme of Psychology is implicit or explicit in any attempt at methodological interpretation, it is necessary that the fundamental principles of phenomena on the continuum be calearly grasped.

Physics :—Transformation of energy,—physical forces are inter. convertible.

Chemistry :—physico-chemical changes and reactions are relative to the position of elements in a scheme.

Biology :— Symbiosis is the growth and living-together of all kinds of organisms in terms of subordinate, equal and superior relation. ships in the context of organism-environment integration. Homeostasis is the principle of self regulation.

Social Sciences :—(Economics, Politics, Sociology, etc.,) Organ. isation and control of human relationships which are grounded in variati. on with respect to a goal. On the one hand there is the attempt at mate. rial orgnisation and efficiency with regard to physico-chemical and biological facts and forces; on the other hand there is the attempt at organisation and control of facts and forces of human nature,—indiv. idual and collective—towards a need—goal or value scheme.

Philosophy :—Search after certainty or a view of Existence which throws light on the ultimate nature of man. It is the problem of ess. ential nature of person in Existence that it should be meaningful at all. Here, abstraction as in the field of mathematics focusses on the nature of reason and ideas in their relation to concrete reality.

The test, of course, is that a mathematical design works as it should be in the case of a philosophical system. This is the modern problem of continuum of matter and mind —i.e. mental constructs lead to the mak. ing of mechanical model which is geared to a human purpose.

Religion : The basic need of man to relate himself to Existence in a satisfactory manner and the method of realising oneness of Existence or unity with Existence,however interpreted according to various schemes

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and conceptions of man and Existence as arising out of one or the other process or aspect of human nature,—individual and collective.

With this background, the problem of PSYCHOLOGY is the integration of all states,processes and factors by a centre of control and direction. Integration is at the same time transcendence in the sense of the relata or schemata is given direction by the centre. The problem of growth illustrates this point. Broadly speaking, motivation, learning and perception, however weighted, is of the self, the centre. For, man thought born ignorant has capacity for knowledge which is the matter of growth.Growth,in fact, is the transcendence of various stages: bio-physical and chemical, socio-psychological and psychic. Now, if it is possible to express human behaviour in a formula, then :

Person or Self or Centre=f(factors of continuum, actual and potential)

An approach to Psychology is conditioned by methodology. Here is the point that the problem should determine the method, not that a method should reduce the problem to its limiting conditions.Abstraction may be analytical and reductive as in Physical Sciences and to some extent in Biological science when Psychological phenomena are not treated as such, but as the outcome of physico-chemical,bio-physical and bio-chemical and physiological mechanisms.All this serves as the negative evidence on the continuum. Since physiological psychology, experimental psychology,behviourism,Freud and Adler,such others,have adapted the reductive analysis,their findings serve only as the negative evidence.Abstraction may be synthetical and integrative as in the New Biology (Julian Huxley),and some schools of Psychology,—McDougall, Spearman, Gestalt, James, Jung, Stern, G. W. Allport, Psychosomatics and intercultural data,when psychological phenomena are treated as such with their own laws which point on one side to antecedent factors as conditions and on other side to consequent factors as determined by the principle of growth.In Psychology, it is not merely a matter of antecedent consequent relationship,a mechanical process, but an organismic means-end development that is the problem of growth. A psychological law,then, should express the conditions, processes and states of growth from the lower to higher stages as from infancy to childhood to boyhood, and so on. Therefore, Person or Self=f (factors of continuum, actual and potential) of a stage or level of growth. Integrative abstraction on this view is essential for developing designs for living and for formulating laws of behavior which clearly point to and envisage the nature and purpose of growth.

Analytically, abstraction is reductive,—quantitative isolation and control—as in strict Experimental psychology whose limitation is encountered in Clinical psychology where it is a case of involvement and inherent directional tendencies as against arbitrary manipulation.But,the reductive analysis may be helpful only in the sense of discovering a dominant tendency.

The law of chance or probability presupposes the relativity of phenomena. In the first place, probability may prove the existence of phenomena in terms of uniform recurrence; in the second place, it points out the factor that supervenes or predominates over the rest. Causal relation,then, is interpreted in terms of multiple corellation which is measured by factor-analysis and statistical probability. All this viewed in the light of relativity of phenomena points to the continuum.At present, all concepts in Psychology are static in the sense that psychological phen-

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omena are treated in a closed system of assumptions reduced to certain working conditions. But the nature of psychological phenomena is dynamic as growth,—transformation, integration and transcendence.

Synthetically, abstraction is integrative,— qualitative discrimination and control—as in clinical psychology,child psychology,social-psychology and psychology of Religion where it is the problem of growth, i.e. need-means-value dynamics that is determined by the level of growth or consciousness. Therefore,abstraction is the nature of self in the sense of essential nature of growth of structure and function.

There are three fundamental issues in Psychology :

1. Individual differences (personal and cultural) and uniqueness of personality
2. Levels of consciousness
3. Growth of individual

A set of psychological laws has to account for these three fundamentals and their inter-relations. Abstraction, now, has to account for differentiation that is at the same time integration of factors. It is integral --differential function.

It should be kept in view that the presupposition of all sciences and humanities is order, system and law or laws of Existence. A psychological law should throw light on mental disorder and illness and on paranormal phenomena from the standpoint of Normality. Experimental psychology in general checks on the findings of various fields for clarification and confirmation. Then, Social Psychology which takes for its subject-matter the entire range of psychological phenomena has to deal with the individual and collective on the continuum. Normality, now, should denote both the actual and the potential factors as constituting the growth of the individual in a given socio-cultural pattern. That is possible only through a deeper probe into human nature,—levels of consciousness,—physical, vital, mental, subliminal, and superconscious—and the outlook on the continuum. For after all, the serious business of man has been the discovery of laws and their manipulation towards a purpose.It implies that the laws of various phenomena are correlated and that the nature of phenomena on the continuum is the Structure or Gestalt. Differentiation and involvement(integration)of phenomena show that it is matter of structure within a structure bothways, inclusion and extension. That means the integration-transcendence dynamics. But, here it must be noted that the known functions do not exhaust the structure, for on the continuum it is the problem of growth.Transcendence may be understood in the sense of determining in relation to determined, cause in relation to effect, ends in relation to means,structure in relation to function,super-consciousness in relation to conscious level.Now,therefore Person or Self in Existence conceived as Continuum

> is a structure within structure, a part of whole, a function of system of functions, a process of power, a level of consciousness of evolutionary progression or transcendence, an agent of the Cosmic Self.

The Psychological Perspective is the nature of Self.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE YOGAVĀSISTHA

A BIRD'S EYE VIEW

B. L. ATREYA

ONE of the strangest facts in the wide spread movement of the revival of the ancient Indian religio-philosophical thought is the neglect of the study of the great Sanskrit work, the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. "The Yogavāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa", rightly remarks Principal Gopinath Kaviraj, "was once one of the most widely read books in the country and.....it greatly influenced general philosophical thought. Though a Vedānta work of the highest order, it has a place of its own in the history of Indian spiritual philosophy and cannot be described in any sense as affiliated to the school of thought associated with the name of Śañkarāchārya. It is unfortunate that a work of such monumental grandeur, the like of which is hardly to be met with even in Sanskrit literature, should have been allowed to remain obscure and neglected so long." (Editorial Note to B. L. Atreya: *Vāsiṣṭha Darśanam*, The Prince of Wales Saraswatī Bhavana Texts, No. 64, 1936).In our opinion the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* is a more comprehensive,deep. systematic and literary philosophical work of ancient India than any other known to us. Its philosophical doctrines can favourably be compared with the most up-to-date philosophical thought of the West (Vide B. L. Atreya: *Yogavāsiṣṭha and Modern Thought*, 1934). Here an attempt is made to place before the reader an epitome of the philosophical doctrines of this great work.

Discontent

The *Yogavāsiṣṭha* Mahārāmāyaṇa embodies the teachings of the sage *Vasiṣṭha* to his illustrious pupil, Prince Ramchandra of the ancient kingdom of Ayodhya. Rama represents the unenlightened individual awakened only to the miserable plight of life and eager to find out a way out of it, and Vasiṣṭha the enlightened teacher who knows all that is worth knowing and who has attained Peace of Perfection. Rama has begun to reflect over the misery and sufferings of life and feels dissatisfied with it. This dissatisfaction finds expression in his conduct. Being asked by his teacher why he was not happy, he gives expression to his ideas in such words:—"What happiness can there be in this world, where every one is born to die ? (I. 12.7). Everything here comes into existence only to pass away. There is no stability in our achievements (I. 12.8). (How foolish are we ? Knowing the vanity of the affairs of life, we continue to be whole heartedly engaged in them like fools (I. 12. 12). Even knowing

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well that there cannot be real and lasting joy in our life, we foolishly continue to hope for it (I. 12. 13).) Accumulation of wealth does not make us happy, but miserable. Like a poisonous creeper, it hides within it the possibility of our ruin (I. 13. 10). (Life is as evanescent as an autumnal cloud, as the light of an oilless lamp, and as ripples on the surface of water (I. 14. 6).) Our mind is always restless like a caged lion (I. 16. 10).(It falls to its object as passionately as a bird to its prey, but like a baby with his toys, it gets soon disgusted with it (I. 16. 22).) Desire is as fickle as a monkey. It is never satisfied with the object which is already in hand, but jumps to others which are beyond our reach. The more it is satisfied the intenser it grows (I. 17. 29). (There is nothing desirable in the body. It is an abode of disease, a source of all kinds of agonies and subject to wrinkles (I. 18. 34). Childhood is characterised by weakness, cravings, incapacity to speak, lack of knowledge, longing for unattainable things, fickleness of mind and helplessness (I. 19. 2). Youth comes like a flash of lightning, soon to be inevitably followed by the roars of the agonies of old age (I. 20. 8). It is pleasing only for some time, but soon turns into an evil (I. 23. 10). Bitterness of pain and suffering is the consequence of the pleasures of youth, which are pleasant only at their commencement (I. 21. 36). The poor rat of youth is soon devoured by the cat of old age, which takes delight in consuming the flesh of the body (I. 22. 25). At last, the cruel hand of death removes everything. It allows the creature only to ripe for its own use, as it were (I. 26. 6). Of what value is the body, the pleasures, the wealth and kingdom, when early or late, death shall put an end to all ? (I. 18.36). Is there any direction where there is no suffering ? Is there any creation which is not transitory ? Is there any view which is free from error ? And is there any transaction which is free from deception ? (I. 27. 31).

Rama, then, asks his teacher, earnestly: "Is there any better state of existence which may be absolutely free from suffering, ignorance and grief and full of undecaying Joy ? (I. 30, 11).(What is the spell by which the disease of worldliness—the source of all kinds of suffering—may be cured ? (I. 30. 24).) What is the method, the science, or the way, by which this life may be freed from undesirable consequences ? (I. 31. 6). Initiate me into the Science of a perfectly happy life (I. 31. 17).

Vasiṣtha was very much pleased to know that Discrimination and Discontent, which are the source of all spiritual attainments have dawned upon the mind of his young pupil and that he keenly aspires to know the secret of Blissful Existence. He assures him that there is such a Science which enables a man to be free from suffering and pain, and this Science is the Science of the Self. Self-knowledge is the cure of all suffering and source of happiness. This Science was taught to him by Brahmā,the Creator of the world,at the very commencement of the Creation.Having taught the Science of the Self to him,the Creator asked him to

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live in the Bhāratavarsha (India) and to teach it to those who may be the proper and suitable recipients of it. The main principles of the Science of the Self taught to Rama by Vasiṣtha are given below.

The Source of Knowledge

Direct Cognition or Intuition (*Pratyksānubhava*) is the only and ultimate source of all our knowledge, be it of an external object, Self or God. There is no other *Pramāṇa* (source) through which new knowledge comes to us (III. 42. 15; II. 19. 16; VIb. 52. 29). If anything is not directly experienced by anybody, it cannot be made known to him by any description of it by others. The taste of sugar, for example, cannot be made known to one who has never himself tasted it. (V. 64. 53). Others can give us only a hint or partial knowledge of things unknown to us by way of analogy and illustrations (*Upamāna and driṣṭānta*). (II. 18. 51.)

Knowledge presupposes Idealistic Monism

Any relation between two things presupposes an identity behind them. Without a common substance immanent in both of them, two things cannot be related either as cause and effect or as subject and object. The knowledge of things around us and the relation of cause and effect obtaining between things of the world, therefore, leads us to Monistic view of the Universe. The fact of knowledge further presupposes that the object of our knowledge cannot but be a modification of consciousness itself, i.e. an idea (kalpanā). For, knowledge can have for its object only that which is homogeneous with it in nature. All objects, therefore, along with the perceiving subjects, are ideas of our consciousness. (III. 121. 37. 42: 53; VIb. 25. 14. 7; VIb. 38. 9; VIb. 101, 54).

Idealism

The most outstanding feature of the philosophy of the *Yogavāsiṣtha* is *idealism*. Idealism is the keystone or the basic principle of its entire philosophy. The world of experience, with all things, time, space and natural laws, is a creation of Mind, i. e, idea or *kalpanā* Everything is created by the mind just in the same way as the objects of dream are. Time is only a relation of succession of ideas. It is relative to the activity of the mind. An age may be experienced as a moment and a moment as an age in accordance with the moods of the mind. A moment of waking experience is often experienced as years in the dream. Space is also relative to the mind and its ideas. Within a span the mind can have the experience of miles and miles can be experienced as a span only. Time and space together with objects cease to exist for a yogin who passes into a thoughtless trance. The so called Laws of Nature (*niyati*) are also ideas of uniform order of precedence and sequence. They hold good only so far as the ideas are manufactured in the furnace of the mind in the same order. But there is no reason why a different order may not be introduced by the mind. The stability and persistence of the world are also ideas of the mind and they are as much imagined by the mind as the

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stability and persistence of the dream-world. (VIb. 210. 11; IV.47.48,59; V. 48. 49; VIb. 42. 16; VIb. 56. 3; VIa. 61. 29; VIa. 37. 21; VIa 148.21; III. 56. 37; III. 13. 36; III. 60. 20. 21. 22. 23. 26; III. 103. 13; VIb. 73. 19. 20).

Similarity between Waking and Dream Experience

There is little or no difference between the waking and dream experience. Both are alike in their nature, as long as each lasts. From the standpoint of a higher realization, no difference is felt between the two. The difference is, however, felt from the standpoint of each other. The waking man considers the dream-experience as unreal and visionary, while to the subject of the dream, its own world is really real, and the waking experience is unreal and non-existent. When a person is on the death bed, to him the entire life-experience of years passes away as a moment's dream. As hundreds of dreams are experienced within the waking age of our life, so hundreds, nay, thousands of waking-dreams are experienced by the Self in its transmigratory journey. As we can recollect the many dreams that we have experienced throughout our life, so the enlightened ones (*siddhas*)can remember the many waking dreams experienced by them during their past career (IV. 29. 11. 12; VIb.34.29. 30; IV. 18. 47).

Subjective Idealism

According to the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, every individual perceives and cognizes only that which is within his own experience; no mind perceives aught but its own ideas. The world experience of every individual has arisen individually to every one. Every mind has the power to manufacture its own world. Such a view is called subjective Idealism in modern philosophy. (III. 40. 29; III. 55. 61; VIb. 13. 4).

Objective Idealism

The statement that there are countless individual minds, which is often made in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, implies an extra-individual reality in the form of other individuals, who, of course, must likewise have their own world-experience. Vasiṣṭha is alive to this implication and therefore admits a cosmic world with countless objects and individuals within it, which in its original form is a system of ideas in the Cosmic Mind called Brahmā. Brahmā imagines the world and all the individuals within it at the commencement of the Creation, and they continue to exist as long as the Brahmā continues to exist. (III. 55. 47).

Reconciliation of Subjective and Objective Idealism

The experience of a common world by many individuals is thus due to the fact that over and above these individuals, there exists a Common Mind, the Cosmic Mind, in which all the common contents of the world as well as all the individuals themselves exist as ideas and are represented in every individual mind within the Cosmic Mind. The ideas imagined by the Brahmā are the common objects of experience of us all, although in our own mind they enter as our own. Or, it may also be said, they are

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the reals (*bimba*) which our minds imitate or copy (*pratibimba*). As every mind is an idea of the same Cosmic Mind, it is capable of representing within itself other individual minds also as its own ideas. One is an idea in the mind of others as much as others are ideas in that of the one. Although no body knows anything except its own ideas—the perception of other individuals and common things being our own ideas—yet they are believed as existing in a common universe, for they are the common ideas of all alike. As it is possible that several men may see the same dream, so, in the same way, it happens that we all experience the same objects. As the same person may be seen in imagination by many individually, so also the same world experience is imagined in every mind in the same ways as it has arisen in the Cosmic Mind. (VIb. 20. 7; III. 55. 48; V. 49. 10; VIb. 151. 10; VIb. 154. 11; III. 53, 25; VIb. 38. 4).

Worlds within Worlds

The terms Cosmic and individual minds are to be understood in a relative sense. That which is considered as an individual in relation to a wider Cosmic Mind and its contents, may in its own turn, be considered as cosmic in relation to the entities within its own objective experience. For, according to Vasiṣṭha every object has a subjective aspect, i. e., is a mind in which is experienced a world peculiar to itself, as in a dream. Every idea thus is a monad in itself and has a world within its experience, every ideal content of which is, again, in its turn, in itself, an individual monad having another world within itself. There is no end to this process of worlds within worlds. In this way, in every universe, are contained millions of other universes, and this process goes on *ad infinitum*. All this is unknown and unreal to us, but it is directly known to those who have attained purity of mind and vision of the Absolute. (IV. 18.16, 27; IV. 19. 1; III. 52. 20; III. 44. 34; VIb. 59. 33. 34).

Variety of World-experiences

One need not, however, believe that all the worlds which thus arise successively or simultaneously are of the same kind, or are governed by the same laws, or are evolved in the same way as our own world. There is no such uniformity having under its sway all the world, actual or possible. Some of them may, however, be similar in their entire nature, others similar only in some aspects; others quite different from one another.So is the case with the countless individuals in the different worlds. The theories of creation propounded in various Shāstras are only idle fancies. The Divine Mind is not bound by any particular law of creation to be followed always and everywhere. (IV. 47. 14; VIa. 66. 23; IV. 47. 17: VIa. 66. 24).

The General Law of Manifestation of an Objective World

The manifestation of an objective world within a mind proceeds by way of materialization and externalization of ideas in the form of things, body and senses, consequent upon a wish, craving or desire to enjoy the

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particular objects; this process can be well-understood by a study of the phenomena of dreams, for the law of evolution or rise of an objective world is the same in the case of a dream, of an after-death vision or of the rise of a cosmos. The dynanic force behind the manifestation of all objects in one's experience is the desire to be something or to have something, which the creative imagination supplies forthwith. (III. 12. 2; VIb. 22. 37; VIb. 114. 17; III. 4. 79).

Individuality or Mind (Manas)

Individuality (*jīvatva*), according to Vasiṣṭha does not consist in being something like a simple, undecomposable, spiritual entity, called soul. It consists, on the other hand in being a mind, *manas*, which means a particular mode of the Ultimate Reality, determined by a peculiar movement, tendency, desire, or will to imagine. The form is in perpetual change. It is called by various names on account of its different functional forms. It is called *Buddhi* (intellect), when it knows something definitely; *Ahankāra* (ego), when it assumes for itself a distinct existence; *Chitta*, when it displays fickleness; *Karma* (action), when it moves towards a desired end; *Vāsanā* (desire), when it attaches itself to something not in its possession; *Indriyas* (sense-organs), when it reveals external objects to the Self; and *Prakṛti* (root-matter), when it creates objects out of itself. In fact, everything that we know is, according to the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, a mode of mind. (III. 96. 3, 17-27; V. 13. 80. 54; III. 46 43).

Mind is not anything different and separate from the Absolute Brahma; it is the Brahman itself manifesting itself as a creative agent. It is the whole looked at from a particular point of view (IV. 42. 18; V. 13. 24, 53; VIa. 96. 19). From the point of view of grossness and limitations there may be distinguised three grades in the manifestation of the mind, namely, the monad (*jīva*), the ego (*ahankāra*) and the body (*deha*). The jīva or monad is that aspect of mind in which it originates as a ray from the Absolute Consciousness and is yet very subtle in character. The ego is the jīva in a grosser and more limited form in which objectivity acquires a greater degree. The body is the grossest form of the mind (III. 64. 12, 14; III. 13. 15, 22, 24, 28. 29). There is no limit to the number of monads in the world, and the monads are of various kinds (III. 43. 1; IV. 43. 2, 3),

Thought Power

As minds, we have got tremendous power at our command. Thought is the most potent force in the world. The mind, according to the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, is omnipotent (III. 11. 16). It is endowed with creative power (VIb. 139. 1). In creating a world for itself, it is absolutely free (III. 4. 79). We all attain what we aspire for. All that we intensely desire comes to us early or late. Our own efforts guided by our aspirations are the warp and woof of our destiny (III.45. 12;III. 54. 48).The nature of things around us is as we think it to be.Our lives are what we make them

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by our own thought.Thoughts are the bricks with which we build the mansions of our personality. We become what we aspire to be. The world around us is the reflex of our thought. It changes its appearance as we change. The extent of space and duration of time are relative to our thoughts and emotions. (III. 56. 28, 30; III. 60, 16, 17, 20-22, 28; VIb. 148. 33; VIb. 100. 3; IV. 23. 13). Faith or *bhāvanā* is the secret of all achievements. Our perceptions are coloured by our beliefs. (IV. 21. 20-22, 56-58; IV. 17. 4; VIa. 51. 3) Even bondage and freedom are also states of our mind and are wrought by our thought (III. 98. 3; III. 99. 43; III. 115. 24). The body is a creation of the mind and can be shaped by it into any form. Most of the diseases of the body originate in the disturbances of the mind and can be cured by right thinking and re-educating the mind. (IV. 45. 7; IV. 11. 19; IV. 21. 16; VIa. 28-34). If we never allow the balance of the mind to be overthrown by ambitions,cares,anxities and worries etc., there is no reason why disease should ever lodge in the temple of our body (VIa. 26. 10-35). Happiness is another name for the harmony of the mind; right culture of mind is the secret of joyful living. (V. 21, 12. 14).

The Secret of Super-normal Powers

The secret of attaining supernormal powers is to rise above identity with the physical body, which is another name for limitation, imperfection and incapacity of doing great things, and to affirm one's being spiritual in nature and therefore full of higher powers. Through this process of constant denial of the actual limitations and thoughtful auto-suggestion and affirmation of the ideal perfection, very extraordinary powers are evolved in us (III. 57. 30-33-; VIa. 82. 26). Extra-ordinary powers can also be realized through the awakening and control of the *Kuṇḍalinī Shakti* (Serpent-power) residing in the solar plexus of the body. When one has mastered the *Kuṇḍalinī*-power, through the control of the movements of the vital current (*prāṇa*), one can have communion with the invisible *siddhas* (enlightened ones), can leave one's body at will and enter another, can have a vision of distant events and things, and can become abnormally small or large in size. (VIa. 24; VIa. 80; VIa. 81; VIa. 82).

The Self

The concept of the Self is different from that of the individuality: The Self is that within us which never changes in spite of perpetual change in the personality. It is the essence of the subjective aspect of the Universe. To find the Self we have to find out what aspect of us endures throughout all the levels of experience, namely, waking, dream,sleep and the "fourth" in which the previous three are transcended. The Self being the ultimate Subject within us, we have to find out what aspects of our personality can be made objects of our knowledge and so cannot be regarded as the Self. The Self must also be the Ultimate Source of all our movements. Judged by these tests, the body, the senses, the mind,the

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intellect, the ego and the individuality cannot be regarded as the Self, as each of them can be transcended on one or the other level or experience; as each of them is an object of our consciousness; and as each of them is moved to activity by something else from the deep within. Again, there cannot be duality between Subject and objects ultimately, otherwise knowledge would be impossible. The Self in the subject, therefore, should be identical in essence with the Ultimate Substance of the objects, the Ultimate Essence of the Universe. The Self, therefore, according to the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, is the Reality at the root of the Universe, which manifests Itself in all individuals and things of the world (VIa. 78. 18-27; VIa. 6. 15-16: V, 73. 4; IV. 22. 33; V. 26. 12; V. 34. 52).

Death and After

The individuality, however changing and impermanent it may be, is not dissolved with the decay of the physical body and its total dissolution by death. The body is only an external manifestation of the inner will to be, which, with countless desires and hopes, persists to continue as an individual mind and shall, as a consequence of the unfulfilled desires, surely experience another body and another world after the death of one body. What the loss of the physical body does is only that it shuts the individual from the experience of this world, which is relative to these senses. Death brings about only a change in the kind of the objective world of the individual. It shuts from us the world with which we are no longer *en rapport*. It is not necessarily a passage of the individual to any distant place, but an experience, after temporary insensibility consequent upon the shock of losing the vision of this body and this world, of a new body and a new objective world *in this very place*, if the expression can be rightly and seriously used in this connection. This new experience is, of course, not accidentally determined. It is what the "dead ones" morally deserved, although coloured by and imagined in accordance with their long cherished beliefs. Having thus enjoyed the joys of "heaven" and suffered from the torments of "hell", according to their desires, beliefs and merits, they again experience the life of this world, if any desire for the objects of this world remained potential in them. For, the chain that binds us to anything or world is our own desire. It is only those persons who have become absolutely free from desires that, having given up their physical bodies, do not undergo any further experience of the wordly life. They attain, after the death of the physical body, the state of *Nirvāṇa*. They cease to be individuals and become completely identified with the Absolute Brahman.

The Cosmic Mind (*Brahmā*)

Most of the minds reproduce rather than create actually, although potentially all are capable of the greatest creative power. But there is a mind which really *creates* ideas in its consciousness, which for others are the real things of the external world like mountains, rivers and oceans

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etc., which are regarded by them as facts and things unalterable by their thought. We may or may not experience them, but these things are there. The mind which creates the objects real for us is called Brahmā in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. It is the Cosmic Mind which has imagined the world-idea. Brahmā creates the world through his imaginative activity with the freedom and skill of an artist. He is not determined by any previously existing plan, for there is none in existence or in memory, Brahmā being a fresh wave of creative activity in the ocean of the Absolute Consciousness. He is the Lord of our Cosmos which continues as long as his imagination is at work and will collapse or dissolve when he ceases from his play of imagination. The rise of Brahmā in the ocean of the Brahman is the most mysterious fact for the human mind. He is like a sprout coming out from the seed of the Absolute when it tends to evolve the objective world out of itself. The Absolute, in its creative aspect or power, in a merely playful overflow by its own free will, comes to self-consciousness at one point, which brings about the forgetfulness of the Whole, and on account of intensity there, begins to vibrate, pulsate or agitate in the form of thinking or imagining activity, and finally assumes a separate and distinct existence for itself as apart from the Whole whose one aspect it is in reality. (III. 55.47; III, 3.35; VIb. 208. 27-28; IV. 44. 14; IV. 42. 4; VIa. 114. 15-16; VIa. 33. 21; III. 114. 10. 20; VIa. 11. 37; IV. 42. 5).

The Creative Impulse

The Brahmā is regarded by Vasiṣṭha to be a wave of mentation in the ocean of the Absolute Consciousness, the Brahman. The cause of the rise of this wave is not an external or quasi-external force or influence. It is the Creative Impulse (*Spanda shakti*), an inherent energy, a power of movement, a will to manifest in finite forms, of the Reality Itself, which is ever present in the Reality, either in actual operation or in potential rest. The Power is ever identical with the Absolute. When the Power is active, it may falsely assume a separate and distinct reality for itself, but when it ceases to work, it turns back to its source, and merging therein, becomes undifferentiated. In that state there is no creation. In the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* the Creative Power is called by various names, such as, *Spanda-shakti*, *Samkalpa-shakti*, *Jaganmāyā* and *Prakriti* etc. (VIa. 84. 6, 3, 2, 26-27; VIa. 83, 16, 14; VIa. 85. 14, 15-19).

The Absolute Reality

It is very difficult to say about the essential nature of the Absolute. What can we say of That which is the Ultimate Substance of all things, the Unity behind the subject and the objects of experience, the Essence of all forms, the Ocean of Being in which we all live and move; from, in and into which, we down from the Logos to the tiniest vermin, originate, stay and dissolve ? Words fail to describe it, for they are all but linguistic symbols for things of the manifested world, and the Reality is much more than its manifested aspects. The categories of our experience are,

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one and all, incapable to express the Reality which is in and beyond the world-experience. No aspect of the Whole can be equated with the Whole. All our concepts—matter, mind; subject, object; one, many; self, not-self; knowledge, ignorance; light, darkness; etc., etc.—comprehend one or the other aspect of the Reality but not the Absolute Reality as such. They prove unsatisfactory when applied to the Reality which is inherent in everything denoted by these concepts as well as in their opposites. All conceptual moulds break under the weight of Reality. All the groves created by philosophy to fit the Reality in are unsatisfactory, for there always remains much of the Reality that "cannot be fitted into a groove." The Reality, therefore, if to be described at all, should be described in all terms, positive and negative, and not in any of the opposite terms. Either affirm everything of It, or deny everything of it, if you have to speak of it at all. Otherwise, keep silent, if you have already intellectually arrived at a synthesis of all affirmations and negations in the silent realisation of the Absolute Calm, the Blissful Nirvāṇa. (VIb. 184. 86; VIb. 52. 27; VIb. 31. 37; III. 5. 14; VIb. 104. 11; III. 7. 20. 22; III. 10. 7.14,36; III. 9. 50, 55-59; etc., etc, Vide our *Vāsiṣṭha-darśanam*, pp. 134-145).

Everything is Brahman

Everything in the world is a manifestation of the Absolute Reality, the Brahman, the Eternal Conscious Blissful Existence. There is nothing here or anywhere, which is not a mode of this Reality, which, in spite of being differentiated in countless forms, keeps Its Unity intact, because It in Itself is the continuous medium in which all forms, which are such only in relation to each other, persist temporarily. One form may be separate and distinct from another form as such, but can never be separate and distinct from the Reality of which it is a form. An ornament of gold is never different from gold with which it is ever one and identical. Bubbles, ripples, waves, etc. are never different from water of which they are forms, and abstracted from which they will cease to be anything at all. In the same way, everything in the Universe *is* Brahman. We are Brahman. "Thou art That". (VIa. 49. 29-32; III. 100. 17; III. 1. 17; V. 57. 1-12; VIb. 60. 28).

The World as an Unreal Appearance

The test of reality is eternal persistent. All forms, however, persist temporarily. They, as such, come into existence and pass out of it. How can, therefore, they be regarded as real in the true sense of the term. But we cannot also say that they are unreal, because they partake of reality, however little it my be, as they persist for some time at least. They may not be absolutely or fully real, but they are not totally unreal as long as they persist for some time. A new category is required to comprehend this fact of the forms being neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal, but persisting for some time. Vasiṣṭha calls such things *mithyā* (not true), *avidyā* (that which exists not eternally), *māyā* (that which is not) and

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bhrama (delusion), etc. *Appearance* is the best philosophical term to express the idea behind these terms. There is another sense in which Vasiṣṭha regards the objective forms not as realities but as appearances. As he is an idealist, to him nothing of the objective world real apart from its appearance in the mind. The reality and existence of every world and every object is only relative to its experiencer. It is nothing to another percipient, like the vision of a ghost; like things in the experience of a hypnotised person. (V. 5. 9; IV. 45, 46; III. 6, 64; III. 65, 5; III. 44, 27. 41; VIa. 114, 20; III. 54, 21; IV. 1, 2, 7, 12; III. 67, 76; IV. 41, 15).

Acosmism

In Itself, the Absolute Reality is, according to the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, above all changes, above all distinctions and differentiations, and above all relations. All differences and distinctions are within It, yet in Itself as a Whole, It is the distinctionless and homogeneous Substance. All the opposites—self and not-self; subject and object; being and non-being; one and many; consciousness and unconsciousness; rise and fall of individuals and world-processess,etc.—negate each other,balance each other, fuse with each other, neutralize each other into a zero, void (*shūnya*), a total blankness, which is at the heart of both the opposites, neither of which as such forms the content of this timeless and spaceless Reality. Thus the *samsāra*, creation, world, individuals, objects, bondage and freedom, etc., all, as such, are absent in the Absolute considered from Its own point of view, because their existence as forms is relative to some particular kind of consciousness apart from and outside which they are *nothing*. They are all like dream-objects which have no existence apart from their being perceived or imagined by some mind. Production or origination of anything is meaningless for the Absolute and from the Absolute point-of-view for the Absolute everything is ever *negated*. The Absolute is everything as well as its opposite, and so nothing as such. There is no individuality, no world, no creation, no movement, no bondage or freedom from the Absolute point of view. Acosmism is the Ultimate and the Highest Truth, which can be realized by every one, when one ceases to be interested in the relative, particular and finite appearances. (*Vāsiṣṭha-darśanam*, pp. 168-178).

The Ultimate Source of Happiness

All creatures, says the author of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, strive for Happiness. (VIa. 108. 20). But they seek for it in wrong places. They are under the delusion that they can be happy through worldly prosperity and possessions. All kinds of worldly enjoyments and sense-pleasures have the seeds of pain and sorrow hidden within them. No increase in our wealth, possessions and objects of enjoyment ever increases the chance of our thirst for happiness being satisfied. Even a flood in a mirage river will not quench the thirst of a really thirsty man. No amount of dream-wealth will ever allay the suffering of a poor man. (V. 49, 6-7; V. 9, 41;

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VIb. 93. 39, 73, 75, 78; V. 9. 52; VIa. 78.8; IV. 46.3-4). The real source of happiness is elsewhere. It can be easily found by carefully observing the conditions under which we feel happy or miserable. Things as such, are neither pleasant nor painful, agreeable nor disagreeable. It is our own attitude towards and our relations with them that make them appear so. The same object may be pleasant, painful or indifferent to different persons, and to the same person at different times. If we hanker for some object, contact with it is pleasant, and the pleasure decreases in proportion as our hankering for it diminishes in intensity. The contact with an object which is not desired by us is felt indifferently, whereas it will be felt as positively painful in case we have an aversion for the object. From these facts Vasiṣtha concludes that pleasure, pain, agreeableness or disagreeableness of objects depends on *our own desire or aversion* and not on the objects themselves (VIa. 44. 2; VIa. 120. 18-20; VIa. 44. 4). Really speaking the rise of a desire in us for something and its persistence for some time are themselves a painful experience, and our obtaining the desired object is pleasant only because it relieves us from pain of an unfulfilled desire. So, enjoyment of the objects of desire is only negatively pleasant. In reality, therefore, the presence or absence of desire are our worldly pain and pleasure. (VIb. 36. 24; VIb. 68. 31). But if desire is absolutely and permanently eradicated from the mind by right methods, there will not only be freedom from pain, but there will also be an experience of a peculiar and abiding Joy or Bliss, which only those who have experienced it know and which cannot be experienced as long as hankering for objects continues. (V. 74, 24. 50). "The Joy of desirelessness is much greater than and superior to that of ruling over an empire, of the company of one's beloved, of Heaven, and that experience by Vishnu" (V. 74. 44). This Joy is really the Bliss inherent in the Absolute Reality, which is our very Self. The Absolute Self is the real home of abiding and unconditional Happiness. It is the Bliss Itself for which all of us are consciously or unconsciously seeking (V. 54. 70, 72, 69). A glimpse of this Joy can be had when the mind is at peace, when it is not functioning in its usual way of thinking of this or that object, but is calm and quiet. (VIa. 44. 26, 27).

Bondage and Liberation

In spite of thus ever living in the ocean of Absolute Bliss, we are at the mercy of external objects for happiness. In spite of our own Self being the fountain-head of Joy, we are seeking for it in the objective world. This is our trouble. This is what is called bondage (*bandha*) by Vasiṣtha. (II. 2. 5; V. 13. 20; III. 1. 22). This, however, is only one aspect of our bondage, which assumes different forms in our cognitive, affective and conative nature. When we are bound, we are bound in all our being. In fact, we are ever one with the Infinite and Absolute Reality, yet at the present stage of our evolution *we do not know that* (IV. 12. 2); we are in reality omnipresent and unlimited, yet we *feel to be finite*, limited and

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weak (IV. 27. 22, 23, 25); Bliss is the very being of us, yet we *desire* this or that object (IV. 27. 18; VIa. 10, 8), *thinking wrongly* that it will bring happiness to us (IV. 12. 12); our abiding essence is the Reality behind everything, yet we take it to be the *ego* (VIa. 99. 11); everything is within myself and myself is within everything, yet I limit my *interest* (IV. 27. 25) to this or that object, *prefer* this or that, *attach* myself to particular things and actions, *possess* something and *reject* another. No form is real, yet we take everything to be real. All these are so many aspects of our *bondage*, release from which is called *Liberation* (*Moksha*), which consists in our *conscious realisation* of our being identical with the Absolute and freedom from limitations of all kinds. It is the same as the *dissolution of the mind* or individuality (VIb. 38. 32); as *indifference* to objects of enjoyment and *desirelessness* (VIb. 38. 32); as *dropping down of the world* from consciousness (III. 21. 11); as freedom from ignorance about the Self (VIb. 20. 17). This experience (*moksha*—liberation) can be realized even while one is alive, for we are one with the Absolute here and now.

The Way of attaining Liberation

According to Vasiṣṭha, there is no other way to attain Liberation than *Self knowledge*, as our bondage consists in the ignorance of the fact that we are here and now the Absolute. Liberation cannot be attained by living in a forest, undergoing penances (VIb. 199. 30), performance or renunciation of any kind of actions, undergoing any disciplinary practices (VIb. 199. 31), pilgrimage, distribution of alms, bath in sacred rivers, learning, performance of duties, riches, friends (V. 3. 8), fasting (III. 6.4), Scripture, words of a teacher, worship of any personal God (VIb. 176.26) etc. etc. Knowledge alone is the means of Liberation (III. 7. 17; II. 11. 36; V. 83.18; V. 13.89). The saving knowledge consists in the conviction that Brahman is the only reality; that everything is Brahman; that nothing other than the Brahman is real; that the Brahman is the very Self of us (V. 79. 2, 3; VIa. 190. 5). This knowledge can be acquired only through one's own thinking and effort. Nothing else will bring right knowledge home to anybody (III. 6.9; VIa. 118.4; V. 12. 8; V. 5. 6). To think correctly, the mind is to be purified; purification of mind is effected through the study of philosophical works, association with the wise and cultivation of virtue (V. 5. 5; V. 21. 11). No *Shāstra* or Scripture can make us realise the Self, if we do not make our own attempts along the right interpretation of our experience, and thereby have the direct intuition of the Self (VIb. 197.18; VIb. 41.15). The Scripture and the words of great teachers have value only so far as they suggest to us the existence of the Self, the Absolute, of which we, at the present stage of our knowledge, are not fully aware. (VIb. 197. 19-21, 25, 29).

Need of Self-reliance and Self-effort

Wisdom or Self-knowledge cannot be acquired by one who does not make earnest effort to acquire it, but merely depends on fate or God to bring it about. Vasiṣṭha is a great opponent of the belief in Fate or Des-

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tiny and the first thing that he taught to Rama was that he should be self-reliant and earnest in determining his own destiny by his own efforts. "He thinks that every individual is wholly responsible for what he is. He believes in complete self-determination and the strength of every individual to overcome his miserable plight or to achieve anything he wants in the realm of the world or in the kingdom of heaven. Fate, for him, is not a reality other than the results of our own previous actions, which every person is bound to have, but is at the same time quite free and strong enough to modify by his present efforts" (Atreya: *The Philosophy of the Yogavāsiṣṭha*, p. 128; Vide also Atreya: *Vāsiṣṭha-darśanam*, p. 20-24).

Worship of a God not necessary for Self realization

Devotion (*bhakti*) to or worship of any personal god is not of much use in attaining Liberation. No body can confer Liberation as a boon on any body, unless the latter deserves it by his own right. No other agency than our own, than that of our own purified mind, can show us the Absolute, which is our very Self. "One is one's own friend or enemy. If one does not save onself there is no other remedy (VIb. 162. 18). God like Vishṇu and Shiva, however propitiated and pleased, cannot bestow Self-knowledge on one who does not think for himself. (IV. 43. 10). God, according to Vasiṣṭha should not be sought for elsewhere; He resides within every one (III. 7. 2). The God residing within the temple of one's own body is the same as is immanent in Shiva, Vishṇu, the Sun and Brahmā (III. 7. 4). "Those who, leaving the God residing within their own heart, worship other gods, are like those fools who, having thrown away the precious gem that was in their hand, run after ordinary glass-pieces." (V. 8.14). The best way to worship the real God residing within the temple of our own body is Self-knowledge and Self-realization. "The artificial and showy ways of worshipping God are only for the ignorant and for those whose minds are restless and not matured" (VIa. 30. 5). And "devotion of gods like Vishṇu is invented only to put on the right track those fools (*mūrkha*) who run away from study, effort and thinking" (V. 43. 20).

Renunciation of Active Life not necessary

Performing or giving up of any kind of *action*, whether it be religious, moral or worldly, is immaterial for attaining liberation. It is foolish to believe that action can be given up. Life is action, thought is action. As long as one continues to be an individual and is thinking and living, one is doing some action. Renunciation of activities is therefore impossible and so is not required for attaining Liberation (VIa. 28, 8, 6; VIb. 2. 34, 31, 35, 42, 43). The root of action is desire or will. That is to be cut off. Personal desire and will are to be given up and not actions. (VIa. 2. 44; IV. 38. 4). For Self-realization, one has not even to go to a lonely place in some forest, renouncing worldly duties and activities. The busy home-life is obstruction to Self-realization. It is the culture and refine-

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ment of mind which is needed more than renunciation of worldly life. (VIb. 3. 26, 38).

Practical Self-realization

Knowledge, for Vasiṣṭha, is not merely an intellectual affair. It must be lived by, otherwise it cannot stay. We have not only to *know*, but also to *be* and to *feel* and to *expand pari pasu*. To truly know the Absolute, we have to expand into the Absolute (VIb. 22. 1-5). How actually to effect this expansion is therefore as important a problem as to know the nature of the Reality. The practical method of Self-realization is called *Yoga* by Vasiṣṭha. (VIa. 13, 3; VIa. 128. 50-51). This *Yoga* is a process along two lines, namely, *denial of individuality*, which is the same as limitation and imperfection, and *affirmation of the Self*, which is Perfection and Peace. As our individuality does not consists only of *intellect* but also of *feeling* and *activity* and as the Self is not only the Absolute Consciousness, but also the Absolute Peace and Bliss, the practice of Self-realization may proceed along three ways or along any one of them, for they are only three aspects of the same process, namely : (1) Intellectual conviction of not being an individual, but of being the Infinite Absolute (*Brahma-bhāvanā*). (2) Negation of desire, attachment, like and dislike, of imagining to get this or that, of possessing this or that, and of feeling to be an individual, etc.—all of which are various aspects of our affective nature. Along with this negative process, we require positive cultivation of equanimity, universal brotherhood, cosmic feeling of oneness with all beings, and love of the Self verging on ecstacy. (3) Practice in stopping the perpetual activity of life manifesting itself in the constant rising and setting of the vital current (*prāṇa*), which is an external expression of our being in perpetual flux internally. This stopping of the activity of the *prāṇa* can be brought about by practice in lengthening the usually unnoticed moments of rest which occur when one current of the vital breath has set in and the other has not yet taken its rise. This moment of rest in breathing activity corresponds to that experience of rest in consciousness, however fugitive it may be in our ordinary life, when one idea has ceased to occupy the focuss of consciousness and the other has not yet appeared therein. (*Vāsiṣṭha darśanam*, pp. 204-237; *The Philosophy of the Yogavāsiṣṭha*, pp. 434-488).

Seven Stages on the Path of Self-realization

Although in reality the Self is ever realized and the individual ever identical with the Absolute, yet from the point of view of the individual himself, it is a gradual process which may extend to any length of time or to several lives of the individual, in accordance with the intensity of his aspirations and earnestness of his efforts. Several stages may be marked on this progressive path of evolution of the individual consciousness into the Absolute Vasiṣṭha notices seven. The first stage is when the individual, having come to the consciousness of the evils of individual and selfish living, aspires to transcend it (*Shubhechchhā*). The second, when

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he philosophises over and investigates into the nature of the Self and the world (*Vicharaṇā*). The third, when on account of the knowledge of its ultimate unreality revealed by philosophical thinking, the individuality (mind) becomes less and less assertive and is little experienced (*Tanumānasā*), The fourth, when the aspirant begins to feel the being of the real Self within him (*Sattavāpatti*). The fifth, when clinging to the objects of the world is finally given up by rising above all desires (*Asamsakti*). The sixth, when all things are realised to be unreal from the Absolute point of view (*Padārthabhāvanā*), or (according to another reading) when the individual affirms himself to be the Ultimate Reality (*Padārtha-bhāvanā*). And the seventh, when the mystic experience of being one with the Reality is realized in consciousness(*Turyā*). This is the last door which opens into the unspeakable *Nirvāṇa*. Those who live on the 7th stage are called *jīvanmuktas* (the liberated living ones). After the death of their physical body they enter the Disembodied Liberation (*Videha-mukti*).

The Life of Liberation

The person who has become liberated from individuality and is yet living is called a *jīvanmukta*. His way of living is described in great details in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. For want of space we shall quote only a summary statement of the life of *jīvanmukti*, made by us elsewhere: "He or she(for we must remember the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* is not prejudiced against the fair sex and admits that women have equal right to be liberated) is the happiest person on the earth. The jīvanmukta is neither delighted in prosperity nor dejected in distress. Outwardly discharging all the duties of life, he is free within. He is free from the bonds of caste and creed and is polite and friendly to all. He is busy in the affairs of life, but is free from desires. He has nothing to attain, nor has he anything to give up. He is in solitude, even in the midst of worldly activities and is always above the turmoil of life." (*The Philosophy of the Yogavāsiṣṭha*, p. 72). "Having seen him, having heard about him, having met with him, and having remembered him, all creatures feel delighted (V. 39. 54). He has no longer any struggle for livelihood. The guardian-angels of the world protect and support him, as they do the entire cosmos (IV. 32. 38-39)" (*Yogavāsiṣṭha and Its Philosophy*, p. 47).

Nirvāṇa or the Final Liberation from the World-experience

Such a man (or woman) is no longer bound by the universal Law of Karma to undergo another birth or experience another objective world as a consequence of his thoughts and activities in this life. He is outside the pale of the Law of Karma, because only those acts, mental or physical, have to germinate or fructify into future lives and experiences which are done with a *motive*, with a conscious desire to attain or avoid something. But the actions which are performed spontaneously, without any desire, motive or attachment, are above retribution, fructification and bondage (VIa. 87. 19. 21; VIb. 199. 7, 33; IV. 38. 16 17). Thus the sage,

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who has transcended all desires. is free from attachment and is above selfish willing, is beyond the pale of the law of *Karmaphala.* He is not bound by any of the actions done in his freed life to experience its consequence in this or any other life (VIa. 102, 31; VIa. 2. 43; V. 42. 14). His personality (mind, individuality, finitude, etc.) will be dissolved in the infinite ocean of Bliss, after the death of the present body—the effect of his previous *samkalpas.* (IV. 42. 13). It has also to be noted here that according to Vasiṣṭha. "It is not necessary or compulsory that the liberated individual should totally cease to continue as an individual (after the death of the physical body). He may or may not do so. Some freed sages continue to exist as individuals, of their own accord, and take part in the Cosmic activities, disseminate knowledge and help other individuals in working out their Liberation. Vasiṣṭha, Krishṇa and Buddha are some examples." (*The Philosophy of the Yogavāsiṣṭha*, p.548). "The kernel of Liberation according to him is *conscious realization of complete oneness with the Brahman.* It makes little difference whether this occurs in an embodied state or in a disembodied one (II. 4. 5)" (*Ibid*, p. 548).

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LANGUAGE And PHILOSOPHY

S. H. DIVATIA

IN this paper I propose to discuss briefly the linguistic slant given to philosophy in recent times. We are too near it to give a dispassionate accouut of what is known as 'the analytic'or linguistic movement in philosophy but we can certainly reveal the technique of linguistic analysis and offer comments on it.

That language plays an important part in shaping philosophical problems is nothing new; though some over enthusiastic linguistic philosophers would like to have us believe that dawn broke with the publication of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. To take an instance at random, Berkeley writes, upon the whole I am inclined to think that the greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hiterto amused philosophers and blocked our way to knowledge are entirely owing to ourselves, that we have first raised a dust and then complained that we cannot see".

Again it is not Wittgenstein who has written the following passage:

> So far too are the students of metaphysics from exhibiting any kind of unanimity in their contentions that metaphysics has rather come to be regarded as a battleground quite peculiarly suited for those who desire to exercise themselves in mock combats and in which no participant has ever succeeded in gaining even so much as an inch of territory... This shows beyond all questioning, that the procedure of metaphysics has hitherto been a merely random groping, and what is worst of all, a groping among mere concepts."

The writer of this interesting passage is Immanuel Kant. Of course,I do not mean to suggest that there is no difference between ancient and modern criticism of meta-physical philosophy. The modern criticism is much more radical. It questions the basic tenets of metaphysics and doubts whether that is at all possible. It has been necessary to show this continuity with the past philosophical thought because some people still persist in thinking that linguistic philosophy is something that is entirely new. This belief is shared by its admirers as well as its critics. Nothing is entirely new under the Sun and I even believe Indian Philosophy bears signs of linguistic influence, if one takes pains to ferret it out.

With this introduction, I propose to exhibit the linguistic technique. The proof of the pudding, they say, is in the eating. It is in its ability to make clear and, if possible, to solve philosophical problems that the technique will be judged.

The weapon used in combating the traditional philosopher is the 'Verification Principle.' According to this principle, "a statement is Verifiable, if and only if, some observation statement can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises, without being deducible

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from those other premises alone. So, according to this principle, if some observation does not directly or indirectly make a difference to a particular statement then it is metaphysical. In other words, "The meaning of a statement is really simply, the method of its verification".

But this principle, it was found, is too general, and is guilty of the same high a priorism with which it charges its opponents. It is realized now that just to bring out this principle with a dashing air is not enough, and one must examine each philosophical problem on its own merits before dismissing it as meaningless.

I, therefore, propose to examine how linguistics confusions are responsible for the problems that have continued to puzzle philosophers.

Usually, philosophic thought takes the form of laments:—

(1) We can't know (or sometimes, really know that there is cheese on the table(Problem of physical objects).

(2) I can't know what is going on in the minds of others (Problem of solipsism v/s behaviourism)

(3) Inductive generalisations can't give certain conclusions (problem of just)

(4) I can't know whether machines think. (problem of int. v/s. non int.

These problems can easily be shown to be linguistic and not factual. A philosopher makes radical departures from the ordinary use of language, and it is these that puzzle us.

Take for example, 'the problem of 'Other Minds''I can't know whether you are in pain. I can only observe the contortions of your limbs, the twitching of the muscles etc. Usually, we infer by analogy that other people have minds. I have painful feelings when I see your twisted face, cries of ah ! etc., I guess that you must be in pain.

The analogy breaks down at a crucial point. Indeed, it breaks down just when it begins to count. No sooner, the analogy is put forward, then we are inclined to exclaim, "Bur this is different".

The point is that I have direct access to my own experience, but I do not have the same direct access to your feelings. 'I know I am angry or in pain and I cannot in the same way know your anger. Now clearly the philosopher is guilty of misuse of language. 'I know I am in pain','I introspect my own pain'—these are phrases used in everday language to refer to my own sensations or feelings. Strictly speaking it does not make sense to say "I introspect your pain'. 'I introspect your pain lacks a usage in language. If I know your sensation in the same way as I know my sensation, then it will no longer be your sensation, but my sensation. The words 'mine' and 'yours' will become useless.

The problem of 'Other Minds' can be cleared up still further if we examine the use of the word 'know' in everyday language. The word 'know' is used in various senses 'I know that' '7+5=12' Here 'know' amounts to complete or demonstrable certainty. 'I know I have sharp pain in my ears'; this also I know with complete certainty. It is senselss

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to ask;—'I am in pain but do I know that I am in pain? But,I know'this is a chair' 'I know him to be a good man, here 'know' is used in varying amount of certainty . There is a very interesting use of the word 'know' in 'you ought to have known me better than to be capable of that'. This interesting use is often found in connection with others estimation of our minds. But this is not the same 'know',as in philosopher's question.'Do I know what is going on in your mind?'

The point is that the philosopher is using the word 'know' here in the same strict sense as I know that '7+5=12' and 'I know that I am in pain. This assimilation of everyday use of the word 'know' in connection with complete certainty is wrong. The philosopher is asking for the impossible. In other words, he is crying for the moon. As Prof. Wisdom says 'Not being able to know the minds of others becomes a logical impossibility and not a physical impossibility. I can't know what is going on in the minds of others is like 'parallel lines can't meet' (or if you like, they meet at infiinity). It is unlike 'I can't go to America or the moon (where the difficulty is due to expense or lack of available means) When analysed in this clear light, the problem loses its former hold on us. As Wittgenstein puts it 'What the Solipsists means is quite correct. Only it cannot be said, but it shows itself.... That the world is my world, shows in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which I understand) mean the limits of my world".

Take again the problem of intellegence v/s. intelligence Man being the most self-congratulatory of all animals likes to assert his unique intelligence. He does not like to be told that the same intelligence in its rudimentary form is found in species lower down in the evolutionary scale. A philosopher says,"only men can think and certainly machines cannot". Nowadays there are complicated machines like electronic computers, which, if you feed data into them are able to compute results on a punch card. 'But that is not thinking' we say. Is this thinking" one might ask again, 'Can we watching this complicated behaviour pattern, say, that machines think? The problem begins as a serious factual problem. But, it only begins with all seriousness we look intensely at machines and wonder at their power.But after some time the verbal aspect of the problem strikes us. We have in mind a certain definition of thinking,(as a rational human activity) (Compare Wittgenstein: Could a machine think?Could it be in pain?Well in the human body to be called such a machine?It surely comes as close as possible to being such a machine. But a machine surely cannot think.Is that an empirical statement?No.We only say of a human being and what is like one that it thinks. We also say it of dolls and no doubt of ghosts too. But a machine' No:) Then no amount of evidence is allowed to count as evidence. Therefore it becomes a necessary linguistic truth that 'machines cannot think'. The problem which appeared profound factual problem becomes a request for a ruling. 'Is a flying boat a ship?''Is tomato a fruit or a vegetable?' appears a genuine question but

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it becomes a question of application words. In this way as Prof. Wisdom puts it"A philosophical problem when fully asked and when it is not half asked, answers itself.

Take again, the problem of induction which has puzzled philosophers. Inductive arguments are criticised because they lack certainty. 'Is inductive reasoning reasoning'They ask.(That is why they like to cast their speculations in the deductive mould in the grand manner of Spinoza). I may see the sun rising in East hundreds of times. 'Will it rise to-morrow?' philosophers have stressed the lack of certainty here and they have said that we require a non-empirical principle to justify induction. But why should induction be justified? Linguistic philosophers have said, that the problem of the justification of induction,or the skeleton in the cupboard of inductive logic, has unnecessarily caused worry to philosophers.

The Reasons for inductive generalisation are inductive reasons and not deductive ones. Inductive generalisations do a different job in the language of logic, and science from that done by deductive arguments. Prof.Ryle would call the confusicn a 'Category Mistake'.Induction and deduction belong to different levels and it is wrong to ask from inductive generalisations the same certainty that one asks from deductive arguments. In other words,the word 'reason' as it is used in ordinary language has various uses, for example, "I have reason to believe that India's policy of non-alignment will produce good results in the near future. It is logically possible that I am mistaken.But as my belief is based on some evidence. I can use the word legitimately. It is extremely puritannel to restrict the word 'reason' to deductive arguments' (P.F.Strawson writes, in his 'Introduction to Logical Theory. "It is an analytic propostion that it is reasonable to have degree of belief in a st. which Is proportional to the strength of the evidence in its favour. So to ask whether it is reasonable to place reliance on inductive procedure is like asking whether it is reasonable to proportion the degree of one's convictions to the strength of one's evidence. Doing this is what being reasonable means in such a context'.

In this way, we can conclude that the deductionists are trying to introduce an impossible standard in inductive arguments. It is an instant of a glaring misuse of language.

In the case of the problem of reality of physical objects also, the problem can be shifted from a factual level to the linguistic level. Relying on the obvious fact that our senses sometime deceive us (e.g. I might mistake cheese for soap) philosophers conclude that we are always so deceived. But mistakes in sense experience are always corrected by further sense-experience(In the avove example on tasting I might learn that it is cheese, and not soap) The philosopher on the other hand gets into a neurotic doubt that no amount of testing will justify, confidence in his sense-organs. 'I am always deceived' he says like a neurotic' 'The world as a dream' he goes further. But here he is using the word 'dream' in a

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different way from ordinary usage. For even when sleeping in Baroda. I dream that I am in Bombay.I wake up say I dreamed that I am in Bombay but what sort of dream is it which everybody dreams and what would count as waking up from that dream? The dream that everydody dreams is no longer a dream at all but a physical reality. Common agreement is an indispensable condition of a physical object language."(Newell-Smith)

Linguistic philosophers therefore say that it is better not to talk about reality or unreality of physical objects but to talk about the relationship between statements about sense-data and statements about physical objects. The theory that they advocate is that of linguistic phenomenalism. It says that statements about material objects can be translated without loss of meaning into statements about sense-data. Such a sentence as 'There is a table in the next room' is to be recast into 'If a normal observer were to go through the next-door to look next to such & such a sense-data (giving it a place) then he would, if the light is normal see such & such a brown coloured data.

In other words,physical objects are what they are(Real in every sense of the word as Prof. Moore would say) but philosophers have coined a sense-datum language to do justice to the fact of illusion. Thus the drunkard sees pink rats means'The drunkard sees a pink sense-datum which he mistakenly believes to be pink rats. The problem of ultimate reality of physical objects just does not arise.

Instances of linguistic confusion can thus be multiplied almost endlessly to take another instance-the problem of infinity has puzzled philosophers because completion of an infiinite series is impossible.But infinity is not a place to be reached like Poona. I can go to V.T.station or Bombay and pointing to a train say'it goes to Poona'Now the sentence'It goes to infinity' has grammatical similarity to the above but the two sentences are not logically similar. Thus, if carefully reflected upon, answers most of the Idealist arguments against Space Time etc.

Wittgenstine has rightly remarked that philosophical problems begin when language goes on a holiday. We must bring the metaphysician back to ordinary language showing him that words have many uses and that he is too much fascinated by one particular use of a word,and adopt it as Standard. Wittgenstein has coined the word language-game to illustrate the many uses of words.

In one such game one party calls out the words, the other acts on them.The whole consisting of language & the actions into which it is woven, is the language game. There are many such language games 'Giving orders and obeying them.Reporting about an event,making up a story and reading it,making a joke,telling it,play acting etc.Naming objects and stating facts is not the only use of language. If we remember this we shall not search for a mythical world of values over and above the word of facts. Moral statements are not statements at all but expressions of attitudes "Propositions cannot express what is higher or lower" (W). Certain interesting questions arise.

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To take only two—

1. Why this insistent appeal to ordinary use of words? Surely philosophers can use words as they like.
2. Is it an inevitable feature of language to mislead people, especially the philosopher?

To take the second question first it does seem as if language was a contrivance invested to mislead philosophers but we must remember that it is human beings who use language and they form impression about the world and select certain aspects of reality and that too, not always at the conscious level either unconsious motives and need to prove something at all costs also are at work. Hence we can say that language does mislead philosophers. But there is no room for any undue pessimism, If language misleads, analysis of language can show mistakes,the more conscious we are about our use of language the fewer mistakes we shall make.

As for the first question why this insistance on ordinary language. Vagaries of ordinary language have proved a stumbling block to many people who otherwise would accept the linguistic point of view. As a philosopher burst out at a philosophical conference "I as a philosopher do not care a brass farthing about whether bus conductors use this word in the way they do". Russell also says ordinary language allows nonsensical combination of symbols and contains symbols which are vague and ambigious. But then the answer to this ordinary language is necessarily vague. It is better to use the word elasticity instead of vagueness. It is due to this property of elasticity that ordinary language is richer than any artificial language that we may invent for some technical purpose. Always this has to be explained in terms of ordinary language. There may be departures from ordinary language for example Weissmann has given example of "not I think but it thinks in me to show the suddenness of flashing inspiration.

Too much fun can be made of metaphysicians. We must understand and respect the metaphysicians' motives. After all 'Is not a philosopher a person who is continually trying to say what cannot be said' thus breaking the pan 'where of you cannot speak, there of you must be silent.

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THE ABSOLUTE AND THE RELATIVE

JAMES B. KLEE

I

THIS is a scientific poem. It is scientific because it is about experience as each of us can experience and about behavior as each of us can behave. It is descriptive of the experiential values, both the obvious and the abstract, and does not try to explain in terms of "something else". It is a poem, well, because it is a creation, a hypothesis, a speculation. It is a symbolic expression of feelings about the symbolic and non-symbolic as we experience and express and react to these. (And that ought to hold the anti-neo-Aristoteleans.) It is not science *per se* in the ordinary but narrow use of this symbol because in the main nothing will be exactly measured or counted. However, as proportions will be judged, science in its elemental stages will be seen to emerge.

First let me suggest that the absolute and the relative are demensions of one another. An experience, A, cannot be relative to another and different experience, B, unless there are these, A and B, to bo related. In this sense they or what they designate are absolutes. At the same time, A and B cannot[1] be A and B as such unless there is some relationship between them which permits A to be discriminated from B. For A to be A or what it designates instead of something else (B) and vice versa, some continuum of relationship must be extant. In other words no thing can be considered out of context unless that in itself is considered as the context. Experiences are what they are because of their contexts but simultaneously in the other dimension of our argument the contexts can only be what they are because of the material of the context, what is contexted, the objects, symbols, or the experiences. In brief the absolute, the is or the being, is to the relative, the relationship, as form is to substance, up is to right, time is to space. Neither is "primary" except within a particular context. Neither is reducible to the other. They are not only of themselves existential but coexistential. All of which is so obvious as to seem absurd, But none the less it is difficult to say, and especially difficult to believe and remember all the time, and of course to act upon, because in and of itself it seems such a minor abstraction of little or no value. You still take a bath now and then, and your own at that, as Delmore Schwartz expressed it.

And yet this almost absurd obviousness may be at the core of several of our most difficult problems of existence: the problem that of our

1 I deliberately used the term 'cannot' to make the statement imply impossibility. Why it 'cannot' is a function of the fact that the two items A and B are defined as different in the first place. If there were doubts about this separation the statement would be mere dogma. The impossibility is logical. Empirically there always remains the possibility of misidentification.

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knowledge of the experience and motivation of others, and even the knowledge of our own experience and motivation. For it is possible to consider that a particular aspect of existence is relative when it is absolute and absolute when it is relative. Examples of this kind of confusion are legion but for purposes of dramatic illustration, the realms of madness and creativity in art, science, and morality as they manifest themselves in all aspects of daily living are the most immediately challenging. This is especially the case since as for example in art, "normal", we frequently emphasize the absolute, whereas in "madness", the relative (usually to our own point of view) is more apparent.

II

By the absolute aspect of dynamic experience I mean the "thing-in-itself" quality which is accepted in the naive realism of everyday living. By dynamic experience I am trying to indicate that motivation, or value generally, is part of the experience itself, is intrinsic to the experience and is not superimposed by some drive or force external to the experience. Experience itself is forceful and self driven. The emphasis, however, in this description of naive experience is not on either the objective reality of the alleged referent of experience or the subjective reality of the experiencer. This dichotimization of experience into organism and environment is legitimate only from the point of view of an external observer during the experience or before and/or after the experience relative to the experiencer. The absoluteness of experience concerns the immediacy of the dynamic experience. The experience is absolute as long as the object is not identified as such and the perceiver is not conscious of his relationship to the object as perceiver; or it is absolute as long as the relation of the simultaneousness of object and perceiver itself has become the absolute of experience. The absolute is that which Northrup calls "the immediately apprehended differentiated aesthetic continuum" with both "terms", the object and the subject, reduced to one, experience. Whatever you may wish to call this absoluteness of dynamic experience, this statement of immediate relationship, is irrelevant. James Joyce has suggested the use of the term "epiphany" in the brief discussion of aesthetics in *Stephan Hero* and this may well be accepted because of the seemingly miraculous element in all experience. The point remains that recognition must be given to this existential consciousness. Of all that which from a relativistic aspect could have been the particular relationships of organism and environment, only the only experience did in fact occur and that is the given, that is the conditon of existence and for good or bad you're stuck with it. Perhaps the thinker could have had other thoughts and perhaps other contents were available yet the particular thought as the combination of specific thinker and content was absolute and irrevocable. The particular experience experienced, the experiencer goes on from there.

This absoluteness of immediate apprehension, or the epiphany of

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aesthetic reality, this dynamic experience in itself is easy to recognize in one's response to inventions, scientific discoveries, moral statements (categorical imperatives), political or economic principles, historical events, the act of love, and to works of art, for these have a discreteness, a "standing alone" quality which frequently tends to prevent comparisons or other types of relational activity with other areas of experience. In a sense no continuum or choice scale is immediately recognized. These events have the arresting and numbing quality of a thorough seduction. For the moment, the individual is captivated and encapsulated from all the rest of the world. He becomes selfless and seems to exist neither in time or space for indeed such questions about subject or object, time or space, are not likely to arise. He is the experience and vice versa, and seems to move in a relatively effortless way towards—satiation. This is most frequently called the aesthetic experience. And yet it is but an aspect of the whole of experience and as such can be treated as noncorrelative. It is but one factor in the matrix of experience, a factor which enables the uniqueness of each experience, a moment of the exact time and space which makes the past past and the object always that object, the subject always that subject, and no other. Such is the dimension in which all experience is discrete, unique, and limited in time and space. By such is meant the absolute.

III

If art helps us to define the absolute, so madness brings us to a closer understanding of the relative. For whereas we sometimes can accept the aesthetic, the immediacy of the work of art, we fight acceptance of the products of the deluded and call it madness. We say no to the possessions, the compulsions, the hallucinations We deny their uniqueness, their absoluteness and immediacy, and place them in relation to something that can be accepted. We say these are the products of diseased minds, of sick brains and glands, of distorting heat waves, of propaganda and suggestion, or drugs and poisons, of the experience of frustration, conflict, and trauma For these other categories are acceptable. The unacceptable is thus related to the sick organism, to the false culture, to the disproportionate environment: we feel safe once again. And we may be at that, sometimes. For in the relational dimension there is mobility, change, and the chance to choose. One is not captivated entirely; one can compare, discriminate, and select. It is possible to move from or toward, increase or decrease one over the other. Then there is the chance to get out of trouble or into still more. There is freedom to the n-1 absolutes available within the perspective allowed. One has gone from the principle of pleasure to the principle of reality; but when no choice continuum is offered, when there are no degrees of freedom, then one is frustrated in that dimension. We may try to fight as long as there is some dimly sensed hope, but when that too disappears that dimension is dead for us and we are left just a little less alive.

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Of course for him who is "adjusted" to his madness, who accepts his mission, who no longer questions his lot, the same epiphanous structure of experience is evident as in the case of the experience called aesthetic. There is no need to distinguish between abnormality in the absolute dimension of experience. The madman like the priest accepts his calling. In fact it is not unusual for the inventive genius to claim the voice of God as the only authority. For the new absolute is not derivative, has no ultimate sanction beyond its being, its epiphany. Each individual, including the reader, must refer to his own insight for an ostensive definition.

To some extent experience in madness and aesthetic experience differ only as a matter of taste. There is no difference that cannot be questioned. Each may be accepeted for itself and that is the point. It is only in so far as we see that each leads to consequences of different value to us that any distinction between the two may be noticed. Madness too frequently is self-limiting, and as such defeats its protective function by ultimately removing or devaluating that which it would protect. The question which madness does not answer or answers but poorly is: "Madness, then what?" In fact any inability to answer the question: "Then what?" is revealing of madness; to the degree that the answer evades this question, to that degree there is madness.

That is the only test of the abnormal. The normal epiphany of experience is, like most science and art, open ended. Growth may still occur, selection take place, change be accepted with grace and interest. Life can expand in depth and scope, in richness of action and experience. The completion of one leads to the opening of the next, not to boredom, self-destruction, or fear. Theoretically, if the paths chosen were completely normal, there should be no termination to life. Even at present there is usually continuity of life on into the future somewhere of some species. And that life can be called normal, the healthy life. No, it is not in the absolute dimension that the difference between normal and abnormal lies. It is only in the relative dimension that such a consideration gains significance. Then why do we continue to make the mistake of judging the absolute as good and bad, healthy and diseased, normal and abnormal? I do not know entirely the probable answer to this but the fact is that we do confuse these and I would like to point to a few crucial areas where this confusion causes no end of needless suffering to those so misinformed. This includes all of us.

IV

Actually a good part of the difficulty starts in the confusions relating to the nature and scope of one's own experience and particularly as it is extended to the interpretation of one's relation to others. This is especially obvious when one is in an authoritative relation to another as expert, leader, or parent. True, good and evil exists for us in our pain and misery, joy and exaltation. Yet the thing-in-itself is not good or bad

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but only in its relationships. Any one thing is sometimes good and sometimes evil and only the extremely, misexperienced can ultimately fail to see this. Very recently some things like love were good, others like sex were bad. Yet how can this be if one is of the other ? We admired the highly motivated but despised the over emotional yet the intense disregard of emotion is nothing but the negative aspect of high motivation. To do any one thing intensively is for that time to neglect and obviate all other values. Too often we developed pairs of names to designate the good and bad aspects of a thing separately, yet failed to realize we were but naming the same thing twice instead of the different relationships which were the actual basis of the differentiations. The epiphanous experience in and of itself is always ambivalent. Only the context enables the discrimination of its relative values. The psychoanalyst has long been aware of this ambivalence and of course it has been long recognized as the "golden mean", "tao", or "way".

From birth, and possibly from even before, such choices are apparent and are usually mishandled by those in the dominant political(power) relationship to the developing individual. For the authority in attempting to choose for someone else sets up rules or lists by which to ease this task for himself. No longer can he permit others the exercise of taste for obviously his tastes are his own and not the others.' An authority then, if he is to control the actions of others, must resort to standards and external sanctions. Only in this way can he maintain his special privilege. And yet if dynamic experience or taste is the basis of choice how mad he must be to think he can in any way choose for another. Because of his often superhuman sense of power and its complement of obligation he feels it his responsibility, which, of course it would be if he were omniscent. Yet does not the parent think he knows better in relation to the child, the child to the dog, the teacher to the student, the lawyer to his client, the doctor to his patient, the governor to his people, the priest to his parish ? The superior, the expert, because it is what he knows is his own absolute experience is misled to believe it is all that is to be known and so offers a rule, a list of sanctions and values. And because the recipient is likely to be unaware of such origins in the absolutes and relationships in the experience of the authority, he can only apply the rules to the thing and so probably is doubly mistaken and confused.

The last statement is somewhat misleading for the submitter does not experience the list or rule of things entirely without relationships. In fact, the matter is far worse than one might suspect. The additional trouble lies in that there is always and very definitely a relationship but it is to the authority and not to the situation that the relationship is established. To borrow from Norbert Wiener (out of Heisenberg) the concept of the "evil eye", the authority by trying to establish an experience of relationships to some situation succeeds only in establishing it to himself. But when asked for what he has done this he will usually deny that was

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his intent and answer instead that he was trying for the development of independent and responsible experience in the existence of the other. As such, all authority is truly mad. At best the expert, the individual, who, because of more experience has some advantage, can only lead by example and guidance and not by command and instruction if both of these dilemmas are to be circumvented.

Specific examples of this type of difficulty are extremely easy to find for they are most of our life. The mother who is anxious for the welfare of her newly born child prevents it from putting strange objects in its mouth for fear of contaminative results to the infant. She has just established that habit when the time for weaning arrives and the must now cope with a child which rejects what is for it, the "bad" strange objects, its new solid food. Simultaneously this rejection of what was learned to be avoided incurs the loss of his mother's affections for which the avoidance relationship has been established in the first place. He soon ceases to trust the evidence of his senses and in his turn seeks signs of eternal truth instead of reliable knowledge. Again strictures regarding sexuality, especially for females, cause them to abhor the act for the first third of their existence but then they discover after receiving the ring that it takes the next third of existence to overcome this former set of values so what formerly was bad is now good. No wonder that so many reach the menopause thoroughly confused. The student in submitting to "basic disciplines" soon abandons thinking about the subject matter of the discipline and instead thinks primarily of how to please his superior, the teacher. And since his own original work is likely to be highly unbasic or individual and not in strict conformity with the "basic discipline" he too ceases to trust in his own experience and seeks sanctions in a white coat, collar, or skin color. Yet when out of school he discovers that he must learn to choose for himself. We can only pray he hasn't learned the original lesson too well. Of course one could continue to develop food aversions, frigidity, or slavish professionalism instead of fighting through the handicap. Such individuals are frequently comfortable in their selves even though to others they are dull and a threat to the freedom of everyone. It is possible to let the ambivalent remain bad always or good always. One can place the blame or praise elsewhere and so not have to choose now one way now another according to the relative circumstances. I just suggest that since choice is possible, and if we wish to have a democratic society with a self-choosing and responsible people, we can do much to make such choosing probable. We do not have to give in to totalitarian measures. They are not necessary.

V

On the more intimate level of the belief in one's own experiences the same sorts of consideration apply. Actually of course one need not apply principles to experience since, as experience is unique—"solid". discrete, or absolute—principle or form can be found to be intrinsic to it in the

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first place. It is this of which I speak.

The individual accepts or rejects his own immediate experience to the degree that he is able to reject or accept the declarations of authority. This is particularly noticeable in the case where the two may be found to conflict. Perhaps such conflict does not exist in the vast majority of cases. This may even be the case for most of us a good part of the time. After all, we all eat much the same food (if given the chance), we all sleep, drink, etc. It may even seem at first that to give up total totalitarian control of our more dependable experiences, just to make room for the vagaries of a few individuals or our own rare contradictory experiences, may be too great a price for the immediate security which the totalistic system apparently would offer. The anxiety which at first glance seems to be the alternative may easily spur the defeated individual to re-establish a security system far worse than the one so hesitantly left behind. And the despair following defeat certainly seems horrible at first. Such anxiety, the "dizziness of freedom" as Kierkegaard put it, should never be underestimated. Anxiety is always the first payment towards the price of freedom. Yet the longer the first step is postponed the more difficult it may appear to be to take it. And the main point is overlooked, anyway. If such motives or dynamic experiences (anger, eating, love) are so dependable in the first place, would it not be wiser to recognize that it is not necessary to insist upon them? Can we not see that they will so likely insure themselves that any systematic organization can be developed democratically and need not be imposed from above? The stupidity and madness of totalitarian discipline lie in the fact that in the hysterical haste to regulate and constantify life one loses sight of the truth that life contains in itself sufficient limitation and self-discipline as to obviate the need for regulation if given half a chance. Life itself is its own discipline, contains its own order, is self-regulating. More order in and of itself within the life structure is unnecessary.

Perhaps the story is apocryphal, but an acquaintance once said he came across Mondrian in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, seated before a Breughel making sketches for one of his "compositions." In the Breughel could be seen the order he was abstracting. But it could not have been the other way. What is necessary is to expand and enrich living, to bring more into the scope of living. This will not occur if we deliberately cut off the paths to the future by distracting attention to the internal disorder which is disordered only by our misunderstandings and fear and by the unconsidered vagaries of existence which have induced or elicited it. Actually the cues to further internal order are outside the system and these can only be found by continual expansion, not by involution and contraction. Creativity and invention, although they restructure the experience at hand, do so only because of the additional experience of other sorts which create new contexts and dimensions of experience. They do not come from more of the same for all that provi-

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des are the permutations and combinations of what one already has. In the latter case the need for creativity is obviated. If what one had at hand solved one's problems entirely one would have no problems to begin with. The staticity, the balance, the homeostasis, the ordered discipline sought under authoritarian ideals is found only in the unperpetuating machine. As such it is regular and trustworthy provided it is well maintained. But it is insufficient in the long run, leading only to the boredom of self-imposed impoverishment and to the destruction caused by one's own excess of timidity.

VI

As a matter of fact it would seem that wherever ambivalence or conflict arises within a problem it can only be solved by reference to at least a third point of reference. Just as a plane needs to be fixed in space by at least one more point than the two necessary to a line, so any complementary schism needs an additional referent in order to avert mutual destruction. This has usually been popularly recognized in any situation where civil warfare threatens in either the individual or social dimension. It frequently takes an external enemy to bring the individual together with himself, to reunite the quarreling family, to bring the nation together, to restructure the idea. However, it is not necessary that the "third force" be negative and threatening; a common goal can unite the split group or individual. And in fact that is the essential aspect even under negative pressure. For in the latter case, unless there were a place to which or a way in which they could go together, pressure in and of itself need only have a purely chance result. It would even seem that only by a third external factor can any problem, insolvable within the stated limits, be solved. Every trick puzzle bears this out as do all the psychological experimentations on "direction" in thinking. Once a split has occurred into mutual or complementary oppositions, reconciliation must always be through re-organization via the mediation of at least a third factor. Besides, if this were not so, there could be no division or differentiation in the first place. For as indicated above it is the contexts that enable discrimination and for a context to exist there must be at least one more absolute than the thing contexted to provide the relationship.

But what is more, the neglect of the self-regulation of living structures is not dissipated entirely unless authoritarian control is absolute and perfect. Usually the ignored capacities find enough nourishment on their own to continue independently. The remaining viability is amazingly tough and is likely to fight back as Toynbee's internal proletariat or Freud's unconscious "id" well suggest. As such psychoanalysts as Wilhelm Reich and Carl Jung and the other scientists who have a sense of the continuity of things and their expansive evolution and development have pointed out, chaos and lack of discipline of which we are most afraid and confronting which we are most anxious and insecure we have

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ourselves created. For it is but complementry to the restrictive discipline we have attempted to impose. In a sense, whenever one makes a thing disproportionately some one definite thing. one also creates its opposite through neglect or repression. One creates one's own nemesis in dialectical fashion. Only by a grasp of the thing in its entirety can one go on from there. Otherwise one remains in a state of internecine warfare, which will bring either the group or the individual to its own destruction long before its time. In our fear of burning the candle at both ends we burn it in the middle and thus fall apart the sooner.

It do not intend that this has to be of necessity in some mystical fashion for that would be as dogmatically limiting as the tendencies to which this argument is offered in opposition. The "failure of native", the neurotic hesitancy, the search for perfection of experience before action is equally as destructive and for the same reasons. Rather the whole evidence of evolution is suggestive of the fact that the complementary, that which is left out in the plans of the present, usually finds reinforcement somewhere or it would not be extant in the first place. One would not have neurosis if the things fought against were not sufficiently nourished by one's environment to enable their viability. There would not be the anguish of frustration and the conflict within the individual, the misery of civil warfare between the peoples of a state or states, or the waste of warfare of mankind against the other creatures of his environment, if the opposition were not in some measure in and of itself-successful and valuable.

If we were perfect, if we had the exclusive solution, there would be no anxiety, no doubt,no disease.But in fact there has always been something else left to be desired and in an expanding universe one would have to have colossal conceit, superhuman knowledge and experience, to ever not feel that something remains unexplored in this universe. Every art, every science, every system has at one time or another found itself unnecessarily limited by its own conceit and has admitted its humility or has perished. This is as much a fact of experience as any "hard fact' in any field of endeavor. There is little reason to believe that this state of affairs will ever change.

And the recognition of this is in experience itself. Sometimes we deny those murmurings of things to come which are before, nay in and of our eyes. Yet these are in our experience as absolute as that which we do accept, that which we do affirm. As we throw off the totalistic and authoritarian aspects of our experience these new items emerge, not because they are newly created but because they were their all along and have for reasons relating to there evolution only now reached sufficient proportions to be taken cognizance of. Or perhaps we have lost fear of the earlier contents of experience by acceptance of their implicit organization, we have been liberated for what we had potential in us all along. Within the potentially expanding experience of the individual

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is all that he can use, all that he could use to regulate his life and set an example in the experience of others. That all that he may need is not in his own experience at a particular absolute moment is the tragedy of existence, is the source of his forlorness his, loneliness, his anguish and despair. Yet, to believe that another's experience can do it for him is to deny his own experience, is only to lead to an acceleration of his own destruction and that of the others, too.

VII

The artist traditionally, and the creative and productive individual generally, be he scientist, philosopher, businessman, laborer, parent, child, in fact all of us, recognizes this sooner or later. Who is to sanction whatever we may do? Perhaps primitives did what Picasso did before him but does that confirm or excuse his own original experience? May be Cage's music has had its analogies in Bali. So what ? Perhaps Aristotle, Christ, Moses, or Freud thought it too. About all one can say is "that's nice" and feel somewhat less lonely, feel a bit warmer that there is a point of departure, a start for cooperation. Here is an act of intercourse in which two have momentarily had a sense of kinship. Yet neither sanctions the other. Of course by the experimentation and measurement of science one can gain the accumulation of experiences which will enable one to discriminate better the relative proportions and probabilities of that which is already known and hence act more wisely. But that changes only the degree not the kind. And should that remain the focus of the scientist, he too is doomed sooner than he need be and by his example destroys all who would trust him. The whole history of science bears this out as Leslie White has recently shown. The earlier sciences were concerned with those facts of existence which were relatively distant and regular. Astronomy, physics, chemistry, set patterns which because of their apparent relatively greater objective concreteness and regularity have held up advancement in the more intimate social and life sciences. Mistaking objects for objectivity, the life scientist has sought his data in the same area of mechanics as the physicist and hence has been unable to perceive life, society, mind, or culture. In measuring social behavior he believes he has an "objective" record if he weighs his rats rather than accept the most apparent fact that they fight or dominate or mate one another. The anthropologist, unable to believe in the obvious fact of culture and its evolution, seeks sanction from the psychologist only to find the latter worshipping at the shrine of the physiologist and so on down the "party line" of "objectivity". Yet the experience of culture is as absolute as the experience of a gram or an act and just as real. The object, the mechanism, is but part of the story and as such is relative. It is the experience, which contains the object, which is absolute and gives rise to as many dimensions of science or experience as there are kinds. The social science of which we have such great need today can only help us if those whose interest it is strike out in these new dimens-

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ions and explore them no matter how hesitant and awkward this may be. And so the growing child, no one can take his first step for him. And the parent, their child has never been raised before. And the teacher, the new producer, the laborer. Their jobs have never been done their way before by them. Yet they are in the absoluteness of their own experience. And the absolute, the irrevocable past and present are none the less the more, just that. One must still go his own way. If there be any legitimation for the act, it is only in one's own experience. For that is all that is absolute and is itself its only sanction. But then the consequences are one's own also, not to mention their influence on others, and here we are forced to recognize the relative.

VIII

Like radiation wave to particle the relative is just another way of regarding the absolutes of experience. The relative can only be a dimension of the argument, not separate as an entity, except in name only. The relative aspect provides the continua from which by the very fact of the relationship the absolutes are discriminated. Whereas the substance is the existent absolute, the relative provides the form, Northrup's theoretic component, the structural aspect, the direction, the choice scales, continua or configurations. The relative is the other dimension of the absolute. It provides the direction of the choice. And it occasions the consequence.

As in the case of the absolute, the relative is not good or bad in and of itself. But it does provide the continuum which enables the comparison. A candy bar relative to diabetes may be good, if taken after insulin, had if before. A symphony as music may be good, as a sex substitute it woefully is inadequate. Yet the relationship is meaningless without takings into consideration the ends in view, the absolutes which it has related, the needs which view them and these are of course our absolutes. We shall find again no sanctions here either. Once again no rules can be offered except that we have no rules. No one relative dimension is exclusive of good or evil, of sanctioning necessity, of redeeming purpose. Redemption and the other problems we worry about in connection with the afterlife should be postponed until the afterlife to be worried about. Then it is a necessity but not one second before.

Yet it is only in the matrix of absolutes that the relationships reveal the directions of good and evil, health and disease, sanity or madness, social organization or chaotic exploitation, life or death. Given certain absolutes some relations are productive of further continuance, others only can lead to frustration, despair, conflict, and hopelessness, or misleading perversions. Some lead to a furtherance of love, others only to aggravated hate which if fulfilled can only instill more hate until the individual ends in murder or suicide. This may be of course good or bad depending on the relationships of the murderer or the suicide. But for any specified absolute the consequences may be for good or ill depending on

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the relative connecting dimensions of this absolute.

Such are the questions of values, of human motives and emotions, of general economics, of quantitative factors in whatever guises they may assume. For any absolute may be related to any other. Only unfortunately some relate more than others within the particular direction of relationship specified or to the absolutes which are existent. Relative to need for food, cement may fill the stomach but not entirely remove the hunger in all its aspects. This is the main point. The relation between the need and the particular goal which will completely satisfy that particular need is an absolute relationship. Anything less can only be found to be inadequate. If this is the case we may look at partial satisfaction in two ways. One is that such a partial relationship provides the opportunity for learning or change and if accepted in this vein enables one to change his mind but remain essentially unsatisfied. The other point of view is to reject the relationship as too limited and seek to find some other end which is more satisfying, but fail to recognize that a new relationship has ben offered. Actually both can be utilized. It is only the confusion of the two which is dangerous to the organism: For here the organism may be tempted to reject the newly-discovered relationship as a perversion or as a waste of time and effort, and hence frustrating. Or he may accept the new relationship without realizing that it is not what was sought in the first place, in which case sublimation is thought to have occurred and the perversion of means and ends is not recognized. Paradoxically the latter as "adjustive" is really perverted whereas the "perverted" is really adjustive or at least provides the possibilities of a further adjustment, and of course neither is completely in and of itself "necessary" or exclusive.

To be concluded

SYNCHRONICITY

Evil has its own synchronicity,
As good has too.
It is something to do with "The Law".
That "the Law may be fulfilled."
It is something to do with Balance,
Long years from the Centre of Life;
When individuals seem powerless
Against synchronistice strife.
Near the Centre, The Law is protective,
Full of loving care, and light.
But away from The Centre is darkness,
So no one can see what is right.

Zoe Richmond

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THE RELIGIOUS IDEALISM OF BERKELEY AND RADHAKRISHNAN

R. P. SINGH

BERKELEY'S Idealism has a religious background and his new conception of matter is put forth by him in the service of theism. His aim in propounding the principles of human knowledge is the restoration of beliefs which a revolutionary scepticism and materialism had destroyed. His philosophy is meant by him to be an attempt to adjudicate the rival claims of matter and Spirit to be the foundational reality and his judgment on this point is the nerve of his idealistic faith which is a faith in the final supremacy of Spirit. Materialism had given rise to impieties. "It had occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion".[1] He regards his new conception of matter as an effective argument against scepticism and atheism which "are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirits and ideas".[2] He speaks of the materialists as "impious and profane persons" whose belief in matter has led them to deny immaterial substance and the reign of divine providence.

Berkeley therefore undertakes "to give a glimpse of another world, superior to the sensible".[3] This superior world is the world of Mind, Spirit or Soul. Berkeley's philosophy is meant by him to be the vindication of the superior claims of this other world. Spirit or Mind for him is God who is the Creator,[4] who works all in all and by whom all things consist.[5] He is the Author of Nature and Maintains intercourse between spirits,[6] the sovereign Lord of all things,[7] the All-wise Spirit who fashions, regulates and sustains the whole system of being.[8] "Nature is vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God".[9] Nature i.e. "everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense" is "a manifest token of Divinity" "a sign or effect of the power of God"[10] "clear manifestation of the Deity"[11]. From this point of view Berkeley does not truly belong to the succession from Locke to Hume, that is, to the empirical line of thou-

1 Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec. 21
2 Ibid., Sec. 133
3 Siris, 330
4 Principles of Human Knowledge, 146
5 Ibid., 141
6 Ibid., 147
7 Ibid., 148
8 Ibid., 151
9 Ibid., 150
10 Ibid., 148
11 Ibid., 149

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ght the foundations of which were laid by Locke and which ultimately issued in the destructive nescience of Hume whose philosophy constitutes the very *reductio ad absurdum* of empiricism.

What Berkeley wanted to show was that nothing exists independently of Mind or Spirit and ultimately an Absolute Mind or Spirit. The vindication of this truth, he said, was the only effective answer to Materialism, to "the monstrous system of atheists", the "heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God".[12] What gives a distinctive unity to the idealistic schools is the thought that "spiritual values have a determining voice in the ordering of the universe."[13] Berkeley is mainly interested in establishing the general truth of the supremacy of Mind or Spirit in the ordering of the universe and not in any specific issues such as form the centre of philosophic discussion in the hands of later idealists including the modern ones, issues which are involved in Berkeley's own statements of his idealistic position. He is willing to accommodate himself to any philosophical position, provided it recognized the centrality and supremacy of the Divine Idea and "did not exclude the Intelligent mind, but considered it as containing all things."[14] Whether God be abstracted from the sensible world and considered by itself, as distinct from, and presiding over, the created system; or whether the whole universe, including mind together with the mundane body, is conceived to be God, and the creatures to be partial manifestations of the divine essence—there is no Atheism in either case, whatever misconception there may be"[15] He seems satisfied to think of God as transcending the natural world of things and persons (Plato and Aristotle) or as omnipresent in nature and spirit and "God and Nature as making one whole, or all things together as making one Universe".[16] The Egyptians in accepting the latter position cannot be condemned as atheists as they acknowledged the supremacy of "the Intelligent Mind".[17] Berkeley is concerned with the vindication of the primacy of Spirit in any attempt to understand the truth of the universe and the nature of the real; and it is towards such an attempt, namely bringing out the foundational character of Mind or Spirit for any conception of an intelligible world, that his enunciation of the principle '*esse* is *percipi*' is directed.

Berkeley's Idealism is primarily a metaphysic and not a theory of knowledge and the problem which Berkeley sets before himself is the problem of what he describes as "a distinct explication of what is meant by Thing, Reality, Existence; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge there of,

12 Ibid.. 150
13 'The Idealist Tradition', edited by A.C. Ewing (1957), p. 4
14 'Siris' Sec. 300
15 'Siris', Sec. 326
16 'Siris', Sec. 300
17 Ibid.

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so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words".[18] Thing or Being is the most general name of" what he calls the real existence.[19] There is an existence which he calls real or absolute existence[20] or existence in itself.[21] What is absolutely real has a "natural subsistence",of its own[22], and is able to subsist by itself.[23] There is another kind which constitutes the class of "dependent beings""which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by,or exist in,minds or spiritual substances'[24]They are'inert,fleeting".[25] What subsists by itself is the "real and true cause" and is "the object of theology, Metaphysics, or The *Philosophia Prima*"[26] the province of *philosophia prima* is constituted by "another order of beings —**mind and its acts—permanent beings**—not dependent on corporeal things, nor resulting, nor connected, nor contained; but containing, enlivening the whole frame; and imparting those motions, forms, qualities, and that order and symmetry, to all those transient phenomena which we term the Course of Nature".[27] Due to historical circumstances, the question concerning reality which Berkeley posed for solution assumed the form of an enquiry into the **reality** of 'matter': What in reason should we mean when, with Locke, we assume the reality of'matter'; and to what **power** should we refer the changing appearances presented to our senses" It was open to Berkeley to have asked a direct and straightforward question about what, in human experience, could be said to be real in itself. But the age in which Berkeley lived and thought was dominated by dogmas about Matter which was supposed to be deeper and more explanatory than conscious reason and these dogmas were making men materialists. Instead of trying to find **the true philosophical meaning of Reality,** he tried to ascertain **the true philosophical meaning of Matter,** of sensible and corporeal Things.[28] His enquiry led him to the truth that "Sensible or Corporeal Things" have no "absolute actual existence";[29] that anything should **exist in itself** or **absolutely** is absurd".[30]

Berkeley asks the question: "What is meant by the term 'Exist' when applied to sensible things:"[31] His answer to it is that their *esse* is *percipi*. To say 'this table **exists'**, or is 'something **real'**, means, if it has any meaning, that it is seen or felt by some one. Its being consists in being perceived. Out of all perception of the phenomena, the word 'table' is an empty abstraction. This is true of all the things we

18 'Principles of Human Knowledge', Sec. 89
19 Ibid., Sec. 89
20 Ibid,. Sec. 133
21 Ibid.. Sec. 87
22 Ibid.. Sec. 86
23 Ibid., Sec. 91
24 Ibid., Sec. 89
25 Ibid.. Sec. 89
26 Siris, Sec. 285
27 Siris, Sec, 293
28 Siris, Sec. 311
29 Ibid., Sec. 311
30 Ibid.
31 'Principles of Human Knowledge', Sec. 3

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touch and see or, in any wise, experience which cannot be real otherwise than as appearances of which a mind is percipient. The "unthinking things" have no absolute existence, "without any relation to their being perceived". Mind or consciousness is the root of reality. If all conscious life in the universe were to be annihilated, the phenomena realized in the five senses could have no existence. They would melt into non-being after total withdrawal of conscious or percipient life.

What is the nature of the above argument advanced by Barkeley in support of his thesis that the *esse* of material things is their *percipi?* According to Berkeley it is an instance of **"intuitive knowledge"**[32] The key-question which he raises is a question about the "intelligible existence" of the material world, of the concrete data of sense or phenomena and rejects "the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived", because such an existence is "perfectly unintelligible"[33] and one may "perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction".[34] This truth belongs to the class of truths which according to Berkeley, "are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them"[35] Berkeley does not expressly and explicitly formulate the ideal of intelligibility which, according to him, unperceived existence of matter fails to realize and of which it falls short. The only thing we can gather from his discussion of the intelligible conception of existence is that what is intelligible must be free from contradiction and must be meaningful. For Berkeley there is an *a priori* of intelligible existence and of intelligible thought which is involved in his entire discussion of the conception of reality. Berkeley attempts to enunciate this *a priori* truth in his axiom *esse* is *percipi* This is the truth that in all intelligible thought and existence there is a transcendent factor which is immanently present in both and without which neither thought nor existence would be intelligible. When Berkeley lays down that things around us would neither exist nor be as we now perceive, if no one was perceiving them, and on any other view the conception of Matter would be meaningless, he is unconsciously referring to this transcendent factor. This transcendent factor, according to his own formulation, is what he describes as perceiver, mind or spirit. The argument that matter is meaningless on any other view than that of *esse est percipi* is the basic argument of Berkeley and all others presuppose it and are but variations of it. Let us examine this view.

Berkeley attempts to render existence intelligible by introducing mind, spirit, or perceiver. Does this factor lend intelligibility to existence? On a closer scrutiny of the matter we find that Berkeley has got hold of an important truth in recognizing, in his analysis of the concept of material existence, the transcendent factor which is immanent in it. The only

32 'Principles of Human Knowledge', Sec. 3
33 Ibid., Sec. 3 and 6
34 Ibid., Sec. 4 and 24
35 Ibid., Sec. 6

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short coming in his movement of thought is that his passage, in *esse est percipi*, from existence to perceiver is abruptly direct and not gradual through the factor of "meaning and value". Berkeley, therefore, fails to integrate existence to spirit or mind in an ordered whole. He unconsciously recognizes that 'meaning and value' are part and parcel of the full-fledged existence of a thing. The real thing is 'existence plus, meaning and value' which is its very being and makes it what it is. But he does not fomulate this insight concerning the inseparability of existence from meaning and value into a recognized philosophical principle, and by passing directly from existence to mind, without the intervention of the world of meaning which would naturally lead to Mind or Spirit as the proper foundation of this world, lays it open to several difficulties which he is not able to overcome even after he has introduced God in his theory. Even a simple thing like a table or chair becomes intelligible only through the meaning or value which is an element in the reality of the thing. An existent is explained adequately not by another existent which is on the same level as the thing to be explained but by a factor which, while immanent in it, also transcends it, and is of a superior order. The *esse* of a thing is not its percipi it is its meaning and value which is also transcendent to the thing. Berkeley, in his analysis of the notion of existence, recognized this transcendent factor. He called it *percipi*; but he omitted to see that this factor was not immanent in the the thing, because it was brought in an external way and as an *ab extra* factor' and could not therefore be part and parcel of the full existence of the thing. The perceiver, if it has to enter into the reality of the thing must do so through meaning and value of the thing. The meaning and value of the thing are objective; they are meaning and value not for this mind or that but for Mind as such. As objective Mind is the foundation of the world of meaning and value which belong to the thing and constititute its being and without which the thing cannot be intelligible.

Berekley committed the mistake of passing directly from existence to the perceiver without the interposition of the world of meaning. The result was that he had to be content with an ideal of intelligibility, which was nothing more than verbal intelligibility, clarity of expression, explication of the meaning of sentences. He undertakes to render intelligible "what is meant by the term 'exist' when applied to sensible things"[36] and gives an analysis, by way of illustration, of the reality of the 'table'. "The table I write on I say exists—that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed meaning thereby that if I was in my study, I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it".[37] This is, to be sure, not an explication of the 'meaning' of the table and hence not an explication of the 'existence' of the table. It is an explication of the meaning of the sentence 'The table I write on I

36 'Principles of Human Knowledge', Sec. 1
37 'Principles of Human Knowledge', Sec, 1

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say exists'. Berkeley is unconsciously aware of this. "This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions"[38] But he is misled to think that herein he is giving a metaphysical account of the unintelligibility of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived',[39] namely proving that the *esse* of a thing is *percipi*. The truth of the table does not consist in its being an object of perception by a mind; it lies in the meaning and the purpose or value of which the table is an embodiment and which is roughly indicated by the words "I write on" in the sentence from Berkeley quoted above, words whose significance does not appeal to him. This meaning constitutes the true reality of the table. But meaning is founded in conscious mind which maintains and upholds the word of meaning. Existence, therefore, is ultimately grounded in mind or spirit. The *esse* of the table is in this way grounded in mind which is the dominant reality. The perceiver as perceiver has a factual existence and is not on a different level which is a superior level. Meaning and value belong to a superior order. Perception, the thing perceived, and the perceiver belong to the same order of existence. As Berkeley passed directly from the perceived object to the perceiving mind and ignored the element of meaning-value as a constituent element in the full "being" of the thing, he had to waver whether the perceiver who maintains the reality of the existential order is the individual mind or some universal mind.

Meaning is an objective something. This meaning which makes the thing what it is not relative to individual perceiving mind, but is a part of the intelligibility, which also means intelligible existence, of the thing. A thing may mean different things to different minds. But in spite of this there is a meaning which is the thing's own which one has to discover for oneself. The pen, for instance, has a meaning; it is an instrument for attaining a specific end. This meaning is part of the full existence of the thing. This meaning may have been put by the author of the pen in the pen. But after the pen has been brought into existence, the meaning becomes the meaning of the pen and can never be separated from it. Even before the pen came into being and became an accomplished existence, before it was produced or created, the thing and its meaning went together. The author was the seer who discovered these two going together i.e. the togetherness of the two.

Radhakrishnan's thought is in sharp contrast with that of Berkeley whose philosophy appears to me to be an unsuccessful attempt to found spiritualism on an idealistic basis. Radhakrishnan does not found his Idealism on consciousness or spirit being merely something factual but on the nature of the content experience and the character of that consciousness. The content of consciousness is value and that consciousness itself has a valuational structure which is three-dimensional (*sat, cit, ananda*) though the three are not three but three in one. The

38 Principles of Human Knowledge Sec. 1
39 Ibid.

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notion of value with which Radhakrishnan works is the notion of something which has or is existence—for-itself, which is *svārtha*, whose very being is its validity. Accordingly for him it is not only things like Bliss Calm and Peace that are values (being ends) but also those which are ordinarily regarded as realities or entities. Being or Reality is a value as much as Bliss. Likewise consciousness is a value. Spirit which is the oneness of Being, Consciousness, and Bliss is a value, the value par excellence, the supreme value of Reality as well as the supreme value of End. Spirit or consciousuess as value of Reality is not mere perceiver. The valuational character of consciousness is not constituted by the act of perception which is mere factual consciousness. In perception *qua* perception no valuation is involved.

Radhakrishnan joins issue with Berkeley according to whom the *esse* of material things is their *percipi* and the *esse* of spirits their *percipere*. The mere act of perception cannot confer on the "perceiving active being" which Berkeley calls Mind, Spirit, Soul or Myself, a valuational status and turn it into an entity which is the foundation of the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth" without undergoing a transformation in its constitutional character and appearing as an End-in-itself. In Radhakrishnan's idealistic thought Consciousness or Spirit appears as a Value, as the Value of Reality which is Existence-for-itself. Berkeley's argument is made to appear plausible because he, "in speaking of the Universal knower, introduces phrases like a creative consciousness, a perceptive understanding which originates matter as well as the form of its objects". The recognition of Spirit as an end-in-itself and as something which has existence for itself defines and determines the mode or degree of reality which can belong to what is presented by the sense-perceptive consciousness. Spirit or Mind becomes the dominant reality and not Matter. Consequently it is mind which is more explanatory and not matter. The argument of Radhakrishnan moves on a valuational level to which Berkeley does not ascend though what the latter is attempting in establishing that the *esse* of matter is its *percipi* is the valuational superiority of spirit over matter. Berkeley does not see the inconsistency in his attempt to exhibit the valuational priority of Mind over matter while keeping both on the same level in the valuational scale. The perceiver *qua* perceiver is on the same level as the perceived and without rising above this correlativity cannot determine the 'being' of the perceived. For Radhakrishnan Idealism stands for an ultimate connection of value and reality, spirit being the supreme value and the supreme reality. The notion of reality for him is the notion of value. But the perceiver in his perceptions has a mere factual status and an argument which is centered around a factual being cannot bear the weight of a Divine Existence which is meant by Berkeley to be the sovereign Lord and the sovereign Good, which has been the main theme of the value ontology of Radhakrishnan but which has turned out to be the central knot of Berkeley's immaterialism, moving as it does between the two poles of a factual ontology and a factual epistemology.

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IS RELATIVITY A PERSPECTIVE ?

HENRY G. HADLEY

In the special theory of relativity, there is a complete reciprocity of the two inertial systems. This is however, merely a quasi-perspective distortion, resulting from relative motion. In the theory a stationary observer would assume that an approaching moving observer at celestial speed was lengthened in the direction of motion and that events appeared to move faster in the same direction. For the same reason an observer moving in the opposite direction would be apparently shortened in the direction of motion and that the events in the same direction would be slower. This consequence of how the stationary observer regards things and is not any change in physical reality. It is not therefore a matter of cause and effect, but it is because the shape of a moving body is defined as the locus of the simultaneous positions of its different parts.

In the general theory of relativity, the lengthening of time does not have the same apparent referential character. The difference is that gravitational fields do not have the same perfect reciprocity of appearances that are assumed to be present in the inertial fields of the special theory. There is claimed that an actual modification of proper time results from the action of the gravitational field. This theory concerns acceleration and gravitational fields instead of merely inertial frames of reference and therefore a reciprocity of gravitational fields is not usually present. According to the principle of equivalence, the phenomena of acceleration are dynamically equivalent to the effects of the gavitational field. If we may imagine two systems of reference with the same gravitational forces, then the space time changes necessarily are reciprocal as in the special theory. Either observer would then consider the time of the other to move more slowly and space shortened in the direction of motion. In both theories, a cube moving at the speed of light would still be seen by an observer as a cube, even if there was an actual contraction of the dimension n the direction of motion. This would be true because the light from the trailing face would make the cube still appear as a cube. If then, the apparent changes of a moving body in the general theory may also be reciprocal, the problem still is not one of cause and effect, but one of perspective, for both observers would then have an equal right to claim that time moves more slowly for the other. When the two observers unite, there is then a relation of contemporaneity between their metrically discordant temporal series. This proves the existence of universal cosmic time, for at the uniting of the two observers, they find themselves at the same moment. The topological relations of succession between two events, that is between the point of separation and the moment of reunion remain unaffected, for both events lie on world lines which are irreversible, no matter what frame of reference is chosen.

The two apparent uneven temporal intervals are actually contemporary, for when the two travellers are joined, they find themselves at the same moment of time, so that therefore, any apparent change in time is not real but only a perspective, which each one could attribute to the other. Therefore the clock and twin paradoxes are not a question of cause and effect, but are only the imaginary results of a change in relationship and are a perspective of velocity, similar to the usual perspective of space. As there is a creative advance of nature and a perpetual transition of nature into novelty, relativity even in its radical form does not destroy the possibility of correlating its different local times. On the contrary, its multiple times which are only apparent, do not destroy the unity of real time, but imply and uphold it.

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New Books

S. K. Nandi : *An Enquiry into the Nature and Function* of Art, p. 175. Price Rs. 10.00 published by the University of Calcutta, 1962.

The author, Dr. S. K. Nandi, M. A., LL. B., D. Phil. (Cal.), Sahityabharti (Visvabharati) is a brilliant scholar of the Calcutta University and is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Presidency College, Calcutta.

The work under review was originally submitted as a doctorate thesis. It is more a critical than a creative work. The author herein gives a critical analysis of the theories of art propounded by Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Croce and Romain Rolland. He makes a detailed comparison between the theories of Croce and Rabindranath Tagore. He prefers the theory of Croce to those of others. The author expounds the fundamental principles underlying each theory with remarkable simplicity and clearness. The reader can easily grasp the great ideas of the above mentioned aesthetic thinkers. The book is equally valuable for a student of art and a general reader.

Th. Stcherbatsky : *Buddhist Logic* in two Volumes, pp. 558 and 468. republished by Dover Publications Inc. New York, 1962, price Dollars 2.35, each Volume. It is unabridged republication of the work first published by the Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R., Leningrad, circa 1930.

This great work by a great Sanskrit scholar deals in great details not only with theBuddhist logic but also with the Buddhist Epistemology and Metaphysics. It is a well-known work which will always be regarded as a masterpiece. No scholar or student of Indian-philosophy can disregard or neglect it without feeling small and imperfect in his knowledge. The Dover Publications Inc., have rendered a great service to the cause of Indology by bringing out the book after its having remained out of print for many years. Every libray and every scholar of Indian philosophy and philosophy in general should have a copy of it.

Martin Ross : *Logic and Existence,* pages 240, price Dollars 4·75, published by Philosophical Library, Inc., 15 Eat 40th street, New York, 1962.

The author was formerly a professer of Philosophy at Haverford College. He is author of *The Idea of Perfection in the Western World,* and *Symbol and Metaphor in Human Experience.*

In this work the author makes a thorough analysis of human thought in the various fields of ethics, art, religion, philosophy and science and comes to a conclusion that the various realms of experience and knowledge are manifestations of the same fundamental structure. He says, in his Introduction, "Metaphysics means for the West the realm of Being, just as it means for the East the realm of 'Naught'..... Although their reader are thus very different, East and West do meet in their aspiration to transcend subjectivity. But the fact that in its way has to cope with a fundemental paradox shows that their approaches are not the truth. Paradoxes are a symptom of onesidedness and distortion. The full truth must lie in the union of their approaches. In the course of this work such a union will be attempted."Having surveyed all the realms of human experience the author comes to the conclusion, "A true evaluation of life will disclose the service which abstraction, and only abstraction, is able to render life. Reason receives dignity through life, and

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life stability through reason. Order is meaningful only when allowed to serve the directed unfolding of life." (p. 217). Life and thought, Existence and Logic, thus cannot function separately. They must work along with each other.

The book is very clear and thoughtful and every student of life should go through it.

Samuel L. Hart : *ETHICS, The Quest for the Good Life,* pages 127, Price Dollars 3.75, published by Philosophical Library, Inc., 15 East 40th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

The book is written in a very unconventional and simple style and deals with Human Nature and Nurture, Moral Conduct, The Place of Emotions in Conduct, Freedom and License, Happiness, Facts and Values, Good and Bad, Right and Wrong, Ethical Relativism and objective Ethics, Science and Ethics, Ethics and Religion, and on Moral Progress—Toward a Universal Ethos. The book deals with all these questions quite objectively and in a critical and constructive manner.

The author rightly thinks that even today when science has given us much knowledge about the world and life around us, "the need for philosophical visions is not less urgent. .....Philosophical reflections are most needed in political, social, and moral issues." "The philosophical activities which comprise ethics have a threefold task : An integration of the empirical findings of the various studies of man; a clarification of the moral terms and their implications; and a projection of a feasible better state of affairs." We agree with the author when he says, "The best way to make man into a moral being is to have moral injunctions more congenial to man's nature to make them into a source of enduring satisfaction." While discussing the role of reason in moral life the author says "To live is to strive for self-preservation, for a life above the mere subsistence level, for a life free from drudgery, want, and fear, for a life of abundance of security, affection, and belonging. Reason can neither justify nor deny these intrinsic values which have their roots in our sentient nature...Whenever we question these intrinsic values we reveal some lack of vitality, despair of attaining them or callousness to our fellow men."

In the chapter on Freedom and License the author says freedom "consists in making the most of the causal nexus, and not in defying or acting contrary to it." As rational beings we are able to utilize natural and social uniformities for our own self-determination." According to the author "True happiness comes from a concourse of needs and their fulfilments in the form of values." a view which is very different from that held in India. Where happiness has always been regarded as a sequence of freeing from all bodily and mental needs.

The book is very interesting and gives in a very readable manner the general modern western attitude to life and its values.

Dale Riepe: *The Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought;* pp. 308, price Dollars 5.00 Published by University of Washington Press, Seattle.

The author is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Dakota. He travelled widely in India and in Japan and stayed at several universities as a Fullbright scholar and studied the naturalistic trends in Ancient Indian Thought as opposed to mystical and idealistic ones which are too well-known. He discovered and presents in his book the materialistic and naturalistic thought of Ancient India found in the literature of ancient India. He has outlined the naturalistic and

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scientific tendencies as they appear in Charvaka and other systems of Indian thought such as Jainism, Hinayana Buddhism, Samkhya and Vaisheshika and comes to the conclusion that side by side the Idealistic Philosophy of India there existed a parallel current of thought which emphasised the objective and material side of our life. In his concluding chapter he writes, and it seems he is correct that "The views of Uddalak Charvaka, and early Vaisheshika are clearly naturalistic; and that the views of the Ajivikas, Jains, Samkhya, and Theravada and Vaibhsahika Buddhism are certainly strong in some naturalistic elements. The author has taken pains to collect references on Naturalism and has put his views very emphatically. This much truth in his views that Indian philosophers had a sense of reality and never neglected the objective side of their life, althought they transcended it in a fully comprehensive view of life. Matter and mind, Nature and Self have never been regarded as unconnected and unrelated factors of human life. Sometimes the emphasis has been on one and other times on the other. It is wrong to believe that Jainism Buddhism, and Vaisheshika and Samkhya were wholly materialistic system of thought.

Prof. Reipe's book, however makes a very interesting reading and brings into prominence a feature of Indian thought which was neglected for a long time by writers on Indian Philosophy.

Charles F. Wallraff: *Philosophical Theory and Psychological Fact – An Attempt at Synthesis* pp. 218.Published by University of Arizona Press, Tucson (1961).

The author has tried to examine to what philosophical theories the facts of psychology lead. In his own words he has tried to show "How various observations of the laboratory point the way to a certain philosophical approach. "He has not cared and tried to formulate a systematic philosophy in which all the factual discoveries of psychology fit as he feels probably that at the present stage of our scientific knowledge it is not possible to come to one definite conclusion. He writes ' No system of objective immutable and universally valid truths is available to us, and dogmatic finality in philosophy is everywhere to be avoided. This conclusion is just like that of Jainism presented in the form of Syadavada. Like a true Jain he writes, "To renounce the one vision for the many stand points is to gain sufficient diversity to avoid the tedium which unity entails, and to allow for the possibility of the unlimited cognitive growth. Philosophers, unlike jurists, physicians, and other practical men, need not make final and irrevocable decision."

The book is very interesting and illumintaing. Every serious student of life should go through it.

Pavitra (P.B.Saint-Hilaire): *Education and the Aim of Human Life,* pages 85, price Rs 1.50, published by Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education, Pondichery, 1961.

This small book deals with the following subjects:–I. Purpose of Education, II. The Conception of Progress and the Present World Crisis, III. The Dawning of the New Age, and IV. Sri Aurobindo's Integral Education. According to the author the object of the bookelet is: 1. The purpose of education is closely connected with the general conception and aim of human life prevalent at the time. 2. The present day cultural crisis is due to an unsatisfactory conception of progress the modern world has. 3. The present crisis is the birth pangs of a new age which is going to dawn. 4. The views of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother on Integral Education are suitable for the new age. According to the author the true

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aim of the society in the new age will be to "regard man not as a mind, a life and a body, but as a soul incarnated for a divine fulfilment upon earth". The destiny of the body, life and mind will be, "to spiritualise themselves so as to grow into visible members of the spirit, lucid means of its manifestation, themselves spiritual, illumined, more and more conscious and perfect". The society of the future "would make the revealing and finding of the divine Self the whole first aim of all its activities, its education, its knowledge, its science, its ethics, its art, its economical and political structure".The integral education of Sri Aurobindo, advocated by the author in this work, is to be the development and training of the whole man consisting of the physical, the vital, the mental, the psychic and the spiritual aspects. The author is right when he says, "The discovery of the soul, the real man within, is truly the first great goal of human life. Education can and should give a good start in the right direction." The book is very interesting and instructive and should be read by all educationists."

Rajbali Pandey: *Popular Hinduism at a Glance,* pages 40, price Re. One, published by Kashi Cultural Publications, Varanasi,5 1963.

The author Dr. Rajbali Pande, M.A., D.Litt., is a Professor of Ancient Indian History and Culture at the University of Jabalpur. He was formerly a Professor and Head of the Department of Ancient Indian History and Culture at the Banaras Hindu University, for several years. He knows the subject very well and has tried to give in brief the popular beliefs and rites and ceremonies of Hinduism, which the non-Hindu and foreign visitors want to know when they visit India. In 40 pages he has given almost all the information about Hinduism that a visitor needs.The book is useful to those Hindus even who have not yet found time to know what their religion is, of course, Hinduism is much more, much deeper, and much more mystic than what is given in this book. But all those aspects of Hinduism could not be given in such a small book,which must be regarded as only the ABC of Hinduism for a beginner. Such a book was greatly needed and it is expected that Dr. Pandey will write books on Hinduism for higher grades of students as well.

Prem Nath: *Popular Talks on Psychological Topics:* pages 141, price Rs 2.50, published by Vishveshvarananda Vedic Research Institute Hoshiarpur,Panjab.It is XXX Volume in the Sarvananda Universal Series in Memory of late Swami Sarvananda Ji, edited by Vishva Bandhu.

The book is a collection of the radio talks and popular articles of the author who is Head of the Department of Philosophy in Panjab University.It deals briefly and popularly with the Unconscious, the Nightmare,Reason and Rationalisation, Mental Tensions,Mental Conflicts,Complexes, Fear,Attitudes,Criminal Mind, Anger, Laughter, Rumour, Genius, Clothes, Fashions, Psychology of Literature, Revolution, and Religion. The style is simple and everybody can read the book and derive benefit from it.

Anima Sen Gupta: *Chandogya Upanishad: Samkhya Point of View.*, pages 40 price Rs 3.00, published by the authoress herself. The authoress is a Reader in the Department of Philosophy at the Patna University. The main contension of the writer is that " the Upanishads may be interpreted fully from the point of view of the dualistic Samkhya as well (as the monistic Vedanta) since the dualistic elements are very prominently present both in the earlier and the later Upanishads". She has tried to establish her thesis by a detailed study of the *Chandogya Upanishad.* Dr. Anima Sen Gupta is one of the best scholars of the Samkhya system in

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India and her work is very scholarly and valuable. The book deserves the notice of the scholars in the field, and it is expected that it will receive the recognition it deserves.

Kewal Motwani: *Integration:* A Programme of Education pages 114, price Rs 2/- published by Ganesh & Co (Madras) Private Ltd. Madras 17 India. 1962

The autor is Head of the Department of Post-graduate Studies and Research in Sociology, at the University of Jubalpur, India. He is the author of several books including *Manu Dharma Shastra*. In the book under review the author makes a strong plea for the study of Indian Sociological literature at the Indian Universities. He advocates a strong study of sociology and particularly Indian sociology both at the B. A. and M. A. stages and draw up syllabi for the B. A. and M. A. classes. It is gratifying to note that after having made a thorough study of the world's sociological literatrue, the author has come to the conclusion, "In *Manu Dharma Shastra* shall India find the secret of her past greatness and future salvation, nowhere else, nowhere else." The book deserves reading and thoughtful consideration. It will be helpful in framing courses in Sociology in the Indian Universities.

James R.Simmons: *The Quest for Ethics,* pages 54, price Dollars 2.75, published by Philosophical Library, Inc. 15 East 40th Street, New York 16, N. Y. 1962.

The author is an Associate Professor of Philosophy, at the University of South California, California' U. S.A. "The basic need today is planning and bringing forth the international community of man. In brief form I wish to suggest the direction for the initial planning and to touch on those ideas which make possible the decisive step to cooperation" says the athor at the commencement of his book. We agree with him when he says, "We are confronted with the problem of constructing, consciously, the bare framework of the human way of life. We can do this only when we know what, in fact, humans *qua* (human) are. "The book tries to determine the nature of man and makes valuable suggestions for "The Generating of Humans". He thinks of a World University for the generating of Humans and discusses what kind of a Professor of Philosophy in the World University should be. The book is thought provoking and interesting. All those who are interested in the world society should read this book.

Sadashiva A. Dange and Mrs Sindhu S.Dange: *Critiques on Sanskrit Dramas,* pages 121, price Rs. 6/-published by Darshana Printers, Moradabad, 1963.

The book is a collection of original research papers written by Dr. and Mrs.Dange. In this book a new light has been thrown on several importent problems connected with Sanskrit Dramas, which are a great literary contribution of the ancient Indian writers to the ever lasting literature of the world. Some new problems are raised in the book and new solutions are suggested. We are sure students of Sanskrit literature will derive much benefit out of this book.

Mario Lins: *Foundations of Social Determinism,* An Enquiry into its epistemological problematics. pages 147, published in Rio De Janeiro, 1959. The author belongs to the Brazilian Institute of Philosophy.

The author is right when he says, "Social facts do not operate in *vacuo,* but subordinated to existential conditions that impose relational connections on them". By means of the operational control over them

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man can dominate and modify them. This is the central thesis of the work. The author has established this thesis by many arguments and deserves congratulations, the book should be read by all students of social philosophy.

Dibakardas Mahanta: *Allocation of Pupils in Secondary Education*, pages 130, price Rs 4.75, published by Kamala Book Depot, Calcutta 12.

The author is an Assistant Professor in the Bureau of Educational and Psychological Research, David Hare Training College, Calcutta;and Lecturer in the Department of Education in the Calcutta University.

In this age when the number of school going children has increased enormously and when the number of the subjects taught has also increased it has become a great problem for educational institutions how to allocate pupils to different subjects and courses. This book throws great light on this important issue, and deserves to be read and understood and used by all those who are interested in secondary education. The author has shown great insight in the problem and thrown much light on it.

Sylvia MacCracken: *My Silent Obligato*, Notes, Phrases. and Cade n zas pages 59, price Dollars 2.75, published by Philosophical Library, New York. 1962

This book is very interesting in its own way. It refers to the writers and thinkers to whom the author of this book is obliged for an insight into life. A reference is made to Plato, Emanuel Swedenborg, Count Emerson, Hermann Keyserling, Swami Vivekananda, and St. Thomas Aquinas. Here are some very interesting statements: "I believe in the Law of Compensation....If I am underpaid, let's say, in one capacity, then I will be over-compensated in some other quarter". "Remember this Love seldom dies a natural death". "Because two people happen to be members of the same church is no reason to assume that they have the same religion". A quotation from Swami Vivekananda is given. It is this: "Religion is not in doctrines, dogmas, nor in intellectual argumentation it is in being and becoming".

Leo Balet: *Rembrandt and Spinoza*, pages 222, price Dollars 4.50, published by Philosophical Library Inc. 15 East 40 th Street, New York. 1962

The author is a Dutch. He was born at Rottendam, Holland. He was educated in literature, art and philosophy in Holland, France, Germany and Switzerland. He got his doctorate in Switzerland. He was appointed first as Conservator of the Art and Craft Collections of the State of Bremen and then Professor of Art History at the Art School of Bremen. He also lectured at the Sorbonne in Paris. In this book he has extensively and thoroughly dealt with the times and art and philosophy of the philosopher Spinoza and the painter Rembrandt, who were both born in Holland. The book contains the following Chapters: The Age of Individualism, Absolutism in Western Europe, court Art in the Absolutist Countries, Holland in the Sixteenth Century, Holland in the Seventeenth Century, Spinoza's Philosophy, Arts in Holland, Rembrandt's Art. In the end Bibliographies of Spinoza and Rembrandt are given. The book is a masterly work and deserves a place in every library of the world.

Angelo A. De Cenanaro: *The Philosopy of Benedetto Croce*, An Introduction. pages 103, price Dollars 3.00. published by Philosophical Library, Inc. 15 East 40th Street, New York. 1961

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The author is a Professor and chairman of the Department of Modern Languages at Loyola University of Los Angeles. Croce is one of the most well-known Italian philosopers of the recent times. His Idealism and theory of art are discussed in all philosophical circles. The author has very nicely dealt with the various aspects of Croce's thought, namely, aesthetics, literary criticism, logic, historiography, economics, politics and ethics It is indeed a very good aud readable introduction to the thought of Croce, which deserves to be well known. Every student of philosophy should read it.

N.C. Zamindar; *Adhunik Bharat aur Gita* (Hindi) pp.131, Price Rs. 2.50, published by Sahityalaya Prakashan, Indore City.

It is a study of the Bhagwadgita from the following points of view: Gita and Brahma Samaj, Gita and Arya Samaj, Gita and Theosophy, Lokmanya Tilak and Gita, Shri Aurobindo and Gita, Gandhiji and Gita, Radhakrishnan and Gita, Gita and Vinoba, and Modern India and Gita. In addition to these studies there are two other chapters on the study of the teachings of the Gita. The author has done a very valuable work in presenting the views of many writers creeds in connection with the Gita. The book deserves being read by every lover of Gita.

N.C.Zamindar: *Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan—A Study* (Hindi) pp. 62 Price Rs.1.50. Sahityalaya Prakashan, Indore City 1960 with a Foreword by Shri Shri Prakash. formerly Governor of Maharashtra.

The book contains a study of the views of Dr. Radhakrishnan in connection with Hindu Religion, Buddhist Religion, the Bhagwadgita, Indian Philosophy, the West, Literature, Women, Democracy, Communism, Rabindranath Tagore and Gandhi.

It is a very good study of the great philosopher and the author has done a great service to Hindi literature by presenting Radhakrishnan's views on so many topics in the Hindi language in which until very recently there has hardly been any book on Radhakrishnan or his philosophy in Hindi. He deserves the gratitude and congratulations of Hindi readers.

Ethel Beswick: *Tales of Hindu Gods and Heroes.* pp. 287, price Rs. 2.00. Published by Jaico Publishing House Bomby in Jaico Books in pocket book edition

In this book an attempt has been made to give a brief description of the Gods and heroes of Hindu Religion. They are classified under the Cosmic God, the Nature Gods, the Creative Gods and the Heroes of the Ramayana and Mahabharat. It is a very handy volume giving a lot of information which everybody in this age, whether he is a Hindu or not would like to have in order to be a cultured man. The book ends with a fine glossary of Sanskrit words.

Madan Gupta (Translator): *The Secret of Culture and other Stories* pp. 192 Price Rs.2.00 published by Jaico Publishing House, Bombay.

Prem Chand has been a very great and popular writer in Hindi who got great recognition soon after his death. He is the author of innumerable short stories and novels, many of which have now been translated into several foreign languages including Russian. The present collection contains English translation of 20 selected short stories of Prem Chand with a critical appreciation of Prem Chand written by Madan Gopal. Those who are unfortunate not to be able to read and understand Hindi should certainly read this book in order to know something of the genius of Prem Chand.

John Ennis: *Bombay Explosion* pp. 204 Price Rs.2.00 Published by Jaico Publishing House, Bombay.

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This book gives a detailed description of what happened before, during and after the explosion of the Fort Stikine in April, 1944, It is a thrilling account of a disastrous event and makes an interesting reading.

Madan Mohan Sharma Shastri: *Veda Sara Parikshan*, pp.160 Price Rs.5 00 published by the author with a Foreword by MM Pt. Shri Dhar Anna Shastri Vare.

It is a critical study of the work called the Veda Sar a which is a selection made by Vishwa Bandhu Shastri for the students of M.A. of the Panjab University and deals with the various aspects of the study of Vedas. It is useful for all Vaidic students and as it throws light on many problems of Vaidic Studies.

William Nicols (Editor) *Words to Live By* pp. 199, Price Rs.2.00 published by Jaico Publishing House, Bombay.

It is a very interesting collection of sayings or passages of some great thinkers selected and anontated by 94 eminent men and women. Every statement is worth meditating upon and worth living by. Every man and woman who can read English should possess the book and read it daily

Dr. H. N. Misra : *Moral Philosophy: Green and Gita*, Published by Kitab Ghar, Kanpur, Pages 250 Price: Rs. 20/-

Dr. H.N. Misra is member of the Department of Philosophy, D.A.V. College, Kanpur. The book is divided into 8 Chapters. The Introductory Chapter deals with the nature and problems of ethical study and the Second Chapter is concerned with the Metaphysical basis of Green's Ethics. In the Third Chapter the author has taken up the main principles of Green's ethics while the Fourth chapter contains a detailed discussion of Philosophical basis of the Ethics of the Gita. The Fifth chapter is concerned with the ethical principles of the *Bhagavadgīta* and the Sixth chapter contain comparison and contrast between the two stand points. The Seventh chapter gives the critical estimate of the two philosophies while in the Eighth chapter the author has tired to maintain that the Moral Teachings of Green and Gita are very valuable for this age of social and political upheaval.

So far the exposition of the ethical doctrines is concerned, the book is quite exhaustive. Most of the important problems have been excellently treated. The author has tried to discuss these problems in the light of contemporary events. The study evinces the author's knowledge of both Indian and Western philosophy and a thorough grasp of the two systems of thought he undertook to compare. The author's critical remarks on the philosophy of Green deserve notice. Unfortunately he had been less critical of the philosophy of the *Bhagavadgita*. Such comparative studies are greatly needed to bring the East and the West nearer and to build a Common World Culture. We agree with the author's view, that the world today needs ethical living, and the moral teachings of Green and Gita are of a great help to us in elevating our lives. I hope the book will get the recognition it deserves. It should find a place in every Library of philosophy.

Nisargadatta: *Self Knowledge and Self-Realization*, pp. 52 Price Rs. 2-00 Published by Shree Ram Narayan Chavhan, Shree Nisargadatt Ashram, Banmali Bhavan, 10th Khetwadi Bombay 4 (1963).

The booklet, is an English adaptation of a Marathi book of Shree Nisargadatta, a Marathi saint, namely. आत्म ज्ञान आणि परमात्म योग, done

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by Professor Vasudeo Madhava Kulkarni M. A. a pupil of Late Dr. R. D. Ranade. It contains some hints on Self-knowledge and God-realization. It throws some useful hints for spiritual seekers.

Y. Masih: *A Critical History of Modern Philosophy* (From Bacon to Kant) pp. 299, price Rs. 8.75, Published by Moti Lal Banarsi Das Patna, Varanasi (1963).

The author Dr. Y. Masih is a well known Professor of Philosophy, and Head of the Department of Philosophy,Bihar University and now in Magadh University. The theme of the book is well known, on which quite a large number of books both by Western and Indian writers exist. The author does not claim any originality. He admits "The book does not claim any originality and certainly not any scholarship". However, "It proposes to focalize certain issues in modern philosophy, which are important for any student of philosophy. The author further says about his book ' It states modern philosophy, more or less, in language of the authors themselves, Much material has been taken from the most recent publications and Journals. These are the very reasons for which the book is recommended to students of philosophy and as well as to the beginners in Western philosophy. Dr. Masih has taken much pains to put before the readers the material of Western philosophy in a simple and interesting way which deserves appreciation.

Sisumu Yamaguchi : *Dynamic Buddha and Static Buddha*-A system of Buddhist Practice, pages 93, price Dollars 1.50, published by Risosha, 46,Akagishita-machi Shinijuku-ku, Tokyo, Japan.

The author, Prof. Susumu Yamaguchi is a noted Oriental Scholar and writer, on Buddhism. In this book he gives an account of the system of Buddhist practice. First he elucidates the meaning and significance of the realization of Buddhahood by Sakhyamuni and then gives an exposition of non-dualism which, according to the author, constitutes the key note of the Mahayana creed. He describes how the Supreme Wisdom of the Buddha got transformed into his great compassion. In the end the author advocates the Faith in Amita Buddha,the Infinite Light and Infinite Life,as the Ideal of the Mahayana Buddhism,as professed and preached by St. Shinran, founder of the Shin Buddhism. The book is interesting and will be helpful to those who want to put into practice the teachings of St. Shinran.

Roberto Assagioli: *Money and the Spiritual Life,* A Study of the Harmonizing of the Two Basic Factors, pages 24, price not mentioned, published by Courier Co. Ltd., Tunbridge, Wells. England.

It is an interesting article by a famous psychologist and thinker, the founder of the Psychosynthesis school. It is worth reading by those who suffer from a conflict in their mind between God and Mammon (Spirit and,money).The well considered conclusions of the author are worth mentioning here-Right use can be made of wealth in two ways:-

(1) The first is the elimination or the considerable limitation, of luxury and of ostentatious display:

(2) To utilize riches for the spiritual and moral evaluation of men. Some suggestions in this connection are:(i)The publication and distribution of books that have helped mankind to elevate themselves spiritually. This includes such periodicals as lift men spiritually. (ii) To make use of cinema, radio and television for spreading spirituality

(3) To create or assist Institutions which offer Psychological and

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spiritual help to people.

(4) Training of Spiritual Servers.

Seekers of Wealth and possessors of it should know that "Possession of money is no panacea for serious personal problems". Secondly "Well -earned property, giving economic security and liberating man from the fear of need, can also have its drawbacks"....Absence of risk...often produces a lack of initiative and creates a sense of monotony and *ennui*". "Freedom from Want" is not enough, says the author, "is not enough', and it does not necessarily bring happiness and serenity''.

The essay is worth perusal by every serious thinker.

Introduction to Parapsychology A monograph, published by Parapsychology Foundation, Inc., 29 West 57th Street, New York 19, N. Y. U.S.A.

It is a very good introduction to the youngest branch of modern Psychology, namely Parapsychology, which was fromerly known as Psychical Research. It has the following sections from Croesus to Sidgwick, S.P.R. and A.S.P.R. Early Laboratory Experiments, Spontaneous Cases; Mediumistic phenomena, International Activities, Parapsychology Today. This monograph is a good and useful popular review of the history and the contemporary work which is being done in this field in Europe and America. All those who are not acquainted with this branch of psychology will do well to begin with it.

Yash Deva Shalya (Editor): *Anubhavada* (Empiricism) in Hindi, pages 117 Rs.5.50, published by Akhil Bharatiya Darshana Parishad (Indian Philosophical Society with Hindi as its medium of proceedings and work) Faridkot,has done memorable work by having published a number of high class philosophical works.The book under review is one of them. It is cooperative work consisting of9 highly original and critical papers on various aspects of Empiricism. The contributors to this volume are Dr.Daya Krishana,Shri Shri Chandra.Dr.Rajendra Prasad,Prof.J.S.R.L. Narayan Murti, Dr.Y.Masih, Shri Suresh Chandra and Shri Yash Deva Shalya (the Secretary of the Akhil Bharatiya Darshana Parishad),the Editor. The topics dealt with are: Empiricism: Some Fundamental Problems G.E.Moore, Russell's Logical Atomism, Repudiation of Metaphysics by Logical Positivism, Repudiation of Metaphysics, Ludwig Wittgenstine; Philosophy of Meaning, and Metaphysical Analysis. For Hindi Readers the book is very informative and even those who are well-read in philosophical literature can derive a lot of benefit from the book.

Mohammad Noor Nabi: *Development of Muslim Thought in India from 1200 A.D. to 1450 A.D.* pages 210. price Rs. 7.50, published by Muslim University, Aligarh (1962)

The author Dr. Mohammad Nur Nabi is a lecturer in Philosophy in the Aligarh Muslim University. The book deals with the philosophical thinkers and Muslim writers who flourished from 1200 A.D. to 1450 A.D. It covers the first period of the advent and stay of Muslims inIndia. It consists of an Introduction and eleven chapters including the Conclusion and 4 Appendices. It is a very thorough and systematic study of the thought of Muslim writers who lived in the period concerned. It is a valuable piece of research work and we are sure will be useful to the future writers on a history of Indian Thought which will include the contribution of Muslim thinkers also to the onward march of Indian Thought and the mutual influence of Hindu and Muslim Thought. A Comparative study of which will certainly reveal that the philosophical

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ideas of the two are not altogether different as is often wrongly believed. How the two acted and reacted upon each other is worth investigation.

Shriniwas G. Sathaye: *A Philosophy of Living;* An Introduction to Ethics. pages 285, Price Rs.15.00 published by Asia Publishing House, 1963 (Bombay. Calcutta, Madras, Delhi).

In this book the author, Shriniwas, G. Sathaye who has been educated in London and has been connected with the Commonwealth Educational scheme and is working as a part time lecturer in Philosophy Chiswick Polytechnique, is a very thoughful writer. He has approached the problem of human life,its values,and activities very critically as well as historically.He has taken into consideration well-known Western ethical writers and has critically examined and commented on their views. Although the book does not follow the style of usual books on Ethics, he does full justice to the vital problems of ethics. His outlook,however, is typically western, and there is very little reference to Indian Literature on Ethics. It is worth perusal by all those who wish to think seriously on the primary problem of human conduct, namely, what is to be done by man. The book is divided into four sections: Thinking and Acting, Feeling and Acting, Willing & Acting, and Self and Action. The book consists of 17 Chapters. The author's own opinions are worth consideration by every thinker. The writer has no respect for the Hindu view of "detachment". He says, "Morality is not impersonal but an interpersonal matter." We recommend the book for every library in India and abroad and to the students and teachers of Ethics.

A.G.Javadekar: *Axionoetics* Valuational Theory of Knowledg, pages 188, price Rs.16.00, published by Allied Publishers Private Ltd., Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta 1963.

The author is Head of the Department of Philosophy, Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda. Science and philosophy based on science has been laying emphasis on facts as touchstone of truth. Science has been neglecting and disregarding value in connection with knowledge. The author of the work under review, however, asks "Is not our experience of values as fundamental as that of facts? Then why should facts rather than values be considered as more obligatory in our thinking consideration of things? Why at all should we be partial to facts as if values have no claim on us?If we could begin and end with facts,we can as well begin and end with values. Our enquiries and investigations can very well entirely be oriented in terms of values".The book "proposes to study knowledge as a concrete human institution in terms of the concept of value which is the most fundamental of human experiences." Thus the author has worked out the organisation of all knowledge—ethics, epistemology, sociology, history, metaphysics, science, religion and art. The book consists of 13 chapters, all of which are vigorous attempts to vindicate the author's valuational point of view. Every student of philosophy must know it.

G.K.Yacorzinski: *Frontiers of Psychology*,pages 229,price Dollars 5.00 published by Philosophical Library, 15East, 40th Street, New York, 1963.

The author Prof. Yacorzinski is Head of the Division of Psychology in the Medical School of North Western University.

The author places a new Point of view in psychology which when understood and accepted will revolutionize the science, which is at present going on very much astray from what it should be as the science of

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Psyche. Man can be understood, the author rightly maintains, only in terms of his inner feelings, and not in terms of the attributes of the external world. Creativity and values are fundamental aspects of the psyche and not merely the epiphenomena of its physical aspects. The author tries to understand all the activities of human self, in terms of Introjection, Projection and Introjection again (I–P–I formula). The book, contains the following 11 chapters: Introduction, Systems of Psychology, Reality and the Inner Feelings of Self, Striving, Striving, Extroversion I-P-I, the Self and Related Concepts, I–P–I of Sexes, Life Distance, Inversion, Towards and Understanding of Psychotherapy and Psychopathology, I-P-I Therapy.

The author presents really an original and novel point of view in modern psychology which, we repeat, if properly understood and accepted by psychologists, will certainly revolutionize the science. It is a great contribution to psychology and the author deserves congratulations. Every psychologist should read the book.

B.H. Kazemier and D. Vuysje Editors): *Logic and Language*: Studies dedicated to Professor Rudolf Carnap, on the occasion of his Seventeeth Birthday, pages 246, published in Synthese Library, by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 1962.

The book consists of 16 very learned articles by eminent thinkers of the world, bearing on various aspects of Logic and Language. The contributors are–Yehoshua Bar-Hillel of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Abraham A. Fraenkel of the University of Jerusalem; Paul Bernays of Zurich, Jorgen Jorgensen of the University of Copenhagen; W.V. Quine of Harvard University; Evert W. Beth of the University of Amsterdam; Henryk Mehelberg, of the University of Chicago; Karl Menger, of the Illinois Institute of Technology, Chiocgo, Richard Montague, of the University of California, Los Angeles and Berkley; Carl G Hempel of Princeton University; Wolfgung Stegmuuer, of the Munich Uuiversity Karl Durr, of Zurich; Arne Naess, University of Oslo; H. Tennessen of the University of California, Berkeley; David Rynin, of the University; of California, Berkeley; and Charles Morris, of the University of Florida. Some of the topics discussed are: A Prerequisite for Rational philosophical Discussions, Epistemology and Logic, Some Remarks concerning Languages, Calculuses, and Logic, Extension and Intension. The present situation in the Philosophy of mathematics, Towards a General Theory of Computability, Inductive Inconsistencies, Permissible and Impermissible Locutions.

All the articles are very learned and original and they deserve to be read by serious students of Logic and Language. Every Library of Philosophy should have the book.

Horace M. Kallen: *Freedom, Tragedy and Comedy*. pages, 50, published by Northern Illinois University, De Kalb, Illinois, 1963.

This booklet contains three lectures on 1. Freedom and Its Meaning, 2. The Spirit of Tragedy, and 3. The Spirit of Comedy. The author is a great social and educational thinker and writer and deals with the subjects in a learned and intelligible manner. The book deserves to be read by all students of literature and philosophy.

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Our Contributors To This Number

Atreya, B. L.–Retired Professor and Head of the Departments of Philosophy, Psychology & Indian Philosophy & Religion, Banaras Hindu University, Author of several works, Varanasi, India.

Atreya, J. P.,–Professor and Head of the Post-graduate Department of philosophy. K.G.K. College, Moradabad Editor *Darshan & Psychis* Chairman Psychology of Religion Section of the XVIth International Congress of Psychology, Bonn (1960) and Akhil Bharatiya Darshana Parishad, Psychology section Bhagalpur (1962).

Dana, Richard H.–Professor Department of Psychology, College of Arts and Sciences, West Virgina University. A large number of scholarly contributions to credit.

Davies, Bolden–A Canadian writer and essayist of repute. Contributed enormously to the various International Journals on different branches of learning. Regular contributor to *Beacon* under the caption of 'The Forerunners'. Interested in esoteric philosophy and arcane Christianity and its relationship to the other religions of the world

Dewy, Ernest W.–Chariman Department of Philosophy, State University of South Dakota; Vemillon, U.S.A. Contributed enormously to various Journals.

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Lapan, Arthur–Counsellor B'nai B'rith Hillel Counsellorship, University of Wisconsin. Held teaching jobs at Brooklyn College, Long Island University, Akron University of Wisconsin. Contributed articles to several Journals.

Mollenhauer, Bernard–American writer of repute, Life Fellow of International Institute of arts and Letters, Switzerland.

Richmond Zoe (Mrs.)–Eminent English Spirtual writer and poet.

Singh, R.P–Retired Principal and Professor of Philosophy, Government College, Kotah (Rajasthan) India.

Stone, Vida Reed–An eminent American spiritual writer and poet. cotributed several articles to many International Journals. Author of several books. Famous works include *Creative Living, Behold My Song, Letters to You, Winged Thoughts* etc.,

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Messages And Opinions

...I hope you will be able to make the New Journal a valuable contribution to Philosophy and Religion. Wish you success (S. Radhakrishnan, President of Indian Republic)

...I wish you success. (Jawahar Lal Nehru, Prime Minister of India)

...Let me congratulate you on the appearance of a most stimulating and cosmopolitan journal. It is varied in appeal and subject matter—there is no other journal quite like it. (Dr. Oliver L. Reiser, Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh and Chairman International Committee on Scientific Humanism, U.S.A.)

...We look forward to the continued success of your journal as an intsrument of co-operation between 'philosophers' in the broadest sense. It is indeed fitting that such a co-operative venture should originate from India.

With warmest good wishes for your work in furthering the brotherhood of thinking men all over the world. (Dr. John King Farlow, Prof. of Philosophy. Amherst College, U. S. A-)

...I found its contents most stimulating (Dr. Henry P. David, Consultant Psychologist, Department of Institutions & Agencies, Trenton U. S. A.)

... I found your Review 'DARSHANA' very interesting. (Dr. G. Migliorino, Professor and Head of the Department of Applied Psychology, University of Palermo, Italy.)

...I found the issue most stimulating and refreshing. I wish you all the success possible in this exciting new venture. (Andrich Puharich, M. D., California U. S. A.)

... The International Quarterly 'DARSHANA' duly reached the Embassy and the profoundness and eclecticism of the chosen subjects raised huge sentiments of admiration here. It could not be otherwise when you consider the eminent personality of its Indian and foreign mentors. (J. Alsteens, Head of Chancery, Embassy of Belgium, New Delhi.)

...Very interesting quarterly (J. A. Mantalto, University of Malta.)

...As far as I could read from the editorial it is the intention of 'DARSHANA' to bring philosophy and science together and guess that in our present somewhat troubled world this is one of tne highest goals. (B. G. H. Vanderjagt, Dutch Engineer U. S. A.)

...'DARSHANA' impresses me as the sort of publication I have been looking for sometime. (Mrs. Helen Mendez, Redwood Estates U. S. A.)

...I find this journal very intriguing because its orientation is somewhat different from most of the American journals but undoubtedly is a reflection of the Indian cultural background and thinking. I would certainly recommend it highly to individuals who have an interest in the International movement in Psychology. (G. K. Yacorzynski, Chief Divisional Psychologist, Department of Neurology and Psychiatry, North Western University U. S. A.)

...It is truly a well written and enjoyable contribution to the academic world. (Miss Maryan Tigges, Dept. of Psychology, University of California U. S. A.)

...I find 'DARSHANA' well planned and substantial. Its scope is quite comprehensive and the contributors are specialists in their respective fields of thought. I am quite sure it will prove a welcome addition to list of journals of International standing on Philosophy and Mysticism. I congratulate you on the undertaking and I am sure you will receive ample support. (Dr. W. Nolle. Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, New Delhi.)

...We warmly congratulate you on having printed such excellent work. (Miss Marguerite Lidchi, Managing Editor, World Union, Pondicherry.)

...It is most interesting journal, wide in scope and seems likely to improve the channels of communication of psychologists and philosophers throughout the world. May I wish you success in your efforts. I shall be happy to co-operate with you in any way I can. (Dr. Norman Abels, Counseling Center, Michigan State University U. S. A.)

...Your review has a very wide horizon and is really openminded. (Liz. Dr. Hans Hartmann, Berlin.)

...I was greatly struck by the comprehensiveness of its contents and its bold approach towards the problems that have recently attracted the attention of the thinking public. (C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyer, Ootacamund.)

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...Best wishes for the success of your quarterly. (John. T. Reid,Cultural Attache, U. S I. S.. New Delhi.)

...We certainly wish you every success in your venture. (Ivan H. Acheier, Ph.D, Associate Director Institute for Personality and Ability Testing Champaign Illinois U.S. A.)

...I am watching with admiration the progress of your quarterly. Darshana. (Dr. K. Satchidananda Murty Professor of Philosophy, Andhra University, Waltair.)

...I am glad that the Journal has already attracted international notice and you have been able to secure articles from some very well-known men from outside the country. (Humayun Kabir. Central Minister for Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, Government of India New Delhi.

...The 'Darshana' is a magnificent adventure. I am sure, it will work successfully as a unifying force for all the peoples of the world. (Dr. D. G. Vinod, Poona.)

...My very best wishes for the success of the most interesting Journal which you have started. If the succeeding issues are of the quality of the first two issues, you need have no fear abut the future of Darshana. [Troy Wilson Organ, Professor of Philosophy, Ohio Univesity.]

...I have been very much impressed by the very high standard of the magazine. I hope in the years to come a magazine like this will prove very useful in creating a synthesis of the Eastern and Western Thoughts. (R. K. Bountra, Education Officer Municipal Corporation of Delhi.)

...It is a bold venture which has captured the admiring attention of the world of philosophers. I congratulate on your grand success. (Prof J. S. Yajnik, Banaras Hindu University.)

...You have my best wishes for its success. (A. J. Ayer, of England,Visiting Professor to the City College, New York.)

...I am sure that the publication fills a definite need...Please accept my continued best wishes for you and for the success of Darshana. (Dr. Jay P. Mc Cullough Department, of Philosophy, San Jose State College. Calif. U. S. A.)

...I have been studying over the issue, which seems to me both well settled and presented. Certainly the range of content fields you cover is most unique, and it seems to me very desirable to have such a Journal. (Stuart C. Dodd, Professor of Sociology, University of Washington.)

...It is most interesting Journal, wide in scope and seems likelly to improve the channels of communication of psychologists and philosophers throughout the world. May I wish you success in your efforts. I shall be happy to co-operate with you in any way I can.(Dr. Norman Abels,Counseing Center Michigan State University U.S.A.)

Glad to know ! You will be doing great service to the public through the magazine...May God bless all your efforts with sanguine success.(Swami Shivananda, Rishikesh.)

...I certainly wish you every success in this new and important undertaking. (Charles A. Moore, Director Univ. of Hawaii, U.S.A.)

Wishing you success with your publication.(Nandor Fodor, New York.)

I am pleased to know of your enterprise and wish you every success with it. (E. M: Adams Chairman Department of Philosophy, The University of North Carolina U.S.A.)

...I wish to congratulate you very heartily on your success in bringing out the new journal...Uriel G. Foa. Director of the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research Jerusalem.

...Let me congratulare you on starting a new Journal in Parapsychology. (Dr. Karlis Osis Director of Research, Parapsychology Foundation, New York.)

...This brings my best wishes for the success of your New Quarterly.(Ian Stevenson, Professor and Chairman Department of Neurology and Psychiatry, School of Medicine U.S.A.)

...Darshana is indeed an all-round publication in different areas related to Psychology (A. S. Patel Reader Faculty of Education and Psychology. M. S. Univ. Baroda.)

...Please accept my heartiest congratulations.I take this opportunity to wish you all success in your new venture. (Dr. N. V. Banerjee, Professor and Head of the Departments of Philosophy and Psychology, Delhi, University Delhi.)

...I wish your noble venture all success. (Dr. D. M. Datta. Shantiniketan.)

Wishing the journal every success. (A. R. Wadia M. P. Director Tata Institute of Social Sciences. Bombay.)

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...I wish you the best of luck with the enterprise. (Robert R. Sears, Chairman Department of Psychology, Stanford University U.S.A.)

...I must congratulate you upon your venture of publishing 'Darshana', I am sure it will be a success journal with your dynamic energy. (B. Kuppuswami, Prof. of Psychology, Mysore University).

...Your enterprise is in right direction. I am happy in your happiness and take this opportunity of promising all help and co-operation in your courage venture. (Y. Masih, Head of the Department of Philosophy, Bihar University).

...I send my best wishes and blessings for the success of your worthy endeavour. (Dr. S.C. Chatterjee,Retd.Prof. of Philosophy, Calcutta University).

...I wish your endeavour all success. A Journal of the kind you are contemplating is very necessary for our country. I am happy that you are taking the initiative, (T. M.P. Mahadevan, Madras University, Madras).

...It is a good idea to publish a quarterly devoted to Philosophy and I hope the venture will be a success. (Babu Sampoorananda Ji. Ex. Chief Minister U. P. and Governor Rajasthan).

...I think it is very creditable venture on your part and I hope very much that the venture persists. (S.K. Saksena, Ex. Head Philosophy & Psychology Department, Lucknow University).

...I have highly appreciated the advent of 'Darshana' I hope the thinkers of Modern Times will welcome it in as much as it will keep them adequately informed about recent researches being conducted in the domain of Philosophy, Psychology and Religion. I heartily wish the venture a bright success and large circulation. (Dr. K. D. Bharadwaj, New Delhi).

...Yours is a very laudable and interesting venture. I fully appreciate it, and wish you all success. [Prof. S.B. Roy, Dehradun.]

.. I congratulate you on this enterprising service to the cause of Philosophy. & Psychology. (S. L. Pande, Allahabad).

...I trust Darshana will certainly be a source of enlightenment to millions of men, who are groping in abysmal darkness of ignorance. (V. K. Singh, Budaun).

...I heartily congratulate you and wish your efforts all success. (Dr. M.S. Chowdhury, Lakhaoti).

...I must congratulate you for the most commendable work that you are doing in publishing an International Journal. 'Darshana' surpasses all the existing journals of Philosophy in research material on Metaphysics and social as well as creative and progressive thought. (Dr. R.S. Shrivastava, Head Philosophy Department, Ranchi University, Ranchi Bihar).

...This is an excellent undertaking and I do hope that it will be widely appreciated. [V.V. Narlikar, Chairman Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer].

...I was glad to see a cpy of your quarterly journal 'Darshana'. It is very enterprising of you to have brought out a specialised journal of this standard and I wish you all success in this difficult undertaking. [J. C. Mathur, Director General, All India Radio, New Delhi].

...Thank you very much for your sending me 'Darshana', which I found interesting. You are doing a fine job indeed [Dr. Karen Akhoj Nielson, Psychologist, Copenhagen Denmark].

...The new Quarterly 'Darshana' the contents of which I found most interesting. [Prof. Dr. G. P. Crowden. London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine London].

...I have read it with considerable interest, and I wish to extend my congratulations to you for producing such a fine number. We have need for a publication of this kind. [Dr. Charles H. Patterson. Chariman Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska U.S.A.]

...May I congratulate you on this new journal that you are publishing and commend you for your interest in making it an international journal. [Dr. W. J. Kilgore, Chairman Department of Philosophy, Baylor University].

...We are all quite interested in it; it seems to be a very unusual and stimulating piece of work...It's a good organ of expression for the world view...' Darshana 'should be a big contribution to East-West dialogue. Congratulations. [Mrs. Beatrice, Burkel, International Philosophical Quarterly, Fordham University U.S.A.]

...Permit me to congratulate on the new venture and to wish you and your collaborators every possible success. [Prof. Paul A. Schilpp, Editor, Library of Living Philosophers, Northwestern University, U.S.A.].

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...The 'DARSHANA' is a laudable enterprise. It compares favourably with many standard journals of foreign publications on the subject. It has made its importance felt in academic circles.I have no doubt that the Journal will attain an International fame and wide-spread popularity. It will be valuable assett to the Departments of Philosophy and Psychology in every college. I wish it a long and unchequered career of glory and success. (Hari Mohan Jha, Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy. Patna University,India.)

...Congratulations on the excellent publication ever so interesting.(Mrs. Florence Anson, New York.)

...I have read with most profit. My congratulations upon the role you are playing in developing philosophical enquiry through a most stimulating way. With best wishes for continued success in your intellectual activities. (Mario Lins. Brazillian Institute of Philosophy, Brazil.)

...It is an excellent quarterly and I congratulate you both on the contents and the get up. Wishing you every success. (A. V. Rao, Vice-Chancellor, Lncknow University.)

...It goes without saying that I have been delighted to find you engaged in a work that may contribute to the revival of genuine interest in a subject which made to a great extent the Indian culture and the Indian way of life the centre of admiration of the whole world ...Darshana I hope will make a great contribution to the task of reinstating the eternal glory of ancient India.

I have read carefully some of the articles and impressed by their quality. Wishing you all success in your attempt. (A. C. Mukherjee, Formerly Professor of Philosophy, Allahabad University.)

...It is a wonderful production, and reflects great credit upon yourself and others who have brought it our.

I must congratulate you upon publishing such a high class philosophical journal It is undoubtedly the best philosophical journal in India. (S. K.Maitra, Formerly Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University.)

...I congratulate you ! You have brought together, the widest range of material under one cover. (Louis H. T. Dehmlow. U.S.A.)

...Thank you very much for you stimulating and interesting journal, which I enjoyed reading. (Cyril M. Franks, Ph. D., Director Psychology Service and Research, Neuro Psychiatric Institute, New Jersey U.S.A.)

...It is a great achievement of which you can justly be proud. (Miss. C. Rogers (U.S.A.) Camp: New Delhi.)

...The articles contained therein are very impressive and effective to make thinking - minds more thoughtful, non-thinking-minds thoughtful and cultured minds more fertile. (Kowtha uryanarayan Row, Honorary Managing Director, Swadharma Swaarajya Sangha, Secunderabad.

...The articles are well selected, both with respect to variety and significance of content. And again, the typographical editing, proof-reading, etc. remain at a high level of excellence and deserve no end of praise. (John O. Nelon, Prof. of Philosophy, University of Colorado U.S.A.)

...I congratulate you warmly on all what you have acheived with this magazine. (Blodwen Davies, Ontario Canada).

...Darshana is a very fine magazine. (Vide Reed Stone, Hollywood,Calif.U.S.A.)

...Please accept our sincere congratulations for your splendid publication, a worthy contribution to the cause for the Upliftment of Humanity. May it continue to be possible for you to maintain its present high quality, both in its various messages, and in its physical make-up. Your proof reading is excellent...Assuring you of our heartfelt appreciation for the opportunity of co-operating with you in such a worth while endeavor, and may you continue for a long time to come in this dedicated work. (Cynthia and Mark Halpern, Santa Cruz, Calif. U.S.A.).

...You deserve nothing but appreciation and congratulations on its so good a standard from the very start...I think Darshana would go a long way in bringing the East and West together. The articles are rich in matter, varied in taste and first rate in quality. I congratulate you once again. (D. R. Vij. Govt. Basic Teachers' Training College, Dharamshala,Punjab.)

...I am happy to say that the standard of the journal is quite high and I hope it will maintain that standard in future. (A. G. Javadekar, Head Philosophy Department, M. S. University of Baroda.)

...I like high intellectualism and philosophical pursuit as contained in the quarterly, Darshana. (Dilip Kumar Bhattacharya, Calcutta.)

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...Cartainly makes excellent reading. I congratulate you on finding the distinguished contributors and for the interesting articles. With all my heart I wish you further success all over the world. [Dr. Gerda Walther, Munchen, West Germany]

...I have gone through the Magazine and I found it quite instructive and illuminating. I am sure the quality and standard of the magazine will find large number of readers in our country and abroad too. I wish you good luck. [Harbans Singh Azad, Speaker Legislative Assembly, Jammu & Kashmir, Shrinagar]

...In my opinion it is just the type of the journal which we need at the present transitional period in our country. What is wanted today is a happy blending of the old and new with the object of having one common standard of life for mankind. A Journal like the 'Darshana' may serve as a useful guide in this respect and I wish it a long and useful career. [B N. Singh, Vice-Chancellor, Ranchi University]

...My congratulations on the completion of two years of the publication of 'Darshana'.I am very happy to be associated with the journal and with you and Dr. B. L. Atreya in its publication. [Charles A. Moore, University of Hawaii. Honolulu 14]

...With many thanks and all good wishes for the continued success of your journal. [R. Samuel Glasner, Ed. D, Director, Board of Jewish Education. Baltimore 15, M.D., U.S.A.]

...We are receiving the Darshana regularly and hasten to congratulate you on your splendid efforts. [Dr. Jayadeva Yogendra, Yoga Institute.Bombay]

...Wishing you all success in your undertaking. [Dale Reipe, Chairman of the Philosophy Deptt. C.W. Post College of Long Island University.]

...The notion of an International Quarterly based in India and published in English seems to me an admirable one, and thoroughly worthy of support. I wish the enterprise all success. [Brand Blanshard, New Haven, Connecticut, U.S.A.]

...Wish you well in your important endeavors educationally and professionally. H. L. Silverman, Prof. of Psychology, Yeshiva University, U.S.A.]

I like the magazine very much. [Albert Van Aver, Prof. of English, Western Washington State College, Belingham, Washington.]

...Darshana has made itself known and respected. that is the first and chief hurdle to be surmounted. [John O. Nelson Prof. of Philosophy. Colorado Univ.]

...I loan your magazine to a number of friends, and all wish you every blessing in your dedicated undertaking. [Vida Reed Stone.]

...Thank you for this rich material for enlightenment and growth. [Mrs. Gray Breckner. Los Angeles, California.]

...With best wishes for continuing success in maintaining the quality of the articles in Darshana. [Howard L. Parsons, Prof.of Philosophy and Chairman of the Deptt. of Philosophy & Rel. Cole College,]

...I really admire you for having assembled so many authors all over the world to participate in this discussion...you are contributing to the much needed rebirth of the whole world. The present world crisis concerns spiritual foundations of mankind in general. [Stan J. Velinsky, Georgia, U.S.A.]

...I feel it a great blessing and honour to be associated with such an outstanding magazine from our mother-country-India. [Vida Reed Stone.]

...I enjoyed the Quarterly's high level articles. [Dr. Gustav E. Mueller, Research Professor of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma.]

...Darshana is a very fine magazine.[Vida Reed Stone. Hollywood.]

I congratulate you warmly on all you have achieved with this magazine.[Blodwen Davies, Canada.]

...Please accept our sincere congratulations for your splendid publication a worthy contribution to the cause for the upliftment of Humanity. May it continue to be possible for you to maintain its present high quality, both in its various messages, and in its physical make-up. It is seen that you and your staff have given its form considerable attention, and this is as it should be, your proof reading is excellent...

Assuming you of our heart-felt appreciation for the opportunity of co-operating with you in such a worthwhile endeavor, and may you continue for a long time to come in this dedicated work. [Cynthia Halpern, Santa Cruz.. California. U.S.A.]

...I think you have accomplished a very amazing and fine thing in putting into existence a journal of the compass and excellence of DARSHANA [Prof. John O Nelson Colorado Univ.]

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ANNOUNCEMENT

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Souvenir Volume

Essays in Honour of Dr.S.Radhakrishnan, President of Indian Republic

The Organisers of Darshana have decided to present a Souvenir Volume to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan on completion of the 75th Year. It will consist of 75 articles from many great and eminent writers and thinkers of the world, among whom are:

A. R. Wadia, A. D. Mendonsa, C.K. Bliss, B. L. Atreya, C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer, C. Hartshorne, D. Sharma, Dal Riepe, G. Walther, H. Winthrop, J. C. Feaver, J. O. Nelson, J. Sommerville, M. Reale, M. Farber, N.K. Devaraja, N.G. Damle, P. Nagaraja Rao, R. Coburn, R. S. Hartman, R. P. Singh, S. J. Velinsky, S. P. Atreya, S. P. Adinarayanan, U. Mishra. A. Boyce Gibson H. Thomae.

The Following Articles Have Already Been Received

The Spirituality of Western "Humanism," Charles A. Moore[Hawaii]
An Archetype for a World Philosophy, Oliver L. Reiser [Pittsburgh]
The Concept of Self Transcendence in Radhakrishnan and Niebuhr William Horosz [Oklahoma]
Methodologies of Control in Ideological Conflict-Luther Evans [Ohio]
The Nature of Mystical Experience: According to Hildegard von Bingen (1098 to 1178) David Baumgardt [Long Island N.Y]
Generalization in Historical Explanation and Prediction in History Nicholas Rescher [Pittsburgh]
Radhakrishnan And America, Archie J. Bahm [New Mexico]
One Source of Religin, Ralph B. Winn [Monmouth College, N.J.]
Inscriptions and Epitaphs, Nandor Fodor [New York]
Creation, Evolution and Emanation, Gustav E. Mueller [Oklahoma]
Paramārtha Darshana: A Revolutionary Trend in Contemporary Indian Thought, Hari Mohan Jha [Patna University]
The Self As Intelligent Substance, G.R. Malkani [Amalner]
Development of Psychology in India, J. Patel [Baroda]
The Reality of God, Y. Masih [Bihar Univ]
Synoptic Philosophy, T. G. Kalghatgi [Dharwar]
Nāgārjuna: On Causation and Nirvāna A. K. Sarkar [Ceylon]
Philosophical Studies in India During the Period of Crisis, K.C. Varadachari [Tirupati]
Fundamentalism in Scientific Enquiry, B. G. Tewari [Jabalpur]
The Meaning of Philosophy in An Age of Crisis, Syed Vaheeduddin [Osmania]
Philosophical Outlook in Life, D.D. Vadekar [Poona]
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan's View of the Nature of Religion, S.M. Tewari [Gorakhpur]
Immortality Through Art, J. H. Bunzel, [Virginia]
Is Number A Quantity, Brian Ellis [Melbourne]
How Exact is our Knowledge of Early Greek Thought Albert E. Avey[Ohio
Language and Ontology, William D. Nietmann [Pacific University]
Human Nature aud Institutions, James K. Feiblemam[Tulane University]
The Moral Meeting of East and West. William E. Hocking [Harvard]
R.M. Bucke and the Sources of Genius, Blodwen Davies[Ontario, Canada]
Is Existentialism a Psychology ? Donald B. Kuspit. [Pennsylvania]
Psychologieal Implications of College Administration: H.L. Silverman [Yeshiva University]
Naturalism in Recent Indan Philosophy-S.P. Kanal [Delhi]
Philosophy and Social Change, Dr. Prem Nath [Punjab]

It will cover about 600 pages of Royal Octavo Size and will be priced approximately: Rs. 30/- or $ 8.00 or Shillings 40.

Concession Price for those who pay the amount in advance before the 31st January, 1963 will be: Rs. 25/- or Dollars $6.00 or Shillings 30.

Money should be remitted to:— **Prof. J. P. Atreya,**
Managing Editor '**Darshana**' International **Moradabad (India)**

Limited copies are being printed. To avoid disappointment, order immediately, get your copy.

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जिज्ञासा

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J. P. Atreya
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AN

International Quarterly

OF

Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical Research, Religion, Mysticism & Sociology

14

MORADABAD *(INDIA)*

Volume IV April 1964 Number 2

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DEDICATION

This Issue of **The Darshana International** is most respectfully and affectionately **Dedicated** to The Venerable Shri Kowtha Surya Narayana Row, the Founder and Managing Director of Swadharma Swaarajya Sangha (Orthodox National League)Madras and founder of the International Academy of Integrating Bharatiya Culture (Varanasi), who has a rare combination in his lovable personality of learning, wisdom, generosity, goodness and simplicity, who has earned money by right and honest means and spent it on good and noble causes, such propagation of Indian culture and Sanskrit language, and who came to the rescue of the **Darshana International** in its time of financial crisis by advancing a loan without interest of Rs. 12000/-. At the age of about 85 he is quite enthusiastic and earnest for good causes. May he live long.

J. P. Atreya
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EDITORIAL

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE WORLD TODAY ?

Mankind today is in possession of much greater knowledge of natural things and occurrences, of many more resources of maintenance and comfort, of better means of transport and communication, and of many more and surer cures of diseases than it was ever before in its history. Yet it seems that it is on the whole more unhappy today than it was ever before. There is too much of conflict, tension, competition, discontent and dissatisfaction everywhere. No individual, no family, no community, no nation and no country is free from fear, anxiety, insecurity. Almost every country in the world is preparing either for aggression or for defence. No country feels secure enough to work for the welfare of its people. The major portion of the annual budgets of the various governments in the world is devoted to the means of defence. In the so called democratic countries, political parties and groups have the only aim of coming into power and consolidating themselves for gaining power and overthrowing those already in power. No political party in power ever thinks of and works for the welfare of the people of the country. The members of the ruling and powerful parties vie with one another in occupying the topmost position. There is a reign of nepotism, favouritism, partiality, corruption, fraud, and crimes against life, property and chastity. There is too much of politics, diplomacy and deception everywhere. There is a blind race in becoming rich, by hook or crook. Everywhere there is a cry for demands, claims, rights and higher and higher wages, but no body cares for doing his duty honestly and sincerely. Every body demands the highest price for what he can sell. Everybody wants to extract the greatest amount of money for what he can do for another. The medical men make the diseases more complicated and the lawyers make the cases more prolonged in order to earn more money. Money and more money; power and greater power; position and higher position; following and larger following; absolutely false advertisements ; largely adulterated foodstuffs and medicines: false promises are the order of the day. Everybody tries to deceive everybody else; and an honest and simple man falls a prey to everybody. It is believed today that nobody rises high in life without taking recourse to wicked means such as falsehood, flattery, sycophancy, and alliance with a powerful group. Most of the appointments on high positions and posts are these days made on other conditions than efficiency and fitness. So are also promotions made. On account of all our values being economical, and on account of all our activities proceeding from selfishness and self-interest there

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is no family life in the real sense of the term. There is no respect for any family relationship. There is no real love left between parents and children, between brothers, between sisters, and between brothers and sisters. They quarrel, fight, and even kill each other when there is a clash of self-interest. Newspapers report such cases in abundance, the number of divorce suits is increasing day by day. In fact all sorts of crimes are on the increase. Thefts, robberies, murders, and kidnapping are too common to be mentioned.

Why is the world so of bad today in spite so much knowledge, so much production, so much contact among people ,and so much government ?It is a serious question and all those who care for the welfare of humanity should ponder over it and try to find its answer. The present writer has been worried about it for long and has come to the following conclusions.

1. In spite of the vast knowledge man has acquired about the things around him and about the physical nature, he is still very ignorant about what he himself is in his entirety. He knows very little of himself yet. Not to say anything of his deeper spititual being, he does not know much about his mind even, which plays a very important role in his life. Being ignorant about his mental and spiritual layers of existence, he has accepted very wrong values for his pursuit. He falsely believes that money, possessions, power and position in society will give him satisfaction, joy and happiness. He runs after them, not knowing that as mind and spirit he cannot get satisfaction, joy and happiness by piling up and acquiring those things which cannot satisfy the mind and spirit of man. Our values must be determined by our deeper cravings and by our greater knowledge of ourselves. Mental and spiritual joy and happiness can be experienced without those objects which the ignorant men run after. The lives of all saints, poets and thinkers indicate it.

2. Modern man is too selfish to recognise the existence of others like him in the world. He does not want to give to others what he wants to have from others and from the world. He is totally blind to the existence, rights and demands of others and does not think of others in terms of himself. He tramples over others and rises high above them. No one today follows the golden rule of doing unto others what he wants them to do to himself or abstaining from doing unto others what he does not wish them do to himself. Every body today makes others the means and instruments of his own selfish ends. In such a world where everybody is so selfish and self-centered; where every group, every party, every nation, and every community, race or country is selfish, self-centered and aggressive, how can there be peace, fellowship, good will and love ?

3.The man of body is quite ignorant of moral order in the world and of the need and efficacy of moral principles. Truth, Sincerity, honesty, justice, love, fellowship, sympathy, service, and kindness, good neighbourliness, etc. are not recognised as principles of conduct these days. In order

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to acquire wealth, power and position the man of today disregards and violates them, thinking that they stand in his way of being great. A very great man told the writer some time ago that no man had ever become great without taking recourse to wickedness.

4. Modern man is ignorant of the potential powers of his mind and spirit, which the ancients knew well and cultivated and acquired. He, therefore, runs after powers depending on external means. In the same way the modern man is ignorant of the real source of joy and happiness which the ancients knew to be within and experienced them in greater degrees,and therefore wrongly believes that joy and happiness come from outside and depend upon external objects of enjoyment. He thereore,tries to collect and possess the so called means of comfort and pleasure. He is ignorant of the laws of mind with regard to its experience of beauty and pleasure. He wrongly thinks that objects are beautiful and pleasant in themselves, forgetting that beauty and pleasure depend more upon the condition of the mind of the enjoyer. There is a great need of understanding the laws of the mind and spirit today because the man of today has lots of illusions and delusions about the world around him.

5. The man of today has ceased to think about himself, as he has too many outside and external objects and problems to think about. He has ceased to be philosophically minded. He does not worry about his distant future, his distant past, about the consequences of his actions and conduct.He never cares to know whether there is anything in him that may survive death, or may have existed before his having been born here. He never worries whether there is any law of *Karma* governing human life. Like an animal he simply lives in the present and lives as determined by his instinctive impulses and desires. He never questions whether his actions are moral or immoral, right or wrong, good or evil, as animals never do. He is born like an animal, lives like an animal and dies like an animal. He puts no higher value on human life than that of an animal. Hence there is hardly any scruple is injuring or killing others. There is nothing sacred, noble, or high in human life today. Hence there is no respect for anything in man. Man has to know human life better in order to properly evaluate it, and in order to relative value of the various factors in life.

6. The modern man knows only the physical, chemical, economical and biological laws of the Universe. There are mental and spiritual laws also operating in human life, which man cannot transgress and violate. Unless and until he comes to know and obey them, he cannot live well and happily. These laws can be discovered by probing deeply into the depths of human nature and social life. All the great seers and sages of the world, like Buddha, Christ,Emerson and James Allen have spoken of these laws of mind and spirit. Modern man is not only ignorant of them but scoffs at them and does not take any notice of them. Consequently he suffers.

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7. Modern man depends too much on drugs, medicines and surgical operations for his health and treatment of the various diseases of his body, knowing not that most of his bodily diseases are emotionally induced illnesses and can only be radically cured by a proper training and culture of the mind. Recent discoveries of the Psycho-somatic branch of medicine have proved the ancient doctrine of influence of thought on the body. As a man thinketh so he is.

8. The life of a modern man is unhappy, restless,anxious,and sickly. He needs sleeping drugs, stimulants, palliatives, aneasthetics to forget his pains, worries, anxieties and to work. Hence the reign of tea, coffee, tobaco, alcohol, morphia and stimulating drugs. Hardly any modern man escapes slavery to one or the other of them. It is so because no one dares face life squarely,no one tries to understand his life's problems deeply,and because no one tries to acquire proper adjustment to society and nature. It is a rare thing to find a man or woman perfectly healthy and free today. Almost every one is subject to some or other physical disease and is addicted to some drug, stimulant, or palliative. Asthma, high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, weakness of heart, arthritis, to name a few of them, are common diseases today. It is so because man has not yet learnt to live rightly and harmoniously.There is too much of conflict,frustration, and pessimism in human life these days.

9. There is too much lack of real religion and too much prevalence of religious formalism and fanaticism in the world today. On account of materialism, positivism and secularism born of narrow scientism man has lost faith in God, in his own Destiny and in life after death. He has lost faith even in himself. He lives a surface life, which is a life of pleasure-seeking, duty-avoiding, hoodwinking, worldliness and self-seeking. It lacks hope, peace and harmony. God, Immortality, Law of Karma,possibility of Perfection, may not be proved, but they can never be disproved. Man should keep his mind open and should cultivate faith in rational possibilities. Every man needs religion as much as he needs phliosophy and science. A rational and scientific Religion is the greatest need of the day in order to make life worth living.

10. The world today needs very much what in ancient times was called *Yoga*. discipline, training and perfection of the whole man, particularly that of the inner side of man, which is grossly neglected today. It needs a great change in the aims, methods, and means of education. Modern education is very imperfect and pernicious. It involves a great waste of very precious years of human life.

B. L. Atreya

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LOGIC OF THE MĪMĀMSĀ

K. C. VARADACHARI

The term Mīmāmsā is used for the same purpose as the word Nyāya which means the method of interpretation or understanding experience. It is therefore sometimes equated with the latter. However there seems to have been some understanding of the differences. Ānvikṣikī or the means which goes beyond the given or that which attempts to bring all experience under a formula of understanding or buddhi.

If Nyāya devoted itself to the field of perceptive experience and sought to gain the knowledge of objects of sense-experience and devised the rules for inference based on invariable concomitance (vyāpti) observed between any set of facts of perception, the field of transcendental or super-sensory knowledge was sought to be covered by the Mīmāmsā. The usual term Nyāya is used to embrace also the general rules of conduct also. The word 'Naya' in Jaina logic is again a modification of the word Nyāya as it means a lead or perspective or road or path based on experience. *Sapta-bhañgi* in Jaina is a way of analysis of experience in terms of being and non-being and their unity and inexpressibility. We can see that the three terms Nyāya, Sāmkhya and Mīmāmsā refer perhaps to the three levels of our experience, the perceptual—inferential, enumerative -causal inferential, and the supra-sensorial and scriptural inferential.

This conclusion seems to be justified from the fact that the term originally was restricted to the inferential propositions within the field of the scripture (*śabda* and *āptavacana*). The level of the perceptual brings up the problems of error and illusion so much so the truth of the propositions referring to perception and inference is to be determined. There arise the questions of tarka or dialectical determinations by confronting one proposition by another. Thus two propositions which are given may be both false, or both true or one of the false and the other true. The necessity of determining the principles which should help decide the truth when both the given propositions are false, must be some other than both of them. This is the reason for rising above the antinomies in experience. Seeking a higher kind of knowledge. Within perceptual experience when it is shown that both propositions are false and also that all perceptual experiences are false then it becomes imperative to seek a higher level experience which will be true. The rationale for the search after God or Absolute truth which has no falsehood in it any where is this alone. Having arrived that at Knowledge or area of Knowledge the statements made then are all true statements. Scripture or Veda is this field of true statements. If apparent contradictions are observed between them all that is needed is not the logic of exclusion or contradiction but reconciliation (*samanvaya* not *tarka*)

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Thus it follows that the statements of the Upaniṣads and the Veda had to be reconciled rather than dialectically decided on the basis of the laws of contradiction or excluded middle. The scholars were very much put to the problem of seeking to know the meaning of the propositions which appeared to wear the garb of contradictions. The search for meaning led to their considering the meaning of the letters, the words and sentences,and the meaning of the meaning. We are presented with several types of investigations. The origination of letters or individual sounds, their eternality of form and their individual meanings formed one vast branch of study—varna-sāstra. How the individual letters go to make up the word,and whether the word has to be understood in terms of letters, their arrangement and the fixity of the order of letters became another branch of study (*pada-sāstra*). The problems of philology have shewn that the words themselves depend upon the roots or their origin (*dhātu*) which express actions or intentions or some such functions which make them capable of manifesting meaning or intelligibility. The words themselves seem to get a kind of arrangement which leads to the knowledge of the sentence. In fact a sentence or proposition is a single act of judgment expressed in words that express or manifest the meaning of that act,the words being so to speak these which are appropriate to express that meaning. There are various discussions on the nature of this : some claim that in a sentence of judgment (or imperative etc.), the words are to be so linked up as to yield a meaning or rather it is the purpose of the speaker to link up appropriately the words so as to express the meaning(*abhihita-anvaya*).Some others hold that the natural method is to express the meaning through words which can express it—*anvita-abhidha*). Thus the total effect of these discussion is that we are confronted with the problems of interpretation of the sentences,grammatically, logically,philologically on the one hand and on the other we are forced to explain our words on the basis of physical objects (*adhibhautika)*, psychological experiences (*adhyātmically*) and spiritual truths (*adhidaiva* or *adhi-mokṣa*). This extraordinary range of interpretations has revealed that the whole scope of Mimāmsā is very vast.

Thus divisions of Mīmāmsā include grammer and philology, and logic and psychology, and supernatural functions. Words connoting in one sense are at certain levels only denotative or pointing. They even take up the role of being just symbols (or linga or leaders to that which they signify or symbolize lingi).

Properly thus the field of inspection for Mīmāmsā is the super-sensory field.Inference of a different order is called for Bādarāyana has put it in his Vedānta Sutra I.i.3 & 4 "Śāstrayonitvāt' and '*Tat tu Samanvayāt*" The knowledge of the Transcendent Brahman as cause etc., is from the Śāstra (Veda) and to be known only through Reconciliational Logic (*samanvaya*) not disjunction.

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It is to be noted that the scriptural sentences (*vākyas*) have a particular order which is fixed and is asked to be so fixed permanently (eternally fixed by the Godhead) and any attempt to change either the order or the pronunciation is said to be a grievous error. It is true that later agamas have not conformed to this prescription and therefore became what was called secular writings and though agama not Veda. The questions about the eternity of the Veda or its dependence on the retention by the Isvara or creation by the Isvara are in fact closely linked up with the necessity to grant these Veda a fixed meaning and fixed order of anvaya for the words used in such sacred work. The greatness of the interpreter lies in trying to understand the meaning of the same naturally. It is true that in verse-forms or mantra or metrical forms there are those who seek to work out the anvaya of the words by what they mean or by the terminals and case-endings and *liñga* (in Sanskṛt). But the attempt to restore these to prose constructions is always counselled in such cases where the need arises for granting a meaning. This being the rule generally in ordinary verse-constructions and analysis, it is said that abhihitaanvaya is correct;but in fixed forms and arrangements and in logical discourse it is necessary togather the unity of the whole sentence and determine the meaning of each word in the context of it and find whether the words have a direct meaning or indirect yogic or coventional (*rūdhi*) meanings and their relevancy.Thus the principles of *ākāṅkṣā*, expectancy, *yogyata* (appropriateness) and *sannidhi* (nearness) and also prayojana are applied in these cases of fixing the meaning of words in a sentence or in bringing the words into opposition. I have dealt with this aspect in a different paper. * The ordinary laukika or world perceptual knowledge is capable of being communicated in so many ways and it may be complete or incomplete and may require the knowledge of the meaning of each word and their synthesis. But in scriptural texts (*āptavacana* of the Veda), the words are meant in contexts and in their determination by the whole. Ambiguity is avoided by fixing the meanings, and in a language such as Sanskṛt it becomes necessary to have univalency rather than multi or poly-valency or meanings of words. The need to deduce this existent conventional multi-meanings to single meaning is said to be the technical meaning within the context. Thus arises the necessity to inspect the nature of language and how the words have to be explained or determined in meaning in logical and metaphysical thought that goes beyond the pale or area of perceptive and social dimensions. Attempts to interpret the scripture with the help of the conventional and common and perceptual as such leads to grave misinterpretations of scripture and ingenuities the most scandalous.

As the Sāmkhya has stated the scriptural authority reigns only in

* *Some Problems of Indian Logic.* Journal of S.V, Oriental Institute XIV. 1953. pp, 143-148.

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matters concerning the super-sensory.* The Mīmāmsā-logic thus also seems to subscribe to this view. The two mīmāmsās consider the philosophy of Karma or *Dharma* (sacred rites,*yajñas*, *yāgas*) as taught in the Veda and the Philosophy of Brahman (upāsanas) as taught in the Vada (Upanisads). Both Dharma and Brahma are supersensory truths of conduct and attainment. They are the Ṛta and Satya of the Veda. Dharma of this restricted kind should not be confused with Niti (Rajaniti),also called Rājadharma, Śānti-dharma, Āpaddharma and other secular societal rules of behaviour or principles of government). In fact the ethical dharma also comes under the secular when it is social. There was a time when all was considered to be sacramental and as such men looked to the Veda for such dharma too. However the whole scope and area of dharma as the Mīmāmsās show is sacred rite and neither the results predicted by the Veda nor karma that has to be done are matters for which secular and social understanding can give a meaning at all.Surely the rules of interpretation are based on the general line of consistency, appropriateness and non-self-contradiction with the general tenour of the Vedic teaching.

Problems germane to this field are of course the karma-doctrine that every act produces a fruit or result–or every cause produces an effect and ought to. There is freedom for the individual either to do the karma or not, and thus gain the effect or not. Doing that which is prohibited will get results for wrong-doing, even as not-doing that which ought to be done also produces results of non-doing. But above all the most important part of the principle is that results which ought to come about later or after death or after one departs to another world (svarga) or, as later people have interpreted in a life after rebirth. Individual differences and deserts which are inexplicable are said to come about in this delayed result or effectuation. Several reasons are adduced the most important being that the result or effect is obstructed by certain impediments which death removes. The principle of karma effectuation is-called *apūrva*, in the sense that it is something produced. Only in respect of action or dharma performed does this arise not otherwise. Results of dharma-activity are *apūrva* not natural productions which perhaps have their presence already—a kind of *sat-kārya-Vāda* and a kind of *asat-kārya-Vāda* too blended.

Thus the priniciples of Mīmāmsā interpretation have to take into consideration reconciliation of the texts and practices introduced by the ancient Seers who are credited with the knowledge of them thoroughly. Therefore too the interpretation of the scripture is said to demand the six preliminaries, *sikṣa*, *nirukta*, *jyotiṣa*, *vyākaraṇa*, *chandas kalpa*.

Problems of great interest arise out of the conception of place of words in the sentence (*vākya*). The grammatical sentence has to be disti-

*cf *Logic of Sāmkhya* : Sri Venkatesvara University Oriental Journal Vol. III, 1960.

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nguished from the logical sentence or proposition. Both indeed have to be distinguished from the poetic constructions of words and meanings. Double entendre may have a legitimate place in poetry but not in logic which aims at arriving at truth and in ethics which aims at unambiguous direction for conduct. The West has realised the importance of these distinctions.

A more definite problem of the derivation of words from roots arises when the same or identical word is used in different contexts necessitating a reflection about the root from which the word has been derived. This yaugic method has been used plentifully in arriving at connotation from denotations—as in the bhāṣyas referring to *Sahasranāmas*.* This yaugic method has been very useful but it has also led to very many ingenuities,** and even today it bedevils most of our philologists. A comparative study of the words and their roots has* undoubtedly proved a corrective but it is yet at the stage of infancy.

All these show that a more rational appreciation of the problems as of language and meaning to which modern logicians are paying great attention is a great desideratum.

Mīmāmsā would have to take into consideration all these problems as it had done previously. There is a vast field for rediscovery and reinterpretation in the light of our increasing knowledge. The ancient Mīmāmsakās have indeed along with grammarians done great work in this field which requires the close attention of the modern scholars. However the analytical approach and the attempt to generalise one theory over the whole field of human understanding has led to exaggerated emphases on all sides. A unified theory would have to take cognizance of the several areas of human activity, secular as well as spiritual perceptual as well as revelational.

Thus leads to the consideration of one more urgent problem, the problem of the relation between inference(*anumāna* including upamāna*** and revelation. As the word *anumāna* itself signifies it is a method or reason that waits upon some experience or datum other-than itself. It is either perception-observation dependent or revelation dependent. Its dependence on material for cogitation on the two extremes of sentience (inculding the sensory sentience and supersensory sentience, sentience being taken to be experience of being or reality) makes it formal and the modern thinkers or logicians think that the proper knowledge or reason is to gain its infinite (?) symbolic possibilities in argument and formal deduction.This field is thus marked out as the field for knowledge of Reason.Such a reason is an instrument(*kāraṇa*)for deduction or induction or reconciliation.

* cf Bhatta's Viṣṇusahasranāma-bhāṣya is an excellent illustration of this method.

** Roots. Verbs etc.: D. Whitney. & *Worterbuch der Indogermanischen Sprachen*: August Fick and others.

*** *Critique of the Pramānas* : Pro. Indian Philosophical Congress 1947. Presidential Address-Metaphysics Section.

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Reason is an instrument for discovery of truth or Reality but by itself it is not truth or reality. It is clear that it is a valid instrument provided it is used carefully within the limits fixed for it. This was the reason for the famous works of Kant known by the name of *Critiques*. Mīmāmsā, Sāmkhya and Nyāya when properly understood restrict the areas of operation of Reason or Understanding (*anumāna*) to the supersensory-revelational, the causal inferential, and the perceptual fields of time-space-generality, non-existence, qualities and things. But this gives rise to the problem of the sphere of reason's function when it has to decide between the scriptural and the perceptual.

Great Mīmāmsakās have tried to grapple with this problem of the function of Reason in Revelation. The field of Revelation embraces fields incapable of being covered by other sources of knowledge or objects of knowledge. There can possibly be some objects which are embraced by the perceptual also falling in the field of revelation. In such contexts the perceptual field and the scriptural field coincide. If there is unanimity between the two then there is nothing more to be said, the validity of the perceptual is fully guarranted. But if there is difference between the two which should prevail that is the question. Some thinkers hold that the perceptual should prevail and it will rule out (*bādhita*) the revelational for the revelational encroaches on the field of the perceptual. Some others will hold that the revelational knowledge will rule out or override the perceptual knowledge and all other knowledge as well, for the revelational in addition to being super-sensory also legislates for the perceptual. Herein comes most of the struggles between the systems and sections of the Vedānta (Mīmāmsā). The autonomy of the perceptual is sought to be maintained by those who claim that all knowledge is of the true and true: but the autonomy and sovereignty of the revelational is claimed by the revelationists who stick to the field of Mīmāmsā.

In any case we are presented with the problem of revelation embracing the ordinary common man's perceptual fields and the common man trying to legislate about the super-sensory.

One of the profoundest points not noted by the expositors of Śankara's standpoint is that he had made the disjunction of fields as also the interpretation of reality dependent on these two standpoints. The contrariety between the two is trenchantly stated in the form that what the revelation teaches is the Reality (*pāramārthika-satta*), what the perception teaches or delivers is phenomenal reality (*vyāvahārika satta*). If you are the latter the perceptual is invaluable guide, and the area of its operation is all life as we know it of artha-kāma and such dharma as are related to their preservation etc. But if the Real Reality is sought after one has to accept the scriptural truth as real and true whatever may be the deliverances of perception and other instruments of knowledge.

The radical diversity between the revelational and perceptional truths however was sought to be overcome by the revelational formula of

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Oneness (*ekameyaadvitīyam ekam sat*,) along with the equally emphatic utterances of the absolute non-duality, and the call to perceive oneness and not duality anywhere. The entire empirical field of experience as well as the linguistic usages and epistemology have provided only the possibility of dualism or duality and as such get set aside or overruled or obstructed by the scriptural knowledge. Further it is only the scripture that gives utterance to this non-duality and Oneness not the other instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇas*). As such these texts of Oneness or Monism are unique differentiating features of the Veda-Upaniṣads—whereas the other texts of duality, or organic even and bheda-abheda are not so very unique. This exclusive truth has its source only in the Upaniṣads. Therefore the arguments of Śankara give high or supreme priority to the monistic texts as the differentia between the Śabda pramāṇa and the other pramāṇas. It would appear that this kind of reasoning on revelation is in the realm of apologetics. One could hardly charge Śankara of not being most loyal to the scripture provided we accept this differentiating view. It is clear that it had led to the attempt to explain the other world which vanishes once this knowledge or experience of the truth of the Śabda becomes accomplished.

The other âcāryas do not think so, and try to reconcile the world presented to other pramāṇas with the unique distinguishing feafure ot the Śabda-the monism. But it is the attempt to bridge the gulf between the two realms however different in this respect that forms the basis of mīmāmsā. Rāmānuja seeks to reconcile the two by means of the conception of the Organic relationship of Śarīra-śarīaī between the Divine and the Universe and individuals which he hold to be the *pradhāna-pratitantra* (supreme or differentiating doctrine of his from other systems). Thc empirical and the transcendental meet in the unity of the organic experience of self-body where the former is the body and the latter is the self. The Śabda teaches the Self (*Śarīrī*) and the others teach the body, both physical and psychical (*Śarīra*). No doubt the bheda-abheda doctrine seeks the unity or oneness but it struggles with the atomistic psychology and physics, and hardly understands the functional monism that is exemplified in all experiences, spiritual or secular. It is this truth that is expressed in the Upaniṣad which counsels dynamic Organism of Reality which embraces all levels of consciousness and all levels of reality, infinite down to the finite, spatial and temporal and cosmical.

The Mīmāmsā has thus to mould itself to the patterns of Reality in the transcendental experience, whilst it joins hands with the nyāya and the sāmkhya in order to unify the transcendental with the psychological and the physical, external and internal, and the epistemological. The Metaphysical Reality thus is the meaning of the empirical in Mīmāmsā of the Organismic experience and explanation.

Thus we can see that the logic of the Mīmāmsā mould itself in the pattern of our most ultimate experiences. To subordinate Mimāmsā to

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the necessities of nyāya is to transform it utterly and make it meaningless in respect of the transcendental experiences. The attempts to rationalise the yajñas and others have led to strange results and modifications and they too have failed to convince any one of their efficacies. To identify all experiences and make them fall into one class has also been disastrous. It is true that we can see universal and transcendental significance and sybolism in all things perceived or sensed, in the limited and the finite too but that does not entitle poetic imagination to the status of mīmāmsā. Even when it is vision of the poetic nature it does not rise to the status of Mīmāmsā. A clear seer-like triple awareness of the Oneness in all and as having become All, and paradoxically as All-containing which the *Īśā*-Seer speaks of as the peak of the peak of Divine gnosis is the Mīmāmsā.

If the basic principle of the Logic of the Mīmāmsā is reconciliation of valid utterances, then it follows that the principle must be stated in a wider form than it has originally appeared in the Systems. The principle of consistency or non-self-contradiction may be useful only within the limited sphere where one meets with contradiction. The priniciple would be found to be at cross-purposes in the context of valid statements. It is not itself, the test of validity and cannot be the rule or principle of validation. The principle of coherency would demand the acceptance of the System or Absolute and awareness of its nature itself. The question arises whether the instruments of knowledge that we have, including the Śabda do give or present the knowledge of the Whole. Even the Śabda itself says that it is beyond all speech-*na vag gacchati*—and mind which are all capable of giving partial knowledge which can hardly fit in to in to yield us the Whole Knowledge. But the question yet is though it may be impossible to arrive at the knowledge of the Whole from the knowledge of the parts of sense, should it be so when the parts of knowledge-valid statements of the Veda are put together ? The principle of coherence is an idealistic principle but restricted to the field of perception it cannot lead to the knowledge of the whole from the knowledge or juxta-posing of the parts. The principle of synthesis of opposites thought of in Dialectical thought by Hegel also is restricted to the field of Change and evolution or the Organic, and should be able to embrace both the transcendent and the immanent but in the formulation of this principle again we have great difficulties for it includes other dialectics as well, such as the dialectic of the distincts. The dialectic principle underlying the relationship of distincts formulated by Benedetto Croce seems to come near the principle of reconciliation of the valid and the true or the real. But it is a dynamic principle.

Can we say that this *samanvaya* principle is identical with this principle of Croce ? This is a question of some importance to all who seek to give an explanation of the efforts to embrace divergent truths of several fields of experience for formulating a Real philosophy.

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The logic of Mīmāmsā is dependent upon the method of reconciliation (*samanvaya*)rather than *sāmānya* (generalisation) on the basis of common qualities.Thus the word *mīmāmsyayam*(Kena II.1)really seeksto enunciated the principle of reconciliation of diverse texts teaching diverse material so as to arrive at that real meaning and leading to that intuition of the Ultimate which is the Reality.Thus we find the Sāmkhya also uses the two methods *sāmānya* and *samanvaya*. Thus by the method of inference which is samanyato'drṣta one arrives at the nature of that which is or has the qualities through the observation of the qualities in all the effects (vikṛtis)(*Sām-Kārika 6 Sāmānytastu dṛśṭāt atīndriyāsnām pratītīranumānāt Sām.Kārika 11: triguṇam avivekī vīśayah Sāmānyam acetanam prasavadharmī)*. Generalisations from common experiences like inductive inferences are indeed helpful in respect of non-sensuous objects or entitites or which are extra-sensory or subtle. But they have to be in the relation of causes and effects. But this is certainly not applicable in the case of transcendental realities as such and one has to depend on aptavacana and Veda. The term *samanvayāt* is used in the 15 Kārika and almost all the commentators have taken this to mean *sāmānya* or homogeneity which is but a variation of the word sāmānya (generality). The need for *samanvaya* is to show that diverse effects or differences have to be considered and reconciled and all this leads to the conception of one single Avyakta and not many avyaktas. The avibhāga nature of the whole universe *(vaiśvarūpasya)* is not arrived at through generality or *samanyato' drasta* but through *samanvaya*.

That the two methods were well-known and the approach through *samanvaya* is also the method of the Vedānta śūtras as of the Sāmkhya can be seen. The modern thinkers also find that these methods are valuable. Comparative studies depend on both these methods in the interpretation of scriptures as well as philosophies. Sentences and words are also sought to be interpreted by these two methods side by side. The usage-statistics that is revealed in the philological field of words and phrases is a method of *sāmānya*(generality or common meanings),and the reconciliation of passages called different import passages require certain mediating texts (ghataka śrutis) that bring about reconciliation. Contradictions and oppositions are to be reconciled through insights and intuitions immanent in the scripture and help resolve the paradox of contradictory truths in the single Reality which is One and indivisible *avibhāgād vaiśvarūpasya*) or which is One (Ekam—*nadvitīyam)*. (*avibhāgena dṛṣṭatvāt* V.S. IV. iv. 4 & *avibhāga vacanāt* : IV. 2. 15 ibid*)*. Thus Sāmkhya speaks of prakṛti as *avibhāga* in its form as Viśva,whilst the Vedānta Sūtras speak of the Brahman as *avibhāga*.Both these are due to the *samanvaya*—harmonisation of the texts or experiences of the transcendental and the extra-sensory or super-sensory.

It is in accepting certain basic axioms of Reality that we are enabled to seek a *samanvaya* of all various and diverse experiences *(anubhavas)*

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which leads us to the Real Idea of the One undivided Being. We have yet a question of great importance to settle and that pertains to the question of reality. It is sometimes held that Śruti-pramāṇas must be checked by the perceptual and the inferential. If the scriptural is supersensuous and the super-inferential, then it appears that the demand that the scriptural should come to the bar of perception and inference is simply unthinkable. Of course in matters which are within the field of perception and inference it may be claimed that they are absolute and not the scriptural which may seek to throw a new light on the objects of perception and inference. The perceptual and the inferential deal with the limited and fragmented reality for that is all that we get through them. But the scriptural can throw a universal consciousness and give a new reality and truth to them in the context of that vast illuminative consciousness. Thus the claim that perception is valid and binding over the scriptural is extravagant on the whole. No one can deny that there is not a difference in kind between the scriptural and the perceptional, the one being divine and the other being of the finite. Unless there is claim that the two are one consciousness it is impossible to grant any comparison or parity between them. The scripture itself says that the ātman and brahman are one : is it with reference to their consciousness or essence or both. The *Vedānta Sūtras* claim that in all respects except in respect of universal creative functions the soul and brahman are equal. If then the emancipated soul and the Divine are one except for this incapacity on the part of the individual, is it a difference in kind or merly extensiveness. It appears that it is a difference in **kind** for there are powers of consciousness denied of the soul. But the question is whether perception is merely a question of degree of consciousness or difference in kind from the scriptural. Those who claim that there is only limitation but not difference in kind hold that all knowledge, perceptive, inferential and scriptural are different only in degree and that all are of real objects. But the question is whether the quality of knowledge is such as makes for correct action or activity,and it is precisely this inability to perform actions fully correctly with the help of perceptive knowledge that is mainly of the present condition (*vartamāna*),that leads to disease,disruption, defeat and sorrow (*duḥkha*). God's knowledge embraces the past, present and the future (*mattah smṛtir jñanam apohanamca* Gītā. XV.).It is also seen that quality changes when quantity changes-concentration and expansion do vary inversely and in fact there is inversion in the flow of consciousness also. This principle of inversion in movement is expressed as wave-motion, or circular motion etc.. There seem to be two axioms in mystic knowledge: (1) As in the macrocosm so is it in the microcosm and (2) There is always and invariably an inversion : the higher is the inversion of the lower, and vice versa. These two principles reveal that the world-knowledge is the inversion of the Higher or transcendent knowledge, and in the intermediate steps there are inversions also alternating from one plane to another.

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It is this inversion of the above in the below that has given rise to the theories of unreality, illusion, reflection, (*prati-bimba*) and so on, and whilst it shows that there is difference between the two yet there is also identity between the two conditions or statuses. The identity-factor is the material causality and is real in both the statuses, whereas the formal causality is different in both, the former being considered to be subtle and potential and the latter being considered to be gross and potential in the one theory and new and original in another system. Whatever it is it is clear that the theory of inversion is a profound truth which when recognized links up the whole in one Reality.

Mīmāmsā logic in so far as it seeks to reconcile the other ways of knowing with the scriptural tries to connect and link up the many statuses of the One Reality as manifestations of the One Reality, and only in so far as the value considerations are concerned does it affirm that the Highest is the One which manifests itself in and through the values of the many. The Unity sustains the manyness. Thus arise several kinds of logic, the Logic of the Infinite, the Logic of Systematic Unity, the Logic of the Universal and the Collective Society, the Logic of the Organic mind and the logic of the Mechanical aggregates and machines. If the real is all, these several logics should have to be reconciled and spared the contradiction that is the feature of their impact—the logic of negation, contradiction and illusion.

Not only in respect of the practical rituals and rites and their ordering but also in the realm of beliefs and knowledges, vidyas, methods of attainment of the supramental knowledge, do we require a different logic —the Logic of the Mīmāmsā, the logic that is of the supersensible and super-reasoning or inference and super- analogy. Aparoksa, divya, jñāna, divya pratyakṣa, divyapramāña is the transcendental knowledge (*divyanubhava* which is no longer an *anubhava* but a bhava, a birth and a being in the Divine *brahmabhūta, brahmaja*).

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THE VEIL OF SALVADOR DALI

NANDOR FODOR

This story begins with a forgotten dream that I only recalled subsequently during my preoccupation with psychoanalytical problems.

To begin with, two mysterious words must be explained. One is *Thalassa*, Greek for waters. It is the title of a small book, Sandor Ferenczi's most challenging contribution to psychoanalyis that even today many analysts consider bewildering. It is a theory of genitality that traces the sexual desire of man to a regressive urge, the purpose of which is to regain the comfort and safety of the maternal womb. On a deeper level, this is said to be an archaic striving for the primeval waters from which life had originally emerged,and on a still more remote level it is a yearning for the inorganic state.—The second mysterious word is *Thanatos*, also Greek, the death instinct of Freud. It postulates the same drive under another name without following Ferenczi explicitly to the last frontier.

In order to get better acquainted with Freud's formulation of the death instinct I plunged into Freud *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*[1]. which,at the time of its publication in 1922,was considered a very daring speculation by many of Freud's followers.

Looking for the book I found a cutting from the New York Times Magazine, dated May 22nnd, 1949 which said that Salvador Dali was through with Freud, and that he was taking up Einstein for his subject matter. The humor of the item was emphasized by a sketch and by a poem. The latter was written by Richard Armour. One of the verses that particularly amused me was:

Enough of melting watches
Or scenes with piecemeal
nude in,
For Freud and I,
Don't ask me why,
Well, Freud and I are feudin'.

The dream that I had during the night suddenly flashed into my mind. It concerned Dali and, in its ramifications on analytic scrutiny, focussed on an armour (of a mediaeval knight) and involved very much the melting watch. This was the dream:

I was inside an arena–like place where crowds of people gathered. A man entered through a gate, after paying an admission fee. It was Dali. His head was covered entirely by a stocking–like mask, the type some bankrobbers wear to hide their identity. Apparently, he did not want to be known, though the mask not only revealed something hidden, but actually attracted attention to it. Somehow I knew who he was

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and joined him, telling him that I was a psychoanalyst and an admirer of his art. Yet I could only think of the melting watch and was dissatisfied with my comments. I felt them flat and insincere. Dali never uttered a word. Presently,a stretcher was brought in,he was laid on it and taken, or rolled away, without the mask being removed or anyone becoming more aware of his identity.

I was awakened from this dream at 5.15 A.M. by two violent thumps on the wall of my bedroom. (I had a mysterious neighbor who was enjoying himself by hammering on his side of the connecting wall at dead of night. He seemed to react to a recurring nightmare in which, judging by his obscene shouting, he was wrestling with his psychiatrist.) The thumps made me forget the dream. No sooner did I recall it through the newspaper cutting mentioned, I was distracted by the doorbell: my first patient for the day—a colored social worker—had arrived.

I had a busy day. My inbetween periods were taken up by reading two exciting articles by Jung in the *Atlantic* of November and December 1962. One had a strong personal interest for me. I always wanted to know Jung's own story of his first visit to Freud in 1909 on which occasion, according to Ernest Jones *Biography of Freud*, [2]. he played the "Poltergeist". Jones suffers from a confusion of parapsychological terminology. What Jung did was the production of a telekinetic phenomenon: a loud report on a book case,and he predicted the repetition of the same denotation after Freud tried to brush it off.

In recalling the story Jung could not tell why he was so sure that the report would come again, but the motive was clear to him: he wanted to awaken Freud's interest for parapsychology; or occultism, as Freud called it. It can be stated now that he succeeded better than he knew. I owe, I believe, to this encounter that Freud had taken an interest in the MS of my book. *On the Trail of the Poltergeist*,[3] not only reading it through but warmly commending it in a personal letter.[4]

The writings of Jung have always fascinated me which, I suppose,is a sign of a mystic lement in my own personality make-up. I cannot follow him all the way(few people can)but these chapters in the *Atlantic* from his expected auto-biography were such a delight and intellectual treat that it was easy to keep my dream about Dali in the back of my mind for the rest of the day.

During the night that followed,as might have been expected, I dreamed of Poltergeists. It happened that some time before that night I gave a long distance telephone interview to the editor of *Fate* Magazine on a ghostly disturbance inCalifornia. The interview,by this time,appeared in print but in the present dream my conclusions were applied to another case which was associated with the *Fate* story and was new to me. I resented the scramble and felt so annoyed that I woke myself up.

Lieing in bed in the stillness of the dawn recalled the claim of Dr.Ludwig Jekels, one of Freud's early associates, that dreams have an awaken-

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ing function. With a mental leap, I asked myself an odd question: could I have acted on my neighbor as Jung acted on Freud to awaken myself to something?

Let me pause a minute to state that of the physical reality of the thumps on my wall there was never any question. I did not dream them and they were not hallucinatory. They kept me and my wife awake night after night and the police was at the house on three occasions. But by this time my neighbor was no longer beating a tattoe on the wall as on earlier occasion. He just gave two big bangs to break up our sleep. By the time the police arrived, everything was quiet and he did not even answer the door to the police. On the sole occasion when two police officers succeeded in getting into his apartment,he blandly denied the whole story.

Preposterous as the thought appeared, under the influence of my Jungian feast, I could not help wondering: could I have caught my neighbor (atfer he had laid down an original pattern of disturbance,) in some kind of a psychic net and impel him, through my unconscious while I was asleep, to act as a Poltergeist?

I recalled that Freud had twice fainted in the presence of Jung.When it happened the first time, Freud charged Jung with a death wish against him. Jung derided it, and rightly so as, this time, the schism between him and Freud was not too apparent and he had a tremendous respect for the founder of psychoanalysis.When it happened the second time he was not so sure of himself. After all, he did prove himself to be a psychic battery in Freud's study and Freud was certainly more sensitive as a subject than the furniture on which the explosive sounds were produced. Whoever reads Jung's life story will find abundant of psychism and inherited mediumistic talent.Unknown to himself, he could have knocked Freud unconscious.

I have no such psychic talent, but I had written books on the Poltergeist and it would have been the supreme irony of fate if I had turned out to have the potential of making somebody into one. This idea of the psychic net is not as ridiculous as it may appear. I recall a similar situation from the story of my adventures with the fabulous Talking mongoose of the Isle of Man.[5] I found an item in the diary of James Irwing, the host of this modern Rikitikitavi according to which Gef(that was the name of the little animal) pleaded with him: Let me go, Jim, let me go !"

Still,I told myself that this was absurd.Feeling that I had to shake myself free,I turned my mind on the interpretation of the Dali dream.What was the outstanding element in it? I answered: the mask. Mask ?–I continued: would it not have been more correct to call it a veil? A veil; a veil that covered a mystery. In that light, my dream appeared to be synchronistic with the one Jung had written about.In Jung's dream an armored knight haunted a town as a ghost, appearing every night between 12 and 1 p.m. and this had gone on for 500 years without anyone seeing the face

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behind the iron mask. Had I "borrowed" something from his dream twentyfour hours before I read it? The poem I quoted was written by Richard ARMOUR. Jung could not see the face of the ghost behind the visor, nor could I lift the veil of my Sphynx. Jung took his knight to be a crusader in search of the Holy Grail, a legend that had fascinated him ever since the age of 13. (The hours: between 12 and 1, of the ghost's appearance, added up to this figure.) I asked myself for association with Dali's name. The only thing I got was: Daily,John Daily.I took the name to be that of a friend in the advertising field,until I realised that his name was Day, not Daily. I still could not remember his first name, but now I knew it was not John. What was Dali's first name ?–I wondered. I could not recall it.Strange,–I mused,these blocks of memory must have a meaning.Then something snapped and I remembered: Salvatore, that is Dali's first name. (It was still wrong but a good enough substitute for Salvador) What about Day ? It came now easily: his name was Lionel Lion? Lion ...the Sphynx has the shape of a lion. Where did I read of the Sphynx: my veil no man has ever lifted? What does this "advertise?"

I went off at a tangent: the veiled man fits an archetype of Jung: the persona. I have been collecting dreams to find out the possible use of the Jungian archetypes as an additional structure. Freudian dream interpretation I had notes on the Anima and Animus, on the Shadow,on the Wise Old Man and the Mysterious Fellow Traveller; but I have completely forgotten the Persona, the face that we present to the world. Here, I thought, was an illustration, my own. Dali must be myself and I am hiding my real face from the world...Or did the dream go deeper than that? Did I try to say that our psychic essence, the Self of Jung is always hidden becsuse it is a mystery like the Sphynk. Jung believes it partakes of the divine. Salvatore ? Son of God ?, the face of the divine that is hidden from mortal eyes? Was Dali's face veiled because he was wearing the mortal coil? He paid admission to enter the arena of life through the gate of birth and,after a short stay, left on a stretcher (death ?) He came from out of time and returned to out of space.

Dali's flowing watch is an excellent representation of distorted time. Who knows, perhaps all surrealistic art expresses mainly our confused to attitude to time and space?

If I fell under the spell of Jung I was questing with all the synchronistic data presented, for the meaning of life and for knowledge of the inscrutable an unknowable Self, the Christos if you like, as he did.

However, as I was aware of Jung's views on the subject,the question still remained unanswered: what was I trying to wake myself up to ?

Now I recalled that during the day after the dream I had received a letter from a lady in California whose name was identical—with a slight difference in spelling—with the suffering hero of my outstanding haunted house adventure in England. She was asking my opinion on some table rapping experiences and on the deceptive messages the ouija board spelt

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out. On having reproached the board for the waste of money and time in tracking down false messages and asking for an explanation, the word GAZA was spelt out. She asked what Gaza was and the ouija board answered: God. She received the answer with scorn, nevertheless she wondered if I could give her some information on Gaza.

My immediate association was biblical : Philip, in the presence of a eunuch, was caught up by the Spirit of the Lord at Gaza and deposited at Azotus, 30 miles away in the same instant. (I always thought of this eunuch as a colored man). My second association was Aldous Huxley's *Eyeless in Gaza*, a book I always wanted to read but have not. Finally, I recalled an old dream of mine that I had analyzed in a study on the *Psychopathology of Language*.[6] It was about a son called Gazi, so named—in the dream—because his father was a Sultan, and the Sultan was called—believe it or not—Gugen Erbotul. (The spelling was never for a moment in doubt) The dream continued to involve a childhood friend who changed his name from the original Kont to Azot. You may note the similarity to Gaza and Azotus. The name of the Sultan yielded, as an anagram, The German "*genug*" for Gugen and the English "trouble" for *Erbotul*. Gazi became the Hungarian "*igaz*" (true) and Sultan the Hungarian "*tanulsz*" (you learn), So I added up the linguistic hodge-podge as meaning: if you take the trouble you learn the truth.

There was more to the dream into which I need not go here. The question I would like to ask the Jungians : could all this, and the events that accompanied my original dream be considered a-causal brick-a-brack in a spatio-temporal universe ? Does it say that if I take pains I shall find out the truth about Salvador Dali ?

I am not averse to admitting the possibilty. I had tried to word the truth (to which apparently I have been trying to awaken myself) several times before, first in an essay on precognitive dreams entitled *Through the Gate of Horn*,[7] then in my book, *New Approaches to Dream Interpretation*, suggesting the recognition of precognitive associations in our *Technique of dream Interpretation*.[8] Now I was able to claim more precisely:

A dream may never be fully explained by relying on associations with the past. It is not enough to ask the patient for the day remnants that Freud so strongly urges. He failed to discover the importance of the day after. Stekel claimed that every dream contains an adumbration of the future, but he meant the distant future, not the day after the dream. Jung's armored knight, the Holy Grail, the Son of God, the appearance of my colored patient, the letter from my Californian correspondent with the ghost-evolving name and the tumultuous associations with Gaza all belonged to the day after (the *jour venant*) and without these bits and pieces flooding my mind, the dream would have remained obscure. I built the dream from remnants of the day that had not yet dawned.

From all this another important conclusion can be drawn.

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In some dreams we know that we are dreaming. I discussed this problem at great length in *I Dreamed that I Dreamed* [2], pointing out the parallellism between such dreams and the waking experience of *deja vue*: the feeling that something that is about to come into view had already been seen. Variations of this strange experience can be called *deja raconte, deja entendu, deja eprouve and deja lu.* Many people tried to explain the strange phenomenon but it is still a mystery.

I thought I had a clue in an instance that was premonitive but gave the sensation of *deja vue* because it was immediately retrojected into the past. I concluded that the serial order of our cognitive processes demands such retrojection. Possibly, there is a wishfulfilling element conjoined with it: to make a future pain more bearable by placing it into the past and save the ego from despair. I had analyzed some very strange experiences from this angle: houses haunted not by a past but by a future inhabitant indicating precognition functioning in reverse.[10]

Quite recently a patient told me of an experience in a burning motor boat. Just before the flames broke out the thought occurred to her: what would happen if I had to jump into the water?. The next minute she had to—to save her life. Here the premonition stopped half way from becoming a *deja vue*. I went the full way with *deja entendu* in my High School days. I used to hear my name being called for recitation a minute before the professor, looking into the class book, had uttered it.[11] The sensation came with a shiver down my spine. The certainty was so absolute that by the time he looked up and called my name, my papers were gathered and I was standing.

My dream about Dali seems to be a combination of *deja vue* and *deje lu*. The narrative of Jung turned into the dream picture of a veiled man. The lesson I presented myself is that all our dreams are distortions of things experienced in the past and in the future. In some dreams there is an instantaneous awareness at a certain temporal point of a long story that stretches way back into the past. We do not call it *deja vue* because no boundary line is drawn between the past and the future in dream life. Past and future flow together like Dali's watch. In waking life, sanity demands temporal separation. By retrojection we escape the confusion that the knowledge of a future event would create in our workaday life. Today or tomorrow is a meaningless definition for the inner self.

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THE ABSOLUTE AND THE RELATIVE

JAMES B. KLEE

IX

In terms of human endeavor this is most usefully recognized in the motivational of emotional aspect of experience and action. Especially since the advent of psychoanalysis and dynamic psychology generally,the idea of will or motivation as a disembodied force, operating as an entity independent of the content of experience and behavior has tended to disappear. True, many psychologists, especially in American universities, still seek physiological sanctions for motivations in terms of nerves, glands, and other intra-organic factors. This is a fashion which William James accidentally started by such expressions as:"he is afraid because he runs", where physiological concommitants of the running are considered causally creative of the fear.Actually such an interpretation is not necessary to James' theory of the emotions.One could just as easily equate the two from the viewpoint of a descriptive type of causality so that running (the act) and fear (the experience) are but aspects of one another. In fact little by little we are beginning to recognize that the distinctions between behavior or experience as sometimes emotional and at other times not emotional, that is, reasonable, are both meaningless and useless in furthering our knowledge of human behavior. As emotion and motivation are gradually accepted as being **intrinsic** to the act or experience as aspects of it, the more obvious and fruitful question becomes: which emotion, which motivation ? Meanwhile reason becomes more fruitfully intetpreted as the **form** of the emotion or motivation rather than as some disembodied mind or spirit. In this way reason is the formal relationship of the emotion's substances. Reason takes place in a living organism and constitutes the qualitative relations of the absolutes, its dimensional inter-connections and correlations. Emotion and motivation are the substantive, the quantitative aspect, the probabilities, the strength of the possibilities, of **what** is related, these "whats" again being the absolutes of experience and action.

Even language, or more generally the symbol as an emotionally invested experiential sign, is slowly being perceived as a new dimension of **human** endeavor which increases his mobility, his intelligence, his adjustive capacity but does not thereby make his feet less of clay. It used to be **thought** that one **could** be unemotional in his language and reason but now it is becoming more and more apparent that this is just not so. As the psychoanalyst is well aware, individuals who pretend to such behavior are usually emotionally impoverishing themselves by their own **emotionalized** intellectual rigidity. That is, such

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individuals are being highly motivated not to be motivated, being very emotional about being unemotional, being extremely unreasonable about being reasonable, being subjective about being objective. In other words you can't win in this one direction without losing out in some other which is essentially of the same nature. In this case you have lost in principle and in fact the very thing you sought in principle. In gaining one reason you have lost another reason, in losing one emotion you have gained another.

Just because a word in a culture–logical context is a **symbol** and as such its emotional aspect is irrelevant (that is, the symbol is not intrinsically meaningful outside the aesthetic qualities of the symbolic vehicle –the print, the sound, etc.) in its experiential context it is just as real, just as moving as your mother's face, your dog's teeth. The symbol provides only another means for organization and integration,another direction for relationships. As such it increases the richness of possibilities of living but the emotional aspect still provides the probabilities, the significance, and the "then what". One still eats, breathes and copulates in the flesh, not only with symbols, even though this latter dimension has become important for humans.One has increased his varieties,discriminations, relationships, absolutes, by the use of symbols but he still lives and dies, still is dependent and symbiotic with the rest of the universe,and still of the same stuff

Emotion and motivation, themselves, need no longer be distinguished as entities but can more fruitfully be considered as two sides of the same absolute,the dynamic aspect of experience.We all approve heartily of the man who gets somewhere,we delight to speak of him as highly motivated.But we forget that frequently he has done so at the expense of his family, his employers and employees, of his own impoverishment of values. Yet these, when we do recognize them we consider as signs of emotional behavior.Conversely,we recognize the emotional quality easily when an individual jumps out of an upper floor window of a burning building and forgets to notice his highly developed motivational structure at the time.The problem is of course the old one of the basic ambivalence of all absolutes When the American soldier held off superior numbers of the enemy we called it bravery,high morale and faith in democracy, superior motivation. When the"Jap" or Nazi did the same we called it emotional fanticism, failure to recognize a superior way of life (and the superior creatures who embodied it) or Prussian militarism. In other words, "motivation" is the name we give to actions we like, but when we dislike the same acts we call them "emotional". "Motivation" and "emotion" are themselves motivated and emotional, the former approving of the fact that one direction is organized the latter disapproving the fact that complementary–wise all else is relatively disorganized.*

* See also Robert Leeper's and Elizabeth Duffy's discussion of this in *Psychological Review*.

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X

As suggested above, motivation–emotion provides the dynamic aspect of any formal relation and gives the life significance to the aesthetic absolutes and the relations between them. The dynamic aspect is intrinsic to them both. Hence sublimation is logically incredible as are the current ideas of extrinsic reward and punishment. If rewards or punishments are offered which are external to the relationship which one desires to promote, one in reality causes a "perversion", that is, a different set of relationships to which these values are intrinsic to come into being. Or, if one does not wish to respond in terms of the emotion of which for some reason he is afraid, in attempting to sublimate the need he actually changes the goal into what was intrinsically needed or develops the motive to which the new goal is intrinsically satisfying. Neither is of course what was desired although both may be useful in their own way. Even these pairs of paradoxes are ambivalent.

These dilemmas can be symbolized in metaphorical fashion by the old controversy of the amateur versus the professional. The amateur not having committed himself to a party line by economic and political arrangements with others in regards to the particular endeavors at hand is free to allow himself to follow the newly established needs or goals. He need not follow a "principle" derived from the absolutes of others. When we emphasize the formal aspects of the dynamic experience the behaviorist would say that learning has occurred, the gestaltist or psychoanalyst would call it insight the artist would realize that creative thinking had taken place, inspiration had happened or a new aesthetic experience had emerged. The inventor or mathematician would exclaim, "Eureka !" or ejaculate, "a ha". All would be correct, for this is a description of the emergence of new absolutes. Simultaneously, a new need appears for the given (but not originally desired) goal; a new value is perceived for the given (but not originally acknowledged) need. The amateur being in direct relationship with the work because he is in love with it for its own sake is enabled to receive, discover, or create the newly realized absolutes. And conversely he must be free of other external obligations if such a realization is to occur. Otherwise these obligations would have to be perverted for these are the formerly desired needs and ends to which new relationships even though dimly perceived would be irrelevant. This is why from time immemorial it has been the amateur who paradoxically has started the new professions whereas the professional has rarely advanced in knowledge except in his own specialization which he already had to begin with. This is why new ideas can't just be bought or ordered by universities, foundations, industries, and states except by simply allowing the searcher complete freedom within the best opportunities, both ideological and technological, that can be provided. It is this problem which keeps everyone in protest against external control. The scientist may thus refuse government or industrial support, universities may jealously guard their academic

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freedom from similar encroachments. Thus the artist may refuse the teaching job or the commission. This may cause the prophet to refuse the church.For only as external responsibilities are not imposed can the individual feel free to develop the new responsibilities implied in the intrinsic values of the new directions he has discovered, in the rewards or needs upon which he may have stumbled.For the new is always accidental and miraculous in its first occurrence.If there had been reason to be aware of it,then it would not have been new. It takes great courage to accept and affirm the new values, the new absolutes, the new relations, and anything distracting from the love of the new values can only prevent to that degree their realization.For the new always means to some degree that the old,the planned and hoped for will temporarily at least have to be abandoned. This may be highly improbable if the individual has involved himself with them to any degree.

That the new is always accidental or serendibitous need only mean accidental to the particular direction or system which characterized the individual's behavior at the time. It is only new to that person, that system. It does not mean that insight or inspiration had not had its evolution, had not its antecedents, was without its determini tic aspect.(Determinism is here defined as "determining", "determinable", not as an external"ism".)It does mean that relative to the particular logical sequence the new dimension was irrelevant, did not succeed in point of order or logic, was not foreseen or expected. Not being looked for it could readily be overlooked. As not being of the same set of values as those sought,it could be relegated to the unimportant which of course it would be for that sequence. But it is also accidental that any reinforcement takes place in any system since there are no sanctions, no perfections, only probabilities. So some provision must always be made for accident until perfection is realized.

Another way of putting it is that if committed to do one's best is a particular way one can only do more of the same. Yet every real improvement by changing the form, abandoning the one way for another,making a *detour* or *umweg*. Practice cannot make perfect unless by practice one does not mean repetition of the same but rather, constantly changes in the face of a frequently encountered opportunity. Even then, if the opportunity is unchanging,it is less likely that the grasp of new relationships necessary to the change of form could occur.In effect then being less committed the amateur is in a better position,relative to the professional, to seize the new forms and values, to admit and let emerge into his own experience the insights and inspirations with which accident has brought him in to epiphanous contact. The situation is identical with Reich's description of the orgasm in sexual intercourse or the prophet's experience of the "call."

On the other hand the professional is more likely to exploit what he already has, for because of mutual commitments he feels safer to move

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a long the already approved dimensions. In a sense he will do **research** whereas the amateur will **search**. Both perhaps may be in vain, there being no justification for either procedure beyond its fruitfulness. But having an established basic category the professional can,and is likely to, disregard the epiphanous nature of experience and explore in turn the relative values of a particular relationship. By comparisons and other quantitative techniques he can make the relative evaluations in his description to enable the best proportion among the absolutes.His activity is relatively less significant creatively considered but more important from the point of view of reliabilities and the satisfaction of the immediate need.Actually the main value of each method of approach cannot be directly compared seeing that their values lie in different dimensions. And usually no one individual is exclusively one or the other.All of us search, all of us research at different times and at dfferent points in our contacts with the world outside of ourself. To pretend to either as exclusive would be equally perverse.

Being in a comparative frame of reference the professional is likely to use each absolute, except the ones in which he is working,in a relative or instrumental fashion. As he is not seduced or captivated by the epiphany, not concerned with every experience for its own sake, since he literally loves it all no longer, he is capable of utilizing the experience or the referent (objective or subjective) parts in other contexts. This, if a temporary amoral attitude is permitted, may result in perceptions of new relations, new insights; but as it is in the nature of the relations of the responsibilities of the professional, these are not as likely to be noticed; and if they are noticed, they are probably rejected as irrelevant to the immediate purpose or plan. Which of course is truly the case. The professional then is in a better position from which to calculate probabilities and relative proportions and hence make the better use of what has been discovered by the more amateurish attitude. The latter is likely to lead to excess and perhaps dysplastic destruction for reason of the lack of balance as to the relative significance of that which, ironically, he has himself discovered. In a sense the amateur through his love and acceptance of the absolute may lead himself and what he loves to destruction because of his disproportion. Whereas the professional in proportion though he may be, destroys the world or himself through his perversions of the other absolutes in his own experience,because he is not immediately concerned. Neither is the whole man and neither represents the whole of man. Most of us are a bit of both. Yet probably it would be wise to take cognizance of the possibility of a disparity and allow plenty of room for both aspects of existence.For let me remind again the problem is not one of types, of a dichotomy but one of dimensions of the unitary whole of experience. It is only ourselves we injure when in attempts to limit or sublimate the one, we pervert the other, reward or increase the one, establish what the reward is of. For the absolute is always its own kind

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of reward even though it may not provide all that is needed. Reward can only establish that to which it is related.

XI

A further clarification of this may be gained by referring back to the problems of sublimation and perversion, and of intrinsic and extrinsic reward and punishment. Both, as indicated above, refer to the basic ambivalence of all considerations as they reflect their relationships. When we like a divertive act we call it sublimation; when we dislike its consequences we call the same act in this other relationship a perversion. Should we see a lonely individual reading a love novel we admire his ability to sublimate. Should, however, we be trying to match-make between this individual and another lone soul we would consider the reading about love essentially perverse. Both are correct. Relative to the fact that we are not concerned with the individual's socio-sexual relationships we are pleased with the sublimation for he or she does not annoy us with his or her problems. Relative to the social dimension, we see the individual as behaving in a woefully inadequate fashion. Of course as suggested above the perverted sublimated act in and of itself is absolute and meaningless except in its immediate aesthetic sense, until we relate it to something else. For of itself it is just insight, or creation of a relatively different absolute. So which judgment we will offer depends upon the relationship in which we judge the act or experience. Given a certain need, only a certain set of external (to organism) circumstances will satisfy that need. Anything else will be less no matter what other epiphanies might occur.

Using the particular absolute need-goal relationship as a standard all other absolutes may be compared as to the relative degree of satisfaction these have to offer. Probably all absolutes offer some and differ only in degree of satisfaction. Metaphorically, if we consider this as a probability distribution with the mode as the ideal score, the other absolutes as the other scores can be compared in terms of similarity and frequency of satisfaction that these particular scores offer. (All these other scores will, however, satisfy some other one or group of absolutes in different dimensions depending on what is being distributed.) Conversely, no one score is completely satisfying at all. And as the need distribution curve of various individuals may differ in the location of each of their modal points, no ideal absolute could be offered for all people. For some reason of external or internal selection (environmental or organismic) particular individuals or groups may have a skewed or a typical distribution. In this case perversion- sublimation may not be a legitimate judgment relative to one individual or group but would be relative to others who were skewed towards a different portion of the distribution. Similarly the kurtosis of the distribution might vary from individual to individual, modal score to modal score. Some individual or trait might need the same thing more or less frequently than another individual or

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trait. Variations would also be found in other moments as these become recognized as significant or important to the particular circumstance. In other words,any particular absolute may satisfy any other but to different degrees.Music,painting,teaching,baby-sitting,field hockey,are all potential substitute absolutes for a particular mode of sexual intercourse but are relatively inadequate.On the other hand,field hockey,baby-sitting,teaching. music, sexual intercourse, are poor substitutes for painting. And so on for each motivational modality. Each absolute represents its own modality and dimension of distribution, there being as many modalities and dimensions as there are particular absolutes and each may be considered in terms of any of the others and all in terms of the one. The trouble is that no substitute is as completely satisfying relative to the particular modality with which you are concerned even though,like any perversion or sublimation,it might be interesting in and of itself.Yet the fact of the latter is from the relative point of view completely beside the point. Someone who learns field hockey as a sex **substitute** has learned a perverse type of **sexuality** and not necessarily field hockey in and of itself. This is usually quickly seen when, after a life more adequate to sexual needs is developed, the so-called sublimations disappear. The sexually satisfied frequently stop going to art shows, stop painting, stop attending church, stop playing the musical instrument, stop reading about romance to the degree that these have heen sexual substitutes.Then one finds how "arty" how "socially conscious" they really are. Usually this turns out to be disappointingly little. Meanwhile some of the sublimations may prove fixation cores and then one has a perversion of clinical proportions.The point is that relative to the mode in question there is no true sublimation but only inadequate satisfaction, impotence, and frigidity. However, by distraction to new insights, should the mode or dimension be changed, then one would have only distraction. But then the problem would not be the same either. The relationships would now be in a different dimension, also.

The argument applies generally. It is true not only of sex but of any mode of experience or action. Sex is obviously a poor substitute for the creative arts,knowledge,or even field hockey.Spinach is but an inadequate substitute for oranges or ping pong.It is adequate only for its own absolute relationships. And so for the rest. A worker still needs job satisfaction, the housewife still needs to have her own worth recognized, the child must still be satisfied at **his** level and not with what may be "good for" him ten or one hundred years hence.Anything less in quality or frequency is, relative to the particular absolute, not as adequate as what might be. And furthermore there is no necessity to favor one modality or absolute over another except in their selective life loadings or proportions.

XII

A similar argument applies to what rewards will accomplish for the relationship between what is rewarded and the reward. The need and

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what is needed is just a division between the external and internal aspects of the dynamic absolute, the modality which we make for our own conceptual convenience and frequently, in consequence, inconvenience. When rewards not similar to the thing we wish to reward are offered they in turn tend to set up their own demands for good or ill. Sometimes we admire such insights on the part of the individual. Sometimes we are appalled at what we seem to have created. The parents who reward the crying rather than that of which the crying was symptomatic soon have a cry-baby on their hands. The college which offers grade incentives for knowledge soon has to face up to the very natural short cuts of cheating and apple polishing. The plant manager who offers an incentive system soon finds the worker quite correctly taking short cuts from production which frequently cause both quality and quantity to decrease while the records themselves are improved. Fortunately the individual frequently sees things in more adequate proportions than the planning would actually advise but this is inspite of rather than because of the particular system being advocated.

If reward and punishment are intrinsic, then they will increase or decrease what they are intrinsic to,not what is intended by their administrator, unless by some accident these might coincide. Reward guarantees nothing but what is likely to reward, not what is thought to have been rewarded. Similarly punishment, but in this case even the mutuality of attractiveness, the centripetal quality of reward, no matter how perverse or distracting it may be,is given up.For although punishment is primarily centrifugal in its effects, it does not guarantee avoidance. For one never knows in what direction from the puinshment the individual will choose until it has happened. And in the compulsion neuroses punishment may(and usually does)even cause the individual to do more than that for which he is being punished. The compulsion neurosis is a perverted modality to begin with which gets the individual as for as he can see out of a painful dilemma that he had not been able otherwise to tolerate. To increase the pain only confirms the compulsive modality. Usually, however, punishment just causes the individual to choose towards some more satisfying modal expression and what this will be cannot be easily foretold unless the situation is rigidly circumscribed.Hence the centrifugal result of punishment. You may succeed in driving the individual away but God only knows where he will go instead.

Of course this problem is ambivalent, too. For the extrinsic reward or punishment in setting up their own conditions of choice may cause insight into the forms to which they are intrinsic. But here again the relationship has changed and **distraction**,not increased or decreased motivation in the same modality, has occurred. Relative to the newly offered values the old may be surplanted but that is all that can be said. The only other way is to satiate the modality, bring the experience to completion and thus free the individual to go on from there. It may,

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however,be more desirable not to permit satiation and then extrinsic values are of considerable use in distracting and thus promoting new insigths. For as developed earlier the only way by which new insights occur is by throwing in additional values not yet considered. Other-wise you are stuck with what you have at the particular absolute of spatio-temporal conjunction. In fact you are in turn stuck with the new insight for that matter.

The relative dimension offers what might be termed the choice structure. Depending upon what relationships are available the individual chooses one over the other to the degree which the particular needs require and the specific values offer.A well-integrated individual can move with considerable fluidity from one dimension to another, in one direction or another depending upon the efficiency with which each need is met in turn by what is available in the environment. As pointed out above,each experience and act has consequences which in turn add to the values of the circumstances. Some cause the person to search endlessly until frustrated or injured, others may distract, others cause perversions or sublimations, and still others satiate and in turn free him for the other absolutes available. The poorly integrated or disproportioned experience creates an unnecessary burden with the gaps, schisms, and barriers implied by the concept of poor integration and limited choice structures.

It is the relation among the absolutes which provides the thread of connection or the paths by which variety and new wholes may be achieved and which enable the patterns of existence In the sciences and philosophies we recognize this structural aspect as the formal nature of mathematics and logic. Another paper could be written on that. For the purposes of the present discussion,however,we can accept this as the formal aspect of the absolute which provides the dimensional connections or inter-relationships of the relative.

The foregoing did not clearly distinguish between two aspects or dimensions of the relative which for all living creatures become especiallyi mportant. For one can discriminate between spatial relations and temporal relations. Actually, that such a distinction can be made has no effect on the above arguments. The absolutes are still an aspect of the relative and vice versa. If spatial event A has occurred then B has not, just as if it has occurred at time C then not at time D. Each event remains discrete in and of itself and is so because of its relations to all the rest which it is not. In neither dimension of space or time is any experience revocable. This being the case neither a purely historical or temporal approach nor a purely normative, spatial or schematic approach can be satisfactory to a complete interpretation of any problem of descriptive analysis. Nor does the recognition of value alone(functionalism) help without recognizing the specific value and when it occurred. Only by the recognition of the integration of space, time, and value can we develop any interpretation worthy of the name of a humanistic

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science such as we pretend to have for example in psychology, medicine, or anthropology. Not that each approach cannot be exploited in and of itself. In answer to an over-all "so what" or "then what" question we have less than the whole in the absolute, the relative, or valuative aspect of these as such.

Yet a synthesis of these three main dimensions of experience is at hand and has been available for a long time. Darwin has offered it in biology, Freud, Reich, Jung in psychology: and others such as Tyler, Morgan, Leslie White, in anthropology. That synthesis is what has been called evolution. For evolution recognizes that particular some things have come from somewhere by some functions in certain sequences and such an interpretation is apparent in any manifestation be it of the species, the individual, the social pattern, or the culture which is the vehicle of all we symbolically express.

There in the evolution of things the directional aspect of the relationship becomes especially apparent, for how the selection occurs at any one point determines irrevocably the conditions of the next set of choices, the next set of variables amongst which selection, be it "natural", "individual", "social", or "cultural", can and will occur. As Sartre has expressed it to the modern mind we will choose our own fate from the conditions of existence. What will happen we do not know for sure. We have no exact nature to tell us beforehand what we are to do now or next. Yet by doing we will show what we have just been and as such set once and for all the conditions of the next choice, the absolutes, the choice structures, and the values which provide the dynamic relations among the absolutes. So it behooves us to choose well, not just for the consequences in the next present, nor for the future after death, but for the future of life itself. That provides in itself sufficient obligation without adding to it the unnecessary burden of outworn systems of would-be sanctions, of perverted authority, of relatives considered absolute, of absolutes considered relative. May be we are stuck with it but then what more do we want ?

XIII

A word may be said about one aspect of the nature of the choice process itself. There has been much misunderstanding about choice. It has often seemed as if it were possible to choose negatively or as if the choice were essentially negative. Much of our current methods of social motivation stems from this misapprehension. Freud's death instinct was such a misinterpretation. Because disastrous consequences such as suicide, martyrdom, and the plain masochistic aspects of everyday life result from unwise choices, it has seemed as if such consequences were entirely purposed by the chooser. The manager who assumes men are lazy first and that they have to be motivated or stimulated to their work is manifesting such a belief. How persuasive the effects of such a belief in perpetuating tendencies which encourage an economy of scarcity, motivation through

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fear, and deliberate deprivations, Mumford has explored in his *Condition of Man*.The generalized fear that man left unprodded will do nothing pervades much of our thinking.

The basis of this is two-fold. First, the mechanistic explanations in science in their attempts to avoid their complements of vitalism and mysticism have denied the very evidence of the senses. A machine is not self-regulating and self-perpetuating. A machine has to be stimulated, maintained by external forces, other-wise it will run down. If living creatures are conceived in the mechanistic antivitalistic framework, then we feel obliged to keep them running, maintain them and bring pressure to bear to see that they keep running or restart them if they are seen to stop. Hereditarian concepts of the self seem to neglect the fuel altogether and merely require that the mechanism be greased.

The vitalism-mechanism controversy is an essentially misleading metaphor, however. The very fact we raise it suggests that this is so.For if it were valid, we would not feel the least compunction to keep life going.And who would keep us going in turn?No,we can see for ourselves that life is self-perpetuating within the limits of its optimal selective loadings. It is only when extremely deprived or frustrated that a man sees his situation as essentially negative, as frustrating.

The problem is like that of a man on a treadmill.He must frequently run like Alice or the Red Queen even to stay in one place. But should the treadmill slow down he may slow down but he doesn't stop altogether. In fact one sees the individual begin to look around and even to wonder where he is going. He may perhaps even go sideways or backwards to see where he might go re-explore where he has been. He takes the step regardless of in which direction the step may be or what the speed of the treadmill happens to be. True he steps along the treadmill because it is a treadmill. If it had been a book he might have read or thrown it, or had it been a chair he might have sat in it or picked it up and taken it somewhere else. He does choose among the experiences of and responses to the environment but yet it is the man who chooses, the environment merely offers the choice possibilities and their loadings.

But should the treadmill be speeded up he may find it desirable to walk faster and even run. And the faster it turned obviously the more negative the situation would seem and the more he would feel to be acting under such compulsiveness on the part of his environment as to lose all sense of freedom of choice and perspective.The faster it went the more necessary it would be to run to keep up until the individual might no longer realize it was he who had elected to try the treadmill way of life in the first place.Or the effort to "keep up" could prove so great that should he see an "out" he might decide to quit and jump off to what from the perspective of the treadmill seems more worthwhile. Someone else watching the performanec,assuming individual's values had lead him to choose to step along the treadmill in the first place, and that therefore

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such activity was important, might then conclude that it was one's duty to push him back on each time he tried to step off or deviate from the direction taken originally. Both would choose positively to do what they did given the circumstances of the choice, yet both would feel driven, compelled, and essentially frustrated. In fact such a situation provides the clearest definition of frustration as distinct from more progressive motivational situations, for frustration increases the difficulties of attainment without providing the oportunity for choosing something else of equal or greater value. One is in the position of having won an enormous quantity of merchandise at a quiz show and being forced to sell what has just been received in order to pay the taxes on it. Such an aspect is exceedingly frustrating because relative to what one has just had you are losing ground. You can't seem to run fast enough to keep up. It is only when one looks back to what existed before winning the prizes that you can see it as a positive over-all gain.

The perception of the choice may seem to be frustrating or negative but the act of choice is still positive, the individual still must take the next step. The led horse must still drink. The burnt child must still choose away from the fire by selecting whatever else he does instead. And of course the living creature does choose one thing over another. True he can't "will" just anything, he is still limited by the selective circumstances of the choice and what recombinations and insights are available to him in terms of his own selective loadings. He still is limited to the absolutes of the experiences which are the relationships of himself and the situation but choose he can and does to the best of his understanding And nothing science can see need refute the fact of choice in its many possibilities and probabilities.

The fact that choice occurs and that it is always progressive does not suggest what its consequences will be. What these are always remains to be seen. But we can in view of the foregoing abandon the idea that the individual has to be driven to move or choose at all. We may feel we have to motivate an individual to do what we wish but it is not necessary to rely on negative motivation as our exclusive technique of social control. In fact we really can't rely on it at all. It is only as the individual chooses to help us accidentally in running away from us, in disguise of his real feelings, that what appears to be negative motivation works at all. Too frequently the worker, student, or citizen will take a short cut which effectively destroys everything we have tried to establish. Since the negative picture works only by mistake in the first place, it would be more honest and simpler to ask for cooperation, for a choice in our direction, and to set the stage so that such a choice is valuable to both of us than to further prolong the farce, a farce which has mostly been harmful to all of us and which only displays the poverty and insecurity of our own egos. For as far as I can see, this accidental escape has been the main value behind the perpetuation of the error. In terms of Sartre's theories

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of emotion, it is the function of the magic of emotional involvement with our own ego, a function of attempted fulfillment by wishful thinking only. It is a result of the ignorance of the existence of other men, other values, other ways of life, and of our desire to act immediately upon our own. It is also like the culminations of frustrated authority against what are perceived as invasions of his self-assumed prerogatives and special exclusive privileges. We pull rank, color, caste, position, hoping to force our own values without realizing that the others are doing the same for the same absolutes of their own experience. We are like the thoroughly humiliated "poor white" in White's play, *Freight*, who having lost power before his negro competitors, is left only with the futile but nevertheless agonized cry, "But I'm white, I'm white, I'm white".

If then there is any lesson to be learned it is not one of further guilt. Rather let us see what can be done to ease the burden of the necessary treadmills of existence, to lessen the exigencies of the repetitious problems of survival, and to set the problems so that one sees the ground that is gained as well as what has been lost. As we stop emphasizing the values to be gained after death, as we realize that the future is not promised but is only probable(and at that is only our projection of the Past), perhaps we will be in a better position to deal with all of the absolutes of the present for what they are and in wiser proportions as that. And in doing so we may achieve a better position for the future when it too becomes the present. For as we will choose in a positive manner anyway let us not waste our selections beyond what we are likely to lose in the ordinary course of living. That loss is bad enough. One might say that ultimately our waste is "the death of us."

To be concluded

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ARISTOTLE AND ANALOGY

FRANK R. HARRISON

It is well known that Aristotle has comparatively little to say about the subject of analogy—a subject which some philosophers claim rests at the very foundation of philosophical speculation. On the other hand, we must clearly realize how much the notion of analogy—similarity, proportion—is **used** by the philosopher. In their use analogies are plentiful in Aristotle's writings. In order to see this one simply has to start counting passages in the Aristotelian corpus in which the word 'analogy', or one of its synonyms, appears. But these passages are relatively short, and for the most part do not **say** what analogy is, but rather **show** how it is used in various particular cases. We may, therefore, say that Aristotle does not give in any of his existent writings a complete and general theory of analogy. Now the observation that Aristotle uses analogy and does not say anything about it in any complete and general way is related to another line of thought. This is that from the point of view of Aristotle no single theory, or schema of analogy, is possible. If this is the case, and it is my thesis that it is, then there should be little wonder that we do not find Aristotle working out a single theory of analogy.

Closely related to the above is the thesis that analogies can be spoken of as meaningful only in a given context—in a particular case. Without a particular framework and background we cannot say whether any analogy is meaningful or not. The surroundings give the analogy its importance; its meaning. Thus, while I maintain no general theory of analogy is possible for Aristotle, I also hold that he does meaningfully use analogies in particular cases throughout all of his writings. To say that he Stagirite does not use analogies in meaningful ways throughout his various writings is simply to display one's own ignorance of the Aristotelian texts. Here it would be well to remember that because we do not have, or perchance even could not have, a general theory for x, it does not follow that we cannot meaningfully use x.

Further, I also wish to maintain that analogy is considered by Aristotle as a sub-class of the equivocal. This is a point well worth making for two reasons. The first is more historical in character. In the medieval period analogy came to be thought of as a *tertium quid* between the univocal and the equivocal. But this does not seem to be the position of Aristotle. The second reason is more philosophical. Considering all analogies as sub-classes of the equivocal will lead us to consider Aristotle's notion of the equivocal. At this juncture I shall introduce two possible interpretations of Aristotle, viz., the 'thing-theory' and the 'definition-theory'. I shall maintain that both of these interpretations, while popular, are incorrect statements of Aristotle's position.

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One of the Greek expressions which we must take notice of is πολλαχως λεγομενα, which may be translated as 'things said—ornamented—in many senses'. This notion appears throughout the writings of the Peripatetic in various contexts. Niether is it always clear just what Aristotle has in mind when he uses this phrase—'things said in many sense'.[1] The phrase is ambiguous because it might refer to words, concepts or definitions, or to the things being defined. Thus, the expression itself is used in a number of different ways, which perhaps gives the appearance of inconsistency in the thinking of the philosopher. These inconsistencies can, however, be shown to be more apparent than real by a study of the texts concerning equivocals—'things said in many senses'. In the *Metaphysics* we find Book Delta giving summaries of how 'things are said in many ways'. Book I of the *Topics* devotes fourteen chapters to a discussion of equivocals. And of course there is this important passage from the *Categories*;

> Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only.[2]

From this paragraph one might be led to assert, "Equivocals are things which have one word in common, but different definitions because they are different things. Things are, therefore, equivocal in so far as they are different from one another, but are yet called by the same word." But it is not quite so simple as all that to say exactly what Aristotle is maintaining in this passage from the *Categories*. Is he, for example, asserting that basically **things** are equivocal in the sense that two or more things might be unlike one another, or are the words which we use to refer to these things equivocal ? Here we begin to glean the dichotomy between the 'thing-theory' and the 'definition-theory'. Let us turn to a consideration of the 'thing-theory' and see some lines of thought which might lead one to this position.

A proponent of the 'thing-theory'—such as Joseph Owens—would proceed in a way somewhat like the following:

In the passage quoted from the *Categories*, Aristotle asserts that "**things** are said to be named....."Here it is obvious that things are being formally defined as being equivocal; i.e., it is things which are either equivocal or not. Passages from Book Delta of the *Metaphysics* might also be cited in support of this position. Consider:

> These, then, are practically all the senses in which causes are spoken of, and as they are spoken of in several senses it follows both

[1] See, for example, these several passages; *Metaphysics*, 1003a 32-33, 1004a 22-24, 1013b 28-29, 1018a 35-37, 1048b 5-7; *Eudemian Ethics*, 1217b 27; *Nicomachean Ethics*. 1097a 15-17.

[2] *Categories*, la 1-5.

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that there are several causes of the same thing, and in no accidental sense...[3]

After making this statement, Aristotle proceeds to give concrete examples of what he means; e.g., he speaks of the art of the sculptor and the bronze the statue as causes. Here the Philosopher is certainly talking about **things** when he refers to the sculptor and his art, the bronze, the statue. Each of these is a cause, but a cause in a different manner—efficient, formal, material and final. It is not the word 'cause' which distinguishes these various causes, for it is the causes themselves which do this. It is the things which are different; i.e., in this example the causes. Proceeding through Book Delta of the *Metaphysics* we continue to find examples parallel to the proceeding. In that the **things** differ to which one word is applied, we have an example of equivocation.

Turning to the *Topics*, it is pointed out that a distinction is to be drawn between the various ways in which we talk about a thing and the form of that thing.

> 15 On the formation, then, of propositions, the above remarks are enough. As regards the number of senses a term bears, we must not only treat of those terms which bear different senses, but we must also try to render their definitions; e.g. we must not merely say that justice and courage are called 'good' in one sense, and that what conduces to vigour and what conduces to health are called so in another, but also that the former are so called because of a certain intrinsic quality they themselves have, the latter because they are productive of a certain result and not because of any intrinsic quality in themselves. Similarly also in other cases.[4]

Such a distinction is again ambiguous. However, the meaning of the word 'πολλαχως' becomes evident, the various differences referred to by 'πολλαχως' being based on the forms of the things in question— πολλαχως τω ειδει Thus, various things are denominated by the same word in different ways according to the difference of the forms of these various things. The word 'form' has the same use here as the word 'definition' has in the *Categories*. The definition expresses the form, and differs as the form it expresses differs. Thus, a word is applied in the same or various ways according to whether the several definitions are different or not, for the word refers primarily to the definition—or meaning of the word—and the definition then refers to the object in a formal way.[5] But this formal distinction; i.e., the distinction of several things being based on the distinction of their forms, is the same distinction as that of the equivocal. Thus, strictly speaking, only **things** are or are not equivocal.

A supporter of the 'thing-theory' interpretation of Aristotle is not adverse to saying that a word is used equivocally, but this is only possible because two or more things not having the same form to which it refers are equivocal. For instance, we find Joseph Owens stating:

> Aristotle seems content to let language and concepts mirror the equivocity found in things. Names and definitions are for him but signs

[3] *Metaphysics*, 1013b 4-7.
[4] *Topics*, 106a 1-10,
[5] See, for example, *Concerning Interpretation*, 16a 4-7.

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of things. Terms and concepts play only a subordinate role in sciences which, like the Primary Philosophy, treat of things.[6]

Owen continues:

> His (Aristotle's) method is to examine things directly and see in what ways they are the same in form and in what ways different. Things entirely the same in form are denominated univocally by the corresponding term; things differing in form are denominated equivocally by the same term.[7]

Therefore, it follows that while a word may be used in many senses, it always primarily **things**, though not a single thing, which are equivocal or not.

Thus, because of the 'thing-theory' the meaning of the expression 'things said in many senses' becomes clearer. In equivocation one word is used to refer to several things. The 'many senses' results from differences of forms of the various things which the single word signifies through the definitions of the things. The Greek 'λεγω' means either 'to say' or 'to mean'; i.e., to express something either in word or thought. Thus, 'things expressed by the same word in ways that vary according to the forms of the things' is the extension required of the phrase 'many senses'. And this is what is understood by the word 'equivocal'.

Let us now turn our attention to the opponent of the 'thing-theory'. I shall call this interpretation, which might be given to the passages already cited from the *Categories*, *Metaphysics* and *Topics*, the 'definition-theory'. The phrase 'definition-theory' is intended to emphasize both a particular way of reading Aristotle, and an actual theory of naming which becomes important in our considerations of what the Philosopher means when he says that such-and-such is equivocal. An example of the type of approach to Aristotle would be that of Friedrich A. Trendelenburg, who, for example, argues that the several categories of the Stagirite are derived simply and solely from grammatical distinctions. On the other hand an example of a passage describing the 'definition-theory' as a theory of language would be *Concerning Interpretation*, 16a 3-7. Here we see that words refer to mental images, which we may call concepts or definitions, and these concepts or definitions refer to extra-mental reality. Thus, we are presented with a theory of naming in the sense that each word names its definition. It is this definition which becomes all important here.

Thus, when we read the opening passages of the *Categories*, we are not to suppose that Aristotle is primarily referring to this particular man or that particular ox. What he is interested in are the definitions given of 'man', 'picture of a man', 'ox', 'animal', and so on. The Philosopher wants to talk about the definitions of these words, for it is these **definitions** that are neither equivocal or not—not the **things** being defined. What would it mean to call something equivocal ? Things simply are not equivocal, rather their definitions are—or, to put this in other terms, their

6 Owens, Joseph. *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*, p, 60-61.
7 Ibid., p. 61.

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concepts are. It is not only misleading to speak of things as being either equivocal or not, it is quite meaningless. Any thing is just what it is, and nothing more or less. It is clear, therefore, that Aristotle is pointing out a feature of the grammar of a certain class of words called 'names'. He is not considering a feature of any particular thing, except accidentally. For instance, Richard and his picture are equivocal in definition, and not as particular individual things. We might use the name 'man' in speaking both of the picture of a man and the man of the picture, but the definitions of these things differ entirely, and it is this difference in *definition* which is primary here.

The following passages might be cited by supporters of the 'definition-theory'. The point being stressed here is the occurrence in these passages of such words and phrases as 'use', 'meaning', 'called by', 'applied to', and the like. The proponent of the 'definition-theory' would wish to make very clear that Aristotle speaks of names being equivocal or not because they refer to definitions which are or are not; not because of referring to particular things.

For it must be either by an equivocation that we say these **are,** or by adding to and taking away from the meaning of 'are'....[8]

We have pointed out elsewhere that 'potency' and the word 'can' have several senses. Of these we may neglect all the potencies that are so called by equivocation.[9]

3 Since the science of the philosopher treats of being *qua* being universally and not in respect of a part of it, and 'being' has many senses and is not used in one only, it follows that if the word is used equivocally and in virtue of nothing common to its various uses, being does not fall under one science (for the meanings of an equivocal term do not form one genus); but if the word is used in virtue of something common, being will fall under one science. [10]

But it was stated above that the word 'univocal' was applied to those things which had both name and definition in common. It is, therefore, established that in every proposition, of which either (secondary) substance or a differentia forms the predicate, these are predicated univocally. [11]

Thus, it is clear that the Philosopher speaks only of names and their definitions as being either equivocal or not; not things. Certainly, we speak of things in many ways, but it is the many ways in which we speak that are equivocal, and not the things about which we are speaking. We must not confuse the speaking about a thing with the thing spoken about, which would continue the 'definition-theory' approach. Aristotle is quite clear in this distinction when he talks of equivocals.

A word names a definition or concept, and in this way a word is a name. It is this process of the 'naming of a definition' which is either equivocal or not. We read:

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[8] *Metaphysics*, 1030a 31.
[9] Ibid., 1046a 5,
[10] Ibid., 1050b 33.
[11] *Categories*, 3b 6.

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> Spoken words are the symbols of mental experiences and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. [12]

Words are, thus, thought of as symbols for mental experiences, these mental experiences being the meanings of various words. Further, these mental experiences are thought of by Aristotle as knowledge of universals upon which science and the arts are based, not as a particular sensation of a particular thing. We find this notion being expressed in the *Metaphysics*.

> Now from memory experience is produced in men; for the several memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience. And experience seems pretty much like science and art, but really science and art come to men **through** experience; for 'experience made art', as Polus says, 'but inexperience luck' Now art arises when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgment about a class of objects is produced. [13]

While Aristotle in *Concerning Interpretation* speaks of mental experiences as images, we must be careful not to interpret the word 'image' as meaning a sensation of some particular thing. Rather, the image is the common structure of several particulars as grasped by the mind. In this way, i.e., by the mind grasping the universal structure of several things, the mind becomes the objects which it knows—not materially but formally. Names are the language symbols of these mental experiences, referring directly to these mental experiences—concepts, definitions—and not to any thing. It follows, therefore, that in isolation from any sentence names may still have a meaning, this meaning being the universal concept, or definition, which they name. Such names in isolation, however, cannot be either true or false, for only a proposition can be true or false. [14] Thus, to utter or to write the names 'man' and 'house' is to utter or to write something meaningful, but not something which can be said to be either true or false.

Thus, in a short summary, the proponent of the 'definition-theory' will say that things are not equivocal, rather definitions or concepts, which are named by words, are equivocal or not equivocal.

It should not be surprising to find both the 'thing-theory' and the 'definition-theory' interpretations of Aristotle's notions of the equivocal. After all we have already pointed out that the expression is an ambiguous one, referring to the things defined, the terms of the definition; or the concepts of the things. Because of this seeming ambiguity these distinct interpretations have arisen, each designed to answer the problems put forth by particular passages. It is against this background that we are to see Aristotle's various uses of analogies, for it has already been pointed out that analogy is a sub-class of the equivocal. Thus, anything that we say about the equivocal in general will be related to problems of analogies.

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[12] *Concerning Interpretation*, 16a 3-7.
[13] *Metaphysics*. 980b 26-98la 6.
[14] *Concerning Interpretation*, 17a 1-5,

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After these brief comments, let us now turn to Book I, Chapter 15, of the *Topics*, for it is here that we begin to approach the various divisions of the equivocal.

As regards the number of senses a term bears, we must not only treat of those terms which bear different senses, but we must also try to render their definitions; e. g. we must not merely say that justice and courage are called 'good' in one sense, and that what conduces to vigour and what conduces to health are called so in another, but also that the former are so called because of a certain intrinsic quality they themselves have, the latter because they are productive of a certain result and not because of any intrinsic quality in themselves. Similarly also in other cases. [15]

We are warned to take care in distinguishing the various ways in which we speak about things. In this passage Aristotle uses the example of 'good' We shall continue with this example in our following discussion.

We use the word 'good' at least to describe certain qualities of a thing or action, and to describe things and actions which produce or tend to produce certain results. The things and actions in question may be of different kinds and definitions, in that they are members of different categories, i.e., substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, or passivity.[16] In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle goes into greater detail concerning the use of the word 'good':

> But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just as in respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. The good, therefore, is not some common element answering to one idea.
>
> But what then do we mean by the good ? It is surely not like the things that only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good, or are they rather one by analogy ?[17]

The Stagirite is obviously seeking reasons for predicating 'good' of various things, and how these various examples of such a predication are related. It is certain that the word 'good' is not used in these particular examples in any univocal way, for the various definitions of the word are different, and 'good' is also seen to be predicated of different things. Therefore, there is one word 'good' and several definitions of good things designated by this word. According to the opening sections of the *Categories*, we may say that 'good' is being used in an equivocal manner. The next question to consider is this—just how is this word 'good' being used equivocally ?

One possibility is that these various equivocal uses of 'good' might be simply by accident or chance. An illustration of this would be given by a consideration of the word 'file' as designating either an instrument of cutting or a device in which papers are kept. It is only a linguistic accident that the same word 'file' is used in these two different ways. Such an example as this, and our language abounds in them, corresponds in

[15] *Topics*, 106a 1-9.
[16] Ibid., 103b 21.
[17] *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1096b 24-29.

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the fullest sense to the notion of equivocal as presented in the *Categories*. We find that only the word is common to the various definitions of the things in question. There is nothing else held in common. The application of the same word to these several definitions is one of pure accident or chance. Now it seems that we might take one of two paths in eliminating that type of equivocation. We might say that we could do away with these types of equivocal words by simply applying a different word to each definition. It would then be the case that each word would have only one definition and, therefore, would have a univocal use in the language. This solution is based on the assumption that we can, in fact, give clear and exact definitions, each being utterly distinct from the others. But if we look at our use of ordinary language, we find that we do not give such definitions, and that we could not in all cases.

A second way of attempting to eliminate this equivocation by accident or chance would be to take 'word' for an element in a sentence, and 'term' for an element of a proposition. Then, while a word might have several very different uses, a term would have one and only one meaning. But this is only to avoid the problem by pushing it back one step, and raising several other questions. For instance, such questions as exactly what are terms and propositions, how do they function, do they exist and if so in what way, what are their relations to ordinary language and to the world of empirical fact, and so on, depending upon the metaphysical impulse and bent of mind of the person presenting the questions. Thus, both suggested solutions to the problem of equivocation by chance or accident turn out to have serious difficulties raising a host of problems in themselves.

Aristotle presents a second alternative to the question of how the word 'good' is used equivocally. This suggestion is the word 'good' is used equivocally in the sense that all of the uses are different but still have a common origin αφ ενος, or because there is one definition to which all of the other definitions in one way or another have a reference—προς εν Now do the two expressions 'αφ ενος' and 'προς εν' designate one or two types of equivocality ? Can it be said that the same sort of equivocality is referred by both the phrases 'by being derived from' and 'by contributing to' ? For Aristotle things are often denominated from their source, and their reference to that source is that they come from it. Thus, it can be said that the two expressions 'by being derived from' and 'by contributing to' designate one and the same kind of equivocality.

The third possibility of how the word 'good' is used equivocally, which is suggested by Aristotle in the passage quoted from the *Nicomachean Ethics* on page 10, is 'by analogy'. Here it becomes clear that the Stagirite thinks of analogy as a sub-class of the equivocal. Therefore we here see Aristotle speaking of the following subdivisions of equivocals :

Equivocals { a) by accident or chance
b) by reference
c) by analogy.

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Of these it shall be the last two sub-classes which will be our primary concern.

In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle speaks of προς εν the type of equivocality; i.e., equivocal by reference, first mentioning equivocation by chance or accident, which is quickly dismissed.

3. Since the science of the philosopher treats of being *qua* being universally and not in respect of a part of it, and 'being' has many senses and is not used in one only, it follows that if the word is used equivocally and in virtue of nothing common to its various uses (i.e., it is equivocal by accident(, being does not fall under one science (for the meanings of an equivocal term do not form one genus); but if the word is used in virtue of something common,being will fall under one science. The term seems to be used in the way we have mentioned, like 'medical' and 'healthy'. For each of these also we use in many senses. Terms are used in this way by virtue of some kind of reference, in the one case to medical science, in another to health, in others to something else, but in each case to one identical concept. For a discussion and a knife are called medical because the former proceeds from medical science, and the latter is useful to it. And a thing is called healthy in a similar way; one thing because it is indicative of health, another because it is productive of it. And the same is true in the other cases.[18]

We speak of various things as being 'medical' or 'healthy' in that they refer to some paradigm definition of 'medical' or 'healthy'. To put this in the language of the 'thing-theory' we may say that various things are healthy or medical in that they refer to some one thing that is the paradigm case of medicine or health, but is medicine or health *per se*. We call certain types of knives 'medical instruments' because they are regularly used in the science of medicine. Some discussions are called'medical' in that they treat of the science of medicine. Properly speaking, only a living organism is called healthy. But many things are spoken of as being healthy insofar as they promote the health of an organism. Thus, the sun is called 'healthy', we say that such-and-such a place has a 'healthy climate', mothers may tell their rather doubting children to eat the spinach on their plate because it is 'healthy for them', or drinking too much bourbon too often is said to be 'not healthy' for the individual indulging himself at this past-time. Certainly, we do not mean by these statements that the sun, climate or spinach are themselves healthy. What we do mean is that in these particular cases they at least tend to promote health...and please note that we are talking about particular cases, and not general theories. To put this same notion into the 'definition-theory' we may say that the definitions expressed by the word 'health' in each particular use of the word all refer properly to one and only one definition of 'health'. All the other definitions of 'health' have different meanings, but with a reference to the primary definition. Aristotle again touches on this in the *Topics*:

[18] *Metaphysics*, 1060b 30—1961a 7.

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Often in the actual definitions as well ambiguity (equivocation) creeps in unawares, and for this reason the definitions also should be examined. If (e.g.) any one describes what betokens and what products health as 'related commensurably to helath', we must not desist but go on to examine in what sense he has used the term 'commensurably' in each case, e. g. if in the latter case it means that 'it is of the right amount to produce health', whereas in the former it means that 'it is such as to betoken what kind of state prevails'. [19]

I wish to call particular attention to the phrase "we must not desist but go on to examine in what sense he has **used the term** 'commensurably' **in each case**.....", for it is only in the individual cases that we can see the use of this type of equivocation, can see its application,can understand it.

Once again we are confronted with the 'thing-theory' and 'definition-theory' distinction. We must now more closely examine these theories in relation to equivocation by reference, for in what sense can we call definitions and words, and things by the same word 'equivocal' ?

For Aristotle, definitions are conceptual expressions of what a thing is, or has been, or will be, or empirically could be, or logically is, and so on. And,we find the Philosopher mentioning three kinds of definitions:

(a) the indemonstrable definition of a primary term or postulates of science and mathematics,

(b) the real or causal definition of an attribute or an event, i.e. definition *per genus et subjectum et causam.*

(c) the nominal definition of an attribute or event, i.e. definition *per genus et subjectum.*[20]

Further, concepts, insofar as they are universal, and definitions are the same, for the definition expresses the essential nature of something and the concept is the same essential nature grasped by the mind.

To continue in this line of thought we may say that names are the signs of concepts or definitions, and therefore, are the mediate signs of things. But names and definitions may be spoken of without reference to the things which they signify, either mediately or immediately as the case may be. Thus, we may separate our consideration of the names and definitions from the things signified by these names and definitions. In this way we may talk about our speaking about things; i.e. we may speak in a meta-language. But, again, where does the basis for the equivocal appear ? We have stressed that one answer would be that equivocation is found primarily in things, and only by reference to the definitions and names of these things. But this seems to go against some important passages in the writings of Aristotle concerning the problem of equivocation, for instance where in the *Categories* we read, "things are **said to be named** 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name....." Here things are not equivocal, but are named equivocally; i. e., two things are called by the same name, but each has a diffetent definition.

[19] *Topics*, 107b 5–12.

[20] *Posterior Analytics*. II, 10, 93b 27–94a 20.

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And so it can be said that the Philosopher is maintaining that equivocality is not to be found in a comparison of things but that the names and definitions of these things are the basis for the equivocal. The word 'equivocal' is then held to be a word referring to the grammar of our language; not to things. And this is, of course, the second position; i. e., the 'definition-theory' which we have mentioned.

Niether one of these two views is completely without basis in the writings of the Stagirite. But nevertheless, I hold that both of them are an incomplete picture of what Aristotle is attempting to say. For the Philosopher, things, in the sense of first substance, are individual, concrete and existing, being definable in terms of at least genus and species, and sometimes also in terms of the several causes. Thus, Richard is an animal of the species man. A definition may metaphorically be said **to show forth** the essence of the individual being defined. This is a pictorial way of speaking, for the definition **is** the essence or form of the individual in question, **as expressed in language**.[21] In this way we **say of** the thing its essence, this essence not being some hidden "thing" of the concrete individual itself. There is, then, nothing here of the occult. Further, we speak of things in many ways; e.g. there are many ways to describe any one thing according to our interests and needs at the time. From these statements it would appear to follow that we can say of a thing that it has, as it were, many essences, many forms, many relations to other things. In a sense this is correct, for we do often give nominal definitions. But the Philosopher also maintains that there are essential definitions which give the genus, species and causes of something. In this way these definitions are complete and universal, and not partial and particular, and of these essential definitions there is only one for the thing being defined.

As this theory has been presented in outline, we see that any first substance, any individual, concrete, existing thing is just what it is and nothing more. There is nothing hidden from us in the thing.....some ghostly mist which we call the thing's essence. In a real sense we may say that the individual wears what it is on its sleeve. When we say that we have described the thing's essence or form, we mean that we have described the thing in a complete way, *per genus et subjectum et causam*. Now we can speak of any one thing in many particular cases, and in many partial ways, yet in each case we realize that we are speaking of the same thing, but from different points of view. There is nothing strange or secretive about this procedure. Here is one of the linking points between language and what we at least sometimes talk about in our language; i.e., the essence or forms of concrete, existing things as being expressible definitions. Names signify these definitions, and names certainly enter into our ordinary language. In this way we are in a mediate way using things in our language.

[21] One might want to look at the *Posterior Analytics*, Book II, Chapter 4, where Aristotle speaks of essence as definable form predicated by the premises of a syllogism of a certain sort.

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From these remarks I conclude that to ask such a question as which of the two theories; i.e., the 'thing-theory' or the 'definition-theory' is more correct, more basic, more prior, and the like, is to ask a misleading question. It is to ask a misleading question because it is to imply that one can interpret the whole of Aristotle's position by means of a part. Both of these theories might be viewed as elements of a complete philosophical theory. Certainly, they both can be discussed separately, but this is not to claim that one is more basic, more correct than the other. For Aristotle the empirical world and our language are closely bound up with one another.

Now varying degrees of equivocation are possible. It may be total, as seen in the case of equivocals by chance or accident, or the equivocation many be partial,as in the cases of equivocals by reference in which we find some common element running through all of the various definitions signified by the same name. From one point of view such definitions as these are the same, and from another they are different. The equivocals by reference are expressed in reference to one definition or essence. In this sense they are like univocals, but they can be used in many ways, and so are equivocal. They can be used in several meaningful ways within our language, but in ways which are related.

Aristotle certainly does not require for a word to be meaningful that it have only one exact, essential use. Rather, he accepts the multiple signification of words as we use them in various particular cases. He then proceeds to give detailed rules for distinguishing the different things that are expressed in various ways by the same word. These various meanings of a given word are to be found by ascertaining the way in which the word is being used in a sentence. Thus, in one case the word 'healthy' is being used in some equivocal way, and in another case is not. And the word 'equivocal' itself may be used in various ways; e.g., equivocal by chance or reference. The particular meaning of a word has to be determined by the context in which the word is used.

Now let us turn our attention to the the third type of equivocal which is mentioned by Aristotle in the passage from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as quoted on page 37 of this article. This is analogy, properly speaking. The many uses of analogy run throughout the entire works of the Philosopher, holding a central place in his thinking and methodology. In comparsion however, with its undeniable importance, little is said about analogy and exactly what is meant by it. But even though there is little said, we are given enough material to let us glimpse what Aristotle has in mind when he uses the word 'analogy'.

Here are several passages from the works of the Stagirite which tell us something about the general formal structure of an analogy.

> That from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms so related that the second (b) is to the first (a), as the fourth (D) is to the third (C)....[22]

[22] *Poetics*, 1457b 16-17.

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But all things are not said in the **same sense** to exist actually, but only by analogy—as A is in B or to B,C is in D or to D; for some are as movement to potency; and others as substance to some sort of matter. [23]

For proportion(analogy)is equality of ratios, and involves four terms at least (that discrete proportion involves four terms is plain, but so does continuous proportion, for it uses one term as two and mentions it twice; e.g. 'as the line A is to the line B, so is the line B to the line C; the line B, then, has been mentioned twice, so that if the line B be assumed twice, the proportional terms will be four); and the just, too, involes as least four terms, and the ratio between one pair is the same as that between the other; for there is a similar distinction between the persons and between the things. As the term A, then, is to B, so will C be to D, and therefore, *alternando*, as A is to C, will be to D. [24]

The structural form, then, of a proper analogy in Aristotle's usage is A:B: :C:D.

It might be tempting to say that because the general form; i.e., grammatical appearance, of analogy remains the same in all cases that there must be a general **principle** of analogy which is the same for all cases. Extending this line of thought, someone might want to claim that there must be a general basis of analogy which will guarantee the truth of all cases Extend this line of thought, someone might want to claim that there must be a general basis of analogy which will guarantee the truth of all analogies. Some, thus, might be led to maintain that there is a common basis for all such statements as '2 is to 1 as 6 is to 3,' 'the lung is to the dog as the gill is to the fish', 'potency is to act as matter is to form', 'the goodness of man is to his nature as the goodness of God is to His nature', and so on. Each of these examples is of the general form A:B: :C:D, and each purports to make some comparison between the different parts, or terms, of the analogy. Should there not be, then, some general principle common to them all ? **Must** there not be such a principle ?

We maintain that because the general formal manner of expressing a particular analogy is used in all cases, it does not follow that all analogies can be reduced to one sufficient principle, or to one schema of such principles that will be exhaustive. We hold that there is not any one general, sufficient rule of analogy, or any set of such rules which would be meaningful in all cases. The closest thing that Aristotle seems to do in approaching such a "rule" is to state the general structure of analogies as A:B: :C:D, but this is completely vacuous of any meaning in the same way it would be vacuous to describe a group of sentences as being composed of noun followed by a verb followed by an adjective. But this is not to say that we cannot make meaningful statements about the various individual uses of analogy, or th at we cannot meaningfully use analogies. For, as a matter of fact, we do. To deny this would be nothing less than bizarre.

[23] *Metaphysics*. 1048b 5-7.
[24] *Nicomachen Ethics*, 1131a 33—1131b 7.

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One consideration which should lead us to expect that no general sufficient rule, or set of such rules, is the basis for all cases of analogy is this: How would one go about understanding the meanings, if they do have meanings, of the four sentences '2 is to 1 as 6 is to 3', 'the lung is to the dog as the gill is to the fish', 'potency is to act as matter is to form', 'the goodness of man is to his nature as the goodness of God is to His nature' ? Or ask yourself, what kind of criteria or conditions would be required in each of these cases to make the sentence in question either true or false, if each could be true or false ? Or say, in what context would this sentence be appropriate, and in what context would that one be appropriate ? The fact of the matter is that the meanings of each of these sentences, as well as their possible truth values, would depend on entirely different kinds of criteria and considerations. We cannot simply demand the same sort for each one of them.

> ...it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things (and statements) just so far as the nature of the subject admits. it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.[25]

It is exactly the particular contexts which give any analogy meaning, insofar as a particular analogy might have meaning, and just so far as the nature of the subject admits.

Analogy, then, for Aristotle is a sub-class of the equivocal, and is a four term relationship. But can we say anything about the terms themselves, and in particular, what exactly is the analogous relation of these terms one to another? May we expect a general sort of answer to this question? Can we inquire in a general way what kind of relation holds between the various elements of any analogy? Can we say in general what this analogous relation is, besides the remark that it is some sort of four-term relationship probably expressing an agreement between the terms? But what is this notion of agrement outside of particular cases ? Without a framework, without a background, the word 'agreement' tells us nothing-and the framework, the background, comes only in particular cases, and not in generalities.

Where, then, does the basis of analogy lay ? If some person were to ask this question, it must first be learned just what he wants to know—what kind of information is he seeking, and what would serve as an answer for him? Does the questioner wish to talk about things in our environment, is he speaking of our ordinary language, or is he perhaps referring to some technical discipline ? But, if he is asking for the basis of all analogies, and in consequence, for a theory analogy, it should be pointed out to him that there is not such a theory, and that such a theory is in principle impossible. The fundamental reason for this is simple enough; viz., that the exact relation, the agreement, in any analogy must depend upon the particular elements of that analogy. Thus, we can only talk

[25] *Nicomachean Ethics* 1094b 25-27.

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about particular analogies, if we are to say more than an analogy is a four-term relation expressing some agreement between the terms—which has already been pointed out as being a vacuous comment to make. To say more than this is to have to consider the particular disciplines with which we want to deal, and even more important, to have to consider particular cases of analogies within each of these various disciplines. Only by speaking of particular analogies will there be found any foundations for analogies. We can say very little in general, and what we can say is without any content.

We have seen that the Stagirite holds the general structure of an analogy to be A:B: :C:D, which is quite an empty formula. We also can say that an analogy is meant to express some relation, some ordering between its terms. The nature of this ordering is, however, not expressed in A:B: :C:D. As long as the concrete terms themselves of the analogy in question are not mentioned we cannot specify any ordering or relation of the analogy except to say that each particular analogy has its own particular relation between its terms. But, on the other hand, from this remark we can not suppose that any analogy is simply a comparison—of some sort or rather—of anything in any way to anything else. It may be supposed that any analogy must be based on some real similarity, which is basically characteristic of the terms of the particular analogy. What is this similarity? What is it that is basically characteristic of the terms of an analogy? Again, this cannot be said in general. Without a context in which the particular analogy has its place we can say little or nothing about that analogy. And even given a particular context, given the particular terms of a given analogy, it may still be difficult to say much. It is at this point of attempting to understand a particular analogy than an insight into resemblances is needed. In themselves the terms of any given analogy may be at least superficially unlike one another. But we expect a good analogy to go beyond this, for we expect it to point out some relation to us holding between the various particular terms of the analogy—something that we had not seen before. In this relation a similarity is noticed between the various terms. Thus, an analogy becomes what might be called an act of pointing out, of showing. It points out relational similarities between particular things, which on first glance or consideration might have looked rather different.

While, then, it may be said that a particular analogy involves some sort of relational complex, nothing can be said about this relational complex prior to a consideration of particular cases of analogies. Also, given one particular analogy there may well be several ways of viewing it depending upon the varying contexts of the given analogy. We might change its framework and its background. Thus, a given analogy might display several relational complexes depending upon the set of circumstances: e.g., grammatical, logical, biological, mathematical, and so on, in which we view the analogy. Because Aristotle does not present us with any

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sufficient rule, or schema, by which we may construct analogies, and because there is no general method by which we can say how any particular analogy is interpretable presented in the writings of Aristotle, we can say that there is no single theory of analogy for the Stagirite. We are able, according to the Philosopher,to present a few rather vacuous qualifications which are necessary to being an analogy, such as having four terms,and the first term is to the second as the third term is to the fourth. But this is to say very little about particular cases of analogies. How are we, then able to say something about particular cases; how are we able to use particular analogies ?We study various subject matter,acquaint ourselves with; e. g., the disciplines of mathematics, biology, physics, logic, perhaps even philosophy and theology. We learn the various principles and techniques employed in particular areas of study. Within these various disciplines we construct analogies that are based on the order, principles and techniques of the discipline in question. In relation to the actual constructing and understanding of analogies, this process of learning is vital. Then, to ask what is the ordering principle of an analogy is to ask what are the ordering principles of the discipline in which the analogy appears.

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AMERICA'S CIVILIZATION : A STUDY IN ACCULTURATION

JOSEPH H. BUNZEL

I. Introduction and Definitions.

The present essay is concerned with a specific socio-psychological problem—the problem of Euro-American Acculturation as an example of the important and more general phenomenon of international accomodations. In the interest of brevity, some familiarity with the terms employed, shall be assumed leaving definitory niceties for a more expanded treatment. In dealing with the European backgrounds, we shall refer to Continental cultures from the Vistula to the Channel; while references to Britain as an "in-between" or bridging culture will be more specifically spelled out.

In considering American cultural traits, we shall have in mind the general culture of the continental United States, with apologies to Canada and the Central and South American cultural complexes, since it is only realistic to say that the word "American" has come to be synonymous with the United States of North America.

Without subtle refinements, the term "culture" will be employed to designate simply the sum total of human endeavors and achievements of any people at a given time and place. But this synthesis includes both the material and non-material manifestation. By "acculturation" is meant the complex of social processes, arising from the attitudes and motivations of people, whereby one ethnic group is influenced by another-upto and including the complete absorption of beliefs, practices, and institutional frames of reference.

A complete survey of the problem in the present context would require several volumes, including detailed quantitative patterns for the qualitative comparisons. This, of course, is not possible here. We shall therefore be content to suggest some basic generalizations in relation to the general processes of acculturation. This essay is a research report in the sense that over the years, we have sought out the connections, contexts, and interrelationships within the total configuration of our Western civilization. No effort is made here to quantify the data and findings: nor is there an effort to organize and evaluate the tremendous literature on the subject. Rather it is hoped that some representative traits in Europe and America can be indicated and their apearances and reappearances may be traced.

*Revised from a paper originally delivered at the Urbana meetings of the American Sociological Association under chairmanship of Professor Robert Angell. Section on International cooperation.

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Accordingly, we now inquire by what processes of psycho–social alchemy, and to what extent, is American culture derived from the European origins and influences.

II The Coin

(a) The European Face—The Portuguese sailors who brought strange fruit from faraway India introduced a new time, a new attitude, new thoughts, and a new culture into Europe. Transformed Hellenism created the manuelesque style; but it became more than the artistic expression of a small kingdom;it became in the genius of a Michelangelo the start of a new era. Ever since the Sistina (1506) man's feeling about this universe and on this earth has changed. Whoever has seen that chapel must have felt unspeakably proud that a man has created thusly; and he must have felt unutterably humble in his human insignificance. That was the birth hour of the Baroque.

The Baroque was a great deal more than just one art style in the Italian High Renaissance. It became the expression of an attitude in life and thought at a given area in a given time. It must be stressed that the Baroque dominated life and thought in Europe from 1500 in Italy, moving to Spain and France,then over the Danube into Germany,*simultaneously into the Netherlands and Britain came to a marvelous climax in Austria and Bavaria until it finally petered out in Russia at about the time of the French Revolution. It comprised all froms of life, penetrated the whole culture of all countries but—again it should be emphasized—at different times in different countries during these centuries. The Baroque is recognized most easily in the artistic manifestations of these cultures, but also in its political,economic, legal and social developments. Moreover, it should be noted that the Baroque consisted of two main streams; (i) the *Southern*, Roman Catholic feudal, and the courtly life of society. This was a life which gave great external liberty, directed natural collectives through authorities which were undoubted, and over flowed in generosity of *joie de vive*, not only, it should be stressed, among the ruling but even to a certain amount among the ruled classes.

The other main stream was (ii)the Northern, Protestant, bourgois, feudal at times ,but devoted to the life of the community; with greater internal liberty, directed toward spiritual individualism modulated by authorities whose validity consisted in their power overconscience as harnessed by convention.

Common to both streams and characteristic of the Baroque were strong extrovert structures, power–exercising and power–arousing. Common also to both was the tendency to enlarge and embellish; plus a thinking

1 Without ascribing too much significance to an analogy, the following might be considered. The fixated tradition of the Baroque in America may correspond to the *Id* of the individual in Freudian psychology; under the influence of the external world, the American *Ego* is being formed; Europe then may be liken to the *Superego* constituting "a third force which the ego must take into account" *(Freud Outline of Psychoanalysis*, New York, 1949, P, 14)

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in vast spaces, prodigality, sensuality and its polar opposite, asceticism, Both were absolute, powerful, violent. Common to both was a conscious will to freedom, a self reliance of the human being and the assumption of responsibility of the individual under the roof of mystical union of faith and fate—a *unio mystica* under God.

In the all including Baroque there worked a practical universalism; nature was discovered and subjugated ,symptomatically the blood circulation was discovered, mercantilism in the form of a most liberal economic system was established; techniques of mass communication and domination were recognized and practiced, e. g., in the Jesuit's theater; landscape was incorporated into architecture,yir arts flourished,baroque music, baroque painting and writing, each different times and at different places streamed through Europe. The breath of the Baroque filled the air . And every settling nation discovered America at the time of its Baroque; every settler or conquistador came as man of his Baroque, and thus:

BAROQUE CHEATED AMERICA.

(b) **The American Portrait.** —Europe had created and abandoned many styles under many influences; neither the Islamic nor the Slavic contributions to European culture have been genuinely and generally recognized and accepted; except by specializing scholars in unreadable tones; America,however,began a mixed,but fixed tradition.[1]The Baroque created this Western Hemisphere; The Spaniards in Florida and California, the protestant Baroque men in Connecticut and New England generally, the Dutch in New York, the Swedes in Delaware. It was an extravert push, an expanstionist impetus, which brought than to these shores, with their hierarchy of values. If these were not conscious, even less so was the first stabbing of pain life, the pangs of birth, the trauma—as one might call it—of their arrival. Intent upon creating the mirror and the counter-mirror of their homelife patterns, they started from scratch; this resulted in hostility against their old environment and their new one, creating an ambivalence of hatred and pride.

And again the two mainstreams of the Baroque worked through them. Joy of life, imitation of courts, town-halls, society and community; the urge to subjugate nature and acquire power over men; the wish for predictability and self-reliance and responsibility were used together in violence and power into a new and fundamental attitude. The common bond was the attempt to create freedom under God,tamed by convention and laws. Thinking in vast spaces, the generosity and even prodigality of the Baroque generated and conserved the main attitudes of American architecture. The technical became the typical; in the burdges and high ways of today we recognize the glacis of the Baroque. we see the great old man of American architecture, Frank Lloyd Wright as the fulfiller of Fischer von Erlach; the film as the legitimate heir of the *trinfo*: the TV-families the last remnants of the **lever.**

The concepts of the law of nations, natural laws, the freedom of the

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seas, the stress on principles and absolutes, through these and many others we can see the portrait of the European face.

III The Balonce Sheet.

If you were kind enough to follow this reasoning, you may be willing to stipulate that material cultural necessities and traits were accompanied by the 'non-material, and that the culture of a given time and place can as easily be recognized by its artistic manifestations as by its institutional setting, you may also be willing to attempt a quick and necessarily quite oversimplified periodization of the give and take between Europe and America.

(a) From colonial times to 1750 Europe qave fixated ideas and cultural goods; she gave ideas of freedom and democracy both through Britian and France: whe gave the people necessary to put these ideas into practice; England provided the language to express them.

Europe provided leadership and America served as a vent for the adventurer, the power–greedy,the unadjusted, the poor and the desperate. America returned raw materials and provided a challenge; she offered furs, gold, some new and strange foodstuffs (mostly American Indian in origin) and stimuli America could not have done Europe at the time; Europe could have done without America.

(b) From 1750 to 1850 Europe gave the ideological substructure to and provided actual support for American independence: she received in exchange a full fledged revolution-rather more than she had bargained for.Europe gave economic leadership--the publication date of the *Wealth of Nations* coincides with the *Declaration* of *Independence*—she gave artistic and cultural models and leadership, she gave people, leaders and followers, scientific genius, and impetus.

Amirica reciprocated not only with scientific ideas, but also proved their practicability in the struggle for survival against nature;she provided a model in the scientifiic sense—of political democracy and how to live in it. The existence of a growing nation as a republic was not willingly accepted elsewhere. However Europe was busy with the digestion of the French Revolution and the first Empire, and the Monroe Doctrine. This therefore,was largely a period of non-interaction.

(c) From 1850 to 1900 Europe still provided artistic leadership in fact, her styles were aped successfully. However, attitudes developed in America which were the outgrowth of the early trauma of colonization. While Europe still gave scientific invention and insights, she already received from America technical knowledge; while she still provided immigrants, these waves of mass emigration were molded into a cast formed more than a hundred years ago. Most important: America in its tents and barracks, as well as in its towns and villages,started to live a city life, not a town existence. There the Metropolos started. It is inter esting, to observe that the capital cities that houses governmental offices are almost invariably not the large centers of mass-population; these were

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settled in accord with industrial developments and requirements.

The culture,to be sure,was still not urban in the sense of the census. The land still produced and fed the town; but it was citification—if one may coin a term—rather than urbanization which brought peasants attitudes into cities; American farming developed independently as an industry Europe gave Marxism,which America rejected both politically and economically. Because it stemmed from a different ideological origin, America never accepted political labor unions. In Europe the sheer mars of elapsed time had its consequences. It secured continuation of many different traditions; America's fixated tradition developed into a **gestalt** of its own. Perhaps this can be regarded as a partial explanation for the often observed push toward uniformity. One basic tradition developed in individual diversification.This may,at least in part,constitute an explanation why the world's most collectivized mass culture insist—and rightly so —on moderate individualism as its measure.

(d) From 1900 to 1925 the intercultural exchange became more and more pronounced. Europe gave relativism—not only the Einsteinian but also of the moral and anthropological persuasion. It gave Freudianism, which succeeded nowhere as fully in this country,

America gave absolutes—moral principles which were European precepts decades and centuries ago. It lived in the stability and security in which Europe had lived in its father's youth.

Europe gave this first signs of the decay of the Occident; a disintergrating artistic culture as seen in James Joyce and Picasso,Stravinsky and Alban Berg; it gave the erratic artistic movements and the stateliness of decaying operatic empires. The United States, very much apart from the feudalism of its Central and South American neighbors and their struggle for independence and nationhood, gave concentrated capitalisn to Europe. Americanization was resented—just as was early European colonialism.In 1921 shoe repair shop in Vienna announced proudly: Shoes repaired; no American system" (meaning handwork rather than machine repairs). Despite resistance, the American system was already there; the city and science took over. Still there was little direct influence exerted over European artistic or indeed philosophic developments. Dewey was practically unknown, the great American novels unread, many still unwritten.

(e) Between 1925 and the fifties Europe did not give very much more to America.Inflation lead to bank failures,the depression to further economic collapse. The Roosevelt reforms attempted what 150 years ago the

* Americas non—socialistic humanitanism resulted in strange developments: Hoovors grain shipment to Horthys Huhgary made the white terror possible;U.S. loans to Austria holped the clerico fascism of Seipel and the Dollfuss and Schuschnigg brutalities; Americas direct interventions in Russio, Eastern and Southern Europe are history unforgotten and frequently unforgiven. In its first Americanization wave, Europe accepted parliamentarism even where it had never existed, but could not fill the roomy chambers with consensus necessary for enduring social structures.

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Emperor Joseph II of Austria tried in view of the French revolution: Prevent the social holocaust by immediate social action. Although a great many reforms were repudiated later and the personnel ruthlessly reshuffled, the main trend toward a "welfare state" in Europe remains—just as it persists today in America. After World War II immigration control set in; America did not accept as many people. The United States, however,gave money and advice;it accepted social reform ideas some of which had filtered down from the socialists of earlier times.

Europe still gave old world education. America in turn promoted pragmatism in education,and meriless and less restrictive egalitarianism. America still accepted some of the last Baroque men of the old continent; some who wanted to plan and to grow, some who thought in vast spaces, and scientific terms; men of the city, the future city of men. It Americanized them the audacious, the pugnacious, and the violent; the desperate the, poor, and and the meek.

America Created the great new novel which swept the continent. It started to contribute toward musical forms and architectural developments.The roles were reversed;the resentment reversed too.Just as Americans have resented the cultural colonization, so Europeans resented being cocacolonized." "Where it could be said once: *ex oriente lux* it could be said now: *exoccidente,Luce.* The ring closed--in 1952 the same Viennese shoeshop proudly announced: Shoes repaired by American system. Now Europe is presented with a great and traumatically fixated culture, in the enduring creation of which they only sporadically participated. It is true that it originally was a European culture, but it has grown independently with two main streams: the Germanic-Anglo Saxon and the Latin. It might be suggested that one of the reasons for the present tension between East and West may be the wish—unconscious, perhaps—to push the third part of Europe, the Slavic part, away from a new world culture in the establishment, of which it had no considerable part.

IV. The Exchange

Insight must remain a historical *apercus* if it is not accompanied by specifics, definitions of problem-areas, and suggestions of future developments. These must of necessity be brief indeed.

(a) **Communications.—** Much has been made of the dictum ascribed variously to Oscar Wilde and George Bernard Shaw among others, that the United States and England are separated not only by the Atlantic, but mostly by a common language. Indeed the King's English has greatly changed in the American usage. If one compares the early documents, for instance the list of *gravamina* against the governor of New Hampshire, with a similar list of *gravamina* by the Hungarian Nobility of approximately the same time, and then compares these with recent complaints of our present day politicos, the change in tenor and tone is clearly discernible. Compared with the contemporary listing the presentation is full of innate dignity measured, scholarly and convincing. Compared

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with today, its tone is British in its understatement for emphasis. The American language, perhaps because of its baroque ancestry, has become more and more an overstating, vannglorious dialect. It may not be amiss to remark here that most of the early settlers, to the extent that they had an education, still wrote and sometimes spoke Latin and Greek which served so to speak as a *lingua franca* at that time.

The development from under to overstatement and away from the common denominator made a semantic understanding difficult, both for the Continentals who could not quite fathom the change, and for the British as well. Moreover, only a small stratum of European society spoke English—mostly in the nordic seafaring countries; the language of society and diplomacy was French.

Semantically French is indeed very far from Anglo-Saxon understanding. German, a language related to English rather than French, is certain of easier acceptance, if for no other reason than because of its scientific uses. Thus language constitutes a major problem of acculturation which—it may be said quite frankly—cannot be overcome by creation of an artificial language. The soul of a people swings in its language, its historical developments, its collective memories; only a living language can transmit culture.

Recent technical developments in TV as well as Radio pose the same difficulties but present some hopeful signs for international cooperation. Eurovision might become a communications center which would effect an acculturative understanding via the technical. Global television is not far behind.

(b) Institutions.

1. Political Institution. Based on failures in commuication most institutions, and particularly political Institutions, are hard to understand. This is particularly apparent in the concept of **democracy**, which confusingly embraces political, economic, and social manifestation. It would be easier to subdivide it into (a) *Political democracy*, experssed in parliamentarism, checks and balances, and division of power, (b) **economic democracy** as expressed in capitalism, right to private property, profit motive, collective bargaining (c) **social democracy,** expressed in a high degree of regard for vertical mobility, egalitarinism, and dependence on moral **principles**. The European, however, was primarily concerned with the political aspects of democracy as against monarchy or a dictatorship. Even the English version of a democratic monarchy was difficult for the continental to grasp.

The basic attitude of Europeans toward governments differs some what from that held in the United States. While the American thinks of his government with tolerance, the European attitude is customarily one of distrust and fear. And with good reasons. Therefore, American insistance on truthful information is almost a total loss since in Europe, no government disseminates anything but half truths and fabrications. Another

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instance of this basic attitude instance of this basic attitude is the incredibly low tax morale, the widespread absence in Europe of a **sens civic** in governmental affair.

2. **The Law.**

Such attitudes are interelated with the basic sense of justice and law. Characteristically the American language does not have a word corresponding to *Recht* in German, and *droit* in France; American law consists of laws; there is nothing else. In Europe, however, there is a great difference between the laws (*Gesetze* in German *lois* in France) and the body of law (of right).

Perhaps under the influx of European jurists, some changes have been made in the common law structure of the United States; basically, however, the laws in the United States still depend on English common law. The European governmental offices with which the American comes in contact are staffed with men who may not be lawyers, but who hold as their basic degrees the law degrees of Continent. Roman law and Canon Law still dominate the legal systems of the Southern countries. They have been also received into the Germanic systems which in some instances, for example in the matter of perjury, resemble the English and there with the American legal system.

3. **Economic Institutions:**

Inseparability of economic with political concepts constitute another problem area for acculturation. The European coal and steel community offers perhaps the best hope for international and intercultural bonds that ever existed. After several decades of economic intergration, *via* the Common Market political and cultural collaboration will come as a matter of course. However, words like socialism, still have a magic power in the United States. They have become quite accepted in Europe where one can point to some of the finest American achievements as social democratic in the true sense of the word. However through public housing, social security, social work in general, the American has become accustomed to the results of European socialization. These developments form but a part of the acculturation movement which, in turn, were answered by the Marshall plan, the Berlin airlift, UNRRA, and the various public and private organizations which have entered Europe. Just as at the turn of the century, England was regarded as Europe's governess; so America today may be considered as Europe's social worker.

After the American government spent decades in legislation and litigation, the power of the cartels and monopoles was broken, at least theoretically. Recent attempts at European decentralization were resisted not only by industrialists, which would be logical enough, but also by workers who felt that a cartel could pay better wages and provides greater fringe benefits than a small independant employer. The concern of German labor unions, for instance, with the economic well-being of their members rather than their political position has become very pronounced indeed.

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4. **Social Institutions:**

(a)**Marriage**—There is no time left to discuss the differences in marriage and family between Europe and America; much has been written about it, and little worthwhile has come of it. One might say that the concept of the democratic family as introduced by American sociological research has found ready acceptance in Europe. Whether there are acculturative influences at work is a moot question. Europeans, not being as much accustomed to interviews and questionnaires as their American counterpart, will probably not produce anything like the *Kinsey reports*; if they did it would probably be even of less value.

(b) **Food and Drug Habits**—An acculturation study of food habits in itself would be a very interesting undertaking. Suffice it here to say that there was, of course, a great influx of European national dishes, e.g. spaghetti, or berscht. Then came the American preparation in cans of these foods,which then became general,(have you ever seen a Neapolitan open a can of spaghetti) and finally the acceptance of super-market canned goods by the maid-less European house wife.

Also in the social value of food, Europeans lead the way; American-however, provided the mass basis for this. An acculturation sign all over the continent is the milk-bar (before the war, the author was one of the few men in Vienna who dared to drink milk publicly in a bar or even coffee house).

Drug habits have also distinct acculturative importance. The scientific spirit of Europe bounces back in form of innumerable drugs; some of these were invented and found by Europeans but then produced and exported by Americans. Again, the use of narcotics would afford opportunity for interesting acculturation study.

(c) Another area of acculturation is housing. In building as ture is well as in financing American influences on European developments continued. Again the main American contribution is the possibility of mass production and there with the exploitation of ideas which more often than not had been advanced by Europeans, either within or without the United States.

5. **Insitutions of non-material culture:**

(a) **Education**–There were great differences in the educational system of European and American nations. A good deal has been written on the respective values of each of student-centered versus subject-matter-centered education, of professional versus vocational education, and particularly of democratic versus authoritarian education.

Actually, each culture educates its members to live and prosper within its confines. To educate a young man who is going to live and a small midwestern town, as if he were to become a professor at Leyden,is obvious nonsense. Thus the stress of American education being laid on making a living after school, will be duplicated in Europe in the same measure in which European youth will be educated toward specific life

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situations. Since, by acculturation, it is rather likely that European living will become more attuned to American ideals, naturally European education will follow suit. This will not be done without some difficulties since European, education particularly on the higher level, has an old well -established tradition and a social position of greater standing than in this country.

Such developments will raise the question of universalism versus specialization. The pendulum, having swung in America toward early specialization is about to swing back to subject-centered and more general education, as can be seen from the Harvard report and others.

It would be difficult to measure whether acculturation or simply moderation plays the decisive role there.

(b) **Religion and the Churches.** The searching for an acceptable faith which would answer to the need of man and be in accord with scientific principles is going on in Europe as well as in America. However, the church plays a far greater social role in this country than abroad. Here again, after the first shock of seeing baseball played in the basement, God worshipped on the first floor, and icecream dispensed on the second, the American way seems to make inroads in European country.

The strict separation of church and state while outside of the European tradition of the state-church, if not the church-state, can become an asset in international understanding and cooperation.

(c)**The Arts.**—Little remains to be said about the arts; the problems there are probably deeper than in any other field; but the influence of Acculturation on cooperation is smaller than anywhere else. With growing internationalism, not least because of improvement in communications, national arts have lost some importance. It is the one field in which Europe feels, still and again, that it has the old creative power, the ability to produce new and incisive stimuli. This is particularly so in the theater arts.

In Europe the integration of culture within one national area is strong and pronounced and almost always subsidized. In the theater the eternal varities are reproduced according to the possibilities of the historical moment. While American authors are being played on European stages ,staged carefully and with as much empathy as possible, there is little if any imitation of American style, in contrast to the American novel, for instance. Studies of the films of Britain, France, and United States have shown the different solutions to the same problems of mass culture. For it is quite clear that with the Americanization of the Continent there grows the citification and secularization and the transition from an earlier magical to a scientific culture. Science is becoming the theory of the cosmos; theogony has been replaced by science as cosmogony or the layman. (Broch)

Thus another circle closes. From the curiosity and audacity of the Baroque man, from his expansionism and extrovertism, he returns,as the

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American re-Europeanizes the continent, enriched by the experience of 300 years of independent growth from the matrix which once was Europe.

One thing more remains to be said; one unique American trait must be mentioned because it is crucial for international cooperation. This is the wish of the American to be good. It was not inherent in the Baroque matrix, it is not inherent in the European tradition. Naturally, there were and still are good people in Europe; naturally there were and still are, evil people in America. We do not say that the American is good; who knows as to how much decency has diminished in the last years, no matter how much less a word is worth than it used to be, every stranger coming to the shores of this continent notices the great and abiding desire on the part of everybody to be kind. The European has no objections to being kind; he will be good or evil without attempting to play at being good, much less,to be good for its own sake.

The American wants to do the right thing and he assumes that all others are like him,and thus he treats the whole world,including of course the skin-related Europeans,as if they were misguided,unhappy Americans. Thanks to this trait the American, who has become the *homonovus* through technologies and citification, leads also in the search for the new ethics based on absolutes but adjusted to relativities. Thus he may become the forerunner of a new species, the *homo-not-so-sapiens bonus.*

It is our responsibility as social scientists to work on problems of social organization. Integration and reconciliation within a common world culture—through acculturation—thus present the great sociological challenge of our time. Such endeavor demands a new ethics one which the author—among many others has tried to indicate in other writings mainly on social psychology of the arts. Such undertakings promise the speediest and most lasting fulfilment of the age–old dreams of mankind. They depend on devaluation of victory *per se* and affirmation of the struggle as value—values which the Baroque has taught us.

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INDIAN APPROACH TO PSYCHOLOGY

H. M. JOSHI

Introduction:

Man, since he awoke to the plane of thought, has variously attempted to grasp the universe in comprehensive way,to view it in a vast and total vision. It is the aspiration of man to grow into such a vision fully and integrally. The urge for comprehension has remained persistent throughout the history of human thought regardless of its seeming partial failures.

According to various temperaments, beliefs and attitudes, men have either taken into account the inner cravings and revelations or have evaded and explained them away in order to find out the'How'and'Why' of the universe. Proper study of the early philosophical and psychological literature will, however, reveal to us that search for knowledge, ultimate Reality lying behind the multiple phenomena, the indubitable self and the truths of human endeavour have remained pertinent in the inquiry of ancient man.

In the times in which we live, I do not think that the urge for comprehension has maintained its original content. There is an undue specialization in every field of knowldge and activity. Hence the need has arisen at present for unification and co-ordination among various sciences, schools of thought and activity. In the West we see the separation taking place between Philosophy and Psychology. It is difficult at this juncture to assess the value of such a separation.They say that now there is no love lost between the two old friends and sooner they accept partition it is better. It is held by experts that psychology in strict sense is a laboratory subject like other natural sciences. Therefore it has nothing to do and depend on a speculative subject such as Philosophy or Metaphysics. Such a ready made partition may be quite acceptable to an ordinary layman but not at all to a person who thinks rigorously and in the ultimate sense of the term. To-day in Indian Universities also Philosophy and Psychology are considered totally different subjects. It remains to be seen whether in the hurry of earning the title of 'Positive science', it retains the character of the subject.

Psychology as a science:

Psychology, as a science, attempts to understand living being wholly. Can it study living being in solitude ? No,because every living being has to adjust with the outside environment in one way or other. So while it takes the subject and the object both into its scope, it steps into the province of values and other criteria of existence. I believe that in India, psychology was never looked upon as mere descriptive subject. It was

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studied and is still being studied in order to develop and cultivate the powers of mind, to control bodily functions, emotions and sentiments.

If Indian Psychology recognizes the valuational aspect of behavior and ideation it is not to be inferred that in doing so it loses the character of scientific study. Watson and W.James hold that psychology must be studied like any other material sciences and that values should not be cherished by the student of psychology. This implies that judgement about 'good' and 'bad', 'high' and 'low' is lying outside the proper field of psychology. Events should be observed and studied impersonally and objectively. But Wilhelm Dilthy held the opposite view. According to him 'Understanding' cannot be purely intellectual but must be appreciative, sympathetic and feelingful. He says that values as well as facts are directly given in the inner life. He urged that there should be developed a 'descriptive and analytic psychology' quite different from the 'experimental psychology' that was imitating the natural sciences and attempting to discover the elements of conscious experience and the laws of their combination.

A table or an atom does not give us an impression of being an individual. But every mental act must belong to an individual. Besides, social life and culture are inherent in all psychological phenomena. They require a social field for their exercise and development. Psychology should be considered as social and cultural science. Moreover, since the phenomena studied are not merely physical, the method followed for their study also must differ from the methods of physical science. In this view, Titchner defines psychology as the study of consciousness and maintains that it should follow the method of introspection.

In the light of above vindication we will be able to appreciate Dr. Jadu Nath Sinha's observation which comes to the effect that there is no empirical psychology in India. "Indian psychology is based on metaphysics. The psycholgical account of some problems of perception, e.g.,perception of the self, perception of the universal, etc., is unintelligible without consideration of their metaphysical foundation."[1] Further he says that Indian psychology is based on introspection and observation; it is not based on experiments. Students of introspective psychology will find ample food for reflection in Indian Psychology. They will find acute psychological analysis of some very subtle mental processes which have not yet attracted the attention of the western psychologists.[1]

From ancient to modern times

Upaniṣadic seers were foremost in their age in philosophic reflection in general and psychological insight in particular. After the upaniṣadic age one finds penetrating discussion of mind,nature of self, not-self,nature of consciousness,passions,and desires,in various Darśanas. Jain munis and Buddhist monks have independently developed theories regarding the

1. Jadunath Sinha: *Indian Psychology Cognition*, Vol.I.P.xiv, Preface. second edition. 1958.

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nature of mind and ways and means for disciplining bodily and neural forces to help mind attain spiritual realization. There is unique physiology and preparation and path laid down for those who seek liberation in Yoga Darśana of Patanjali. Saṁkhya Darśana of Kapila elaborates the evolutes of nature called Prakṛti. In Bhagavad Geeta there is a synthesis of various philosophical standpoints. Synthetic yogic training has been ably elaborated in it. Vedānta is, of course, many sided. In its metaphysics the principle of consciousness is adequately articulated. In modern thought, Sri Aurobindo's literature is very heart searching and enlightening both for eastern and western psychologies. His *magnum opus* '*Life Divine*' is acclaimed as a landmark in Metaphysics. Likewise his writings on human evolution and synthesis of Yoga are important for the study of human consciousness and its different layers.

Nature of cognitive instruments

In the *Śatapatha Brahmana* which is said to embody the views of a sage called Saṇḍilya, man is spoken of as being possessed of of under standing (*Kratumayah*). It is further said that the self, both universal and individual, has intelligence *(manomayah)* and will (*Saṁkalpa*). The word mind is used very often in the sense of soul, and in some places its capacity as a psychical instrument is referred to. It is that which knows name and form, which is not equivalent to the body but something which includes the body. Every object is known because it has a form and a name. Form is known by mind, hence it is a mental thing. Name is expressed by speech, hence it is characteristic of speech. When a man knows these two things, he knows the whole universe.[2].

In the second chapter of the *Aitareya Araṇyaka* we find a further advance in psychological analysis and also a clear enunciation of the idealistic doctrine, according to which all reality is mind dependent; in fact it is knowledge itself. A distinction is drawn between self as the real knower and mind as simply a sense organ.[3]

In view of the fact that in many sections of western psychology mind is regarded as passive while the objective world is conceived as dynamic, Impressing itself upon the mind through the nervous system. Such a view of mind is wrong psychologically as well as well as metaphysically. Firstly, if mind were passive we would never have got the real experience of the external universe as D.M. Datta has shown it well in his '*Six ways of Knowing*. Secondly, if it were just passive errors of perception then its omission of certain objects could not be explained. Thirdly, the view the that the senses act first and then the mind, rests on the gross notion that the physiological organs are the senses and that affection of these organs means impression on the senses. But this view cannot be defended ultimately. Changes in the physiological organs due to external stimuli may be possible even in dead organisms, which have no resultant knowledge.

2. Jwala Prasad, *History of Indian Epistemology:*. Page 34–35, second edition. 1958
3. *Ibid.* P. 40.

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mind seeks or tends to know the external world.

The behaviourist view:

The behaviourist view that the so-called mind and mental activity 'Senses are senses in so far as they are the channels through which they are nothing but reactions, to out-ward stimuli, is faulty for following reasons. Firstly, it does not explain unity in our response to outside environment. Secondly, it does not take into account, as Gestalt does, the figure and ground, whole and part concepts and thus it does not interpret all the activities of organism comprehensively. Thirdly, it fails to explain the data obtained recently in Animal Psychology regarding the senses in birds migrating from one place to another and animals who gather a specialized and peculiar knowledge of external things. Fourthly they evade to take account of images by the help of which memory and imagination become possible. Fifthly, if they permit the possibility of verbal report in their fold why should they not admit the possibility of mental activities such as intelligence, aesthetic appreciation and moral purpose which contribute in significant way towards the growth of personality. Sixthly, the unconscious layer of mind provides us with the knowledge of an important layer of man's being and that of society at large. This cannot be properly related with the whole organism and its environment on the behaviourist hypothesis. Lastly, with the advent of parapsychology, psychology as the science of behaviour loses its claim. There has been ample research in that field which shows the possibility of cognition independent of assistance of the senses and mind.

Advaita Vedānta:

If behaviourism does not propound the true concept of mind then it follows that we will have to search for it elsewhere. In Advatia Vedānta, mind is considered as a part of not-self. In *Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṁgraha*, and *Vedānta Paribhasa* mind which corresponds to word '*Antaḥkaraṇa*' has four functions. (1) *manas* the oscillating or indecisive faculty; (2) *buddhi*, the decisive state which determines that 'This is rope and not serpent', (3) *ahaṁkara*, the state which ascertains that 'I know' and (4) *chitta*, the store-house of mental states which makes remembrance and reference possible. It is called the 'mind-stuff.' According to this school mind is conceived as reaching out to the external object through the sense organs and nervous system, drawing its sensations and impressions through them and unifying the experiences gathered into proper information or knowledge.

Thus the senses are not conceived as passively receiving the stimuli that happen to come from the object, but are thought of as themselves going out to reach the object. When Ātman is identified with *antaḥkaraṇa*, the blind senses move under the impulse and guidance of antaḥkaraṇa. *Antaḥkarṇa* stands between the self and the object. On reaching the object the *antaḥkaraṇa* is identified with it, 'Just as the water, going out of a tank through a drain to a tub, assumes the form of the tub on

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reaching it.' This act, however, does not explain the attainment of object's knowledge. To explain this, Vedānta assumes the mode of *antaḥkaraṇa* (*Vṛtti*) being illumined by the Ātman. In all empirical experiences there is union of *antaḥkaraṇa* and Ātman.

Kantian theory of knowledge :

The external movement of mind does not seem to be acceptable generally in western thought. Kant, however, propounds concepts similar to Vedānta theory of knowledge. According to Kant an element of thought as well as a sensory element is involved in all our knowledge of the external world. Subject does not merely observe and experience; subject always goes out beyond what it observes and contributes to it, organising it, interpreting it, comparing and correlating it with knowledge already existing, and fitting it into a net of relations and connections. For Kant, moreover, our knowledge of objects depends upon two factors, viz. sensibility and understanding. Through sensibility, data are given to us, and through understanding, we interpret and cognize them. Thing-in-itself, Kant thinks, provides us with the bare sensation. For Vedānta, however, sensation is modification of mind which is an instrument of the self. Kant believes that although sensation is passive and understanding is active, nevertheless only the co-operation of the two can give us knowledge. As against Newton, Kant shows that space and time are not objective realities independent of mind. According to Kant, space is the form of externality in which alone the mind can be aware of sense-data as being outside us. Kant therefore calls space and time *A Priori* forms of perception. Regarding the aspect of understanding, he maintains that it is in virtue of the categories, i.e., forms of understanding that everything we know possesses certain universal attributes. Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions. Kant believes that such knowledge is *a priori* it is true only of objects as known and not of objects as they are independently. Things in themselves are known by us only in so far as they 'affect us'. Thus we see that Kantian and post-Kantian development have believed mind and intelligence to be active and dynamic enough to attribute form to external objects.

Concepts in Psychology:

Such a justification of the activity of mind and intelligence may be regarded as an idle speculation by psychologists. But I think that any movement in scientific study proceeds and carries on research work under certain concept of its own subject-matter, may it be quantity, number, atomic particles, chemical compounds, living organisms, social institutions or behavioural disorders. In like manner, psychology has got its specific constructions and concepts. If concepts of mind, behaviour and intelligence are found insufficient for accounting the existing data and values then they should be declared inadequate and in their place

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comprehensive and more scientific concepts should be introduced. To suit certain notions about psychology, It should not unnecessarily entertain inadequate pinciples of conditioned reflex, habit formation, stimuli-response formula.

Thus we have found that mind and senses should not be regarded as just passive entities in the creative activity of knowledge. It is also shown that mind should not be confused with intelligence and self. Such an error has occurred frequently and hence one should be cautious while making use of the terms such as mind, senses, intelligence, ego, and the self.

Nature of Intelligence:

In modern psychology extensive research is being carried on in the field of problem solving and thus finding the nature of intelligence. With the help of maze learning, puzzle box and experiments on the behaviour on chimpanzees, Throndike, Kohler, Wertheimer and other psychologists attempt to derive and know the nature of insight, productive thinking and intelligence. Unfortunately, true concept of thinking and intelligence is not sought and propounded by psychologists in the west. True concept of intelligence should explain and account for practical and pure reflection, creative imagination and aesthetic appreciation. In Indian Psychology, Saṁkhya and Vedānta intellect is held to be the finest and the most subtle element in human nature. In Saṁkhya, *Buddhi* evolves from *Prakṛti* owing to the preponderance of the element of *Sattva*. It is transparent. It is the only principle that has the capacity of reflecting the Spirit. Intellect participates both in *Prakṛti* as well as *Purusa*. It unites within itself the virtue of becoming conscious and the functional nature of other sense-organs. The conscious self is reflected in it. It is active but unconscious. But it appears to be conscious owing to the reflection of the self in it. The self is conscious but inactive. It appears to be active owing to its reflection in *buddhi*. The specific function of *Buddhi*, according to Saṁkhya, is determination (*adhyvasāya*). It is either theoretical or practical. When *buddhi* has excess of *sattva*, it has such modes as virtue, knowledge, detachment and supernormal powers (*aisvarya*). When buddhi is vitiated by *tamas* it has contrary modes. Empirical cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, disposition, merit and demerit are modes of *buddhi*. The self thinks modes to be its own owing to its false sense of identity with *buddhi* in which it is reflected. Thus intelligence is material as well as spiritual. It is at the lowest layer when it is a part of matter but it is creative and valuational when it reflects the spirit within its domain.

With the help of understanding and intelligence, geniuses create great works in science and metaphysics, art and literature, social and political life. In our moral, intellectual, social, aesthetic and religious life, we often make discrimination between pleasant and valuable, true and false, good and evil, individual and collective, beautiful and ugly, perfect and imperfect. Thus it is *viveka* or sense of discrimination which makes us

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conscious of values which strengthen and integrate our life. In the second chapter of the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad*, we are told that 'within this physical body which is made up of food, is another body which is made up of vital air; the former is filled with the latter, which is again like unto the shapes of man .More internal than the body which is made up of vital air is another body which consists of mind,the former is filled with the latter. More internal still than the mental body is another body which is full of intelligence; the former is filled with the latter. Finally, still more internal than this body of intelligence is another body consisting of bliss; the former is filled with the latter, which is still like the shape of man. " (*Tait.* II. 2—5).[4] This passage reveals to us that man's being is not limited to the physical portion, but it is a progression towards the psyche which is predominantly intellectual, imaginative, aesthetic and intuitive.

A cat, repeating trial and error in the puzzle box, chimpanzee drawing banana near the cage, children solving mathematical problems, prodigies demonstrating the feats of memory, scientists and metaphysicians articulating and describing various laws and various patterns of the universe are but a few out of many aspects and expressions of intelligence and intuitive insight which would and integrate the self of man. According to Gestalt theory,truth is attainable if we approach our problems 'from above' and resolutely aim at structural understanding. This, however, is an important principle in psychology of thinking. But Gestalt school failed to investigate the source of such a value in solving and thinking out problems. Had they searched deeper into the mooring of half-hearted principle, they would have known the nature of intelligence which reflects pure consciousness

Nature of Consciousness—its analysis

Having examined the concept of mind, senses and intelligence, let us now turn towards the nature of consciousness and its analysis. Late Prof. Ranade remarks that 'The credit which a modern psychologist gives to Swami Vivekananda for having introduced the conception of the 'Superconscious' in psychology must be rightfully given to the author of the *Mandukya Upaniṣad*.'[5] The *Mandukya Uapniṣad* mentions four conditions of the self, which are regarded as different degrees of consciousness. The first condition is the waking state in which the soul is conscious of outside objects, enjoys gross things through five organs of knowledge, five motor organs, five vital principles, and mind,intellect,egoism, and memory (*citta*), is called *vaisvanara*. The second condition is the dream state in which the soul is conscious of inteirnal objects, enjoys subtle things through the mind invested with the subconscious impressions of waking cognitions, and impelled by nescience, attachment, merits and demerits,independently of the external sense-organs and is called *Taijasa*.

4. R.D. Ranade, *A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy:* P.142. Oriental Book Agency,Poona 1926.
5. *Ibid*. P. 139.

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The third condition is deep sleep in which the soul desires no desires, and dreams no dreams. In this state the soul is centered in itself, filled with consciousness and bliss, enjoys bliss, experiences pure consciousness and is called *Prajnā*. In this state and condition, mental modes of waking and dream cognitions cease, the distinction of subject and object ceases. The fourth condition is superconsciousness or what Prof. Ranande prefers to say 'Self-consciousness'' in which the soul is neither conscious of external objects; nor of internal objects, nor of both, nor a mass of consciousness, and transcends both consciousness and unconsciousness. The soul in this highest state is called *Turia* or Ātman. (*Mand.* 2–7)[6] Such a description of human psyche and its various states helps man to recognize and subsequently realize the potentialities and possibly higher and more capable planes of inner self. The state of cognition within the dream is an indication towards the modern exploration within man's conscious and subconscious self. Before we examine the psychological implications the states of self, let us recognise its importance for metaphysics. For herein lies the mutual interdependence between Psychology and Metaphysics which is an important characteristic of Indian Philosophy.

Metaphysics is an attempt to articulate rationally the knowledge of the Supreme Reality and Value. Supreme Reality is not only a theoretical and abstract construction reasoned out by intellect and other allied cognitive instruments, but it is the highest effort of man as an integral being to know, to possess and to become Real and in this sense it is the supreme value. It is not only self-explaining but it assigns and attributes value to all other experiences, aspirations, cravings, endeavours and purposive activities. Dr. Radhakrishnan remarks in this connection that 'The metaphysical schemes are based on the data of psychological science. The criticism that Western metaphysics is one-sided, since its attention is confined to the waking state alone, is not without its force. There are other states of consciousness as much entitled to consideration as the waking.' [7]

Consciousness and Personality development

The value of the highest state of the self is far-reaching for knowing the mysteries, the inner and the most powerful aspect of our personality. The knowledge of the various conditions of the self has taken the shape of a separate science based upon extensive experimentation and intensive methods consisting sometimes of the instrumentation of bodily, nervous and vital systems of our being, sometimes that of the mind, the will or all taken together and their transformation for the complete consecration to the Supreme. Each method has been experimented with for many centuries and each has been formulated into a scientific method. The sources of all these methods lie in ancient Vedas, the Upaniṣads and Bhagavad Geeta and other authorities of Indian culture.

6. J. N. Sinha: *Indian Psychology, Emotion and Will*, Vol. II. P. 28 First edition. 1961,
7. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. Introduction. P.28.

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Modern Psycho-analysis is confined to conscious, subconscious and unconscious layers of man's self. Freud made a great discovery of the inner states of mind which are not known to the average man and yet are powerful and extremely dynamic in changing his conscious expression and behavior. He and his followers held that the great driving forces of humanity are unconscious systems of ideas or desires of a 'sexual'nature. Freud used the term 'sex' broadly to include any craving for pleasure. The major contribution of psychoanalytic school has, however, been in the field of personality development and disorders of behavior.

The explanation of the unconscious in western theories is not sufficient and it is limited only to the surface personality of man and hence it still remains under the shadow of what goes by the name 'empirical' in the West. Leibniz, much before Freud, had propounded the hierarchy of monads from the most confused, unconscious monads to the most logical one. In Yoga system of Patanjali there is a classification of mental states. The *citta* is called *ksipta* or restless, when it has an excess of *rajas*, secondly, it is *Muddha* or blinded when it has an excess of *tamas*. Thirdly, it is *vikṣipta* or distracted, when it is unstable on account of natural defects or accidental troubles. These three are said to be imperfect for they are connected with three *gunas*. Fourthly, the mind is said to be *ekāgra* or single-pointed when it is devoted to one object of meditation and it is completely consisting of *sattva*. It is, lastly, *niruddha* or restricted, when its modifications are checked. It is maintained in this system that every mental modification leaves behind a *samskara* or latent tendency which may manifest itself as a conscious condition when opportunity arises. A yogi attains a balanced state in which all modifications are controlled. Now it can be seen that psycho-analysis limits its inquiry to the three layers of mind. It does not account for *Ekāgra* and *Niruddha* states of mind. Moreover, in Yoga there is a mention of the obstructions to concentration. They are ignorance, egoism,attachment, aversion and clinging to life. Two principles of ego and id in Freudian psychology have still wider extension than they are supposed to have in that system. Metaphysically the principle of ego is not only personal and subjective determinant but it is an objective and cosmic determinant as propounded in Samkhya system. Such a truth is seen in Jung's hypothesis of collective and the racial unconscious. Freud thought that unconscious is inaccessible which is not true according to Jung. It is the ground work of humanity out of which each individual develops his personal and unconscious life. The collective unconscious is inherited in the structure of the organism including the brain structure which predisposes the individual to think and act as the human race has thought and acted through countless generations. The collective unconscious includes the instincts and also the archetypes. Archetypes are the primordial ways of thinking submerged in the waking life. An archetype becomes an idea when it is made conscious [8]

8. C.G. Jung: *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, (1953).

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Law of Karma and Rebirth in Indian Philosophy in general explain living organisms, particularly, animals and human beings. Human life is an organic whole where each successive phase grows out of what has gone before. We are what we are owing to our inextricable connection with the past. Human growth is without any break and its continuity is shown by saying that it is governed by the law of Karma. In this relation Jung says that 'It is possible to find the Karmic factor in the arche-types of the unconscious The Karma aspect is essential to the deeper understanding of the nature of the archetype.' This, however, does not mean that it determines the future course of life. In Indian thought, Karma is at once a barrier and an opportunity to attain freedom. Jung could not inquire far enough into the nature of archetype as he confined the term to psychological field.

Modern Psychology in the West is mistaken in considering man's present partial inner mind as final and permanent. Modern psychologists exclude from their scope higher potentialities than conscious and unconscious mind. As against this, Yoga system points out the necessity of the Superconscient and chalks out the path of attaining it. Indian Yoga lays down a scientific path from conscient to the superconscient.

Evolutionary trend and its psychological implication.

In modern times, Sri Aurobindo has attempted to present a grand synthesis of various paths of Yoga. In India there are certain views held throughout the centuries upto this time regarding the status of consciousness. There is a view according to which only matter is ultimate and hence everything is unconscious. There is another school which maintains that unconscious is unreal. Consciousness alone exists in its strict sense. Its appearance is due to ignorance and created by the process of self-objectification. There is the third view according to which consciousness and unconsciousness exist independently and both are real. Sri Aurobindo reconciled the extremes of matter and spirit by introducing the concept of evolution in his integral non-dualism.

In the West, Bergson, Alexander and Whitehead have propounded theories of evolution in Metaphysics. In Greek philosophy also distinction between mechanical and teleological explanation of things and events was prevalent. In modern times, with the advent of evolutionary theories in biology, philosophers elaborated naturalistic explanation of things and events. General Smuts in his book on Holism and Evolution holds that 'The one universal principle which would comprehend the different sciences of physics, biology and psychology is that of Holism, or the tendency in the universe to the creation of greater and greater wholes.' [10]

Hypothesis of either creative, emergent, ingressive or integral evolution

9. *Ibid*, V. and C.G. Jung. '*Personal and the Collective Unconscious*' P.76. footnote. Here I am indebted to a paper read by Dr. Kalghatgi on the subject of Unconscious and Indian Philosophy at Waltair Session of Indian Phil. Congress. 1960.
10. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*. P. 317. second edition. 1957.

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is found necessary to account for the new values which arise within individual, social, and cultural life.

Bergson is a powerful representative of the dynamic nature of the universe. He regards matter and mind to be equally important for the change and progress of the external word. Reality has two aspects, first is pure movement and second is retarded and reverse movement. Reality is pure flow, but at a time it is obstructed by matter. For dealing with matter, instinct and intelligence are created. Matter is itself a result of Reality as pure flow. But Bergson assigns the evolution of life to matter and thus complicates the issue. Evolution should take place systematically, that is from matter to life, from life to mind, and from mind to still higher evolutes of Reality. This is observed in Alexander's theory of evolution in which he tells us about the emergence of higher and higher forms of consciousness. He calls it by the name of deity. When evolution is at the stage of matter, deity represents the stage of life; when evolution is at the stage of life,deity means mind. So higher consciousness than mind is 'our deity' according to Alexander. Sri Aurobindo calls it the Supermind which emerges out of mind and still higher evolutes.

It will be evident from the above that evolutionary trend implies that the whole apparatus of knowledge, feeling and action of man requires to be readjusted to the inner process and the new values coming into existence. Sri Aurobindo says that 'Behind the surface mentality, there is the vast subliminal comprising the inner mental, the inner vital and the inner subtle–physical. A small and obscure portion of this subliminal is being explored today by modern psychology.'[11] "In basis of Yoga, he says that 'Modern psychology is an infant science, at once rash, fumbling and crude. As in all infant sciences, the universal habit of human mind—to take a partial or local truth, generalise it unduly and try to explain a whole field of nature in its narrow terms—runs riot here.'[12] Thus man is conisdered to be an evolving psychological being. It began with the inconscience and Matter, growing into life and developing into mind. Mind holds the potentiality of what is beyond mind. This has an important bearing upon the subject of psychology of personality. Human consciousness is at the plane of intellectuality(*Vijnānamaya*);it has to grow into the spirit. Dr.Radhakrishnan says that'Looking back on the millions of years of the steady climb of the life on the path of evolution, it seems presumptuouse for us to imagine that evolution has come to an end. The evolution of the physical side, perhaps is over. Progress hereafter is in our psyche. The end and purpose of life is the attainment of clear, come and creative consciousness.'[13]

Man, growing and searching for higher values towards the inner make–up of his personality, may not be regarded as proper subject of

11. Haridas Chaudhari: *Philosophy of Integralism*, P. 183. 1954.
12. Sri Aurobindo: *Basis of Yoga*. P. 115. Sixth edition, 1952.
13. Radhakrishnan: *Moral Values in Literature*. P.1.

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experimental psychology. But the term 'experiment' means the instrumentation and channelization of various energies stored in man and nature. Yoga system fulfils the meaning and aim of experimentation. Miss Geraldine Coster expresses her view that in the East, experimental psychology has gone as far as in the West.[14] Yoga is a practical method of mind-development, as practical as an analytical therapy, and far more closely related to real life than the average university course of psychology.[15]

In the end, such an approach to psychology should not be misunderstod as approach to Indian Psychology. Comprehensive science of psychology should recognize the truths discovered and elaborated in General psychology, Psycho-analysis and Parapsychology. It should prove itself worthy of being called a science. India has tried to approach the subject in as much a scientific way as possible for a scientist.

14. Geraldine Coster. *Yoga and Western Psycho-analysis*. P. 10.
15. *Ibid*. P. 245.

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NOTE ON THE DUALISTIC ASPECT OF MAN AS REVEALED IN THE BIBLE

ALBERT VAN AVER

"With my Soul have I desired thee in the night; yea; with my spirit within me will I seek thee early..."[1] Clearly the prophet Isaiah teaches that there is that in man which hearkens after God and that such a yearning has its genesis in some region in the personality other than the flesh. "And I will put my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes and ye shall keep my judgments and do them..."[2] The spirit of God has taken possession of the personality of man and it is this presence which makes man a dual creature: he is flesh and he is spirit.[3]

There is this difference, however, between the dualism defined in the Bible and the dualism in Oriental literature[4] (with the possible exception of the *Rigveda*) namely, that the eye seems to be turned outward toward God rather than inward toward the "Self." For the Hebrew and the Christian, one might observe, the gap seems wider and deeper between the Higher Self and God than for the Oriental. "Prepare ye the way of the Lord, says Isaiah, "make straight in the desert a highway for our God."[5] The prophet who uttered this ethical injunction was conscious of God in himself, but he doubtless felt his intimacy less than he sensed his existence as an awesome, supernatural personality ruling from afar with a frightening, firm, but solicitous hand.

That hand, of course, makes itself felt when man has transgressed the commands of the Father, so that dualism appears to be between man and God rather than between a power in man and his lower self. The following passage from Ezekiel (fulminating in the name of the Lord) makes evident that though God is interested in his children, he keeps his role of the paterfamilias distinct:

> "And they that escape of you shall remember me among the nations whether they shall be carried captives because I am broken with their worish heart, which hath departed from me, and with their eyes, which go a whoring after their idols: and they shall loathe themselves for the evils which they have committed in all their abominations."[6]

There is here evidently a conflict (or dualism) between two totally detached agents rather than a dualism or conflict in one personality, a

[1] *Isaiah*, 26: 9.
[2] *Ezekiel*, 36: 27.
[3] "...the manifestation of the spirit is given to every man to profit withal." I. *Corinthians*, 12: 7.
[4] See my article, "Dualism as a Presiding Principle in Some Major Indian Masterpieces," *Darshana International*, April, 1963.
[5] *Isaiah*, 40: 3.
[6] *Ezekiel*, 6: 9.

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conflict of two forces that, though separate, act and react upon each other in a personal and intimate way. And though God may speak to the conscience[7] of man which is an oracle for making himself heard, yet he retains, as I have suggested, his individuality. The law comes from an external authority rather than from the intrinsic but universal selfhood of man. Again we hear:

> "I am the Lord your God: walk in my statutes, and keep my judgments, and do them;
>
> And hallow my sabbaths: and they shall be a sign between me and you, that ye may know that I am the Lord your God."[8]

There seems, moreover, to be resentment on the part of the lawgiving Father toward the individual who follows his own "spirit." The Father appears somewhat jealous of his own powers: "Thus saith the Lord God. Woe unto the foolish prophets, that follow their own spirit, and have seen nothing."[9]

Of course the preacher wishes to enjoin upon his people the necessity of distinguishing between true and false prophets, between the spirit of the "Devil" and the spirit of "God," but not very much latitude is given the individual for personal, spiritual evolution. The extrinsic word has preeminence over the inward path, as is evidenced again by the magisterial tone of the following:

> "For I am the Lord; I will speak, and the word that I shall speak shall come to pass: it shall be no more prolonged: for in your days, O rebellious house, will I say the word and will perform it, saith the Lord God "[10]

The fact to be observed is that there is not in Biblical literature as much "synchronization" between the higher spirit of man and the spirit of God—not to the extent certainly that can be found in Oriental literature. There is of course, the conventional view that Jesus and God are one, but the words which Jesus himself utters in the "ninth hour" would seem to betray that view: "And about the ninth hour Jesus cried with a loud voice, saying, Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani ? that is to say, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"[11] with all due allowance that one can make for the strained circumstances under which these words were said, nevertheless the words do not suggest that Jesus felt himself God, or that he felt at one with Him. No human voice, it may be said, either before or after the time of Jesus, ever expressed with such poignancy the distance between man and God—the sense of separateness and isolation from each other.

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[7] "Knowing therefore the terror of the Lord, we persuade men; but we are made manifest unto God: and I trust also are made manifest in your consciences." II, *Corinthians*, 5: 11.

[8] *Ezekiel*, 20: 19, 20. The following evinces the fact further that to the Hebrew, God was an authority that ruled from a throne afar: "Come ye, and let us go up to the mountains of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths; for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem." *Isaiah*, 2: 3.

[9] *Ezekiel*, 13: 3.

[10] *Ibid.*, 13: 25.

[11] *St. Matthew*, 27: 46.

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The objective form of dualism, then, prevails in the Bible, with the emphasis varying regarding the proximity and closeness of God. "That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." [12] The two elements of dualism are here boldly opposed. With marked simplicity John defines the nature of God and the method of reaching him:"God is a Spirit: And they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth."[13] It is the dual nature of life that counts: "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing: the words that speak unto you, they are the spirit, and they are the life."[14]

Although man and God are thus conceived as separate entities, one must strive for his good will and recognition if not for absorption in him. Achieving this ethical goal depends,as Paul indicates, upon an awareness of the dualism of the body and the soul and the war between the members: "But I keep under my body and bring it into subjection; lest that by any means, when I have preached to others,I myself should be a castaway."[15] The flesh is carnal.If one indulges in it,one does not know the spirit which is God: "For ye are not yet carnal; for whereas there is among you envying, and strife, and divisions,are yet not carnal, and walk as men?"[16] "For to be carnally minded." we are told, "is death; but to be spiritually minded is life and peace "[17] The good that dwells in him is not in the flesh but in the spirit: "For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not."[18] Knowing how to fulfill the law is difficult, but there is no question of its spirituality as there is none regarding the nature and attributes of the body: "For we know that the law is spiritual: but I am carnal, sold unto sin."[19] Finally, the warfare (or dualism) between the flesh and the spirit, their contrary nature, is the one inescapable fact:

> "This I say then, walk in the spirit, and ye shall not fulfill the lust of the flesh.
>
> "For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other: so that ye cannot do the things that ye would."[20]

Further, Paul envisions dualism as a conflict between "nature" and "supernature". That is, Paul perceives the relation between the body of man and the natural world without, the soul of man and the heavenly kingdom of God. The following may be considered a theological explanation of the genesis and development of dualism:

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[12] *St. John*, 3: 6.
[13] *Ibid.*, 4: 24.
[14] *Ibid.*, 7: 63.
[15] I. *Corinthians*, 9: 27.
[16] *Ibid.*, 3: 3.
[17] *Romans*, 8: 6.
[18] *Ibid.*, 7: 18.
[19] *Ibid.*, 7: 14.
[20] *Galatians*, 5: 16, 17.

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"And so it is written. The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam **was made** a quickening spirit.

"Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterward that which is spiritual.

"The first man **is** of the earth, earthy: the second man **is** the Lord from Heaven.

"As is the earthy, such **are** they also that are earthy: and as **is** the heavenly, such **are** they also that are heavenly."[21]

If one is to know God, one is to put away the natural man, for between him and the spirit of God, there is no avenue of understanding: "But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know **them**, because they are spiritually discerned."[22]

The significant fact further to be noted is that the spirit of man, once it has come to terms with God, is an ethical spirit. It is life incarnate, because of righteousness. God in man represents righteousness, and one grows in it as one succeeds in nullifying the senses: "And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is life because of righteousness."[23]

In conclusion, limited as this examination of the evidence has been, the fact remains that dualism is a basic doctrine of the Bible. Although this dualism does not have the degree of subjectivity that in general Oriental dualism has, it yet conforms to the definition of dualism as a conflict between two antipodal forces: between the things of righteousness because they are eternal and the things of evil because, not having God's sanction, are temporary.

"And he an angel come down from heaven laid hold on the dragon, that old Serpent which is the Devil, and Satan, and bound him a thousand years.

"And cast him into the bottomless pit, and shut him up,and set a seal upon him, that he should deceive the nations no more till the thousand years should be fulfilled: **and after that he must be loosed a little season.**"[24]

The last phrase would indicate that, biblically, dualism is a salient fact in man's existence.

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[21] I: *Corinthians*, 15: 45-48.
[22] *Ibid.*, 2:14.
[23] *Romans*, 8: 10.
[24] *Revelation*, 20: 2, 3.

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SOME PROPOSALS TOWARDS EXPERIMENTS IN PEACEFUL AND NON-COMPETIVE LIVING

HENRY WINTHROP

The Need For Spiritual Secession

Into the alembic of our modern discontent has been poured a vast literature of protest, dealing with our current social pathology and our current drift towards war. Most of our sensitive, contemporary thinkers are aware of much of this social pathology, particularly in its Western, psychological forms of alienation, anomie, bureaucratization, depersonalization, dehumanization, homogenization, accidie and kitsch. They have also shown a keen awareness of the many concrete and undesirable social consequences which derive in part from highly centralized industry, urban life and government controls. Since the end of World War II they have also become alert to new and dangerous forms of centralization—forms which may lead to a dreaded, nuclear holocaust. Among these new forms of centralization are the transfer of a major role in social decision-making to the military, under the guise of preparedness; the rise of the defense complex which is slowly determining much of our industrial relocation in relation to marginal, economic areas; and the degree to which Western economies now depend for their continuation on the defense contract and insane, unneeded, defense production for purposes of overskill. The problem then for modern man who wishes to do something responsible about dissipating the social pathology of our time, instead of merely wringing his hands or walking away from it metaphorically speaking, is the difficulty of hitting upon something which **may prove to be a way out.**

The Bear Mountain Statement of 1960, issued by the Committee of Correspondence, made the following declaration towards its close. "We must create the means for the decentralized control by citizens over the essential parts of our society." The perceptiveness of this position is, I think, beyond question, for most of our drift towards war and most of our increasing social pathology are both products of the unfeeling, irrational and unimaginative excesses of centralization and the corporate and bureaucratic habits of the age. One way of reversing the tide of social ills, the psychological forms of ill health mentioned above and the current threat of war, would be to establish intentional communities which seek to employ science, technology and invention in the small community which plans for a concrete expression of scientific humanism. These efforts at radically different forms of community would attempt to capture

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the advantages offered by megalopolis, by adapting these advantags to small-scale living with little loss, while trying at the same time to avoid the large-scale **social disadvantages** of excessively centralized and alienating urbanism. The establishment of such **scientific, intentional micro-communities** amounts to a spiritual secession from the present order—which is precisely what is needed—but a secession which is at the same time a type of spiritual non-involvement with the **leit-motifs** of the established order and a clear-cut commitment to pursue profoundly new directions. Commitments to intentional communities—particularly where these are successful—can then serve to establish models for others to duplicate in periods of profound stress and crisis in the future. Widespread discussion of their achievements may serve to indicate the insanity of war as a form of social policy and may also serve to indicate some untried ways of remolding corporate society nearer to the heart's desire. I say "ways" because the scientifically focused type of intentional community should be a gurantee of democratic, social pluralism and should encourage the expression of the religious impulse and social altruism in many possible forms.

The present discussion then will be concernd with the degree to which rational and organic relatedness among men and the degree to which the termination of war as an instrument of national policy, are both inherent in a scientifically and humanistically focused intentional community—a type of community which history has not as yet produced. I do not regard this objective as the **only way out** but I do regard it as one of the waves of the future in the next development of man. A metaphysics for practical decentralization is now a vital necessity, if industrial and scientific research and development are not to degenerate into a comic opera for the gods. It is with this hope in mind that I enter upon the discussion which follows.

Mixed Polity

The intentional communities which I envisage will be as varied as human ingenuity can make them and will comprise a budget of collective purposes limited only by the amount and direction of social alruism which is still in our midst. Inasmuch, however, as such communities cannot be outside of history and, in terms of the Freudian reality-testing principle, must work within the limitations created by the social and institutional pathology of our time, they will have to exhibit attributes both of dependence and independence in relation to the corporate world outside. I shall discuss separately in the section which follows; what I assume this will probably be. The reader is to be cautioned in advance; however, against several possible misinterpretations of my current exopsition. First, the objective of establishing experimental intentional communities will not be fully utopian, since such communities will seek to avoid many of our present social ills (which is a ngative aim) and, even more importantly, to establish relations among men which express a greater sense of rationality and a greater reflection of genuine social and religious

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impulses than the modern Western community does at present. Second, this type of intentional community will whole-heartedly accept government on a small,quasi face-to-face scale as a desirable, social need. It will therefore part company with the philosophical anarchism of such elder statesmen as, let us say, Bakunin or Kropotkin, and in addition it will not reflect many of the emphases found in that modern mutant of philosophical anarchism, so ably developed by Paul Goodman.*

There are two other possibilities of misinterpretation, which are to be avoided. Communities of this type are aimed at illustrating models of decentralized living which, by vitrue of the sense of *gemeinschaft* they provide and their deliberate pacifism,can contribute a set of conditions which will hopefully move us closer to universal peace. They will provide these assets without calling a moratorium on science and technology accept high but unexcessive standards of living, and all those advances in culture and education which can be counted upon to enlarge intellectual horizons and stir the altruistic propensities of modern man.Such communities will reject all efforts to set the clock back, historically speaking. Finally, such communities will possess the avowed purposes of adapting modern science, technology and invention to small-scale, decentralized living, wherever possible, and of preserving a balance between small and large-scale production in a variety of ways which will forward their moral, social and economic aims.

No effort will be made in the present discussion to elaborate upon those specific, technical considerations of production, planning and community development, which are directly related to the possibility of successful decentralization. Such a concern with technical means requires separate treatment in a series of papers and, in any event, would stray from the main purpose of the present paper. The reader, however, will find the beginnings of such attempts in a fairly substantial literature which is now available, of which the works of Ayres and Scarlott, Bates, Borsodi, Goodman,Gutkind,Ley Meier Neutra,O'Neill,Ropke and Smith and Chapin are fairly representative, if somewhat uneven, examples of thinking along these lines.**

* When I speak of Goodman's philosophical anarchism, I have in mind that it is reflected to some extent in the following two volumes.

1 Goodman, Paul. *Growing Up Absurd. Problems Of Youth In The Organized System.* New York: Random House, 1960. 296 pp.

2 Goodman, Paul .*Utopian Essays And Practical Proposals.* New York: Random House, 1962, 289 pp.

** Some of the kind of scientific and technological data whole examples of the type of social analysis and criticism which, I believe, are relevant to decentralist thinking as expressed in the form of social experimentation via the intentional community, can be garned from the following works of the authors mentioned.

1 Ayres, Eugene and Scarlott, Charles A. *Energy Sources—The Wealth of the World,* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952. 344 pp.

2. Bates. Marston. *Where Winter Never Comes. A Study Of Man And Nature In The Tropics.* New York: Charles Scribner, 1952. 310 pp.

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The basic presupposition needed for this new type of intentional community, will have to be the acceptance of the idea of **mixed polity**. By mixed polity, we are referring to a civilization which consists of a mixture of large scale industrialization and urbanization,on the one hand, and a social pluralism in the form of numerous intentional communities, on the other. These latter will express a variety of ways of living and of achieving organic relatedness, culturally, socially and politically, while avoiding the characteristic alienation and sickness of soul to which modern bureaucracy, sprawling industrialism and conurbation have contributed so heavily. Even more importantly, in a society of mixed polity there will be important relationships between intentional communities and standard corporate ones—relationships of an economic and social nature which will be psychologically and materially beneficial to both.It is in this way, as we have already mentioned, that intentional communities will serve as models for the standard type of community, so that whenever dissatisfaction is widespread,citizens of such standard communities will have a choice of models or designs for living to adopt and copy, and efforts at large scale,social reconversion from megalopolis to intentional community, will have technical and social benchmarks for guiding such reconversion.

Above all, the intentional communities of which I speak will be predominantly (and, perhaps, universally) what I have called **scientific, intentional micro-communities**. They will be communities which reject all forms of nostalgia for the past, such as is reflected in the writings of thinkers who see only the evil possibilities in the exploitation of science, technology, invention and industrial research. On the contrary they will try to achieve a sense of organic relatedness, a great deal of face-to-face social confrontation in their common efforts to satisfy community needs, and autonomy in the choice of personal and social values. At the same time, of course, they will bend much of their effort to eliminating the blighting effects of the social pathology of our time—alienation,

(Continued from page 76)

3. Borsodi, Ralph. *Education And Living*. 2 volumes. Melbourne, Florida: Melbourne University Press, 1948. 719 pp.
4 Goodman, Percival and Goodman, Paul. *Communitas. Means Of Livelihood And Ways Of Life*. Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, 1947. 141 pp.
5. Gutkind, E.A. *The Twilight Of Cities*. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. 201 pp.
6. Ley, Willi. *Engineers' Dreams*. New York: The Viking Press. 1954. 239 pp.
7. Meier, Richard L. *Science and Economic Development: New Patterns of Living*. New York: John Wiley and The Technology Press of MIT, 1956. 266 pp.
8. Neutra, Richard. *Survival Through Design*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. 384 pp.
9. O'Neill, John J. *Engineering The New Age*. New York: Ives Washburn, 1949. 320 pp.
10. Ropke, Wilhelm: *A Humane Economy. The Social Framework of the Free Market*. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960. 132 pp.
11. Smith, E.C. Walton and Chapin, Henry. *The Sun, The Sea. and Tomorrow*. New York: Charles Scribner, 1954. 210 pp.

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bureaucratization,depersonalization,dehumanization,anomie,homogenization,accidie and kitsch—which are sometimes **solely** created by excessive degrees of centralization,industrialization and urbanization, but to which, in any event, these always contribute,even if they are not the sole or even the chief causes of the ills mentioned.

Finally, such communities will strive to realize many variant forms, socially and politically, of a democratic way of life and will do everything they can to promote what Maslow* calls self-actualization and B-love. By this we mean that such communities will encourage everything which enables the individual to realize the fullest expression of his potentialities and enables him in turn to learn to relate to and enjoy others in terms of theirs, rather than in terms of how they may serve his own purposes. All such communities consist hopefully of enlightened individuals, socially sensitive and imaginative, concerned with virtue, freedom justice and an eschatological vision of universal peace, who wish to give more and more perfect expression, as time goes on, to the best in human nature by exploiting, in part, the fruits of man's intellect in science, education and culture in general.

The concept of "mixed polity" is the social and political analogue of the **mixed** or **compensatory economy** in economics.The latter is, of course, accepted both intellectually and institutionally. The former is almost wholly alien to public thinking, with the exception of the thinking of a small number of city planners, decentralists, social scientists and technicians in whose works this idea has received some expression, although its systematic elaboration in new designs for living which shall constitute the next development of man, still remains to be done. A move to expand the sense and meaning of the concept of "community" in this direction is entirely feasible. The leading difficulties are certainly not technical, and where they are, they are far from insuperable. What is needed is, of course, public education and dedicated bands of individuals and families, who have determination, energy, imagination, time, money and patience. Know-how is already sufficiently widespread,ideologically and technologically, to provide more than the needed amount of leadership. It is followership which is needed, patience which will prompt us to engage in lobbying and education for years, and even more patience in waiting for desired results as experiments in scientific, intentional micro-communities are running their course.

As for the long-term feasibility of widespread change-over on the part of that larger fraction of society which will remain outside the pale of such social experiments for decades and perhaps for centuries, the difficulties, once that larger fraction becomes sufficiently impressed, are far fewer than popular imagination would suggest. It has been estimated that, at the present time, about 33 per cent of GNP has its source in

* Maslow, Abraham H. *Toward a Psychology of Being*. New York: Van Nostrand, 1962. pp. 214.

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methods of mass production, that is to say,33 percent of the dollar value of GNP must be produced at present by large-scale methods of production. If the majority of individuals in modern society should not wish to forego the consumption of most of the types of item in this fraction of GNP,it would then seem that societies and communities in the near future would have to live permanently with some form of large-scale production and the social pathology it brings in its wake. This will be true,of course, if current technology remains the same or is superseded by other forms of large-scale producers' goods.

Against this eventuality, however, are the following considerations. 1. Education in the future may turn people away more and more from Rostow's terminal socio-economic stage of high mass consumption to the stage which Rostow forgot, namely,highly personalized and autonomous consumption,in which human thought concerning valid consumption needs and appropriate standards and patterns of living, dictate the nature and level of needed technology,rather than the other way around.2.As a result of current war preparations and the ability to establish **industrial defense complexes** anywhere at the present time,we are learning lessons in social, industrial, economic and community decentralization, which will probably reduce the extent of mass-produced GNP well below the figure of 33 percent. This would make large-scale conversion and change-over, if it ever comes, that much less formidable. 3. Finally, with the advent of new technologies, such as prefabricated housing or a modified form of Buckminster Fuller's Dymaxion, with miniaturization and micro-miniaturization, with the possibilities of atomic power plants and above all, automation,it will become possible to produce many,possibly all,of those items which now require mass production methods for their fabrication. All that is needed are new types of technology which will economize on space and personnel, which can be rendered almost completely automatic and which therefore dispense with the urban concentration of industry and personnel as we now know it. Deconcentration, for instance, may be aided and abetted by **mobile residential living** e.g., the section trailer-house used during the construction of the TVA. If pathological forms of urbanization can be made to disappear as a result of these technological possibilities, then again large-scale, social change-over to forms of small community, would clearly become much easier in the future.

During the very extended transition period, possibly lasting several hundred years, between the formation of the first scientific, intentional micro-community and the liquidation of the last standard, highly industrialized, bureaucratized and urbanized community, all individuals would face a choice in their way of life—a choice between living in mass society or living in an intentional community. Such a transition period is, of course, a period of mixed polity. Even under mixed polity, however, the type of community we envisage will be able to free itself to a certain extent from dependency upon megalopolis, with respect to the product

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lines now included in the 33 percent fraction of mass produced GNP.

This may occur in one of two ways. 1. Such intentional communities may find acceptable substitutes for certain mass-product lines. Suppose such a communitiy restricts itself industrially, for instance, to the establishment and location of light industry only—industry which is located on the periphery of such a community (which is, of course, only one type of possible balance between industrial and residential location).Will it still not need mass produced transportation vehicles for both work and pleasure—vehicles which will mean dependency on large-scale production of such items outside the community ? It may be possible to dispense with passenger cars, trucks, and rail and plane passenger facilities (not in-fright facilities,of course). This might be done by exploiting its existing light industry and manufacturing small, callapsible vehicles somewhat like the modern helicopter or autogyro,whose parts can be manufactured locally as **sub-assemblies** in small plants and can subsequently be easily linked to each other through standard coupling devices,before flight.Such vehicles may possess both speed and safety factors and, of course, give economies of space in housing when disassembled. Different models could carry with comfort from one to four persons. The US Navy was in fact exploring the reconnaissance possibilites of items of this sort in the early 50's and the predicted cost of manufacture when mass produced was low enough to suggest that the cost of production of similar items in scientific, intentional micro-communities would not at all de prohibitive. These considerations then illustrate one way in which a population could free itself from dependency on large-scale industry for items which are now clearly necessities. 2. A second way in which intentional communities might make themselves independent of large-scale transport facilities (we use the example of the same commodity only for convenience of exposition) involving mass-produced items, would occur if members of such communities were willing to forego comfort and travel anywhere intracontinentally by locally produced, small-type vehicles similar to motorcycles or small motor-boats which could be produced in relatively small sub-assemblies for subsequent assembly and use.For intercontinental travel, of course, dependency upon passenger plane or ship would be unavoidable.

The Importance of Location For Freedom of Experimentation

Since the members of an intentional community have understood the words of the song in South Pacific, which goes"You gotta have a dream," they will share the conviction that a certain preselected standard of living is sufficient for men and women who wish to pour meaning into their lives—meaning which centers about intangibles of mind, spirit and personal and social relationships In the selection of an arbitrary standard of living and a self-chosen way of life (these are, of course, what we mean by "intentions"), members of such communities will be almost completely free and independent. Full autonomy of experimentation,

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however, with mininum likelihood of interference from a host community, is assured if the geographical site chosen for the community is separated from a host community by being located on an island. Thus, a current intentional community, called Philia, which is beginning its experiment on an island off the coast of New Zealand, can count on minimum interference. It will still not, however, boast of **complete** independence. This is because its membership includes scientists, mathematicians, computer and data-processing specialists who, in order to add to the initial financing the community requires, will be performing data-processing services for the business communities of Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch in New Zealand. Over-water flight is assured through one or more small planes either belonging to some of its current membership or to be purchased later, possibly on a community basis.

If one or more intentional communities were to settle in the Galapagos, for instance, these could be assured of minimum interference. Melville*, however, has given us an account of human effort to inhabit these—efforts made in a pre-technological past—and his description of these grim, barren and uninhabitable islands is so depressing that the impracticality in the choice of such a discouraging site for an intentional community, would be an impossibly high price to pay for minimizing the possibility of interference. However, the grim Galapagos is hardly representative of island sites available. There are hundreds of thousands of islands throughout the world, a large number of which are available for rent or sale, and many of which would be quite favorable to experiments in intentional community. In fact the islands of the world comprise nearly 4 million square miles and represent 7 percent of its land surface. About a third of this area will continue to remain uninhabitable until extensive efforts are made to exploit technology which will make it feasible to introduce alien micro-climates which make human habitation possible. One example of this, of course, is the **reported** Russian use of heat-insulating, plastic domes in the cold climate of the Arctic. The Russians, are particularly interested in research of this nature and its possible applications. Some interesting accounts of their effort and thought along these lines, have been furnished by two Russian editors.**

We can expect that many of these climatically unfit islands will be settled through exploitation of technologies which can nullify existing weather and climate in a favorable direction or which can actually recondition them, hopefully with side-effect elsewhere which are negligible. Successful concrete examples of this, on a small scale, have occurred through the use of carbon black, coal dust and other pigments in Alaska and Siberia, which increase solar-radiation absorption and extend the

* Melville, Herman. *Four Short Novels*. New York: Bantam Books 1959. 281 pp. See the short novel entitled "The Encantadas or Enchanted Isles," pp. 45–103.

** Gouschev, Sergei and Vassiliev, Mikhail. *Russian Science in the 21st Century*. New York: McGraw & Hill, 1960. 222 pp.

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growing season.* A hardy band of intentional idealists, however, with sufficient finances and first-rate planning,might pioneer in such directions if they placed isolation and minimum interference above all other values in their efforts at social experimentation.Clearly enough, we have stressed islands as sites for such experiments, in the present context, only because they provide the fullest basis for group autonomy in the choice of a design for living.

A lesser but still a great measure of autonomy is available on continental sites.A group of Quakers are reported to have started an intentional community near San Jose, Costa Rica, which, from all reports which have come to me, has thus far been quite successful. This is, of course, not the type of scientific, intentional community I am advocating, but I am mentioning it in order to emphasize **location possibilities.** Costa Rica was chosen, I have been given to understand, because it will not levy military conscription on the Quaker, younger generation—a consideration which, of course, would appeal to Quakers concerned with the future of their childern in a world which is rapidly moving towards a third world war.Amish and Hutterite inland communities are also examples of this type. Inland location reduces the degree of autonomy of intentional communities,to the extent that they are subject to the laws of the host community, laws which tend to center largely around matters of taxes,land evaluation, industrial location, zoning, building codes, etc. Sometimes such restraints are at a minimum. Sometimes the interference from the host community is completely destructive and goes beyond considerations of land development. This proved to be the case in certain midwestern states which contained some successful, hard-working Hutterite communities.At the behest of intolerant and less successful, non-Hutterite neighbors, members of these communities were driven from their land and homes under various types of legal pressure. The Amish have also had difficulties. Persecution will be the price which many intentional communities of the kind I am advocating, will probably have to pay for any future success which they may achieve.This is the gamble all must take.Some hopefully will emerge socially and economically unseathed and will provide some of the light needed for the next development of man.

Independence And Dependence Under Mixed Polity.

Let us leave the problem of location, however, and list some of the advantages of independence a successful and unmolested intentional community is likely to retrieve. Let us state these with little or no discussion.

1. Such a community can establish **part** of its total economy and some of the techniques of allocation to its members, of that portion of its total GNP which it, itself, produces.

* See the following item. *United States Foreign Policy, Possible Nonmilitary Scientific Developments And Their Potential Impact on Foreign Policy—problems of the United States.* A study prepared at the request of the Committee On Foreign Relations United States Senate by Stanford Research Institute. No. 2. September 1959. 100 pp.

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2. A community of this sort will be in a position to establish its own type of education. If its schools are unaccredited, this presents no problem because of the increasing number of educational devices which are appearing in possible host communities in the West, which enable young adults who can pass certain tests, to be admitted into standard, academic institutions. Considering that such terminal barriers are being increasingly removed, the potentialities for experimenting with a socially significant and unalienated type of education—and pretty nearly all of our standard forms of education are now highly alienated—are unlimited. If a host community insists on laying down some educational constraints, it should still be possible to devise a compromise through addition to the host community's curriculum—additions which are desired by the intentional community even at the cost of extra instructional time furnished voluntarily by its members. It may also be able to evade restraints through the use of private schools.

3. Certain types of social experimentation are open to intentional communities of the type we are considering—experimentation which is free of permanent, institutional commitment. By not committing itself to a rigid adherence to any single social practise or social institution, any community gains precisely the flexibility which is needed in a world which is changing as rapidly as ours. Thus it simultaneously avoids the blockages and inertia of megalopolis—blockages and inertia which come from vested interests, human laziness and the economic prospect of having to face a costly obsolescence which may wipe out years of accumulated profits, with no opportunity to pass on the loss to the consumer. Since, in an intentional community, no bookkeeping is done on the quality of life, and no economic cost is regarded as too great to be borne on behalf of achieving desirable social relations—the reversal of the typical attitude under private enteprise—the **adaptability** of the intentional community to human needs should be infinitely greater than it is in the standard, urban center as we now have it.

As a result of this institutional flexibility and the high degree of social autarchy it confers, the intentional community should be able to experiment with matters such as the following: methods of social cooperation, new forms of cultural expression which would ordinarily die a-borning if they required commercial mid-wives, new forms of and materials for architecture, new types of community structure and self-government, new types of light industry and new forms of technology which would not be feasible for large-scale adoption, novel uses of automation, social uses for data-processing, computers and electronic controls and the development of amenities precisely adapted to small-scale living through the use of novel products fabricated by tehnologies of miniaturization and microminiaturization. These advantages, exercised during a period of mixed polity, should be able to move the scientific, intentional microcommunity closer to that state of economic and political autarchy which spells almost complete independence.

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4. Because intentional communities of this type can have their own press, theatre, radio and TV, and their own publishing facilities and microfilm storage capacity, they will be in a position to encourage a whole spectrum of opinion on all extra-local issues, an asset which is being lost more and more in the bureaucratic, rigidly institutionalized conurbations of our time. As Mills has put it, we no longer have mass media of communication but only mass media of distraction. In intentional communities the mass media can provide information honestly and without **homogenizing** it, in Dwight Macdonald's sense of this term, so that different news items will also be presented humanely and with the perspectives and the varying emphases which they properly deserve. They will thus add another dimension of understanding to that achieved by free and open discussion on local issues. Thus through their dispassionate knowledgeability, such communities may be able to assume leadership roles in times of world crisis.

Undoubtedly some technical communications device will have to be employed to keep radio and television broadcasts from falling on the ears of possibly hostile elements outside such communities—elements which would be enraged at honest and open unmasking of the activities of vested interests and their selfish motivations. Corporate groups under fire might seek to retaliate against such intentional communities by arousing public sentiment against their continuation. Such risks, of course, should be minimized wherever possible. It would undoubtedly be fairly easy to develop devices which maintain rigid geographical boundaries for broadcasts, so that such a problem would, I think, present minimum difficulties.

5. Intentional communities will be free to experiment with new forms of marriage and the sexual relationship, provided that wisdom, maturity and self-control accompany the existing liberal outlook. This can be done if such communities can provide so great a variety of significant self-expression, that sexuality can be taken in stride, without becoming obsessive, as it does now in hypocritical, puritanical atmospheres, or compulsive, as it does today in the authority-rebellion of youth. Furthermore, if honesty in the sexual relationship is encouraged as an expression of honesty in community living, then we can expect that such communities will be willing to regard the support of children who were born, perhaps unexpectedly, out of wedlock, as a **community responsibility**—particularly where restraint and birth-control information makes the unplanned for birth an infrequent event. Bastardy, of course, will be unknown, as it is in Sweden. The possibilities for wise guidance of, and experimentation with, sexuality in the enlightened and humane intentional community, are unlimited, and this most important of human impulses will, perhaps, for the first time in history, be treated properly. A pluralism of choice in the sexual relationship can, perhaps, be encouraged institutionally, somewhat in the manner described by Aldous Huxley in his introduction

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to a very famous volume by Unwin.*

6. The scientific, intentional micro-community will be the first modern community in a position to undertake research and development from the standpoint of its value to the consumer rather than its prospective profitability for a producer. This shift of attention from the profits standpoint to considerations of social welfare, will result in large measure in the pursuit of a different type of research problem. Such communities will be free of what we have now, where the first question regarding a new development is to ascertain the possible market for it, its possible competition and what it will cost to awaken consumer demand for it. Only years later do we recognize and admit the undesirable social consequences that a given development produced and worry about what can be done.

A reversal of this attitude is sure to follow in the intentional community. This reversal will take the form of first asking what effect a certain proposed development would have on the community **in the long run**, before time, energy, thought, money and skill are expended upon trying to achieve it. The reversal of attitude will also more likely take the form of asking what are the still as yet unfulfilled community needs and the still as yet unsolved community problems, and then focusing research energies on these. Such considerations are bound to shift the direction of research considerably, since we should be going from haphazard development and scientific serendippity to planned development. As a corollary to these considerations, we can expect that knowledgeable members of scientifically focused, intentional communities will spend a good deal of time, during the period of mixed polity, ransacking patent office literature and files for inventions which continue to accumulate the dust of time. These are inventions which, under a fierce type of industrial competitiveness, would not have been profitable, if commercially exploited. Sometimes, in contrast, they will have been unused due to interferences from patent pools, where they would have been **too profitable**, if commercially exploited by entrepreneurial newcomers, but which would have wiped out existing producers laboring under an antiquated technology. It would be of considerable value socially if the rights to such inventions could be purchased outright by an intentional community and if they could be exploited for communal purposes only. Thus the social significance of science, technology, invention, research and development are likely to be substantially different in the intentional community from what they are in megalopolis and cosmopolis whose faces are turned solely to free enterprise.

7. The social sciences are likely to come into their own in an intentional community in a way hardly envisaged by Zetterberg** in considering their applications to the modern, bureaucratic or industrial community. The intentional community whose members are, by and large, suffused with

* Unwin, Joseph, D, *Hopousia or The Sexual and Economic Foundations of a New Society* New York, Oskar Piest, 1940. 475 pp.

** Zetterberg, Hans L, *Social Theory and Social Practice*, New York: The Bedminster Press, 1962, 190 pp.

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the scientific attitude, is very likely to encourage research on questions which would be tabu in the standard community. It is also likely to encourage the use of types of data from within or without the intentional community, whose use would be forbidden by the modern, alienated, bureaucratic community which cannot afford to be honest about its own social pathology. The effects of such research, it they do not succeed in undermining the intentional communities, themselves, should succeed in undermining some of the horribe conditions in modern, corporate society which lead to social suffering and war. In fact, one of the best services which the intentional community can provide a suffering world, is to take the lead in basic social research and disseminate the results wherever they will do the most good socially, taking full advantage of freedom of the press, while it lasts. If such communities wish to escape the effects of outside wrath, they can eat their cake and have it to, by disseminating the results through individual and institutional contacts which are extra-local, and concealing its sources, thereby living to investigate again another day.

8. Although intentional communities are initially formed by individuals of more than average intellectual endowments, they will be among the first of our future communities to discharge properly our social obligations to those of average or less than average intellectual endowments. This they may do in several ways. First, they may conscientiously seek to develop improved techniques of programmed instruction for the average and less than average range in the distribution of human intelligence. Second, they may find improved ways, via pharmacological or surgical techniques, for offsetting tragic, intellectual statuses which have been produced by nature, herself. Third, they may solve the problem in a sense by avoiding it, through an advanced outlook which will permit genetic experiments on as yet unborn human beings, through exploitation of some of the many techniques suggested by the great biologist, Rostand.* Lessened public mis-understanding and a wider and more comprehensive social ethics, should result in a greater social toleration of experimentation in human genetics and a recognition of the desirability of man's controlling his own evolution.

Regardless of which techniques are adopted, the important point in this connection is that we can expect a more humane, fraternal and socially responsible attitude towards the less gifted, who are born into the intentional community. Research will, I feel certain, be conducted so as to find a satisfying place for them and, hopefully, an improvement of their intellectual status. In the dog-eat-dog world of the present this possibility does not exist and with the increasing social and industrial complexity of our time, more and more of the ungifted are being disfranchised from any satisfactory place in our scheme of things and are being forced, as Goodman puts it, to grow up absurd. This disfranchisement is sure to blow up in our faces in the next decade or two, with ungifted

* Rostand, Jean. *Can Man Be Modified?* New York: Basic Books, 1959. 105 pp.

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youth finding that they have little that it is worth anyone's money to buy —a point emphasized originally by Norbert Wiener. These are the young men and women who normally would have entered the work-force but who, under the impact of automation, other types of technology and the economic demands of an industrial management which is facing severe competition, find themselves at the end of the road before they have even begin their journey.

9. Where the intentional community has become an accepted world institution, the newer mothodologies which are now ancillary to planning, can be used not only for industrial and national planning but fot the special type of planning which will be needed by the scientific, intentional micro-community. I am referring to the use of operations research, linear programming, activity analysis, general systems theory, simulation and computer technologies, administration and organization theory, game and information theory, etc. Because all modern communities are nodes in the corporate society, the application of these mothods is largely confined to problems of scheduling, cost minimization optimum distribution of inventory flows, best mixes of commodities, time and effort from a profits standpoint, and similar considerations. When, however, planning is total for a community which is fairly independent of the conditions of the corporate, host community, and when its expression is in terms of welfare functions, such as those so brilliantly treated by Rothenberg,* particularly in relation to what has come to be called the "condition of non-dictatorship," then these methodologies will be working for a change towards the improvement of the quality of life.

At the present time these methodologies are devoted chiefly to the objectives of industrial, regional, and national planning, to helping underdeveloped countries find their economic places in the corporate sun, and to tightening the bureaucratic controls of modern organization men—controls which in the end often produce a good deal of the social pathology against whose excesses the intentional community is one answer. The planning required for the scientifically focused intentional community which seeks to improve the quality of life and the fund of personal choice and freedom, will surely involve types of problems to which these methods have not as yet been applied. When this occurs, however, I would guess that the social fruits of their applications will unquestionably be greater then they are now. At this time any one seeking to squeeze out of their applicability the social welfare type of objective which these methods could help to achieve, is not likely to find a buyer. No seller of this "misdirected use" will currently find much enthusiasm for it. No one now has the independence for this sort of thing. however, that very independence in use and **social** profitability will, I believe, be guaranteed by the intentional community which puts human welfare

* Rothenberg, Jerome. *The Measurement of Social Welfare*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1961 357 pp.

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above entrepreneural returns. The worst features of planning—when it is used for power and production rather than used for consumption and social welfare and runs the risk of turning into the diseased variety made explicit by Jewkes*—are likely to be avoided by a goal which sees to it that these new methodologies serve that improvement of the quality of life which is the basic concern of the intentional community.

10. Finally we come to a major value of the intentional community, namely, certain roles which it can play in staving off war. Where successful, intentional communities have a membership composition which is international in nature, as is the case currently with Philia, they can serve as mediators in international legal and political conflicts short of war. Where their members have made themselves highly knowledgeable with respect to the issues involved, where they can furnish medating committees containing no members who were originally from the countries in conflict, and where such communities, giving instructions to such mediating committees, represent about the most disinterested bodies one might find anywhere—no better source of adjudication can possibly be found. Such communities offering mediation, conciliation and arbitration services on a voluntary basis to the United Nations and other international bodies, can help considerably to lessen the threat of aggression and war, not only through these types of services but also through their ability to function as **disinterested** "peace agents" whose fairness and wisdom have gradually won for them an international fund of good will. The more such international, intentional communities exist and have been successfully able to settle international conflicts over important issues in a way which has been satisfying to all parties, the more likely will it be that they will be taken as models for emulation internationally. This would, of course, be all to the good.

In addition, one can encourage the formation of intentional communities of international composition by international exchange. By this I am referring to exchanges between such communities, whose membership is homogeneous with respect to national composition, in which they reciprocally take in contingents for substantial periods. This would, of course, have the effect of producing cross-fertilization with respect to the variety of meaning inherent in the phrase, "quality of life." Even more importantly, such exchanges would probably result in permanent transfers, either because of a more appealing design for living or because of international marriage and family formation in which the individuals involved are already highly selected for their sensitivity, sense of community, intelligence and social cooperativeness. Thus, apart from the use of the intentional community of international composition, as a source for adjudication in international conflict and apart from its use as a model to emulate and duplicate in social change-over during times of historical stress and crisis, it would provide one more advantage. It would increase the

* Jewkes. John, *Ordeal By Planning*. New York: Macmillan, 1948. 248 pp.

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amount and quality in this world of what Allport calls ego-extension, that is, the capacity of the individual to identify with the values, interests, ideas, ideals, sentiments, attitudes and levels of aspiration, of other persons and other places. The importance of this lies in the fact that as the fund of ego-extension increases internationally, the psychological atmospheres conducive to aggression and war diminish accordingly.

During a period of mixed polity, there will also be many types of **interdependency** between corporate society and intentional community. Some of these interdependencies will be mentioned very briefly at this point.

1. In their **initial** stages scientific, intentional micro-communities will probably try to cushion their financial risks by selling surpluses of whatever commodities they produce, to the larger corporate society. This will not basically involve a market dependency but rather a source of cash accumulation for the purchase of those types of producer goods with which their plans must continue, since such communities, by definition, **initially** possess no capital accumulation By the same token, of course, members of such communities will initially be working part of the time in their host communities. In general, the foundation stage of the inland community will be quite different from its later stages and even more different from the the foundation stage of a community which chooses an outlying island as a site.

2. Members of inland intentional communities will have two choices with respect to war and peace. They will either have to serve the host community militarily in time of war or assume the status of conscientious objectors and, if the experience of world war II can serve as a model, they will be forced to leave their experimental communities. In either case, for practical purposes, the social experimentation is at an end, since the intentional community requires both sustained peace and approximately a 1:1 sex ratio. The result we have described is far less likely to happen to far-away island communities settled by citizens of a nation currently in conflict, if thermonuclear war has broken out. Inland community members may also decide that the evil of military service up to the cessation of the anticipated short-term hostilities of the atomic age, is worth the suspension of social experimentation, if there is a community to come back to.

3. While mixed polity continues to be the rule, members of intentional communities can avail themselves of the right to vote on issues affecting the host community or they can abstain if they see fit. Participation in voting, however, may subject them to subsequent retaliation in the form of political interference, if their vote is predominantly on the losing side. On the other hand, they may also lose some rights and equities via indifference on the part of the host community to some of their basic needs, like public services, perhaps. This can result even while they continue to pay taxes. It might occur, for instance, because such communities failed to exercise the franchise at all.

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4. Intentional communities will initially have to use the currency of their host communities. This will, of course, subject them to the risk of inflation whose fundamental effect will be to raise the costs of initial financing.

5. Intentional communities seeking to buy patent rights will arouse more suspicion than any other group, be seen as more of a threat to the industrial sector of the host community (which, indeed, they will be) and can expect to be refused in some cases and forced to pay exorbitant costs or royalties in others. Difficulties with patent rights would,however,cause no basic hardship, for the role of machinery will, in any event, be limited in the intentional community. This limitation, together with the enlightened practise of birth control, will result in maintaining a better relation between man and nature, that is, between town and country, than might otherwise be obtained.

6. All necessary purchases from the existing corporate structure, during the period of mixed polity, is really exogenous demand on the host community. Such exogenous demand morally continues to support those activities and institutions against which the intentional community is rebelling in the first place. By the same token such economic transactions will also continue to support all the types of waste which are inherent in the structure of the host community.Moral secession,however, demands as its price, initial contradiction, and the intentional community gambles that such economic interdependencies can eventually be reduced to zero.

7. Intentional communities may find it hard to escape certain types of institutional service like those furnished by the post office, phone service, waste disposal, flood control, etc. Almost all such interdependencies can be eliminated in the later stages of their existence, however, if intentional communities take advantage of unusual uses of new forms of technology and bend them to these needs.

8. As we move towards one world in the senses of communication and distribution, we shall continue to have the larger relationships of nations, regions and, perhaps, continents as well as, of course, world government. Certain interdependencies will therefore be unavoidable and scientific, intentional micro-communities will have to work out relationships of integration into each of these. In the distant future, however, if some of the larger geographical entities we have mentioned, can be made to consist of loose regional federations of intentional communities, based upon the principle of voluntary association, this would, **perhaps**; constitute an ideal change. The real difficulties in talking about geographical and political integration, based upon the principle of voluntary association, in a world consisting largely, if not wholly, of scientifically focused communities is this. We cannot now foresee all those social needs which will be universal and whose satisfaction will be a mandatory task for a world of such communities. We must assume, however, that there will

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be a roster of such needs, even if that roster should consist only of curiosity and information desired about one another's activities. Certainly there will have to be pooling of effort, skill and responsibility with respect to such activities as space research, oceanography, the need to pool scientific and technical knowledge internationally, various indispensable commodities which require jointly supported sites of large-scale production, international travel, etc. In a world of such communities many of whose members will be truly enlightened, it will be recognized that activities requiring pooled effort may be defined as the areas of coercive participation in the work and responsibilities of the larger geographical units. Activity which involves coercive participation cannot be subject to the principle of voluntary association but the activities which can be defined as areas requiring coercive participation, cannot currently be laid down for future generations. Interdependencies of this sort, that is, interdependencies due to coercive participation, will, of course,remain permanent and must be accepted. Interdependencies of the dysgenic sort, however, as mentioned in point six, will hopefully vanish to zero.

Epilogue

It should be noticed that I have felt this discussion should center about only one possibility for dealing with the fearful imbalances which have gripped the modern world. I have been concerned with a broad-guage description of only one form of possible solution.The consideration which underlies the approach I have suggested here was best conveyed by Mills* who emphasized that it was our task continually to make new beginnings. In fact the spirit in which such new beginnings should be made is best expressed in his own words.

> "We must release the human imagination, in order to open up a new exploration of the alternatives now possible for the human community; we must set forth general and detailed plans, ideas, visions; in brief, programs. We must transcend the mere exhortation of general principle and opportunist reactions. What are needed are commanding views of the future, and it is our opportunity and our task to provide them..." (pp. 139-40).

Mills is but one of a small band of thinkers, like Riesman,** who recognize the social value of keeping alive a tradition of utopian thinking.

Because the alternative described here exists essentially in outline form, some very important details which would properly be of great interest to the intelligent reader and which would require extended discussion in a series of separate papers, have not been dealt with. This omission of course, is perfectly proper in the present context.It should be

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* Mills, C. Wright. *The Causes Of World War Three:* New York: Simon And Schuster, 1958, 172 pp.

** See Riesman, David, "Some Observations on Communitv Plans and Utopia," Chapter 5 of *Individualism Reconsidered And Other Essays* Glencoe,Illinois:The Free Press, 1954, 529 pp. Although this chapter is wholly devoted to a review and criticism of the volume, *Communitas*, by the Goodmans Riesman makes it clear in section iv of this chapter, his stand on utopian thinking.

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appropriate, however,to **list** seriatim some of these concerns which would be of major significance in making a fresh start. This we shall now do.

The scientific, intentional micro-community (SIMC) will have to solve the following problems sooner or later, and preferably before making its beginnings.

1. Some research will have to be undertaken on the **optimum size of population** appropriate to different designs for living and different types of technology which it is planned to employ,if the objective is to achieve democratic polity, self-actualization, organic relatedness and freedom from the ills to which we now, ourselves, are heir.

2. Some thought will have to be expended on a definition of an "appropriate standard of living" in relation to the technology to be employed and institutions to be developed. This standard of living,however, **is not to be defined** either in terms of Goodman's* **minimum subsistence** or Rowntree's** **minimum adequate standard of living.**

3. A whole new science, in effect, will have to be developed, which will be concerned with both the varieties of plans and the varieties of planning methods, which are appropriate for SIMC.

4.Problems will have to be solved which center about the renewal of resources in the later stages of SIMC and, if it should be necessary to purchase some of these, the manner of providing accumulated funds which can be drawn upon to do so.

5. Ideas will have to be developed for determining the different types of **agrindustry** appropriate both to the design for living which has been chosen, the technologies which are to be employed and the scale of production and consumption which will be relevant to SIMC.Originality of thought will be needed for planning a variety of balanced ecologies between man, natural community resources and available and relevant technologies ***

6. The possible use of technologies for exploiting the resources in sea-water piped into SIMC,where these are located not too far from the littoral,will have to be explored.

7. Some advance decisions will have to be made by SIMC on the proper uses of leisure,in terms which will be as penetrating as those of de Grazia.**** Goodman***** has very roughly estimated that if the standard of living is a subsistence one,an individual would have to spend anywhere from one year in 4 or 5 to one year in 10, in working on behalf of

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* *Communitas* op, cit.

** Rowntree, B. Seebohm, *The Human Needs of Labour*, London: Nelson and Sons, 1918. 168 pp,

*** An illuminating and non-technical orientation to possibilities in this direction and in relation to many other items which should be of proper concern to SIMC, has already aroused widespread general interest.I am referring to Harrison Brown's "*The Challenge Of Man's Future.*" New York: The Viking Press, 1954. 290 pp

**** de Grazia, Sebastian. *Of Time Work & Leisure*. New York: The Twentiteh Century Fund, 1962. 559 pp.

***** *Comunitas*, op. cit.

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the community. Since SIMC will assume a high but unexcessive standard of living, these ratios will probably become larger but, perhaps, not too much so. SIMC will, in fact, be the pilot models of the future, in which the perils with which leisure is fraught in mass society, may be overcome by discovery of mature and humane uses to which it should be put. The dangers in the misuse of leisure have recently been emphasized by Gabor* according to newspaper report, and the uses to which he feels it should be put, apply to the corporate society. The uses to which it must be put in the SIMC of the future, remain to be worked out, in much the same imaginative vein that was exercised by Morris.**

8. SIMC will have to solve problems connected with the utilization of energy and power sources on a small scale e. g., the possible use of solar energy.

9. Some methods will have to be worked out in SIMC for the proper evaluation of personal services in relation to individual consumption schedules. Corollary to this will be the task of working out a judicious and propitious division of **political and cultural responsibility** among members of SIMC and equitable methods of rotating these responsibilities.

10. SIMC will continually have to devote time to changing, and usually expanding, the meaning of the phrase "quality of life," as its members take advantage of ever-new and appropriate changes in science, technology, invention, culture and education, which can be favorably adapted to their ways of life. This may mean occasional community redesign, in a physical sense as well as in an economic one.

11. For all SIMC, agreement upon the areas of social relations within the community which are properly coercive or non-coercive, will be subject to constant modification.

12. All SIMC will have to work out in detail proper relations between themselves and their host communities. For densely populated host communities, SIMC may have to reconcile themselves initially to bringing the public services provided by the host community into the intentional community, paying for these, and gambling that they will not be an open door to interference with their social experimentation.

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* I am referring here to an AP dispatch of March 18, 1963, quoting Denis Gabor, 63-year-old professor of applied electronic physics at London University. In his book "*Inventing The Future*," according to the dispatch story, Gabor discusses the perils which await mankind at the prospect of unbounded human leisure, as a result of the taking over of almost all labor, by advanced forms of technology. Without going into all the points mentioned in the AP story, I feel that what must be emphasized here is that probably a global institution in the form of SIMC has the best chance of working out successful and rational adjustments to the problems surrounding unbounded leisure. For a suggestive picture of how an island SIMC will probably have to deal *in part* with this problem, see Frederick J. Grew's *Wealt and the Common Man*. New York: Wisdom Library, 1959, 184 pp.

** Morris, William. *News From Nowhere*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co, 1901. 278 pp.

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13. SIMC will usually be able to develop surplus production. Since, by definition, they will be producing primarily for use (consumption) and not for profit, all surpluses can be be sold and the revenues used for expanding the quality of life in various ways. However, to continue to do this results in simulating the marketing activities of host communities, an activity to be avoided in the **later stages** of development of SIMC. The principle of an "ever normal granary" will also make little sense in the socio-economic atmosphere of a technologically efficient, intentional community. Thus decisions will have to be made with regard to the dispositions of such surpluses in the later stages of the community's development. One such socially intelligent decision would be to provide other struggling SIMC with these surpluses, in the initial stages of **their** development. The principle of **mutual aid** should be a *sine que non* for all SIMC.

14. SIMC will have to develop plans for avoiding the horrible, social (this word should, properly speaking, be "unsocial") costs of private enterprise as these have been described, for instance, by Kapp*[1], Carson[2] and Herber,[3] to name a few representative critics. They will also, as a corollary to this, have to strike socially reasonable attiudes towards idle plant capacity.

15. Educational goals in all SIMC will have to move in directions aimed at avoiding the worst features of **mass society**, as these have now been aptly described in a voluminous literature on the subject.

16. Some groups of individuals, interested in SIMC, may wish to devote energy, educational effort and years of lobbying, in trying to get moral support for and interest in their ventures, from the general public. Many such groups, with clear-cut community plans and designs for living, may wish to lobby for financial support from the United Nations and other international bodies, from philanthropical foundations and other public-spirited agencies, from financially able religious groups, etc. In general, I believe it would be best for groups interested in founding SIMC, to stand on their own resources only, regardless of how difficult their subsequent struggles may be.

17. All SIMC will have to make use of a variety of educational and psychological techniques, such as operant learning and conditioning procedures, for ensuring a type of altruistic character-structure in the developing young. Such a character-structure will be a necessity if we wish to realize the ideals of community and undo the unsocial impulses and egocentric, behavior patterns which are rewarded by corporate society. In addition SIMC will have to recognize that different temperaments correspond to

* See the following works by these authors.

1. Kapp, S.William. *The Social Costs Of Private Enterprise*. Cambridge, Massachusetts. Harvard University Press, 1950. 287 pp.
2. Carson, Rachel, *Silent Spring*. Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1962. 368 pp.
3. Herber, Lewis. *Our Synthetic Environment*. New York: knopf, 1962. 285 pp

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different ways of life, in the sense described by Charles Morris,* so that the quality of life offered by a community will, to some degree, have to cater to these broad differences in temperament. This will mean, of course, an **internal pluralism.** Community specialization along these lines would be impossible, since no one can predict the modes of living which will be congenial to the as-yet unborn children of the community.

The focus of attention for most SIMC will be once again—in contrast with modern corporate society—to put the emphasis on the quality of life, on a plurality of modes of social existence, on organic personal relatedness, personal development and rationality on limited but mature consumption patterns, economic and political decentralization and last, **but certainly not least,** the possibility of eventual reduction of aggression and the winning of a lasting peace. On the negative side—and this is almost of equal importance—all SIMC will seek to avoid the social pathology of the corporate West, which is perhaps most pithily described in the words of C. Wright Mills**. In talking of the bureaucratic and dehumanized atmospheres of both the USA and the USSR—where these are taken as the inevitable by-products of mass society rather than of ideology—he comments as follows.

"The key to the power of both is technological development. the "materialism" of the Soviet is no more important a spiritual fact than the "materialism" of the West—especially of the U.S.A. in which religion itself is now a quite secular activity. In both the means of production are so arranged that, in the name of efficiency, work is alienated; in both, as well, the means of consumption are culturally exploitative. In neither is there significant craftsmanship in work or significant leisure in the nonworking life. In both, men at leisure and at work are subjected to impersonal bureaucracies. This trend is no Bolshevik invention; it is part of the main line of Western, and especially of American, industrial and technical development.

In both, science and loyalty, industry and the national canons of excellence are in the service of the war system and of war preparations. In both, the Science Machine is made a cultural and a social fetish, rather than an instrument under continual public appraisal and control; and to the Machine's economic as well as military aspects, the organization of all life is increasingly adapted.

For both superstates, war is obsolete as a means of any policy save that of mutual annihilation, yet in both virtually all policies and actions fall within the perspective of a third world war. In both, the justification of means by "our ends," and the acceptance of "our violence" as a necessary means are the official doctrines—and not only doctrines but practices built into the official life of the nation.

In both, political struggles tend to be replaced by administrative decisions. As the standard of living of each advanced nation rises, indifference or fear—as the case may be—tend to make "the management of consent" and the regulation of political irregularities matters of administrative routine. Within both, most men are now "the

* Morris, Charles. *Varities Of Human Value.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. 209 pp.
** op. cit.

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objects of history, adapting to structural changes with which they have little or nothing to do. Although they may be "taken into account" in varying degrees by dictators or democrats, they are not among the history-making—and so war-making—is virtually monopolized by those who have access to the material and cultural means by which history is now powerfully being made." (pp.17-18)

The preceding positive and negative goals then will be the missions of SIMC. Though intentional may use the arts and philosophies of community planning, we should not assume that most programs of town or community planning involve the ideals of intentional community. One can have town and community planning without any effort to achieve a new way of life or to achieve a break with the personal and social leit motifs of corporate society, in one or more drastic respects. Many forms of community planning accept the ideals of corporate society and seek relief only from some of the physical and aesthetic discomforts of conurbation. On the contrary, however SIMC must, by virtue of their discontents, reject **all forms** of centralization and bureaucratization and the ills which attend these.

It is about time that the rich plethora of scientific findings which have accumulated for centuries, be put to work for us. Such a change is long overdue. The socio-technical mistakes of humanity's pre-scientific past and the social and personal tragedy and suffering they have caused when science has been used in a haphazard fashion, are no longer necessary. With a more enlightened concept of community, in which we strive to exploit the findings of science primarily for human and humane ends, there need be no limit to the posssibilities for human and social improvement. We need more widespread recognition of the correctness of C. Wright Mills' Conviction that the utopian way

> "...is now the only adequate way to think about world politics and the human condition...and the only realistic way to work seriously as intellectuals for the conditions of peace." (p.94)

Although I do not accept his recommended, utopian cure, I do share his recognition of the need for utopian vision.

If, as many writers think, we shall witness in the next few generations, the inevitable industrialization of the world, then let it come hopefully over the long run, in the form of SIMC. Were we to welcome the extension of our current industrialization to the world as a whole, we would simply be allowing the social and psychological evils which have thus far accompanied it, to be reflected on a grander scale. The resultant world society would then, I am afraid, not be the happy one envisaged by Ayres[1] but would look more like the global incubus suggested by Seidenberg[2] Conventional forms of enlightened protest regard world-

* The two works I have in mind are the following.

1. Ayres, C.B. *Toward A Resonable Society. The Values of Industrial Civilization.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961. 301 pp.
2. Seidenberg, Roderick. *Anatomy of the Future.* Chapel: Hill The University of North Carolina Press, 1961. 173 pp.

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wide industrialzation, freed from its present, social correlates, as the only practical socio-political and socio-economic trends available to modern man. These are in fact the trends we see about us now.

Quite apart, however, from the unfaced economic difficulties such a picture presents and quite apart from the fact that a monolithic, global, industrial society would have unusual types of problems if it looked forward to indefinite economic growth, it is disturbing that so little creative imagination is exercised on the task of framing alternatives which aim at obtaining the best of industrial technology while avoiding its worst social features. The tendency is to dismiss all such alternatives airily and pejoratively as utopian and impractical. I do not think this is quite true or quite fair. Furthermore, in accepting or dismissing proposals like those for SIMC, we must ever bear in mind **that if we allow centralization and industrialization to continue in their present forms,** we may reach a point of no return at which a choice for SIMC becomes technically infeasible and therefore cannot be registered.

Such a point of no return does not now exist. We may reach it, however, in a matter of a century or more, if the entire globe seeks to ape the industrial characteristics and history of the USA and USSR. This would eventually yield the depressing and pessimistic pictures of the future furnished by Thomson* and Darwin*. In the from of SIMC the social pathology which has thus far been the price to be paid for the undoubted material benefits industrialization has conferred, will be avoided, and perhaps we can move a little nearer to Wells' great dream of a world containing men like gods. For, to repeat what we have already said, and as the song puts it in South Pacific "You gotta have a dream," and I cannot think of a nicer one than this.

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* The bleak descriptions of the immediate and remote futures, furnished by these authors, will be found in the following.

1. Thomson, Sir George. *The Foreseeable Future*. Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, 1955. 166 pp.
2. Darwin, Sir Charles Galton. *The Next Million Years*. London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1952. 210 pp.

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THE MYSTIC LYRIC OF TAGORE

ARUL JOSEPH

It is indeed true that Tagore is above all a poet. But, as Dr. Radhakrishnan has put it:" A poet is nothing if he is not (implicitly atleast) a philosopher" [1]. Besides, our poet is pre-eminently a religious poet, and heir to and vivifier of, the ancient Vaisnavite tradition. He writes: "My religion essentially is a poet's religion...My religious life" has followed the same mysterious line of growth as has my poetical life.[2]. Not without reason, then, the whole world credits him now as a prince, patriot, prophet, philosopher and poet[3].

Tagore's poetic, philosophic and religious sentiments mould into one and provide us what scholars have called 'the mystic lyric' of the bhakti tradition of India: **Tagore** was not only a great poet, but also one of the greatest mystic thinkers of the East in modern times. His mysticism flows in to poetry; his poetry bathes in mysticism" [4]. His religion is steeped in enchantment like the melody of a flute[5].

For a natural poet, like Wordsworth, poetry might be 'emotion recollected in tranquility'; but for a religious poet, like Tagore, Love is essential to everything:" Love is the ultimate meaning of everything around us. It is not a mere sentiment; it is truth; it is Joy that is at the root of all creation"[6]. Human love is indeed sweet for him when pure; but its source and real fulfilment is in God-love, because "Where is this hope of union except in thee, my God[7]. Who is the eternal Beauty, in which all things live and move'[8].

Love's Messagge to Me:—

This God of Love "does not care to keep exposed the record of His power written in geological inscriptions, but He is proudly glad of the expression of beauty which He spreads on the green grass, in the flowers, in the play of colours on the clouds in the murmuring music of running

[1] Dr. S. Radhakrishnan: The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore: 1918 edition, Macmillan, London, p. 165

[2] R. Tagore: Lectures and Addresses: Selected by Anthony X.Soares, 1936, Indian edition, MacMillan, p. 12

[3] Confer Five P's for Tagore; published by Tagore Memorial Publications, Lahore, pp. 31

[4] ibid.p.19

[5] A Tagore Testament; Translated by Indu Dutt, Meridian Books, London, 1953, p. 71

[6] As quoted in p. 7 of Rabindranath Tagore: Poet. Patriot, Philosopher: by K.S Ramasawmy Sastri, Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, 1924

[7] The Garderner: (Tagore): 50

[8] Acts of the Apostles, 17: 28, quoted by Tagore too.

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water"[9]. Thus, for Tagore, every atom of the Universe bears message of His Love: "Somehow, through a rose, the language of love reaches our heart"[10]

Thou art the sky and thou art the nest as well.O thou beautiful, there in the nest it is thy love that encloses the soul with colours and sounds and odours..."[11] "Yes, I know, this is nothing but thy love, O beloved of my heart—this golden light that dances upon the leaves, these idle clouds sailing across the sky, this passing breeze leaving its coolness upon my forehead.

The morning light has flooded my eyes—this is thy message to my heart. Thy face is bent from above, thy eyes look down on my eyes, and my heart has touched thy feet..."[12]

Yes, God gives Himself in the beauty of Nature to fill the heart of the devotee with love and joy. And it is 'to captivate my heart, He who is the king of kings has decked Himself in beauty'[13]. Through the beauty of this universe, through the loveliness of our dear ones, it is ultimately God, the all-pervading One, who is ever drawing us to Himself: Nobody else has the same capacity to pull [14].

Love's Search for Me:

Now, not only Love's "Messengers with tidings greet me and speed me along the road"[15], but Love Itself comes in quest of me, exclaiming: "Whom wilt thou find to love, ignoble thee, save Me, save only Me? [16]. The perfect decks itself in beauty for the love of the imperfect [17].

"Masters are many in your hall, and songs are sung there at all hours. But the simple carol of this novice struck at your love... You came down from your throne and stood at my cottage door...[18] I hoar Him coming: "Have you not heard his silent steps ? He comes, comes, ever comes."[12]

Of myself, I am miserable and helpless; but He seeks me out of love: "I cannot choose the best. The best chooses me"[20].

Love calls for love:—

But this Love calls for a return of love: the descending arc of love should be reciprocated by the ascending one: 'To all things else, He gives; from me He asks'[21]. "What a kingly jest was it to open thy palm to a beggar (like me) to beg ?"[22].

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[9] Lectures: pp.14–5
[10] ibid.p.16
[11] Gitanjali (Tagore): n. 57
[15] ibid:n. 59
[13] ibid n.56
[14] A Tagore Testament: p.19
[15] Gitanjali n. 44
[16] The Hound of Heaven: by Francis Thompsoo: The Works of Fr. Thompson, Burns Oates. 1913,p. 112
[17] Stray Birds (Tagore):n. 62
[18] Gitanjali n. 49
[19] ibid. n. 45
[20] Stray Birds n. 20
[21] Cf. Fruit-Gathering n. 78
[22] Gitanjali n.50

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And our poet realises this. So, enchanted by the sweet expressions of this divine harmony and love, like a love-striken bride, he observes the sunbeam that comes upon this earth of his with arms extended [23]; he waits at the wayside, at the door step of his cottage, he keeps vigil for the coming of the Lover.

His bride's heart recognises its Lover in Nature; catches sight of Him in the playhouse of infinite forms: "Thy sun and stars can never keep thee hidden from me for aye"[24]. "Why, the whole country is all filled and crammed with the King"[25] and the heavens appear as God's lovely "wristlet decked with stars and cunningly wrought in myriad coloured jewels"[26], Thus to that loving heart, as Dr.Radhakrishnan puts it: Earth is crammed with heaven; all existence is suffused with God"[27].

But as the poet's heart longs for 'the perfect union of the two' [28] pining for God alone: 'I want thee, only thee'[29],it is often tried by sorrow and pain, as gold in the furnace: love must be called from its play to drink sorrow and be borne to the heaven of tears "[30]. The king of kings once decked with roses, now hides himself among thorns: "The flower is reigning in splendour among thorns": it is the Dark night of the Soul !

This state, however, is only a passing one, just to prove and purify the soul : "love is recognised by the lamp of pain"[31].Besides, even while the tears are bitter, they are 'the **heaven** of tears' [32]. Does not love transform all labour into sweetness , all service into freedom, all grief into joy ?

Love's surrender to Love:

But soon the trial vanishes; there appears the glorious Dawn. Lo and behold ! The Lover is here at my side: "The sound of his footfall knock at my breast"[33]. The soul wakes up from her languid slumber and opens her eyes and sees Him standing by her, flooding her sleep with His smile"[34].

"Take, oh take" [35], now becomes here ecstatic cry. With a heart overflowing with love, she offers all like the princess in The king of the Dark Chamber: "Nothing of this is mine, it is all yours, O Lord !"[36]. In

[23] Cf. ibid,n. 67
[24] ibid. n. 46
[25] The King of the Dark Chamber:R.Tagore. MacMillan Indian ed. *1930*,p.*14*
[26] Gitanjali n.53
[27] The Philosophy of R.Tagore, New edition, *1961*, Baroda, p. 45
[28] Gitanjali n.56
[29] Cf. ibid.n. 38
[30] The Garderner: n. 68
[31] Stray Birds n.162
[32] Cf. Ref. 30. above
[33] Fruit-gatheringn .7,
[34] Gitanjali n. 48
[35] Cf. Fruit-gathering n. 28
[36] As quoted by Dr. Radhakrishnan in The Philo. of R. Tagore, New ed.p,*69*

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this she would stake all, even herself, and then consider it all a gain and victory : For, in love combat, one who yields alone wins really !

"You have come. Radiant One. You have broken open the door,
May victory be yours...
Victorious Hero, with the dawn of a new day...
Let my bondage break.
Victory be yours"[37].

Love is Shown in Deeds:

Having tasted the sweetness of the Divine Lover, the devotee-poet will not be afraid of anything, even of Death: he will conquer even this, by transforming it as 'his last offering to the Lord' [38]. He will abide in happiness 'not in getting but giving all'. Again and again, like **Chitra**, he will hear His call: "Beloved, my most beloved" and respond to it, saying: 'Take me, take all I am...'Then, a sweet embrace! "Heaven and earth, time and space, pleasure and pain, death and life merged together in an unbearable ecstasy"[39], till love is perfected and consummated for all eternity.

Till then, he will not enjoy idle tranquillity nor be immersed in languid beauty; he will not reject but embrace sorrow for love; he will not renounce evil but transcend it [40]. He will not turn a self-centered ascetic; rather, he will wage war against the powers of darkness and evil and labour for the happiness of mankind, the children of the common Father and Lover: "Lord of my heart, Thou hast given me thy sword for adornment. No more doll's decorations for me" [41]. He will not deny all divisions and contradictions but bring them all to their perfected form...in the knowledge of the Eternal [42].

This Eternal, however, cannot be known properly by our intellect, here or hereafter: He can only be known by our soul, by our joy in Him, by our love. We become one with our Father [43]: for, only in love are unity and duality not at variance [44].

His body and soul, then, are God's, not his, any longer: "Life of my life, I shall ever try to keep my body pure, knowing that thy living touch is upon all my limbs...It shall be my endeavour to reveal thee in my actions...to keep my love in flower..."[45]

Thus he will live and work out of love and finally, when his work shall be done in this world, 'alone and speechless will he stand before the King of kings face to face'[46]. And God would come to him in the

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[37] A Tagore Testament: p, 67
[38] Gitanjaii n. 86
[39] The Philosophy of R. Tagore: by Dr.S.Radhakrishnan, New Ed.p.47
[40] Cf. A Tagore Testament p.64
[41] Gitanjali n.52
[42] A Tagore Testament: pp. 64 & 66
[43] Lectures: pp.156-7
[44] Sadhana (Tagore): MacMillan, Ind.ed.p. 114
[45] Gitanjali n.5
[46] ibid .n.76

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dusk of his evening with the flower from his past kept fresh in his basket [47]. Trusting in His love, he will sing and live till the Lord will be his Lover for ever: "When all the songs of my life will be tuned, my Master, then at every touch of Thine will come out the music of love"[48]. Then, "Drunk with the joy of singing I forget myself and call thee friend who art my Lord" [49]. For, it is in love, there will be consummation: love alone is the meeting point of the finite and the Infinite: "God kisses the finite in His love and man the Infinite"[50]

AN OBJECTION AND ITS ANSWER

All this magnificent edifice, some of my companions might say, crumbles down into nothing for lack of a metaphysical foundation, as Tagore's philosophy seems to be monistic and hence fundamentally destructive of all diversity including man and universe. My answer, however to this is that our poet himself prefers to remain silent on this point. "I am no authority, he explicitly states, on Metaphysics. in any controversial discussion regarding monism and dualism, I shall remain silent. I only say what I feel..." [51]. As regards the eternal union, however, in knowledge and love, of the soul with the Divine Lover, he is unmistakably eloquent and ecstatic. God knows and loves, and is his All: Lord, Creator, Master, King of kings, Father, Mother, Friend and above all Lover. He is the Light, Love, Life, the Supreme Beauty, Truth and Joy [52]. He is related to Him by the closest of relationships, the relationship of love [53]." Yes, I know, this is nothing but thy love,O beloved of my heart"[54].

CONCLUSION

Thus we see that the religion of Tagore is above all an intense yearning of the heart for the divine, for a perfect union in love "that holds duality on one side and non-duality on the other" [55].

This is the sublime message of our worthy poet, which is an appeal and a challenge as well to modern India in a special way. For, as Dr. Radhakrishnan puts it so nicely:Nowadays,our traditional intense belief in God,our sense of the strength of holiness and sacrifice,are fast giving way to materialism and worship of wealth. The brows intended to look up to heaven are kissing the dust ".[56] Shall we still be deaf to the noble call of

[47] Stray Birds: n: 313

[48] ibid. n.314

[49] Gitanjali n.2

[50] Stray Birds n. 302

[51] A Tagore Testament: p.9. cf.ibid. 41. "I am neither a philosopher nor."

[52] Cf.K.S.R.Sastri: R.Tagore: Poet, Patriot, Philosopher:p,222 and also the texts I have gathered about God and addresses to him, in the Collected Poems and Plays of R. Tagore, MacMillan, London 1952, alone: God is mentioned 67 times; Love, beloved, darling, heart, fair one: 36 times; Lord, 16 times; Master,9 times. King,7 times; Friend,5 times; Beauty,5 times; Father, 3 times; Mother. twice, Life, Light: Stray Birds n.24.References: ctd

[53] Personality (Tagore): MacMillan Ind.ed.p.158

[54] Gitanjali n. 59

[55] A Tagore Testament p.67

[56] The Philosophy of R. Tagore: New ed.p.118

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our poet—herald to genuine joy and bliss ? It is joy that I claim as mine, whoever I am: now, joy is love and love is God: "You are the joy of all, O Beloved; it is that joy I claim as mine" [57].

In this trusting love of child in its mother's arms, or of a bride in her lover's embrace all ours will be His, and His, ours: then shall we sing with our hearts and lips the strains of eternal music of love:

Light, my light, the eye–kissing light, heart–sweetening light'
Ah, the light dances, my darling, at the centre of my life,
The light strikes, my darling, the chords of my love;...
The light is shattered into gold on every cloud, my darling,
and it scatters gems in profusion." [58]

In one salutation, then, to thee, my God let all my senses spread out and touch this world at thy feet [59] For all eternity thus, be "all mine, my true Love, and I all Thine" [60].

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[57] A Tagore Testament, p.109
[58] Gitanjali n. 57
[59] ibid,n:103
[60] The Song of Songs: (Knox's version)2:16

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THE MAGNETIC STRUCTURE OF REALITY

WILLIAM F. BURKE, JR.

My desk is piled high with letters from professors and college presidents. As readers of Time magazine (July 21, 1958) already know, a special research project of this institute has revolutionized psychology by identifying self-love as the basic motivational factor in human behavior and in all animal life on this planet. Furthermore, using self-love as the basic motivational factor, we have conclusively exploded Freud's theory of psychoanalysis by reducing human behavior to a simple and permanent order.

Self-love has been theoretically conceptualized a sa spiritual-magnetic tree of primal instinctive urge rooted in God and life which boldly braces itself for preservation against death as well as against the stormy trials and tribulations of life. sometimes bending to disappointment, sometimes shattered by frustration or split by trauma as in schizophrenia, but more often winning the struggle and forever trying to draw to itself those things which it innately desires.

From this tree shoot out a profusion of branches in various directions: the huge branch of greed so manifest in busines, upright branches for the necessities of life, success and happiness, strong limbs of the sexual urge and lust, intertwining branches of jealousy and sadism, ever-widening branches of altruism trying to bridge a gap with egoism and hedonism. There is a twisted black branch of crime or wrongdoing which inthe spiritual light of religion and law, casts two shadows, one of guilt and one of punishment. A young bough of self sacrifice or egocentric austerity is next to an ugly one of masochism, while the crown of this great tree is a glorious group of branches semingly trying to gratify themselves by outdoing each other in the pursuit of God, truth, virtue or beauty and occasionally achieving the highest award this tree can win which is martyrdom.

The Tree braces itself with love and hate, joy and sorrow, hope and fear, hunger, thirst and pain, as well as all of the other emotional reactions of human nature. On this Tree, incest, which includes the Oedipus complex, may be represented as a stunted twig on the limbs of sex and lust. It is stunted by religion and by law.

Suicide is a branch of the Tree which loved itself so much that it considered itself too good to go on suffering the ordeal of life and it has cut itself off from the Tree so that it will no longer have to weather the stormy trials and tribulations of life.

Lying midway between love and hate in the spiritual-magnetic field, the strength of which braces the Tree of Self-Love or Human Behavior, sleep is a region where the mind journeys through time, and thoughts are dreams. These adventures, which the dreamer entertains and which

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entertains and which entertain the dreamer, are always dreamer–observant, dreamer–participant or dreamer–omniscient.

Hypnosis results when an individual is induced to spiritually magnetize himself. Mesmer, of course, also said that hypnosis is related to magnetism and it is known that an electro–magnet may cause subjective discomfort in or restore to normalcy a person who has been hypnotized.

Emotions are magnetic reactions. Joy is the magnetic reaction which follows or anticipates success in any activity. It involves remembrance and enjoyment of the success. In sorrow, the magnetic reaction is a stopping of active magnetic reaction In extreme cases of sorrow, the individual may even be caused to refuse to react to the most powerful of stimuli. Flight or retreat is the typical magnetic reaction of fear. The threatened individual may also brace himself with anger, seeking to destroy the threat. Hope is magnetically associated with advancement.

When two people fall in love, they spiritually magnetize each other. Marriage is the binding together, by religion and by law, of a man and woman who have spiritually magnetized each other. A family is also held together by spiritual–magnetic ties as well as by religion and by law.

Business or trade my be said to begin with the pulling–plus of buying, to brace itself with profits and value, and to end with the pushing—minus of selling.

In human behavior, wars are great spiritual–magnetic storms. Theoretically, at least, all wars can be prevented by reversing the spiritual-magnetic positions of nations from mutual repulsion to mutual attraction.

When two individual spiritual magnets or nations move into positions of mutual repulsion, each may be surprised, angered or jolted by the force and position of the other. The jolt may be mild or sufficiently strong to create an emotional earthquake.

Viewed as a spiritual magnet, America begins with the pulling–plus of Democracy, braces itself with the traditional concept of God, and ends with the pushing–minus of Capitalism. Whereas, Soviet Russia begins with the pulling–plus of Communism, braces itself with Atheism, and ends with the pushing–minus of Dictatorship. The Communism that we refer to as a pulling–plus is the idea of a Utopia and a "workers' paradise."

Today, in a position of mutual repulsion, America's pulling–plus of Democracy is opposed to Russia's pulling–plus of Communism, while America's pushing–minus of Capitalism is opposed to Russia's pushing–minus of Dictatorship.

Mutual attraction will result only when America's pulling–plus of Democracy draws to itself Russia's pushing–minus of Dictatorship; and when America's pushing–minus of Capitalism is drawn to Russia's pulling–plus of Communism.

Clearly, however, the American magnet is lighter, brighter and more attractive to the mind of man than is the Soviet magnet.

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Popularity is a form of spiritual-magnetic power. A political election is a contest between individual spiritual magnets to determine which has the greatest power of attraction. In great men, the spiritual magnet is sometimes so powerful that it continues to function long after the death of the individual, and this we call immortality.

Jesus Christ, whether considered as God or man or both, is the most powerful spiritual magnet that the world has ever known. One reason for this may be that the cross itself is actually a plus sign signifying a beginning. In any event, millions of individual spiritual magnets, whose velocity remains constant because it is geared to the universe, orbit around this great, tugging, rotating, sun-like emotional force which is Christianity. No one knows the date of Christ's birth, but the early Church Fathers, with the wisdom of true greatness, decided to celebrate it on December 25th which was the date of the Roman Feast of the Eternal Sun.

The mind of man is so rationally ordered that certain images of ideas, persons, places, experiences, etc. are held to the self by spiritual magnetism, and in the individual we call this memory. It is history when the ideas, etc. are sufficiently spiritually-magnetic to be held by civilization.Theoretically, this is related to the "magnetic tape memory units" used at the Bankers Trust Company, New York.

We have found that the spiritual-magnetic factor is present regardless of intellect. "Free will" is always motivated by self-love not by the intellect.

Neither Freud nor Jung identified self–love as the basic motivational factor or least common denominator, and their "libido" idea made it impossible for them to reduce human behavior to a simple and permanent order as we have done with self-love. Freud erred when he used the term "primal urge to live" because the urge to live not primal. It springs from the primal instinctive or cosmic urge of self–love which is the underlying imperative or "mainspring" of action.

Everything has a psychological reaction on us by virtue of its relationship to the spiritual–magnetic human mind, and cannot be conceived of except in terms of the degree of acceptance or rejection by the structure of that mind, nor can the mind itself be thought of and understood but by virtue of its relationship to either the electro–magnetic earth or the celestial–magnetic universe. Briefly stated, the celestial–magnetic field begins with gravitational attraction near a planet and it ends with gravitational repulsion out in space. Or, in other words, it begins with the pulling–plus of the finite and it ends with the pushing–minus of the Infinite.

Algebraically, reality to the zero power equals magnetism. In the pushing–minus of Eternity and Infinity, all things begin with a positive or pulling–plus and all things end with a negative or pushing–minus.

When this research was conducted, we took a new look at the whole medical concept of mental health and meatal illness; and we found

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that the mind itself can never become ill. It may become unbalanced and this would seem to constitute legal insanity. But all of our costly programs, based on the idea of "mental illness" are basically wrong from both a moral and scientific standpoint. The primal instinctive urge of self-love always functions as well as it can. Also, the fact that the mind may be split, as in schizophrenia, proves that it is different from the body which cannot be split but may become ill.

Whether this is considered to be the discovery of an axiom or the mere formation of a notion, it will greatly assist hundreds of thousands of sane but "allegedly mentally ill" Americans.

We have surveyed a road from man's mind to all reality, including materialism. And scientists should help build this road that they shall have to travel until the end of civilization.

For example, the magnetic field of light begins with the pulling-plus of a theoretically perfect black which would completely absorb all visible light, it braces itself with its property, color, and it ends with the pushing-minus of a theoretically perfect white which would completely reflect all visible light.

God said, "Let there be light." and there was light. God Saw that the light was good. God separated the light from the darknesss, calling the light Day and the darkness Night And there was evening and morning the first day. (Genesis, I, 3-5.)

In the single unified order of magnetism that encompasses all reality, man, as a whole, is a positive or pulling-plus. This refers to the individul human being of either sex as well as to all of mankind.

A smile is a pushing-minus of warm light. Light itself is a pushing-minus of the Infinite. In the darkness of night, the pulling-plus of man encounters and draws away from the pulling-plus of the darkness. Were there no moon or stars, man would hate the night. At any rate, he finds the pushing-minus of the sun's rays in the daylight more complementary than a very dark and cloudy night.

When he falls in love, man more or less, changes from a pulling-plus of darkness to a pushing-minus of light. This spiritual-magnetic change makes him more attractive to the pulling-plus of the beloved-as well as to himself. However, if it is to be mutual love, each lover must change spiritually, at least in relation to the other. This is an easy concept to comprehend: Each lover brightens the beloved's life.

When a man or woman has an outgoing personality, it means that he or she has become a pushing-minus of light to reach into and brighten the lives of others.

Although the Infinite is a pushing-minus, both the traditional concept of God and the cross of Christ are a pulling-plus. They are repulsive to man so long as he considers himself to be a pulling-plus of darkness. He pulls away from God, and God seems to pull away from him.

On the other hand, when man feels himself to be a pushing-minus

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of light, he is magnetically drawn to the cross of Christ or to the traditional concept of God. But this is no longer a God of darkness. It is now a God of light and love—to balance and strengthen man.

For the magnetic fileld of Christianity begins with the pulling-plus of the traditional concept of a righteous and Almighty God that is comparable to a white light, it braces itself with faith in the Divinity of his son Jesus christ who as the offspring of God is believed to partake of of the Divine light, and it ends with the dark pushing-minus of Satan.

As for the power of darkness, Satan may well be associated with the twisted black branch of crime or wrongdoing which casts two shadows, one of guilt and one of punishment. That evil is sometimes associated with the word "pushing" in the popular mind is proved by the way we use the word "pusher" to describe the criminal who, for profit, causes innocent persons to become addicted to narcotics.

The Tree of self-love is a pulling-plus of darkness that attracts light. But the black branch of crime or wrongdoing is a pushing-minus darkness. Why does it do the wrong thing and push instead of pull ? The answer is simply because it is wrongdoing.

Moreover, the magnetic field of morals begins with the pulling-plus of right which may be conceived as light, it braces itself with the truth which unfortunately is not always so luminous, and it ends with the pushing-minus of wrong which once again is dark or black.

All of this, coupled with the day and night of our planet, the seasons, etc. would seem to prove that mankind will aways need more and more light, both intellectual and spiritual, if we are to find the simplicity of natural order, to dispell dark clouds of war and scientific obscurantism, to be mentally balanced,morally good and happy. The natural order of things is irreversible because it is so inherently reversible.

To sum up, the following is a list of our recent scientific achievements:

1. Identification of self-love as the basic motivational factor in human behavior and in all animal life.
2. Reduction of human behavior to a simple and permanent order of spiritual magnetism.
3. Identification of magnetism as the First Law of Nature embracing all reality in Eternity and Infinity.
4. The first attempt to determine if spiritual magnetism can lift the threat of nuclear annihilation from the world.
5. Reduction of the U.S. and Soviet Russia to terms of spiritual magnetism.
6. By breaking down the celestial-magnetic field, we have explained the force that holds the planets in their orbits.
7. We have found both the beginning and the ending of all things considered individually.

Thus, we have realized the ultimate ideal of harmonizing man with Nature. Encouragement should come from the fact that we have already crossed the scientific frontier and are now blazing a trail in the newly discoverd realm of spiritual magnetism.

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In the face of this fantastic breakthrough, the ideas of Freud and Jung are crumbling in psychiatry, while, in physics, the ideas of Einstein and Newton, both of whom thought in 17th Century terms of gravitation, are cast in doubt by the new theory of celestial magnetism which may best explain, very simply, the reaction of the universe

The fact that the mind of man is a spiritual magnet involving both light and darkness has a basic relationship to all views of both mind and matter.

Here, you see, the magnetic emotional response simplifies and explains something that has puzzled the world's greatest thinkers.

At a time when evil men are proclaiming the primacy of matter which is a fallacy, we have proved the truth of the primacy of the spirit.

And, in the words of the psudo–Chrysostom, let me say:

"This tree as broad of the heavens has grown up from earth to heaven. Immortal tree,it extends from heaven to earth.It is the fixed pivot of the universe, the fulcrum of all things, the foundation of the world, the cardinal point of the cosmos. It binds together all the multiplicity of human nature. It is held together by invisible nails of the spirit in order to retain its bond with the Godhead. It touches the highest summits of heaven and with its feet holds fast the earth, and it encompasses the vast middle atmosphere in between with its immeasurable arms."

The magnetic field of existence begins with the pulling–plus of creation, it braces itself with being, and it ends with the pushing–minus of destruction.

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AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF MAN

A. KANNAN

Man as a subject of integrated scientific study has not reached any measurable progress in modern times. The present situation could be characterised as both an extension and an antithesis to the general premise that man is of the nature of a machine, a product of the activity of the brain and as such there is no necessity to conceive of any reality like consciousness by itself.The support ideas to such a premise have elaborated more on analytical lines the explanation of the behaviour of man. Generally such considerations have led to the confrontotion with the question of "social complexity" of the present situation. On the other hand, the reaction to such studies have led to the conceptualization of human potentialities of a higher order than what can be visualized through the analytical studies of personality reactions of men which could be indicated by the "creative attitude" of men.

Social Complexity and Creative Attitude :

Anthropologists have made recourse to the study of primitive societies with the hope that such studies may yield the necessary criteria and even natural laws for understanding the more complex societies of civilized communities. However, the extension and application of principles derived from a study of primitive societies to modern conditions is beset with difficulties as is reflected in the views of Ruth Benedict, "The effort to apply the anthropological culture area in modern sociology can only be fruitful to a very limited degree because different ways of living are to-day not primarily a matter of spatial distribution."(*Patterns of Culture*, 1955, p. 166). Some psychologists confronted with the study of the "neurosis of man" being the pathological aspects of the reaction of modern society to his environment have come to regard the existence of a hard core of such attributes as basic to human nature and the heights to which man can rise to penetratingly understand the world around him would appear to be helpless when he is all the time to be confronted with the reality of such widespread pathological condition in human society.

Trigant Burrow has observed, "The problem of phylobiology is the problem of the 'I'—persona—problem of man's self. This self of man is the self of everyone. It is the self of every "you" and of every "me". For the neurosis of man is phylic, it is world-wide: and a science of human behavior is truly a science for the millions. I hope the reader begins to realize this. I hope he realizes that a biological science of the self is a science that necessarily applies to us all, that it applies to him—to his self, as it applies to my self and to every other self; that, like every

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science, the science of man is universal." (*Science and Man's Behavior*, 1963, p. 310). However, whatever may be the universal distribution of affect and prejudice in man, is his behavior delimited only to their effects in man and has he no recourse to his higher potentialities ?

Hence, we have to consider other trends in the study of man namely the now well established **Psi** phenomena connected with man. It signifies the possibility of the "creative attitude" of man in his relationship with his fellowmen. However, what can be the implications of such discoveries in resolving the social complexities of the present times is a matter for future discovery. A similar trend is that super-physical experiences could be a subject of scientific study and this has been elaborated by R. C. Johnson (*Watcher on the Hills*, 1959). Experimental work on psychic phenomena through the medium of highly sensitized persons has been in progress for many decades. While the chief merit of all such work lies in their being objective and systematic, still their application in relation to the creative attitude of man to his fellow–being depends upon the level or altruistic function to which man can be the origin and instrument of such para-normal powers and experiences. History, civilization, social movements and all results of collective human action has been studied and correlated to "love as the mysterious energy" and "creativity" as the basic trend of human effort. (P. Sorokin's publications at Harvard School of Creative Altruism). In this upward swing towards the elaboration of "creative attitude" of man being a basic factor in forwarding man's own evolution is also derived from studies on the evolutionary biology and has been very much elaborated by at least two scientists, P.T. de Chardin and Julian Huxley. Julian Huxley says, "A developed human being, as he rightly pointed out, is not merely a more individualized individual. He has crossed the threshold of self-consciousness to a new mode of thought, and as a result achieved some degree of conscious integration—integration of the self with the outer world of men and nature, integration of the separate elements of the self with each other. He is a person, an organism which has transcended individuality in personality. "*Introduction to Phenomena of Man*, P.T. de Chardin, 1959, p. 19).

Evolution and Intelligence :

Evolution can be considered from an objective phenomenal aspect as the assimilation of characters by the evolving species or individual of all that has preceeded it. In essence, a higher evolved being is the sum total of all that has gone before it, but nonetheless is not limited to that only because there is always an emergent new character in the newly evolved individual. In man, the characters that have to be taken into consideration not only relate to bodily form and function but to emotions, intelligence and his being aware of his responsibilities. In fact, by his ability to visualize his potential nature he looks into the future as well. To-day man is able to use his intelligence as an evolutionary force in controlling unbridled emotion. This evolutionary stage must have had an antecedent

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of a wide spectrum of emotional features in man ranging from what now may be considered as para normal perception of emotional reactions to slothful existence among sensual upsets. Although such a course of evolution could be inferred from present day studies of primitive societies still a direct account of such conditions having existed in earlier races of man in Atlantis and Lemuria could be found in Theosophical literature. In such a state of society, the imagery of intelligence in human self-awareness was in fact bringing into effect an evolutionary factor of the future of man into use in the present. However, that same intelligence is now proving a less efficient evolutionary force. Intelligence has spread itself among the modern races of man along channels of application in metaphysics, practical life, inferring occult influences, art and aesthetics, and in social order. But it is the very nature of intelligence that with every new discovery of its useful application, more of the disparity of the state of human being with his environment has come to light although it is also a fact that a minority few have succeded in utilising these very discoveries for integrating their state of being with the environment. It is also a special feature among evolving human being on this earth that he not only assimilates from his past, but becomes aware of his potentialities which are to become awakened in the future which are also working through him and helping him in the assimilative process. Intelligence having itself been acquired through past evolution is not able to visualize the underlying meaning and purpose of the wide range of use to which man has subjected it and has resulted only in arriving at "social complexities". Intelligence is able to discern facts especially with regard to man's nature and behaviour but is itself helpless while trying to integrate his present behaviour with the past. All his accumulated and assimilated wisdom from the past seems to stand apart from him while man tries to look at every aspect of man so bewilderingly contrasted with the other.

Depth psychology has tried to restore to the human being his lost sense of unity with himself by depicting the qualities of free flowing imagery in the Organic Psyche. Ira Progoff states, "Study in the area of personality, which carries the dynamic unfoldment of human nature, has been very largely neglected. The main reason for this, perhaps, is that emphasis has been placed upon the interpretation of symbolism, whereas symbols are the outer expression of the inner flow of imagery. Studies of symbolism have thus tended to be intellectual and analytical and have missed the dynamic quality of flowing unfoldment that is the essence of the movement of imagery in the Organic Psyche". (The Depth and Magnitude of Human Nature, *Theosophy in Australia*, 26, No. 2).

Ancient and Modern Wisdom

The evolutionary concept of man's behaviour can bring out the fact that quality is more important than quantity, the extent of assimilated knowledge rather than peripheral learning and the way one could live upto the principles rather than subscribe to the wide range of facts and so keep

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close to the current of the stream of life around him. If evolution is a fact in the life of man and all that he has learnt through formal and informal sources of knowledge should only be at variance with his behaviour then it only shows that he is partially acting his evolutionary role, that he has self delusion of remembering through a blanket thrown across his full gamut of evolved consciousness. Many of the differentiating and divisive activities of man such as the one relating to modern and ancient wisdom can have no more importance than acquiring more facts than principles. And these facts about man are to be construed only as the super-sructure of the more realistic edifice of human personality in the most comprehensive sense.

Education of Man

With the necessity of bringing into prominence of man living the future in the present, and of rending the veil that separates his accumulated wisdom through divisive importance given to quantity rather than quality the question arises as to what extent he can bring to bear these principles upon the current process of learning. This process in not only the formal educational system of the child and the youth but extends through the fruitful years of man's maturity when he can realise that he has an evolutionary role to play in the world. Although one cannot belittle the importance of giving the best of education to the child when they are best fitted to learn, still the reform of education can start with those individuals irrespective of whether they are children or adults who have intimations of playing their evolutionary role and who have the quality and will to act their role. Then our education system can be so true that it can have greater chance of permeating our whole life rather than make us strangers to ourselves when we are faced with the hard facts of life.

Recent years have seen the elaboration of "evolutionary humanism" and the possibility of formulating an educational system based on the same. Sir Julian Huxley has stated in his Fawley Foundation lecture, 1962, "He(man) is responsible for the future of the evolutionary process on this planet. Whatever he does he will effect it. He must try to understand it. He must have the positive aims of fulfilment and achievement in the realization of which he must learn to become a "responsible partner instead of an irresponsible exploiter....A humanist education must help children to develp into well-intergrated personalities and aim"not merely to by-pass frustration and overcome apathy,but also to provide opportunities for active living, fot satisfying achievement, for feeling significant; no easy task but one that must be done. "(From an abstract in *Science Group Journal*, May 1963).

In retrospect, we note that the educational system must reflect more and more of the dynamic aspects of the study of man himself and to incorporate the larger purpose of living so that on entering adulthood he may be able to be an effective contributor instead of being a helpless victim or onlooker. While the study of man can be pursued in all its

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various ramifications, it seems imperative that the principles of approach derived in one branch of such learning should be alienated and constructively discussed in any other branch of the study of man. It should also be incumbent upon each school of thought to consider how their findings shall fit into man's larger purpose of living which may be termed as the evolutionary role and to bring as much or that correlation into the educational system as possible.

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THE NEW LOGIC

CHRISTOPHER B. HILLS

THE NON LOGICAL AND NON ANALYTICAL BASIS OF NATURAL SELF-CREATING ORGANISMS

"Why call me perfect ? There is no *Man* who is perfect but the ONE that is God"
And call no *Man* your master upon earth, for only ONE is your master who is in Heaven. Neither call yourself a master, for only ONE is your master, not even Christ."

Modern analogue computers reason by proportion and have the faculty of perceiving analogies quite independent of human intervention. The analogue meaning a likeness of relations has brought about a revolution in modern science with the advent of synthesis or a "universalization", whereas traditionally and formerly it was the opposite—the method of analysis and specialization. All this development taking place in the last ten years is a result of what these machines for thinking are teaching man. Man no longer is the sole judge and teacher of creativity. They have enabled us to break through the veil which said, "All knowledge can only be known in the mode of the knower" which has caused us in the past to put such a price on the subjective "temperament" and "personality". This adjustment from the personal to the Universal is difficult, because it is an internal adjustment.

With the slow realization of minds still imprisoned in formal logic it takes a long time to see that we have now discovered the obvious—that the electro-dynamic field is inhibited by the electron which constitutes it, and vice versa. Every human system is an absorber and transmitter of energy; a miracle of electrical circuity. What we in our commission call Radiational Physics is often called "subjective physics", when it is posited against objective physics. But here we have to be careful not to get bogged down in the old logic which is based ontologically on concepts of concepts of concepts of a concept "ad infinitum" which have no basis at all in the kind of proportional reasoning done by a modern computer. Therefore we have preferred to call this new science Radiational physics.

Radiational Physics is not really new. It is more traditional than most traditionalists who do not go quite far enough back. It was familiar to the ancient civilizations of Maya, Chinese and the Indian seers who invented quadratic equations as it was to the Essenes who all made discoveries about man himself by training the nervous system itself as a tool which helped them in conjunction with the mind to reason by proportion. At

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the very heart, all thinking operations are proportional. Even the eye and hand are educated together, not in isolation.

Now it is possible for our Commission to demonstrate scientifically that the Mind and its desires can actually deflect the Random flow of free electrons in any system. Therefore it is inevitable that this ancient discovery will eventually become part of every system, however large or small. It is as inevitable as the discovery of the printing press, the wheel, the electric light bulb, or the telephone. It will lead to many fantastic-seeming discoveries such as throwing light (television pictures) onto the ionised layers of the earths atmosphere, to skywriting in semantic language which will change the thoughts and motives of men all over the globe beyond present belief. We shall soon control free-falling satelites orbiting in the vacuum of space quite easily by thoughts, because we can now amplify minute small changes in electronic potential. It is obvious that thought writing instead of typewriting will also become possible. But before we can understand this writing, a new logic will have to be developed above semantics, because the old logic completely inhibits this perfectly natural phenomena.

What has formerly been Deified and attributed only to our personal Gods will become the property of all, and spirit and prayer will become scientific reality for all, since there will be no artificial divisions between man and his maker, or the Creator and his creation, or between a man's ego and his "self".This is a big jump from our present day troubles. For most men today it seems an impossible jump, for the negative weight of the materialist hangs over the world like a wet blanket. But in fact, it is not a wet blanket but a very necessary condition for the new change to take place. In the images of the old Chinese sages the "old negative" was on the brink of becoming the "new positive" (the old Yin and the young Yang).But this will be almost impossible for some to grasp without reading the whole of the I Ching, otherwise called "the Book of Changes" or "The Book of Mutations".

Basic Assumptions :

The new electro-dynamic theories are a completely new step in our new creative direction, but they need a new kind of logic for us to understand them.The fundamental pre-supposition that a field is no more than an accumulation of its atomic parts, or that nature as a whole is in no sense a primary causal factor, has to be completely abandoned.We are obsessed with lots of little laws for special little frameworks, when in fact there is only ONE law from which all other laws stem. It is ridiculous to think that God having made a law, jumps in to the rescue of us little human beings and interferes with his own law which compensates and adjusts and balances the whole of creation in the most perfect way. He has given us the law many times; only we arrogant little men fail to work it. God and his law are not apart of the natural world any more than an artist is part of his painting. He is the whole of it at any given moment.

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He and his creation, just like the artist's painting, are aspects of the whole, just as atomic physics are aspects, just as we can break down an aspect of reality into its physico-chemical constituents. We can talk about aspects any old time, but the whole is not known, because it is a continuously self-creating ever-changing relationship that only repeats itself in narrow limited studies of its randomicity, and therefore the whole cannot be talked about. It is obvious that the reason why field-physics has supplanted Atomic physics is because of this very false pre-supposition, that the whole is nothing more than the total sum of its parts.

We have to get to the origins of this pre-supposition to understand our new logic (And it seems we must have logic which is really the slayer of the real). The Greeks thought that the continuous "field" was the causal factor which conditioned the behaviour of the atomic particles. They believed that enviroment was the deciding factor in the life of constituent component entities which are the parts which make up the wholes just as most of our orthodox sciences from psychology to physics still do to this day. But where these all differ from the **new logic** is, there was no provision in the Greek systems of logical thought relations which allowed that the particle can and does determine the character of the field. This deficiency has brought the entire world to its present impassee by rooting the psyche and thought process in a metaphysical belief in ths seperateness of mind matter ! When we can see this clearly, it is truly a miracle to fiind suddenly that a human being is completely chained in every way to the concepts which just satisfy his mind. The brain becomes a claw and fang, or a great absording stomach, which mistakes truth for that which is really only an expediency.

The Greek conception as formulated by Plato and Aristotle does give this satisfaction in the continuity or organization and the Unity to be found in mathematics and biology; it also rationalizes the field character of all natural phenomena, but it does so at a cost. That cost is so great that we have to sacrifice reality for it in order to feel comfortable. By interpreting nature as a single substance (matter) or logical system it renders "Change", all atomic behaviour, and the origin of species into meaningless isolated miraculous events so that "facts" become only a matter of personal or scientific opinion which we call a "theory" which is contradicted tomorrow. In fact, the miraculous goes on a infinitum, event by event, thought by thought, if we only had the mental microscope to see it.

To see the novelty of the new logical formulation which follows is essential, otherwise we tend to interpret it as just new names for old ideas, without realizing that these ideas are perennially new because the miracle of change is constantly making every experience of them a new experience. In the new logic the one-way relation of traditional scientific and philosophical logic has to be abandoned in favour of a two way relation. The field both determines and is determined by the particle in it. Similarly

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our own thought processes are two-way. Unless we make this change in our elemental and fundamental concepts, of nature, life, politics and education then all theories about fields, all sociology and study of social cultural patterns, all physiology and physics by reason of their "theories" become just verbal reasoning, otherwise called verbiage. Nothing is more symbolic of the tower of Babel built by men than the giant towering much room of the Atomic Bomb. Peace cannot be obtained by talks across the table which get bogged in the political and technical semantics. Both, the scientists and their political masters are not talking with anybody but only "AT" someone whose terms and definitions are accepted as valid descriptions of reality, when it is obvious by the world situation today that thy are not. But who has the courage to speak up ? No one on the political bandwagon wants to be thought "different" from the mass, and no one will risk deing called "illogical" by the parrots of someone else's logic. Where are the truly great man of our day, our sages who can solve the problems we have made for ourselves ? A wise man does not offer himself to the mass as our politicians do, in case he is rejected. He knows the fickleness of the rabble when the truth is not advantageously in conformity with traditional and fashionable norms.

Yet it is generally agreed we cannot go on like this. That we must take a great leap forward if we are to save the world. But we cannot jump six feet high by taking small one-foot leaps unless we are having a dream about the law of gravity. Our present notions about subjectivity and objectivity is such a dream for we have been trying for years to do just that. The scientific method is to work and do in little bits, yet the really valuable contributions to science have been breathtaking leaps but mostly taken from the ground prepared by previous logical postulates on which the whole scientific edifice is built.

The new logic is such a leap,except we go back further to where men went wrong. From there we must cartainly train for the leap in stages, we must prepare our muscle and train our minds and bodies for the great leap. But the whole leap we discover is 6 foot high, not 6 times one foot high.

One could say today we are prisoners, weighted with the chain and ball of the formal logic of the Greeks. However far back we go, or however far abvanced our techniques of logic are, they are still grounded in the same metaphysical outlook which one takes for guanted; this is especially true of the time-hallowed discrimination between subject and object. We accept this distinction in everyday life,because it makes clarification easy and consequently many of our scientific advances can be attributed to the clarification of this two way principle we call "matter" and"form",the subject and object,the Mind and Matter,etc.Always this has been expressed in the past philosophies and ideas by the identification of "thought" with "Being" which has led to self-identification with or rejection of one or the other in varying degrees.But as long as our logical

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endeavor is orientated to this identification, we can never speak of self-confrontation instead of self-identification. We can never come to the "new logic" even when it is born out in everything we do, and think. Though most people do conceive that there is something meaningful in the idea of "thought-object,' as being **identical with itself** (self-identification) and therefore capable of isolation, it is quite obvious that we can only isolate that which we know about. There are many variables we don't know about, around every entity, and therefore we cannot isolate them.

The new studies of self-creating organisms in Bionics (defined as the science of man-made devices which function in lieu of, or simulate the characteristics of living systems) and the study of automation and self-organising systems with the giant computers of Cybernetics, all show us that we must now go beyond these primordial components of 'reality".

Yes Easy To Say On Paper, But How ?

We are having to use words which are concepts which are supposed to have generally agreed definiton as to their meaning. But life is not lived according to definition and in any case the meaning in the dictionary are not static but in a constant state of revision and change. Yet we humble mortals are for ever pulling greater men down to our level by demanding strict definitions. Some say a true prophet never speaks clearly,but to other prophets he may be only too crystal clear.They say if you want to understand esotericism you have to be an esotericist and certainly only an astrologer can understand astrology. We are no different as scientists or politicians or theologians as long as we speak in words. Our difference if any might be one of spiritual pride—the worst sin of all, and the most evil of all.

The old traditional system including Einstein's formulation that Energy may be converted into Mass and Vice Versa did not provide for the conversion of thought in matter, or meaning into energy. In this system of thought which culminates in the time-space continuum our brain is scientifically and logically a **physical** system largely unknown but in which we know events take place that produce a phenomenon we call meaning, consciousness or self-awareness. This very thought makes us retreat into theology whether it is fact or not, and we begin to talk of "soul", spernatural spirit and immediately assume that Matter, Energy and Mind are only a mere transitory'relation. Yet If we were really immersed in the "spirit" or as the Indians say "in the mother" then like a fish swimming in the sea it is so normal we would not be conscious of it, until it was suddenly withdrawn. This seems to be born out by all our greatest mystics who go beyond such dualisms as spirit and matter when they lose consciousness of the individual "self" and become immersed in the universal self. Certainly all our greatest have regarded themselves as mere instruments in the hands of a higher power. On the contrary side

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of logic, none of these men have assumed that Matter, Energy and Mind are transitory relationships but have always claimed they are ONE and the same which completely defies all logic and sets off all sorts of argument about the meaning of what they did and didn't say.

Any search for a formula governing relation between these three elements of reality from the viewpoint of our two valued logic (which is divided between subjective and objective events) is obviously an insane occupation. The very structure of logic itself implies that we are here dealing with a metaphysical belief in two worlds of Being—the verbal and the **real**, whereas we are dealing with the unity of the universe as a **whole** not an analysis of it.

The reason why a percipient and thinking ego is met no-where in our objective world picture is because it is itself that world picture. It is what we call the **Whole** and so cannot be contained in it as a part of it.

In the new logical system we have found that what we formerly called logical thinking can be done much faster and better by analogue computer. By studying the "feedback" loop (our own nervous system is one) in self-organizing cells we can see how nature adjusts to itself in terms of relationships. This avoids all our scientific terms and definitions which have developed on a logical basis and retain a semantic ambiguity, and so they don't have to be accepted as absolute objectivity or absolute subjectivity. What a great liberation this is. It is a pair of wings to soar with !

This new science starts from the self-awareness of the whole rather than the isolation of an object. This brings great psychological pressure in anyone who has made up his mind by the old logic, and it means to many the complete rethinking of everything they ever thought. But happily it is a great relief for as long as self-reflection is regarded as something mystical and super-natural it is hopeless to look for a logical system that will describe its structure. But now we can study self-reflection in embryonic organisms by the use of electronics, it is time for the public to begin thinking of a new logic, a complete break-through into the application of these techniques to cultural patterns, improved government and decision making, ethical counseling, and compress the time scale of millions of years of human cosmic evolution into 50 years

It is inevitable and natural that the traditionalist, not familiar with cybernetic theory, will think all this new disturbing topsy-turvying of presently acknowledged values is not a correct jumping off point for our leap towards the new changes and new concepts; but actually nothing is new if we go back far enough. Circular Causality, just another name for feedback", just another name for self-adjusting systems was known to Goethe the founder of modern scientific thought and method, and before him the ancient Chinese set it all out simply in the I Ching so that Confucius, who wrote Great Commentary on the I Ching incorporated into it all his wisdom and ideas of "Government by the sage", could be saying with all prophets who talk out of the past "what is new and unfamiliar may just be a bit older than Ecclesiastes".

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New Books :

REVIEWS :

B. G. Teweri : *Secularism and Materialism in Modern India*, University Reader in Philosophy ,Jabalpur University published by Jabalpur Co-operative Printing & Publishing society Ltd; Number of pages,354. Price Rs. 10,00

This work, as its name suggests,is a critical and comparative study of scular and materialistic tendencies in Indian Philosophy. The author has traced the development of materialism—from Chārvāka of old right upto the present-day Indian exponents of Marxism like M. N. Roy and others. He has pointed out the shortcomings of Secularism and suggested its cure in the orthodox Hindu ethics with its ideal of Spiritual Perfections or Moksha. He has made a bold attempt to vindicate the importance of the ancient Vedic ideology of Varnashrama Dharma and its utility at all times. The book is a storehouse of useful information, arranged under suitable heads and presented in a lucid manner. It will not only be helpful to teachers and students in Universities but also prove popular among the general readers interested in Ethics and Social Philosophy. Dr. Tiwari deserves thanks for having made a valuable addition to the stock of philosophical literature by bringing out this book which will be highly appreciated in academic and literary circles.

Harimohan Jha

H. Stuart Hughes. *History As ArtAnd As Science.* New Yrok. Harper & Row. 1964, Pages 107 $ 3.95

Professor Hughes, the well known Harvard historian and author of *Consciousness And Society*,believes history conceived as both art and science is committed to a critical revaluation of social and political trends in the new World Age;that modern mind in transition is reaching toward a wider social unity of thought.

A generation ago History was,more often than not, the Cinderella of disciplines relegated to some tranquil course oriented not to science but to literature. The growing affiliation of History with social science and research in anthropology in Professor Hughes, opinion makes it an intellectual adventure giving the student the feeling of sharing with science great discoveries that are changing the whole conception of man. Perhaps no one has illustrated this so well as he does in this recent volume of essays.

This outstanding study of History as both art and science, twin vistas on the past , is published as volume Thirty-two of WORLD PERSPECTIVES,a series pointing to a reality only partly revealed by science.

Bernhard Mollenhauer

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BOOKS ALSO RECEIVED :

Ananda Coomaraswamy : *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism*, University Books, Inc. 1601 Jericho Turnpike, New Hyde park, N.Y., U.S.A. pp.408 Price $ 10.00.

Beatrice K. Rome: *The Philosophy of Malebranche* , Henry Regnery Company , 14 E. Jackson Blvd. Chicago 4, I11. (U. S. A.) pp 438 , Price $ 12.50

T. W. Rhys Davids (translator) : *The Questions of King Milinda* in two parts, Dover Publications, Inc. 180 Varick Stree, New York 14, N. Y. (U. S. A.) pp.302 & 388 . Price $ 2.25 each.

James Legge (Translator): The Sacred Books of China *The I Ching* Dover Publications, Inc. 180 Varick Street, New York 14, N.Y. (U. S. A.) pp. 448, Price $ 2.45.

H.Kern (Translator):*Saddharma-Pundarika or The Lotus of the True Love*. Dover Publications Inc. 180 Varick Street, New York 14, N.Y. (U S.A.) pp. 454, Price $ 2.45.

S.Ghosh: *A Short History of Western Philosophy*, Bookland Private Limited, 211/1, Cornwallis Street, Calcutta -6. pp 212, Price Rs.10/-.

S.Ghosh: *Handbook of Philosophy of Religion*, Das Gupta & Co.Private Ltd. 54-3, College Street, Calcutta 12. Price Rs. 7.00

Satis Chandra Chatterjee: *Classical Indian Philosophies: Their Synthesis* in The Philosophy of Shri Ramakrishna, University of Calcutta, pp. 152, Price Rs. 5.50.

A.B.Shah: *Scientific Method*, Allied publishers Private Limlted, 15 Graham Road, Ballard Estate, Bombay 1. pp. 122, Price Rs.8.00.

Hari Mohan Jha : *Bharatiya Darshana Parichaya* [Parts I & II] [NYAYA DARSHANA and VAISHESHIKA DARSHANA], Pustak Bhandar, Patna 4, pp. 240 and 218. Price Rs. 7·50 each volume.

Jean Brun : *La Main Et L'esprit*, Presses Universitaires de France, Boulevard Saint--Germain, Paris (1963) pp. 108, 176 F. 14.

Yves Sjoberg : *Pour Comprendre Delacroix*, Beauchesne, Paris. pp 230.

Diderot : *Tratado De Lo Bello*, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Facultad de Humanidades Ciencias de la Education, Instituto de Filosofia, Textos y Traducciones 2, pp. 120.

Emilio Estiu : *Del Arte A La Historia En La Filosofia Moderna*, (Address as above) pp.250.

Prem Nath : *Towards Universal Humanism*, S. Nagin & Co., Partap Road, Jullundur City, pp, 32, Price Rs, 2·00.

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J. P. Atreya
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DEDICATION

THIS ISSUE OF THE *DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL* IS MOST RESPECTFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF LATE DR. NANDOR FODOR, WHO WAS ONE OF THE EDITORS OF THE JOURNAL FROM ITS VERY INCEPTION, WHO WAS A REGULAR CONTRIBUTOR TO IT, AND WHO MADE LASTING AND VALUABLE CONTRIBUTIONS TO PARAPSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS BY WRITING VALUABLE BOOKS, AND WHO WAS A PERSONAL FRIEND OF EDITOR DR. B. L. ATREYA, SINCE 1943, WE PAY HOMAGE TO HIS MEMORY AND CONDOLE WITH THE WIFE, DAUGHTER, AND GRAND-DAUGHTER OF LATE DR. NANDOR FODOR WHO PASSED AWAY ON THE 17TH MAY, 1964.

PROF. J. P. ATREYA
Managing Editor 'Darshana International'
Moradabad (India)



Biographical Sketch : (1895-196) Dutch Born Psychoanalyst and Parapsychologist. He was practicing Psychoanalyst and licensed psychologist, Member of the several Psychological Associations. obtained LL. D. Degree in 1917 from the Royal Hungarian University of Science : Author of a large number of books on Psychoanalysis, Psychology and Psychical Research (Parapsychology) among which are : *New Approaches to Dream Interpretation, Haunted People, The Haunted Mind, On the Trail of the Poltergeist, The Encyclopedia of Psychic Science, Dictionary of Psychoanalysis* and *These Mysterious People*. Regular contributor to a large number of International Journals. Was member of the Editorial Board of *Psychics International* and *Darshana International*.

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EDITORIAL

The Fourth East–West Philosophers' Conference

A great cultural and academic event has recently taken place at Honolulu in the island of Hawaii, which for many reasons is called the Paradise on earth. It was the 4th East-West Philosophers' Conference. The venu of the East-West Conference does not change like the venues of all other international conferences such as the International Congress of Philosophy or the International Congress of Psychology, which keep on changing with every session. The previous three East-West Philosophers' conferences were also held in Honolulu. The main reason is that the East-West Philosophers' Conferences are very much unlike other International Conferences. The latter have a permanent World Organization with paying membership extending all over the world. The East-West Philosophers' Conference has no membership fee and is not widely open to anybody who pays any membership fee. Unlike other Conferences it was held for full six weeks, and all those who were invited to attend it were paid their boarding and lodging expenses by the organisers of the Conference. As the membership of this conference was not by subscription,all those who attended the Conference had been selected and invited by the Managing Committee. Formerly the East-West Philosophers' Conferences were held at the interval of 10 years but this time it was held after an interval of 5 years. The business people of Honolulu and Hawaii Island contributed liberally to make the conference success and not to let the academic organisers of the conference worry about the finances of the conference.The conference was held under the auspices of the East-West Centre at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu. The East-West Centre is a great section of the University of Hawaii in which the sciences and technologies of the West and religions and philosophies of the eastern countries, China, Japan, India and Arabia are studied by students hailing from all over the world, and in which numerous high rate scholarships are provided. It has got two very big dormitories, one for men and and the other for women, called the High Rise and the Low Rise Dormitories. The former is 13 stories high, and both are provided with modern and up-to-date equipment. There is a big Cafeteria situated between the two, in front of a very big Kennedy Lecture Theatre.

The idea of having an East-West centre and an East-West Philosophers' Conference originated with the young looking and enthusiastic grand old

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man Prof. Gregg M. Sinclair, who was the President of the University of Hawaii for many years and is still connected with the University of Hawaii in several honorary capacities. Despite his old age in which he is kept healthy by the care of his young and pretty wife. He is very agile and active and takes keen interest in everything connected with the East-West centre. He attended all the meetings and all the functions of the Conference. The next important man, and in some respects, the most important, in connection with the East-West philosophers' conference was Prof. Charles A. Moore. He is the man who has been organising and holding the East-West conferences, and supervising the School of East-West philosophy. He was the Director of the Conference in whom almost all the powers in connection with the Conference were vested. In 1947 Dr.Charles A. Moore came to India and particularly to the Banaras Hindu University to study Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy. He was closely associated with the Department of Philosophy there which was then headed by Dr. B. L. Atreya and with Dr. Radhakrishnan who was then the Gaekwad Professor of Indian Culture and Vice-Chancellor of the University. On his return from India Dr. Moore introduced the study of Indian and Comparative philosophy in the University of Hawaii and worked vigorously for a comparative study of Eastern and Western philosophy, and invited many eminent Indian, Chinese and Japanese Professors to teach the philosophies of their countries at the University of Hawaii comparatively with those of the West. He started a journal of East-West Philosophy. He has also organised so far 4 East-West Philosophers' Conferences, the proceedings of the three of which have already been published, and those of the fourth are soon going to be published. The work of Dr. Moore has been appreciated both in the East and in the West. It is he and he alone who has proved to the world that there are no fundamental differences in the thought of the East and the West. All kinds of philosophical outlooks have been developed both in the East and the West. Any particular system of philosophy is not peculiar to East or West and no particular system is the monopoly of the East or the West. Idealism, Spiritualism, Realism, Positivism, Theism, Atheism, Pantheism, etc. are found in both the East and the West. On the basis of thought alone the division of the East and the West is invalid. One cannot characterise the East and the West with any particular philosophical, doctrine or attitude. These are some of the great ideas of Dr. Charles A. Moore. And it cannot be denied that the future culture of the world which entire humanity will share should be built on the basis of such an attitude or outlook. Thus Dr. Moore is one of the greatest contributors to the oneness of the world which we badly need in the field of culture as in other fields. His name will go down in history of the world-culture as one who strived utmost and rightly and nobly to bridge the wide gulf between the East and the West, and as such, is one of the greatest benefactors of humanity. He is

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no longer an American or a Westerner, but a man of the world and a forerunner of the type of thinkers that the world will have in future when the division of the world into East and West has become obliterated and belief in it an anachronism.

Honolulu is perhaps the best and and the most suitable place where such a great cultural work could be done. It is a place where the East and the West actually meet. It is a place where Asians and Caucasians, Europeans, Americans, Chinese, Japanese, Indians and Hawaiians, Whites and Negroes meet freely and mix with one another without any reservation; where men and women are more free to mix with one another and are less conventional than perhaps anywhere else in the world; where the climate is temperate and congenial throughout the year; where the planes, mountains and the sea meet and vie with one another in manifesting their grandeur and beauty; where all religions are freely propagated and practised without any mutual animosity; where one can roam about at any time of the day or night without and fear or risk; where there are plenty of things to eat,where there is neatness and cleanliness all around; where all people are welcome everywhere; and where there are no gate tickets even to night shows of dancing and drama; where every man and woman is eager to meet, talk, befriend and oblige every other. This town is situated midway between Tokyo and Los Angeles or San Francisco, one expressing in the best of Japan, the most advanced country of the East today and the other of California the most liberal state of America. Taking all its advantages into consideration, Honolulu is indeed paradise on earth. Blessed indeed are the people who live there and to same extent even those who have visited it.

The University of Hawaii is perhaps one of the best and most catholic universities of the world. It is very extensive and students from many Asian countries flock to it particularly to specialise in Botanical and Agricultural subjects. The dress of students both male and female, and particularly of the latter is the simplest and scantiest I have ever seen at any university, but very neat and clean. So also that of teachers. Perhaps temperate climate and closeness to nature (gardens mountains, and sea) are responsible for it. Indian girl students and wives of Indian professors and visitors in their colourful *saris* greatly add to the beauty and grandeur of the atmosphere of the University. Employees in all the offices of the university, who are mostly girls and women are well-behaved, sweet-tongued and obliging. They know how to perform their duties with utmost care, zeal and sincerity. Professors of the University work very hard and do not waste their time during the working hours. People in Hawaii eat well, work well and enjoy well. On Saturdays and Sundays all departments are closed except for those scholars who voluntarily want to work in the laboratories on their research projects. The East-West philosophers' conference could not be held at a better place than Honolulu and the University of Hawaii there.

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The 4th East-West Philosophers' Conference was held from the 29th June to the 8th August, 1964 under the auspices of the East-West Centre of the University of Hawaii Honolulu. Dr. Charless A. Moore was its Director. Those who attended it and participated in it comprised of 5 kinds of members, namely, Honorary Members, Panel Members, General Members, Student Members, and Associate Members. Of the 5 Honorary members only two could attend it, namely, Dr. T. D. Suzuki, Professor Emeritus, Otani University, Kyoto, and Dr. Gregg M. Sinclair, President Emeritus University of Hawaii (of whom we have spoken above).

How the work of the conference proceeded and what business was carried on there will be described in the next article.

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THE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT VERSUS THE SOCIALLY IMPORTANT

HENRY WINTHROP

The volume of output in the social and behavioral sciences is increasing by leaps and bounds. The development of statistical method has been, perhaps, a major factor in making possible what might be called assembly-line technique in the production of such research. If procedure can be canned, as it were, the rise in research productivity is inevitable. Because of this rise in research output, certain questions are, perhaps, in order. Is there any possibility that canned procedures may lead at times to their misuse ? Is it also possible that the rise in output may reflect to some degree a failure to discriminate between **what is worth researching** and **what can be easily researched ?** The present paper represents an effort to stress some considerations which may have a bearing on the answers to these two questions.

SOME QUESTIONABLE USES OF STATISTICS

There is a strong tendency in the social and behavioral sciences to accustom the student to use statistics and statistical theory **woodenly.** This passes for critical methodology in some quarters. Human populations are treated like items in the urn of nature. The fact that psychological and social characteristics change in the course of time so that extrapolations into the future may—unlike the case of billiard balls in an urn—not refer to a population possessing the attributes it possessed earlier, is frequently blithely neglected. The fact that in much of the research in the social and behavioral sciences, the research worker uses an **accidental sample** and that he often cannot be sure whether the characteristics of that sample are also the characteristics of the **parent population,** is also quite often overlooked.

An accidental sample is one consisting of subjects at hand, without any certainty as to what their shared characteristics are and whether these characteristics—whatever they may prove to be—would also be found to belong to the parent population. Thus, for example, sophomores in one's classes constitute an accidental sample. The investigator cannot be sure just what their **shared** characteristics are, apart from the common label "sophomore" attached to them as an artifact of educational arrangements. To make matters worse what is the parent population ? Is it all U. S. sophomores, sophomores only in institutions in a certain region of the country, sophomores only in the colleges and universities of the same State, middle-class sophomores, sophomors whose mean gradepoint average is the same as that of the accidental sample, etc ? It is from results with accidental samples such as this one that we

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frequently encourage decision-making and policy-formation in the social sciences. It is a risky habit and, if it has to be endured, the undergraduate working on a **project** should be made very self-conscious about it.

Much more,of course, can be said about the wooden and uncritical way in which the student is encouraged to use statistics. Hogben,[1] Chein[2] and others, have written about this. Hogben has gone so far as to say that much of the work done in the social and behavioral science areas should be junked for reasons such as those mentioned, and that research scientists in these areas should start over again. The point, however, is that this wooden use of statistics continues because of what Sorokin[3] refers to as "quantophrenia" and "metromania." Those who carry on in this uncritical fashion, probably feel that they are doing worthwhile scientific work if their labors prove to be grist for the statistical mill. If they are aware of the limitations of sampling theory for human populations, this is not very evident from their willingness to pile up research trivia which no one may use but which can support the desired self-image that one is truly performing scientific labors.

The folly which is inherent in this wooden use of statistics, has been amusingly and succinctly described by Halle[4]. An American professor is describing the **actual manner in which much of academic research is guided.** He is talking to a Professor Pluvis who hails from a mythical Utopia named Sedge. The American professor speaks to Pluvis,as follows.

> "...The basic process of higher education among us, I reminded him, is not mere talk but the conduct of research. The student is assigned a topic that has never before been thought worth ressearching. He proceeds to accumulate source-materials, whether historic documents, woodcock's nests, or diseased pig-livers. These he studies minutely making notes of his observations on cards five inches high and twelve inches wide. When fifteen hundred cards have been accumulated he shuffles them, cuts, and is ready to compose his final paper. The contents of the cards are put together in a continuous text, followed by the appendectal material. This material consists of the contents of the cards in tabular form and in graphic form. Next a set of conclusions is composed with reference to the tables: as, for example, that the number of stalks of timothy grass used by woodcocks in the construction of their nests is .47 per cent greater in nests found between sea-level and three hundred feet than in nests between three hundred and five hundred feet, although the author regrets that the series on which he bases his findings is not large enough in the upper category to justify considering them altogether final. He acknowledges gratefully the pioneer work done by Zipkin and Schroeder on the variability in the length of the timothy stalks used.

1 Lancelot Hogben. *Statistical Theory*.New York Norton, 1957. 510pp.

2 Isid or Chein. *An Introduction To Sampling*, Appendix B. In *Research Methods In Social Relations*.(Claire Selltiz, Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch and Stuart W. Cook, editors), New York: Henry Holt, 1959. 622pp. Publisged For The Society For The Psychological Study of Social Issues.

3 Pitirim Sorokin. *FactsAnd Foibles In Modern Sociology And Related Sciences*. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1956. 357 pp.

4 Louis Halle. Sedge. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1963.118 pp.

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The final step is to compile his bibliography by adding the one contained in Zipkin and Schroeder to the one in Dennison and Stumpf eliminating duplications.

Then ?

Then, I said, the student presents the completed paper to his professor for criticism and grading. It makes no difference that the professor has never studied woodcocks' nests himself because in research what counts is not content but methodology, vocabulary, and scholarly apparatus. The professor looks first at the bibliography, noting with approval that it is longer than either Dennison and Stumpf's or Zipkin and Schroeder's. He looks at the tables in the appendices to see if they represent the approved forms of presentation. He glances over the conclusions, noting that the usual expression of regret that the series on which they are based was not larger has been included. (This qualification of the quantification shows the student's scientific rigor.) The professor then runs his eye over the introductory paragraphs on methodology, checking the vocabulary to make sure it is all there. Finally, he notes that the body of the text is 123 pages long, that the time on his watch is 5:07 P. m., and that he had better be starting home if he is going to get any gardening done this evening. 'Excellent,' he writes on the title page, adding: 'There might have been a more rigorous analysis of Slobdoff's methodology but I agree.' (The professor is always careful not to say what he agrees with.)

Then ?

I told Pluvis that, if the budget allowed and if the proper acknowledgements had been made in the front-matter (words to the effect that the student couldn't have done it without the inspiration of the professor), the paper is then published, complimentary copies being sent to the author's associates, to persons who he thinks may offer him a job, to the learned journals, and to a list of libraries who can be trusted to mention its receipt in their bulletins, giving prominence to the name of the institution in which it has been produced. Otherwise the ribbon-copy and one carbon are deposited in the library of that institution and it is listed in circular material so that it will be included in the bibliographies of students elsewhere.

I was able to inform Pluvis that, in the continental United States alone, 823,541 such dissertations were being produced per year, contributing 87.4 per cent to a total annual growth of university libraries of 16.3 per cent, a figure that, in addition to compounding the principal every year, had itself been increasing at an average annual rate of 1.7 per cent for the past five years.

In response to Pluvis' next question I had to tell him that no one read these research papers, that their only purpose was the training of students in the methodology and vocabulary of research to the point where they could obtain the degrees necessary for professional careers in the teaching profession." (pp,81-83)

The point of all the preceding is this. Most educational programs today which feel any necessity to justify themselves, do so in terms of the assertion that they are trying to develop in the student the habit of critical thought. At the same time most educational institutions set great value upon research in the social and behavioral sciences. This is not

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lost upon the undergraduate. But any educational program anywhere can make sincere references to the fact that it proposes to inculcate the habit of critical thought. Will, however those operating under this educational banner, themselves be critical of the wooden way in which a student is encouraged to use statistics, gather his samples and extrapolate from them ? If they are not, what will be the value of all the training in the field or laboratory ? The practises in one area of an educational program can then give the lie to the objective in another—namely, training in critical thought and insight.

None of the foregoing remarks should be taken to indicate a failure to recognize the importance of field work and laboratory work. That students should be given an understanding of how difficult it is to discover facts and how difficult it is to organize them so that they answer the questions we pose, cannot be denied. The manner in which this is done, however, can degenerate—if not handled properly—into a mere worship of technique for the sake of donning, metaphorically speaking, the mantle of science. One sometimes wonders which would contribute most to undergraduate understanding of method—a careful classroom anaysis of the methods by which certain great discoveries were made, both in the natural and the social sciences, or forcing the student to devise for himself some experimental design in connection with a project. The former approach could, of course, always be supplemented by a course in **Independent Research** or could be enriched by any research undertaken at the graduate level.

Finally, even if research techniques and the importance of methodology are transmitted in a desirably critical fashion, there is still a danger that a distortion of intellectual perspective and social values may result. This danger may inhere in any educational program which gives its clientele the distinct impression that the **most important value** which education can provide is **research** and that the rest of the curriculum, so to speak, is window-dressing for the mind—a mind which is providentially expected to be both technical and technocratic. What we have to be concerned with is that the emphasis on research does not lead to the imbalance just mentioned. With a staff of instructors whose intellectual interests are electic and who are strongly affected by the values of a liberal education and the humanistic traditions, this imbalance can probably be avoided. The risk of imbalance, however, is always present and should we fail to avoid it, the human product of our educational efforts is likely to be something we did not bargain for. What we are likely to get is best expressed in the words of C. Wright Mills[5]. Speaking of Ph.D's who have had their educational outlook confined pretty largely to an emphasis on research, Mills says

"I have seldom seen one of these young men, once he is well caught up, in a condition of genuine intellectual puzzlement. And I

[5] C. Wright Mills. *The Sociological Imagination*, New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 1956. 234 pp,

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have never seen any passionate curiosity about a great problem, the sort of curiosity that compels the mind to travel anywhere and by any means, to re-make itself if necessary, in order to **find out**. These young men are less restless than methodical; less imaginative than patient; above all, they are dogmatic—in all the historical and theological meanings of the term. Some of this is of course merely part of the sorry intellectual condition of so many students now in American colleges and universities, but I do believe it is more evident among the research technicians of abstracted empiricism.

They have taken up social research as a career; they have come early to an extreme specialization, and they have acquired an indifference or a contempt for 'social philosophy'—which means to them 'writing books out of other books' or 'merely speculating'. Listening to their conversations, trying to gauge the quality of their curiosity, one finds a deadly limitation of mind. The social worlds about which so many scholars feel ignorant do not puzzle them.

Much of the propaganda force of bureaucratic social science is due to its philosophical claims to Scientific Method; much of its power to recruit is due to the relative ease of training individuals and setting them to work in a career with a future. In both instances, explicitly coded methods, readily available to the technicians, are the major keys to success. In some of the founders, empirical techniques serve an imagination which, it is true, has often been curiously suppressed, but which one always feels to be there. When you talk with one of the founders you are always dealing with a mind. But once a young man has spent three or four years at this sort of thing, you cannot really talk to him about the problems of studying modern society. His position and career, his ambition and his very self-esteem, are based in large part upon this one perspective, this one vocabulary, this one set of techniques. In truth, he does not know anything else.

In some of these students, intelligence itself is often disassociated from personality, and is seen by them as a kind of skilled gadget that they hope to market successfully. They are among the humanistically impoverished, living with reference to values that exclude any arising from a respect for human reason. They are among the energetic and ambitious technicians whom a defective educational routine and a corrupting demand have made incapable of acquiring the sociological imagination. One can only hope that when sufficient numbers of these young men reach the associate professor level of their careers, they will by some intellectual mutation become aware of the fact that they are no longer dependent upon emperors without clothing." (pp. 105—6)

Any effort to add to Mills' remarks would be superfluous. They deserve a decided "amen" ! or, if we may be permitted to lapse into a Biblical code, "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."

AN ALTERNATIVE STYLE IN RESEARCH

There are, of course, approaches to research other than those which involve aggregate modes of analysis of which the statistical is but a single variety. One such style involves an empasis on achieving an understanding of a complex phenomenon without trying to break it down into what is assumed to be manageable proportions. In other words the

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researcher need not succumb to the lure of a reductionistic approach. In the reductionistic style we try to make an analysis of artificial segments of a complex phenomenon. These segments are, of course, the work of the human mind. We then attempt to synthesize the results of these several, partial analyses. In this way the researcher hopes to arrive at a set of generalizations from which all the conclusions of the partial analyses are seen to be derivative. Where the researcher shies away from the reductionistic style and seeks to understand a complex phenomenon by concepts or themes which are presumably **directly** applicable to it, we have the expression of a contrast between what might be called the global versus the piece-meal approaches to research.

Sorokin[6] has referred to the holistic attitude in research as a search for the meaningful-causal relationship. Mills[7] expressed all this in another way, in his recognition that there were two styles of social research—the macroscopic and the molecular. Those who use the macroscopic approach deal with total social structures and generalised types of historical phenomena in a systematic way and make liberal use of evalution and interpretation. Its examplars are Weber, Marx, Simmel, Mannheim, etc. The moleculer approach is characterized by its usually small-scale problems and by its generally statistical models of verification. It is said that the more socially or politically significant our problems and work, the more macroscopic they tend to be. Mills, like the classic figures in sociology, preferred to work in the macroscopic manner. He recognized, however, that a balance is needed between the two styles.

Mills, himself, recognized the great value of the statistical tool as a device both for confirming large-scale generalizations and for checking the implications which the **total social structure**, to use his own expression, possessed for any limited area of observation contained within it. Essentially, however, he emphasized that a complex social phenomenon could best be understood without breaking it up into artifacts for the convenience of the human intellect. Mills was willing to take phenomena as he found them. He was willing to recognize the rich diversity of institutional and group expression to which essentially the same social processes lent themselves. He believed, however, that this diversity could best be understood by means of unifying or intellectually integreting divices. He was thus, in effect, plumping for an interdisciplinary approach to the social and behavioral sciences.

There are, of course, many meanings to the term "interdisciplinary." However, in most interdisciplinary education the relative emphasis is on obtaining a broad-gauge perspective and a genuine understanding for the phenomena being studied. The achievement of these goals is more important in undergraduate education than the acquisition of research skills.

[6] op. cit.

[7] Mills, C. Wright. Two Styles Of Social Science Research. *In Power Politics And People.* (Irving Louis Horowitz, Editor) New York : Ballantine Books, 1963, 657 pp.

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The latter should, of course, be encouraged, but as something **subsequent** to perspective and critical appreciation of the complex nature of structure in behavioral and social phenomena, rather than as a **substitute** for these. Let me then provide five briefly stated descriptions of what would constitute examples of interdisciplinary approaches in undergraduate education, which are likely to furnish the type of perspective and appreciation we are after.

1. A major use of the term, "interdisciplinary", refers to the use of one or more concepts which are consistently employed to achieve a **technical** integration of phenomena and problems in several, traditional disciplinary fields. Thus Kuhn[8], making use of 5 key concepts has tried to unify **structurally** the concerns of several of the behavioral and social sciences. The set of key concepts which this author employs are the following : **transactions, organizations, transformations, decisions** and **communications**. In so doing this author has produced, perhaps, the first, real interdisciplinary text to date.

2. A second, major use of this term is parallel to the above and identical with the type of **integrative** concepts which Mills characteristically employed. In this second mode, the concepts employed are used to achieve an **interpretive** integration of diverse phenomena and problems, rather than a **technical** integration. One or more key concepts may be consistently employed in order to interpret a variety of social pathology. Thus the Josephsons[9] have used the concept of **alienation** to interpret a variety of phenomena which the sociologist will usually classify as examples of **social disorganization**. They have done this by editing a group of selections which bring together phenomena usually allocated to such areas as psychology, psychopathology, sociology, economics, political science and international conflict. Instead of providing the reader with the standard and highly variable professional explanations of these disparate phenomena, however, they are all profoundly illuminated in terms of the single concept of alienation.

The key concepts most frequently employed for interpretive integration are the following : **identity, alienation, anxiety, anomie, mass culture, bureaucratization, dehumanization, depersonalization**, etc., Ruitenbeek[10] points out that "increasingly and especially at the undergraduate level, American universities have been offering integrated social science courses", using materials which involve the use of key interpretive concepts of this sort.

3. A third use of the term, "interdisciplinary", refers to the use of **major themes** rather than concepts for **interpretive** purposes. A typical

[8] Alfred Kuhn. *The Study Of Society : A Unified Approach*. Homewood, Illinois : The Irwin-Dorsey Press, 1963. 810 pp.

[9] Eric and Mary Josephson. *Man Alone*. Alienation in Modern Society. New York : Dell Publishing Company, 1962. 592 pp.

[10] Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek. *Varieties Of Modern Social Theory*. New York : E. P. Dutton, 1963, 434 pp.

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example of this type of interdisciplinary effort is the work of Bonner, Hill and Wilber[11]. These authors have made an effort to unify a variety of phenomena in several of the social sciences by employing 5 major themes of unification. These themes are the following : **divided personal loyalties, industrialism, urbanism, bureaucratic organization** and **international rivalry.**

4. Interdisciplinary effort may be achieved **technically** through the apparatus of mathematical and logical modes of intensive analysis. There are a number of technical interdisciplinary modes of analysis presently used in both research and formal education. One of the more prominent of these is **General Systems Theory** (GST). Concepts from GST are used to show the extent to which structural similarities permeate a wide variety of phenomena in a large number of the traditional disciplines. To give one example, the economist, Boulding[12], has experimented educationally with a course in **General Systems** to honors seniors. The following description will indicate the nature of such a course. It is taken from the prospectus prepared by Boulding for this course.

> "The object of the course is to examine the general structure of theoretical systems in many different branches of learning, with a view to establishing relationships among the theories which pertain to various empirical subject matters. By so doing it is hoped that the student will come to appreciate certain basic unities which underly the universe of knowledge.
>
> The following is a tentative list of topics to be included :
>
> (i) Basic system concepts : sets, variables, relations, functions, equilibrium, dynamic solutions, entropy, information, etc.
>
> (ii) Static structural systems. Patterns, polyhedra, chemical formulae, valency, crystal lattices, topographic systems, architectural structures, organization charts, etc.
>
> (iii) Simple mechanical systems. The pendulum. The solar system. Elementary field theory.
>
> (iv) Cybernetic system. Servos and feedbacks : homeostasis.
>
> (v) Growth systems Relations of growth and form. Principle of returns to scale. Production functions. Economic growth models. Learning models.
>
> (vi) Social and economic systems. The price system. Role systems. Organization theory. Decision theory. Theories of history.
>
> (vii) Symbolic systems, Ethical and aesthetic systems. Religious systems.
>
> I do not propose, of course, to cover the whole field of knowledge in a single semester, and many of the above topics will be skimmed lightly. There will, however, be opportunity for a student to do special work in his own field of competence....."

[11] Thomas N. Bonner, Duane W. Hill and George L. Wilber. *The Contemporary World.* The Social Sciences In Historical Perspective, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1960. 594 pp.

[12] Kenneth E. Boulding. *Prospectus.* General Systems. (Economics 198) Given in the second semester, 1958-59. University of Michigan. Mimeographed.

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Any glance at the topics listed under (i) through (vii) above, will make it abundantly clear how powerful a tool GST is for interdisciplinary understanding.

5. An important type of interdisciplinary effort is one which frankly seeks to relate problems of fact and theory, on the one hand, with problems of value, on the other. This type of interdisciplinary effort looks for the **connections** between facts, theories and problems of social or personal value. It does not make the mistake of **interjecting** considerations of value into questions of fact or theory. It is, however, deeply concerned with establishing a constant dialogue between the research findings of the several social sciences, on the one hand, and specific social issues, problems of social value and social philosophy, and problems of public morality, on the other. This type of dialogue is, of course, seen in the work of such men as Mills.[13],[14] Likewise Riesman, together with several fellow social scientists, does this quite consistently in the journal, *The Correspondent*, whose subtitle is, in fact, "Critical Dialogue And Research On Home And Foreign Affairs." Many other distinguished social and behavioral scientists could be mentioned, whose work is characterized by the type of interdisciplinary effort which is unashamedly willing to face the larger questions of social value and public morality. Little would be gained, however, in mentioning an appropriate roster of such names here.

I venture to suggest that a balance in research outlook is likely to be attained if the researcher makes use of both statistical method as well as one or more interdisciplinary approaches to those matters which are daily grist for his professional mill. Even more importantly, a program of education, whether at the undergraduate or graduate level, which explicitly employs one or more interdisciplinary approaches in the classroom, can probably help in preventing the student from using statistical tools unimaginatively. Even more than this, interdisciplinary perspective should increase the ability of the student **to distinguish between the statistically significant and the socially important.** Surely this is a consummation devoutly to be wished, for when the capacity to discriminate between the statistically significant and the socially important has actually been achieved, clearly, we have enabled the student to exhibit that **critical thought** which is a major idol of most programs of education.[*] As educators, can we ask for anything more important than this ?

[13] See (1), C. Wright Mills. *The Power Elite*. New York : Oxford U. Press, 1956. 423 pp; (2), C. Wright Mills. *The Causes Of World War Three*. New York : Simon And Schuster, 1958. 172 pp; and (3), C. Wright Mills. *White Collar*. The American Middle Classes. Oxford U. Press, 1953. 378 pp.

[14] For an interesting sidelight on the mainsprings of action which characterize Mills' work, see the following : Irving L. Horowitz. The Sociological Imagination of C. Wright Mills. In Memoriam. *The American Journal Of Sociology*, Vol. 68, No.1, July 1962. 105-7.

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THE PROBLEM OF PREDICTION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Wm. BRUCE CAMERON

A recurrent harrassment to social scientists is the smug comment: "But, after all, no one can ever really tell what people are going to do next—you just can't predict human behavior." It would be tedious to recount the rejoinders: for many years there has been a running battle between social scientists and laymen over this issue, expressed in continually varying language to deceive the enemy. As a card-carrying social scientist I do not want to be accused of delivering up our fortress to Phillistines, but I think we might well declare armistice long enough to take a guided tour around the old place.

For many people prediction, or the lack of it, has been an article of faith, a shibboleth separating the scientifically elect from the unscientific damned. By now, however, there is enough genuine evidence for us to replace faith and belief with cool appraisal. In the early days of social science great promises were made about the prediction and control of human behavior. Today we are about as well off in this respect as meteorologists,to name another group of hard-working and often disparaged scientists. That is to say, meteorologists today can do a somewhat better job of forecasting weather than can bright farmers,and sociologists are a little more credible than bright newspaperman. In both fields, the gain has entailed elaborate machinery and cautious investigation. Both fields now employ considerable mathematization of data and require electronic processing equipment to digest it.

Mathematics offers improvements and extensions to intuition. Through its meticulous procedures men of mediocre ability may be able to arrive at results which only a genius would reach without mathematical aid.[1] And in situations where a genius may intuit a fact and be able to demonstrate it in common language, mathematics of a suitable kind will offer a more elegant proof. There are even some discoveries which are made through mathematics, but this does not assert that all the operations of genius are mathematical, or can be reduced to dependable and transmissible operations.

It is difficult to describe people mathematically. In the early putatively-scientific days of sociology two refrains were chanted: "We are still a young science" and "Further research is needed." Both are true but trivial; they do not in themsleves account for our troubles. It becomes clear as our science ages (we have buried the pioneers) that something

[1] Polya, *Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning*, Princeton, N.J., : Princeton University Press, 1954, (two volumes),

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different is involved, and this may in a manner of speaking be the essence of life itself. Even if we could establish all the parameters we wish, we might still be unable to predict an individual human event.

Prediction is a variously used word, but however it is defined it always involves somebody saying that something will happen before it actually does. There are various levels and kinds of predictions, each with different basis and different uses. Statistically trained persons may try to assemble these into a scale of confidence, but I would argue that they are really different in kind, and that the sources and the applications are logically bound to differ. Four levels may be termed the possible, the plausible, the probable, and the certain.

The most elementary prediction is a statement that an event is possible. One experience is sufficient to permit such a prediction. If it **has** happened, it **can** happen. Conversely, we cannot state that something is impossible unless we have exhausted all of the events. The impossible is 1 minus the possible. This may seem silly, but it has profound consequences. Only in a completely closed system can one say what is impossible, whereas people try to make such statements all the time about human beings, with embarrassing results.

The mere fact that an event has been observed does not mean that we know anything about how it is related to other events, nor, for many purposes, do we need to. We need no understanding of meteorology to say: "Take a raincoat—it might rain." The level of prediction called the possible requires only a knowledge of events that are known to occur.

To argue that something is plausible, on the other hand, does not require any evidence that the event in question has occurred. The addition of such evidence to the argument is superfluous. Plausibility is a quality of relational statements, and relations are always inferential, although we may feel confident of their "existence" when we can demonstrate the effects they imply. Plausibility is achieved through a knowledge of relations which logically imply an event. Where the possible is established by a datum, the plausible is established by an argument, inferring relations among previous data.

Are some things more plausible than others ? This seems reasonable, but confusing. Either it suggests a range of plausibilities (really a kind of probability of things being plausible), or else it proposes some step between the implausible and the plausible. While this is difficult to argue clearly, it makes sense to most of us intuitively. We might profitably distinguish between **casual** plausibility and **formal** plausibility.[2]

By casual plausibility I mean relations which can be perceived without much special training or equipment and which can be expressed in plain language. By formal plausibility I mean relations which do not assert themselves to the naked eye, relations which may appear only as the result of special techniques of investigation, or of manipulative

[2] See Polya, op. cit., Vol. II, Chapter XV,

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description,such as factor analysis or analysis of variance. Whereas many people regard the results obtained from these two statistical techniques as a kind of end statement of the significance, or importance, or even probability of events, at least some statisticians[3] will say that this is really just the beginning of research, and only identifies relations which must be studied under greater control before much predictive value is found.

It goes almost without saying that we might generally place more credence in formal plausibilities than in casual ones, but this in no way assures that they are in fact correct. Most of the basic laws in every science were found by simple, usually single, observations. Where bright intuitive men direct the search for plausibilities, interesting inferences are drawn and subsequent testing establishes the existence of useful laws. Where dullards drag mediocre data through formal processes of inference, little emerges. It can be argued persuasively that the painstaking statistical research in the social sciences has contributed less to our understanding of behavior than the shrewd observations of a few gifted individuals. Plausibility does not stem from data,but from inferences about data;however,the formal processes of inference in turn produce nothing that is not implicit in the data to which they are applied. So for as the overall aims of science are concerned,plausibility is a step along the way,as possibility is, and there are other steps which follow.

At the point where one may properly use the word "probable," we must have knowledge of some relations, and of a great many events. There are technical attempts to reduce the "great many" to more economical size, but these need not concern us here.[4] All statistical predictions are basically actuarial, and achieve their success as they approximate Bernouilli's theorem: the greater the portion of the universe of events we know the more precise is our description of the distribution of their characteristics. The simplest kind of statistical prediction occurs when the events can have two characteristics, and we are able to say in what ratio they will appear.[5]

It should be understood that you can only get out of statistical procedures the same order of information that you put into them. If your input deals with the behavior of large numbers of people, the output is similarly defined. If, in the past, about half the babies have been boys, then in the future we should expect half to be boys, but this does not mean one of your two children. There is absolutely no way statistically to tell what any one man will do on the basis of what many other men have done.

Any individual, concrete, empirical experience is obviously part of the possible, and any man is justified in predicting that what has happened can happen. The crude empirical error, which has many names, is to

[3] Charles C. Peters and Walter R. Van Voorhis, *Statistical Procedures and Their Mathematical Bases*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1940, pages 357.

[4] See, for example: Abraham Wald, *Statistical Decision Functions*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1950.

[5] For a careful elaboration, see Roy G. Francis, *The Rhetoric of Science*, Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1961.

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assert that our personal experience is the equivalent of the world. "Old man Noah knew a thing or two; because he knew a thing or two he thought he knew it all." A subtler and thus more annoying form of this is the attempt to use limited empirical knowledge to contradict general statistical statements. This is what sociologists often call the "Aunt Emma"argument. When a sociologist tells an audience,"In a recent study of five thousand families it was found that 14 per cent of the women did thus and so," someone is very likely to speak up, "But that just can't be true, because my Aunt Emma doesn't !"

The arguments which once sought to establish a special place for clinical, or idiographic, or individual case study predictions seem somewhat puerile today. Whether one predicts the behavior of a man or of a group of men, he does so on the basis of previous observations, always operating under similar restrictions. Claims about the special effectiveness of individuating studies and the so called technique of *Verstehen* can be dismissed today both on logical grounds and on the practical failure to demonstrate advantages.[6] In a three year classical psychoanalysis, a great many observations can be made and many plausibilities and even some casual probabilities may bs assembled, but a clinician does not seem to get more out of a single observation than a statistician does.

Whether there can be a statistical treatment of an individual depends upon the level of abstraction employed. Strictly speaking, there cannot be; but if you are only using the word 'individual' as a shorthand way of saying "the class of actions in which I am interested, all of which have been performed by a single human being," then statistical methods apply. The important point to remember is this: you are still dealing with a large number of events. The mere fact that these events share a common locus in Mr. Jones does not mean that you can make a concrete prediction of what Jones will do the next time out. What you may say is: "In the past, Mr. Jones has performed these acts under these circumstances in these frequencies,and therefore it appears most likely that with respect to Jones in these circumstances these acts will appear in these frequencies again." Lest anyone wonder, it should be stated that in addition to systematic procedures and subtle arguments,statistical predictions include an implicit act of faith, in this case the faith that Jones has not appreciably changed since our previous observations. There are also some other acts of faith,but this is not the place for an exegesis of statistical texts.

The remaining category of predictions is that of the certain.Whereas the possible may be predicted on the basis of one event, the certain requires knowledge of all events. Whereas the plausible and the probable require knowledge of some relations, the certain requires knowledge of all relations. 'Certain' predictions, in short, may be made only within a completely closed system.

[6] See: Theodore Abel, "The Operation Called Verstehen," *American Journal of Sociology*, 54, 1948, pp. 211-218. Reprinted in Herbert Feigel and May Brodbeck, *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts,1953, pp. 677-687.

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Are there any closed systems ? Logically, **certainly**; experimentally, **approximately**; "really", **who knows** ?

Ohm's law works well most of the time. Gravity is fairly dependable if we rule out wind resistance, magnetism, and other nuisances. We cannot say the same of predictions about love, war, or other major human problems. Whatever else history teaches, it argues strongly that just repeating the process of human life does not bring us measurably closer to the actual solution of its basic problems, although we do in time identify, and thus in the first sense (the possible) we "predict" solutions. It is fair to say that we now have technological solutions for every major problem involved in just living on this earth and a few of the problems of living elsewhere, but this does not permit a plausible prediction that they will be enacted, or a statistical probability of enactment, and nowhere near a certainty.

The biggest nuisance in the prediction of human behavior inheres in the behavior of human beings themselves. All of human existence is described by the same characteristics which make social sciences so very difficult. People are physical objects, but they may not be merely physical objects. They cannot violate physical laws, but they can do things which are not described currently by physical laws. People are logical, but they are not merely logical; and when they are logical they do not necessarily operate in accord with a simple two-valued "yes-no" logic. The "logic" of human behavior is perhaps more nearly approximated by the unlimited (we must hope not infinite !) number of sets between a Boolean 0 and a 1. Logicians are beginning to set forth the rules of multivalued logics, and this may be the way science must eventually go.

There is a lively interest today in the simulation of social behavior by mechanical, or partially mechanical means. The most elaborately instrumented perhaps is the Monte Carlo technique, in which numerous probabilities are combined in long time runs by a digital computer. This sort of approach far outstrips our paper and pencil mathematical analyses, at a great saving in time of calculation, but with considerable surrender of the decision process from the scientist to the machine. Not all scientists regard this as an advance.[7]

It should be recognized that digital computers are fundamentally two-valued thinkers. That is to say, their elemental "brain cells" are either off or on. This in turn means that simulations based on them are basically two-valued also, although the switching decisions may simulate such small increments of the total system as approximate a continuum. Much more will be done before we exhaust the capabilities of the machines and their programmers. However, it is not just an idle observation that the machine is basically a yes-no machine, because so also is classical logic, and so is most formal logic, but it remains uncertain whether man himself is. Some researchers argue that human nerve cells are binary,

[7] See: Roy G. Francis: *op. cit.* See also Norbert Wiener, *Cybernetics*, second edition, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1961.

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but we must admit that right now we know more about electronic calculators than human brains.[8]

In thinking about this world, man is always selective, and his basic selections are not so much deduced as asserted. One assertion concerns the amount of behavior which one regards and tries to predict. There are no natural "bits" of behavior,as there are conveniently bits in some other scientific fields. Behavior is an on-going process, and while there may be good arguments for chopping it at certain places for purposes of study, such chopping is an intrusion. Sometimes the way the problem is posed suggests how the data should be grouped, sometimes the theory preceeds selection of the data; mere custom or "force of habit" may lead us to see some articulations and ignore others.

Whether you choose a wave or point theory in physics depends partly on your problem. Whether you think you are dealing with sets or single events depends partly on what you call "one." Whether you have discrete or continuous measurements may depend more on the way you go about measuring than upon what you measure. What is molar to one man is molecular to another, and so on. There is a fundamental choice required in social sciences concerning what is most useful, the most understandable, if you insist, the most "real" unit of behavior.

Probably most people regard behavior as some kind of action which involves one skinful of human. A few will argue that unless this has some effect on other humans it is not truly behavior, and a few others will argue that it is also possible for only a part of the human to behave. Suppose we briefly chase this problem both ways.

Historically, when psychologists felt uncomfortable with a whole human being they tried to reduce him to parts, such as perception, emotion or the patellar reflex. The parts have been selected and described in various ways, and only rarely has a genuine anatomical division been made, surgically at least. It might seem that by reduction we could avoid complications, get rid of large unwieldy masses of events and get down to the simple, single individual, atomic essence. Much has been accomplished through the reductionist approach, but not this. The smaller units are themselves complex, variable, and often experimentally indeterminate. Perhaps we just have not gone down far enough? Let us then become biologists, and then biochemists, and finally nuclear physicists. The appearance of the problem keeps changing, and we lose some troubles and acquire others, but we never seem to find any clear fundamental units, if by units we mean something like marbles. When the physicist casually describes subnuclear particles as being inferential, and mathematical, we throw up our hands in horror —perhaps we should have started the other way.

Well, to be brief about it, that road has not gone anywhere in particular either, although the scenery has been different. Some of the

[8] See: John von Neumann, *The Computer and the Brain*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958.

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Gestalt thinkers had read a little physics, and knew that the physicists had not yet found their marbles either, so in a rather sophisticated way they said "Why try?" Since the physicists had apparently concluded that they were dealing not with objects so much as fields, perhaps social scientists should search for their own fields. Fields are pleasant to wander in, but that is about all the field theorists did. The concept is appealing, even occasionally has some metaphoric use, but has not materially advanced our understanding. There is now strong reason to suspect why.

The field concept is more sophisticated than the notion of one billiard ball bumping another, but it carries its own restrictions, although they are rarely acknowledged in print. The essential one is that once you set about to describe a field, you assume that all of the objects, points, foci, or whatever which are in the system affect each other in prescribed ways. The ways may be very complicated, and the interactions both subtle and gross, but they do interact. If a planet is part of a gravitaional field, it cannot secede. Gravitational influences do not go on and off like a light. In short, if something is part of a field, it must behave as part of a field, however demanding this may be. It cannot exercise choice, it cannot invent new rules, and it cannot make mistakes. All of these things human beings do. Thus it does not solve much just to assert that a human being is interacting with others in a social field. About the time you look for him to interact, he may leave, or day-dream, or go to sleep.

If you can experimentally close up the system, and raise the intensity of the parameters around a man so as to increase the signal-to-noise ratio, you will limit the variability in his behavior. This is done in military basic training, operant conditioning, and in other forms of brainwashing, but even here a few individuals get lost, go A. W. O.L., commit suicide, or flunk out. All you have done is to increase the probability of events for a class of persons, and field or no field, you still have not predicted the individual man's behavior, or an individual human event. Most of these thorny problems seem to stem from the fact that human beings can perform **new** acts, and all theories are hard put to account for this. All of the dispositional concepts, such as tendency, attitude, character, basic personality structure, and the rest, are attempts to limit the kinds of new (previously unreported) acts which an individual might perform.

In simple repetitive situations we do not need these ideas, and they may even get in our way. Our best predictor of what a man will do is simply what he has been doing. But we usually want to know more than this, and we realize that situations change, so we invent something to go between past observations and expected future actions which we hope will account for changes: changes in the situation as it exists, the situation as it is perceived, the internal economy of the person himself, and his own groping understandings and hopes. This is a very large order, imprecisely specified, and consequently only approximately attainable. The fact that such "explanations" provide indifferent success and partial satisfaction leads us to continue using them. However the vagueness of the original

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specifications makes it difficult to tell how well we are doing at any time, and we can thus over-convince ourselves of the success of one theory or the failure of another in such a way that a crucial confrontation of conflicting explanations becomes impossible. At this point, the choice among explanations is often crudely pragmatic at the level of "taste."

This prolem of choice in explanations is posed both for the layman and for the scientist, although the basis of "tastes" and the safeguards in their expression differ markedly. Both the scientists and the layman can predict some human behavior, at some levels. And for either, pessimism or overconfidence about the predictability of man's behavior probably reflects insecurity.[9]

Most of our affairs run reasonably well. We know what to expect of others much of the time,and study increases this knowledge. We continue trying to predict, because in being human beings here is apparently one case where we as a species have no choice. A man get drunk, or go mad or die, but the species keeps trying to sharpen prediction. In fact, this kind of observation about behavior may be the strongest available argument for a vitalism of some kind, but it is of course far short of Bergson's *Elan Vital* or Kierkegaard's theological broad-jumping.

One need not assume that the only value of a science lies in its success in predicting events. Indeed, we have greatly increased our understanding, which is to say the number of perceived relations, in some areas where prediction has hardly improved at all. Aesthetic, moral, and other value-based arguments might support the need for social science even if prediction were poorer than it is.

What most laymen actually demand when they request prediction is the "certain" prediction attainable in closed systems. However, what they bring as pre-conditions are not closed systems at all but only casual observations of possibilities. Far too often, what social scientists attempt to do is to apply their knowledge of plausibilities, or perhaps statistical probabilities, to these individual cases. They might be wiser to imitate physical scientists who regularly disdain to offer practical advice, but somehow this seems harder for the social scientist to do. Most of us feel obligated to prove that we know something, and we too often try to prove this by attempting to predict events under circumstances in which the best we can offer is a general forecast, or a partially educated guess.

Hopefully, a clearer recognition of what prediction entails will enable both laymen and scientists alike to appreciate what we can have, and to avoid the disappointment which follows asking for too much.

[9] Statisticians often speak of Type I errors, or errors of rejecting a hypothesis when it is actually true, and Type II errors, or accepting a hypothesis when it is actually false. Various measures are designed to reduce one or the other error, but as might be expected, it is difficult simultaneously to reduce both. For discussion, John Ernst Freund, *Modern Elementary Statistics*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960,

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INDIAN ANALOGIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLOTINUS

CEDOMIL VELJACIC

The results of a recent research by J. Filliozat[1] have reopened the discussion of possible Indian influences on Plotinus. The present paper is not based on such investigation of historical documents concerning the extent of any specifically determinable sources. Its aim is to give a doxographic analysis with a particular stress on its methodological aspect. On the actual level of historical investigation a **doxographic analysis** of any particular subject from the viewpoint of comparative philosophy should be considered as partial and restricted as long as an investigation of objective historical circumstances by the method of **chronological documentation** can be reasonably postulated, as in our case. The two methods and their fields of research being essentially different and independent from each other, the final aim of producing a coherent and synchronized unit of philosophical actuality in comparative philosophy cannot be attained any longer by a **global** analysis of ideas essential for the **immanent** structure of a **closed** system of thought. Results that can be obtained by doxographic analysis—and in questions of essential philosophical interest only by it—will contribute to the formation of a valid basis for further investigation only if in applying this method special attention is paid to such comparative elements that may facilitate, or at least do not ignore, parallel researches in the field of chronological documentation, and *vice versa*.

In this sense the following doxographic analysis of the Plotinian philosophy has been thematically determined by methodological motives.

I

In comparative studies of analogous or common elements pertaining to separate systems of thought special attention should be paid to **imaginative aspect** of their structure. Its constituent part in the representation of intellectual contents cannot be reduced to the logical value of a symbolic **form** alone. In comparative philosophy the imaginative contents, representing an idea in its sytematic explication, have an incontestable though not exclusively determinant value particularly in cases where the hypothesis of actual, indirect or direct, contacts or influences may reasonably be postulated, as it is assumed in the motives of such analogies with Indian views in the system of Plotinus.

In the following I shall try to demonstrate three specific types of

[1] "*Les relations exterieures de l'Inde*", 1, 2, "*La doctrine brahmanique a Rome au IIIe siecle*"—Pondichery, Institut francais d'indologie, 1959.

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analogies in imaginative complexes on three characteristic examples.

The first type of analogy can be termed "accidental". Its form is more that of a metaphor than of an allegory. Such is the comparison of the body with a garment in a series of homologous metaphors by which Plotinus explains the theory of the soul's reincarnation, proceeding from the same metaphysical and psychological assumptions as can be found in the *Bhagavad Gītā*. The illusory nature of sense appearances and the imperturbability of the spirit are particularly stressed thereby.

Analogies of the second type are the most valuable and the least frequent. There the imaginative representation is connected with a deeper analysis of some specific philosophical theory, whereby a detailed elaboration of the imaginative side is required, parallel to an extended deduction of ideas, while the basic image becomes naturally enlarged by other more or less accidental associations. Such is the deduction of the principle of identity of Being and Consciousness, explicated by the symbol of the tree to which Plotinus reverts on several occasions, mainly in his *III Ennead*. The same magnificent simile holds the central place in the deduction of Uddālaka's principle *tat tvam asi* in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.

As an example of the third kind of analogy the Plotinian theory on the hypostases (especially in the *V Ennead*) will be compared with the teaching of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Some details of this analogy have been already elaborated by S. Radhakrishnan[2]. The peculiar feature of this analogy consists in the fact that here, as in many other Vedāntine texts, the Upaniṣad's teaching contains an analysis of the state of dream, though not as an aspect of representation or as a simile within a complex of intellection, but as its immediate object of study. We do not find any such **analogy in the object** in Plotinus, though it is not difficult to find in the *Enneads* either similar theories or imaginative equivalents of the dream **as a simile** in some specific sense. A doxographic analysis of the Plotinian theory on the dream in view of the elements elaborated in the upaniṣad would therefore not bring us to a negative result. However, an **integral analogy** of essential comparative elements cannot be traced in Plotinus. It could only be **reconstructed** for the purpose of an ideal, but not of a representational doxographic analogy.

The examples mentioned above as characteristic for each of these three types of analogies are elaborated accordingly in the following chapter.

II

The simile of the garment appears often in Indian texts dealing with the theory of reincarnation. In the following analogy it is connected with the central idea of a deduction comparable to the interpretation of Arjun's moral problem in the second *adhyāya* of the *Bhagavad Gītā*. It

[2] "*The Principal Upaniṣads*", London, 1953, p. 699-705.

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is the problem of the moral attitude toward mutual annihilation of living beings in their struggle for life and in war.

Bhagavad Gītā, II :

12. But not in any respect was I ever not, nor thou, nor those kings; and not at all shall we ever come not to be, all of us, henceforward.

13. As to the embodied soul in this body come childhood, youth, old age, so the coming to another body; the wise is not confused herein.

15. For whom these contacts do not cause any waver, the man to whom pain and pleasure are alike, the wise, he is fit for immortality.

16. Of what is not, no coming to be occurs; no coming not to be occurs of what is; but the dividing-line of both is seen, of these two, by those who see the truth.

18. These bodies come to an end, it is declared, of the embodied eternal soul, which is indestructible and unfathomable. Therefore fight, son of Bharata !

19. Who believes him a slayer, and who thinks him slain, both these understand not : he slays not, is not slain.

22. As leaving aside worn-out garments a man takes other, new ones, so leaving aside worn-out bodies to other, new ones goes the embodied soul.[4]

Plotinus, Enneads[3]

III, 2, 4 :

In the immaterial heaven every member is unchangeably itself for ever; in the heaven of our universe, while the whole has life eternally and so too all the nobler and lordlier components, the Souls pass from body to body entering into varied forms.

and, when it may, a Soul will rise outside of the realm of birth and dwell with the one Soul of all... .. for life here is a thing of change; only in that prior realm is it unmoving.

III, 2, 15 :

This devouring of Kind by Kind is necessary as the means to the transmutation of living things which could not keep form for ever even though no other killed them : what grievance is it that when they must go their despatch is so planned as to be serviceable to others ? Still more, what does it matter when they are devoured only to return in some new form ? It comes to no more than the murder of one of the personages in a play; the actor changes his garments and enters in a new rôle.

[3] Quotations from the *Gītā* are, in general lines, taken from F. Edgerton's translation, Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 38, Cambridge, Mass., 1944. Those from Plotinus follow St. Mackenna's translation (London 1917-1930). In both cases slight changes have been made where they deemed necessary to the author, mainly for terminological reasons.

[4] For the comparison with the actor cfr. *Sāmkhya-Kārikā*, 42 :.....*prakṛter vibhutayogān natavad vyavatiṣtate liṅgam.*

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23. Swords cut him not, fire burns him not, water wets him not, wind dries him not.

24. Not to be cut is he, not to be burnt is he, not to be wet nor yet dried, eternal, omnipresent, fixed, immovable, everlasting is he.

25. Unmanifest he, unthinkable he, unchangeable he is declared to be. Therefore knowing him thus thou shouldest not mourn him.

26. Moreover, even if constantly born or constantly dying thou considerst him, even so, thou shouldst not mourn him.

27. For to one that is born death is certain, and birth is certain for one that has died. Therefore the thing being unavoidable, thou shouldst not mourn.

28. He is not born, nor does he ever die; nor having come to be, will he ever more come not to be. Unborn, eternal, everlasting, this ancient one is not slain when the body is slain.

30. This embodied soul is eternally unslayable in the body of everyone, therefore all beings thou shouldst not mourn.

31. Having regard for thine own duty thou shouldst not tremble; for another, better things than a fight required of duty exists not for a warrior.

33. If thou this duty-required conflict wilt not perform, then thine own duty and glory abandoning, thou shalt get thee evil.

Men directing their weapons against each other—under doom of death yet neatly lined up to fight as in the pyrrhic sword-dances of their sport—this is enough to tell us that all human intentions are but play that death is nothing terrible, that to die in a war or in a fight is but to taste a little beforehand what old age has in store, to go away earlier and to come back the sooner.....For on earth, in all the succession of life, it is not the Soul within but the Shadow outside of the authentic man, that grieves and complains and acts out the plot on this world stage... ..

III, 4, 3 :
The dominant (δαι,μωυ) is the prior of the individual spirit; it presides inoperative while its secondary acts.

III, 2, 15 :
To handle austere matters austerely is reserved for the thoughtful : the other kind of man is himself a futility. Those incapable of thinking gravely read gravity into frivolities which correspond to their own frivolous nature.

III, 2, 8 :
.....And both one day stand girt and armed. Then there is a finer spectacle than is ever seen by those that train in the ring. But at this stage some have not armed themselves—and the duly armed win the day. Not even a God would have the right to deal a blow for the unwarlike : the law decrees that to come safe out of battle is for fighting men, not for those that pray.

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38. Holding pleasure and pain alike, gain and loss, victory and defeat, then gird thyself for battle : thus thou shalt not get evil.

III, 2, 13 :
Those that have unjustly killed, are killed in turn, unjustly as regards the murderer but justly as regards the victim, and those that are to suffer are thrown into the path of those that administer the merited treatment. It is not an accident that makes a man a slave; no one is a prisoner by chance.....for in very truth this ordinance is an Adrasteia, Justice itself and a wonderful wisdom.

39. This mental attitude has been declared to thee according to the *sāmkhya* teaching : but hear it according to the *yoga*, disciplined with which mental attitude thou shalt get rid of the bondage of action.

III, 2, 10 :
Given the starting Principle, the secondary line, no doubt, is inevitably completed, but each and every principle contributes towards the sequence. Now, Men are Principles, or, at least, they are moved by their characteristic nature towards all that is good, and that nature is a Principle, a freely acting cause.

50. The disciplined in mental attitude leaves behind in this world both good and evil deeds. Therefore discipline thyself unto discipline (of the *yoga*). Discipline in actions is weal.

51. For the disciplined in mental attitude, action-produced fruit abandoning, the intelligent ones, freed from the bondage of rebirth, go to the place that is free from illness.

III, 1, 10 :
Unwisdom, then, is not due to the Soul, and, in general, if we mean by Fate a compulsion outside ourselves, an act is fated when it is contrary to wisdom. But all our best is of our own doing : such is our nature as long as we remain detached. The wise and good do perform acts; their right action is the expression of their own power.

It may appear, if we confront the intellectual condensation of ideas in both texts, that a more concise and explicite formulation was attained in the Gītā than in the selection from Plotinus. This impression is due mainly to a greater extension of the chapters on Providence wherefrom the fragments from Plotinus have been selected. The criterion applied for their selection required that single phrases or parts of phrases should not be dismembered from their context nor bereft of their primary meaning in the quoted passage. At the same time an integral representation had to be obtained with special regard to its imaginative components, consisting not only of a poetic metaphor, but implying the entire situation analogous to the epic motive of war as it is reflected in the Gītā. The ideal adequacy of some particular elements will, therefore, find a better expression in connection with some other subsequent motives.

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The comparison of the above texts can also be extended in order to disclose a peculiar difference in their theoretical contents. From the view-point of the Indian theory of *karman* it may be noted that Plotinus' arguments to the same effect appear more coherent and specific than those professed by Kṛṣṇa in the same connection. The critical moral situation faced by the author of the Gītā amidst a waged war determines a radical idealistic solution of the problem of action, a solution that will become typical for the later *vedānta*. There is a tendency in this passage of the Gītā to eliminate the deeper ontological sense of the theory of *karman* and to concentrate on a radical solution of the problem of causality—its abolishment by liberation achieved in the *yoga*. Plotinus, on the other side, stressed with more intensity different implications of the idea that "all our reasoning on these questions must take account of previous living as the source from which the present takes its rise". Thus "the quality now manifested may be probably referred to the conduct of a former life" (III, 3, 4). Similarly, the very wrong of man by man may be derived from an effort towards the Good; foiled, in their weakness, of their true desire, they turn against each other: still, when they do wrong, they pay the penalty...for nothing can ever escape what stands decreed in the law of the Universe" (III, 2, 4).

In the Gītā an issue from this unavoidable situation of the human character is searched in metaphysical cognition which, in the teaching of the *yoga*, can be interpreted also as a marked act of violence against our mundane nature[5].

Plotinus remains satisfied with a poetical metaphor on the harmonious beauty of the universe : "Just so the Soul, entering this drama of a the Universe,making itself a part of the Play,bringing to its acting its personal excellence or defect, set in a definite place at the entry and accepting from the author its entire rôle—superimposed upon its own character and conduct—just so, it receives in the end its punishment and reward" (III, 2, 17). The same view-point is not at all unfamiliar to Indian metaphysics. In our time it was stressed particularly by Rabindranath Tagore who tried, in his *Sādhanā*, to deduce it from old vedāntine antecedents. It may be noteworth to mention that Shri Aurobindo in his immanent analysis of the Gītā, commenting the passage X, 18, came to the following conclusion[6]. Here the Gītā points at something that it does not express explicitly though it is often found in the upaniṣads and was developed later on, in a greater intensity of vision by viṣṇuism and *śaktism* : the Joy Divine, a joy that man can reach in his mundane existence, the universal *ānanda*, the play of the Mother, the sweetness and the beauty of God's *līlā*."

[5] Cfr. *Katha Up.* II, 3, 17 .....*tam svāc charīrāt pravṛhen muñjād iveṣīkam dhairyena.*

[6] The quotation is retranslated from the French version of Anilbaran Roy's "*The Message of the Gītā as interpreted by Shrī Aurobindo.*"

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Although Plotinus comes back in various connections to the moral aspect of the struggle and war, his argument remains concentrated just on this aspect whose importance in Indian literature, particularly in post-epic hinduism, was enhanced by the *vedānta* teaching on the illusory nature of the world *(māya-vāda)*.

The cult of beauty was pointed out in this connection by Radhakrishnan in the early *upaniṣads* and even in the discourses of the Buddha. Thus, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (IV, 4, 4) we find the simile: "And as a goldsmith, taking a piece of gold turns it into another, newer and more beautiful shape, even so does this self, after having thrown away this body and dispelled its ignorance, make unto himself another, newer and more beautiful shape like that of the fathers or of the *gandharvas*, or of the gods or of Prajapati or of Brahma or of other beings."

In an analogous meaning the simile of the garment can be found in other parts of the *Mahābhārata*: "Who goes over to yonder world must take off his body as a garment. Then, his soul becomes transparent from all sides to the penetrating eye of knowledge" (VII,321,54).—P. Deussen singled out the analogy of this quotation with Plato's *Gorgia* (523 E).

This is also the meaning in which the analogy reappeares in *Ennead* I (6, 7): "Therefore we must ascend again towards the Good, the desired of every Soul. Anyone that has seen This, knows what I intend when I say that it is beautiful.....To attain it is for those that will take the upward path, who will set all their forces towards it, who will divest themselves of all that we have put on in our descent: so, to those that approach the Holy Celebrations of the Mysteries, there are appointed purifications and the laying aside of the garments worn before, and the entry in nakedness—until, passing on the upward way, all that is other than the God, each in the solitude of himself shall behold that solitary-dwelling Existence, the Apart, the Unmingled, the Pure.....the Source of Life and of Intellection and of Being."

In this passage the metaphor of the garment appears as a less important detail if compared with the central motive where the principles of Intelligence and of Being are identified with the idea of Good and of Beauty. The postulate of their ideal harmony had been formulated by Plato, while several allusions to a harmonious trinity can be found in Plotinus. The quoted description brings us near to the idea of the supreme trinity, formulated in the mentioned frame of later vedāntism as *sat-cit-ānanda*. This formula, expressing the ideal state of mind, had not yet attained its final shape in the older *upaniṣads* nor in the *Gītā*. However, the notion of *ānanda* appears there whenever Being (*brahman*) and Consciousness (*ātman*) are identified by the upaniṣadic sages.

At the beginning of his first treatise on Providence (III, 2, 1) Plotinus establishes the following "relationship" of the same three attributes: "Intelligence or Being constitutes the authentic and primal Kosmos. This contains within itself no spatial distinction, and has none of the

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feebleness of division.....In this Nature inheres all life and all intellect, a life living and having intellection as one act within a unity : every part that it gives forth is a whole; all its content is its very own, for there is here no separation of thing from thing, no part standing in isolated existence estranged from the rest.....Everywhere one and complete, it is at rest throughout and shows difference at no point. There is no action of one part upon another; there can be no reason for changing what is everywhere perfect. Why should Reason elaborate yet another Reason, or Intelligence another Intelligence ? A power of producing by the Self is not indwelling to absolutely perfect beings. Beings produce and move themselves only by reason of some failure in quality. Those whose nature is all blessedness have no more to do than to repose in themselves and be their being.....But such is the Blessedness of this Being that in its very non-action it magnificently operates and in its self-dwelling it produces mightly."

The first identification is that of Intelligence and Being. Also in the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* the identification of *brahman* and *ātman* is the basic postulate. This identical Being (*sat*) is the essential Truth (*satya*) of the universe, it is the First (*pūrva*), Inextended (*avyakta*), Undivided (*advaita*), so that it can be said: "*sa eṣo'ṇimā aitad ātmyam idaṁ sarvam, tat satyam...*"

In the explication of the idea of unity and of perfection of the intelligible world the most important detail for our comparison is the insistence, on both sides on its immovability and immensurability. The richest choice attributes designating these absolute qualities can be found in the quoted analogies from the *Gītā*. In II, 24, it is called "fixed, all-pervasive, constant, immovable, eternal" (*nityaḥ, sarvagataḥ, sthāṇur-acalo'yam sanātanaḥ*). It is obvious that the definition of the irrational character of the Absolute, mentioned in the next sentence of the *Gītā* (as *acintya* but *viditvā*) will possibly be no less explicit in the *vedānta* than in the Plotinian metaphysical construction. Let us remember *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (1, 3, 10-11): "Beyond the senses are the objects, and beyond the objects is the mind; beyond the mind is the intelligence, and beyond the intelligence is the great self. Beyond the great self is the unmanifest; beyond the unmanifest is the spirit (*puruṣa*). Beyond the spirit there is nothing; that is the end,that is the final goal."—According to Yājñavalkya(*Bṛh.*IV,5,15) the transcendence of the supreme principle of intelligence becomes evident in the impossibility of its positive definition: "That Self is (to be described as) 'not this, not this' (*neti, neti*)...Indeed, by what would one know the knower?"—"This eternal greatness of *brahman* is not increased by work, nor diminished" (id. IV. 4, 23).

In this imperturbable integrity of Being and Intelligence is contained the supreme Bliss of the *vedānta*. The most condensed expression of this trinity in its unique perfection is witnessed in the concluding sentence of *Bṛh. Up.* (*III* 9, 28) as "*vijnānam ānandam brahma*". In the course of

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development of the philosophical terminology this designation had been gradually changed until the standardized formula *sat-cit-ānanda* was coined[7].

III

The last sentence from *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up., III*, is the conclusion of one among many upaniṣadic allegories on the tree of existence. There are three essential elements in those allegories. In our example they are expressed in following terms:

"As the tree, king of the wood, so indeed is a man..."
"A tree when it is felled springs up from its root in a newer form; from what root does man spring forth when he is cut off by death?"
"When born, he is not born again, for who should create him again? *Brahman*, the Knowledge, the Bliss is the final goal of him who offers gifts, as well as of him who stands firm and who knows it."

This theory of oneness of the world-soul was known to Plotinus and he takes a critical viewpoint of it in his tractate on the Fate (III, 1, 4). There we find the first allegory of the tree: "Is it one Soul, penetrating all things and performing all acts? Is every separate phenomenon a member of the whole that moves in its place with the general movement?...Is it like in a plant whose principle is in the root, and we are asked on that account to reason that not only the interconnection linking the root to all the members and every member to every other, but the entire activity and experience of the plant, as well,must be one organized overruling, a destiny of the plant ?—But such an extremity of determination, a destiny so all-pervasive, does away with the very destiny that is affirmed: it shatters the sequence and cooperation of causes... If all that performs act and is subject to experience constitutes one substance,if one thing does not really produce another thing under causes leading back continuously one to another, then it is not a truth that all happens by causes, since all beings constitute only one single being. Then we are not ourselves, nothing is our act, our thought is not ours, our decisions are the reasoning of something outside ourselves...".

The central upaniṣadic theory to whose deduction the simile of the tree is attached is Uddālaka Āruṇi's teaching on *tat tvam asi* in *Chāndogya Up. VI, 8*. The same subject, including the sequel of examples used to demonstrate the corresponding theory inspired the most extensive analogy in Plotinus, though in his writings the simile itself appears also in several other contexts.

It is necessary to remember that Yājñavalkya, who was a student with Uddālaka Āruṇi, repeats in a condensed form, in *Bṛh. Up. IV, 5*, the main tenets of his teacher Uddālaka on this subject, in order to connect therewith his own deduction of "*neti, neti*".

[7] This problem was studied very carefully by P. Deussen in his "*Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*" ("*Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*") 1,2—Leipzig, 1922 (4th ed.), pp. 115–133.

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Passages which will be compared here consist, on both sides of fairly condensed texts. In *Chānd. Up. VI*, the conclusion concerning the identity of Being, *"tat tvam asi"*, is repeated in nine instances (paragr. 8–16). Yājñavalkya, in *Bṛh. V*, took over from *Chāndogya* two of those examples: on the rivers and on the salt (12-13). In Plotinus the analogous deduction is condensed in paragr. 10 of the 8th treatise in the *III Ennead* (on Contemplation). He mentions first the simile of the rivers to which follows that of the tree. In *Chānd, Up.* the first example refers to plants and animals in general (9), the next to rivers,the simile of the tree is the third, while the following are the seeds of *nygrodha*–a typical symbol of the cosmic tree "growing upside down",described also in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (XV, 1-3)--and then the lump of salt (13). The last three examples are taken from human life and are by far not so characteristic for the new method of reasoning as the first four.

In the chapter preceeding the series of examples (8) the "root of beings" is mentioned, the supposition of the entire sequel being that "all these creatures have their root in Being, they have Being as their abode, Being as their support". Plotinus, concludes the paragraph preceding the *similia*(9), with the statement: "Consequently, the One is none of these beings, it precedes all, beings". From this viewpoint his imagination finds its approach to the ancient analogies of the rivers and their source, of the tree and its roots. No wonder that his conclusion appears analogous to Yajñavalkya's theory of *"neti, neti"*.

Simile of the rivers

"These rivers flow the eastern toward the east, the western toward the west. They go just from sea to sea. They become the sea itself. Just as these rivers, while there, do not know: 'I am this one', 'I am that one', in the same manner all these creatures even though they have come forth from Being do not know that they have come forth from Being." (*Chānd. Up. VI, 10*)

Plotinus: "Imagine a spring that has no source outside itself; it gives itself to all the rivers, yet is never exhausted by what they take, but remains always integrally as it was; The tides that proceed from it are at one within it before their several ways, yet all, in some sense, know beforehand down what channels they will pour their streams." (*III Enn.*, 8, *10*)

Simile of the tree

"Of this mighty tree if someone should strike at the root it would belled but still live: if someone should strike it at the middle, it would belle but still live. If someone should strike at the top, it would belled but still live. Being pervaded by its living self, it stands firm, drinking in its moisture and rejoicing.—If the life leaves one branch of it, then it dries up; if it leaves a second, then it dries up it leaves the third, then dries up. If it leaves the whole, the whole dries up...Verily, indeed, this body dies when deprived of the living self, the living self does not die.

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That which is the subtle essence this whole world has for its self..." *(Chānd. Up. VI, 11)*

Plotinus: "Or think of the Life coursing throughut some mighty tree while it is the stationary Principle of the whole, in no sense scattered all over that extent but, as it were, vested in the root: it is the giver of the entire and manifold life of the tree, but remains unmoved itself, not manifold but the Principle of that manifold life." (*III Enn*, 8, 10)

In this second analogy a passage from the *V Ennead* (2,2), where Plotinus returns to the same topic, seems to reproduce more faithfully the imaginative composition of the upaniṣadic picture; "Looking more minutely into the matter, when shoots or topmost boughs are lopped from some growing plant, where goes the soul that was present in them? Simply, whence it came : soul never knows spatial separation and therefore is always within the source. If you cut the root to pieces, or burn it, where is the life that was present there ? In the soul, which never went outside of itself."

"Neti, neti"

In connection with the philosophical interpretation of these two metaphors by Plotinus it is interesting to extend the analysis of the homologous elements to the next simile in the *Chānd. Up.*, that of the seed, and also to the simile of the salt, as taken over by Yajñavalkya in *Bṛh Up. IV, 5,13.*

"...That subtle essence which you do not perceive, verily, from that very essence this great *nyagrodha* tree exists."(*Chānd. Up. VI, 12*)

"As a mass of salt is without inside, without outside, is altogether a mass of salt, even so is this Self, without inside, without outside, altogether a mass of intelligence only. Having arisen out of these elements (the Self) vanishes again in them. There is no more cognizance (*samjñā* ...That Self is (to be described only as) 'not this', not this" *(Bṛh.Up.IV, 5, 13)*

Plotinus: "Now when we reach the One—the stationary principle—in the tree, in the animal, in Soul, in the All—we have in every case the most powerful, the precious element: when we come to the One in the Authentically Existing Beings—their Principle and source of potentiality—shall we lose confidence and suspect it of being nothing ?—Certainly this Absolute is nothing, nothing of that whose source it is. Its nature is that nothing can be affirmed of it-not existence, not essence, not life-since it is That which transcends all these. Abstract from Being in order to hold it !..." *(III Enn., 8· 10)*

IV

The uplift through contemplation or initiation in mysteries, interpreted in the *VI Ennead* (9,11) as a return from the world of multiplicity to the original unity, proceeds by three higher degrees of manifestation or emanation of the world (world-Soul,Reason, Unity). It was mentioned above that Radhakrishnan had compared these three stages with

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the phases of awakening which, in the representational world of the upaniṣads correspond to stages of dream.

In the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* the sphere of the waking state is called *vaiśvānara*. According to Saṁkara's commentary it is named so because it "leads all creatures in diverse ways" of existential activities. The next state, *taijasa*, is that of dreaming. In it consciousness is limited to the "cognizance of internal states", since he who sleeps dreams "by his own brightness, by his own light; in that state the person becomes self-illuminated" (*Bṛh Up*.IV,3,9). The third is the state of deep dreamless sleep. It is called the state of knowledge(*prajñā*) by identification, since the subject and the object have "become one" in the totality or "mass of knowledge full of bliss". The fourth state" (*turīya*) is the ultimate state of the *ātman*. According to *Māṇḍūkya Up*.it is"not that which cognizes the internal not that which cognizes the external (objects) not what cognizes both of them, not a mass of cognition, not cognitive, not non-cognitive...This is *ātman*. The difference between the two latter stages, according to commentaries, is that the former still contains latent "seeds" of worldliness-the *logoi spermatikoi*, assumed in the same function by Plotinus.

The essential connotations of this "road of introversion"as Radhakrishnan designates it,[8] are given in the *V Ennead* (3,8): "Even in our own sphere our vision is light or rather becomes one with the light, and it sees light, for it sees colours. In the intellectual, the vision sees not through some organic medium but by and through itself alone, for its object is not external: by one light it sees another not through any intermediate agency; a light sees a light, that is to say a thing sees itself..... Think of the traces of this light upon the soul, then say to yourself that such and more beautiful and broader and more radiant,is the light itself; thus you will approach to the nature of the Intellectual Principle and the Intellectual Realm...it is not the source of the generative life of the soul which, on the contrary, it draws inward, preserving it from such diffusion, holding it to the love of the splendour of its Prior. Nor does it give the life of perception and sensation..."

Efforts to overcome duality on this ground, in the case of Plotinus, have been stressed by Radhakrishnan, too. However, among several aspects of the **ideal adequation** of the three stages of identity, imperturbability and quietness (cfr. *III Ennead, 8, 5*), we do not find in Plotinus any **imaginative adequation** to the peculiar subject of dream-consciousness. On the Indian side, a positive, almost creative power of "realisation" had been attributed to the dream, so that the proceedings of the meditation (*samādhi, dhyāna*) could be deduced directly therefrom.—Far Plotinus dream is a variegated picture of illusion, one of the imaginative elements of Indian *māyā* or *upādhi*.

The central comparative theme of this chapter would, however, remain incomplete if such aspects of partial and peripheric coincidences

[8] i.c, 704.

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of the dream-motive should not be reconsidered as well:

In *Bṛh. Up.* IV, 3, 9—quoted at the beginning of this chapter-Yājñavalkya gives a description of the dream as a two-sided psychical power of internal illumination. The awareness of the dream as pure phantasy is still very spontaneous, as if its philosophical prejudicing was just about to take some shape: "Verily, there are just two states of this person (the state of being in) this world and in the other world. There is an intermediate third state, that of being in sleep. By standing in this intermediate state one sees both those states...Now whatever the way is to the state of being in the other world, having obtained that way one sees both the evils (of this world) and the joys(of the other world).When he goes to sleep he takes along the material of this all-embracing world, himself tears it apart, himself builds it up...In the state of dream going up and down, the god makes many forms for himself..." (id. 13).

The comparison of the dream with a mirror, in *Kaṭh Up.* (II, 3, 5) recalls another analogy to the idea of *māyā* in the III *Ennead*, though its illusiveness effects primarily the world of ancestors and of demons (*gandharva*) the same as in the last example quoted from Yajñavalkya: "As in a mirror, so in the soul, as in a dream, so in the world of the manes, as (an object) is seen in water, so in the world of the *gandharvas*; as shade and light in the world of Brahmā."—Plotinus (III, 6, 6-7) compares "those who, on the evidence of thrust and resistance identify body with real being and find assurance of truth in the phantasms that reach us through the senses, to those who, like dreamers take for actualities the figments of their sleeping vision. The sphere of sense pertains to the Soul in its slumber, for all of the Soul that is in the body is asleep and the true getting-up without the body and not with it. In any movement that takes the body with it there is no more than a passage from sleep to sleep, from bed to bed. The veritable waking or rising is to abandon definitely the corporeal things."—"The Being that we imagine in the matter is no Being, but a passing play. All that seems to be present in it plays with us, it is only a phantasm within another phantasm; it is like a mirror showing things as in itself when they are really elsewhere, filled in appearance but actually empty, containing nothing, pretending everything.....images playing upon an image devoid of Form....."

In order to complete the range of analogies referring to the dream-motive, let us remember *Maitri Up.* (VI,25) where the allegory of dream is connected to that of the "cavern of senses", the *tertium comparationis* being essentially the same as in the famous chapter from Plato's "*Republic*" (VII, 1): "And thus it has been said elsewhere: 'He who has his senses indrawn as in sleep, who has his thoughts perfectly pure as in dream, who, while in the cavern of the senses, is not under their control, perceives him who is called Praṇava, the leader'."

V

The approach to the comparative analysis of the theory of contemplation in the preceding chapter brought us to a subject in which the

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adherence of imaginative elements to the central conception loses its strength and becomes accidental. In such cases the frequency of fortuitous associations may still indicate some prospective extension of analogies, or rather of homologous trends in the development of ideas. At this limit the **problem of differential analysis** arises also within the scope of our study.

Several authors have attempted to deduce from a pheno-menological analysis of the contemplative thought differential criteria for a global delimitation, or rather discrimination, of European and Indian, or still better, of Eastern and Western philosophies.Contrary to such ambitions, the purpose of the following concluding considerations on the Philosophy of Plotinus is to add a specific example of differential analysis,not as a temptative contrary alternative to the preceding interpretation by doxographic analogies, but rather as their prospective extension.

Authors who have dealt with problems of the logic of cultural (or "moral") sciences in recent times—and they are not many[9] agree that the comparative method can attain a wider scope and bring about results of essential importance only when it is directed to the investigation of common features. Pointing out of differences would never constitute the sufficient reason for a scientific method based on general principles. The comparative value of the differential analysis should therefore always be considered in dependence of the basic meaning previously determined by the method of analogy.

At the beginning of chapter III, a problem of differential analysis was pointed out, referring to the theory of oneness of the world-soul. Essential difference in the conceptual **sub-stratum** had to be distinguished within the analogy of the imaginative representation used as a common example in the discussion of the metaphysical theory of identity. There Plotinus criticized a popular oriental theory as it probably was transmitted by Stoics. If we try to estimate the depth of his objective knowledge of such theories of foreign provenience—theories whose objective historical confrontation in the cultural sphere of Alexandria has to be taken as granted—then the comparison of two different examples of criticism to that effect, within his own philosophy, may reveal also some characteristics of our philosopher's own method.

Within the structure of the Plotinian system the theory of contemplation occupies the central position. By it his system obtained its specific place in the history of western philosophy. The same problem reacquired an equivalent value only when it was brought in the center of a wider philosophical interest in modern comparative studies of Indian and European philosophies. Western interest in yoga and buddhist meditation may confirm the actual importance of this topic also beyond our limits.

[9] Here I have in view mainly : P. Masson Oursel,"*La philosophie comparee*',, Paris, 1923;E.Rothacker,"*Logik u. Systematik der Geisteswissenschaften*"("*Handbuch der Philosophie*", Abt. II), Munchen, 1927; and E. Cassirer, "*Zur Logik der Kulturwissen-schaften*", Goteborg, 1942.

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In this case, the same as in that mentioned above, the differential element should be considered as an essential symptom of the depth in which the analogy is rooted. It is obvious, and has often been stressed, that "philosophers almost never do describe the teaching of others in an objective and independent way, but rather interwoven in their own systems as proof and illustration".[10] If comparative philosophy should just serve the purpose of discovering plagiarisms (as naive enthusiasts sometimes tried to do), then its own *raison d'être* would become null and void —another barren ideal of a negative philosophy.

The basic approach of Plotinus to the problem of contemplation results from a trend of thought which seems to proceed from an opposite direction than we would expect it in an Indian system. He considers contemplation primarily as the process of world manifestation or emanation. Nevertheless, ths opposite intention of the contemplative thought, that of liberation from duality and ignorance, is known to him as well, so that both courses merge ultimately in one "circuit" : "Action, thus, is set towards contemplation and an object of contemplation...The Soul produces for the purpose of contemplation, in the desire of knowing all its contents.....Thus once more, action is brought back to contemplation .....in the course of its circuit, and.....the knowing faculty comes to identification with the object of its knowledge" (III, 8, 6). The Soul "refused to have the total Intelligible Being simultaneously present", "it could not bear to retain within itself all the dense fullness of its possession". Therefore "time was produced by desire of succession", and contemplation could "uncoil" in a twofold direction: "A Seed is at rest;the nature-principle within, uncoiling outwards, makes way towards what seems to it a large life; but by that partition it looses.....For the Kosmos moves only in Soul—the only Space within the range of the all open to it to move in—and therefore its Movement has always been in the Time which inheres in Soul" (III, 7, 11), while "the addition introduces deprivation and deficiency" (III, 9, 7).

The orphic symbols of Seed and Serpent are associated, in the same passage of Plotinus, to reminiscences seeming more explicitly vedic when connected with his theory of Time whose Iranian, *zurvanist*, inspiration could hardly be put in doubt. These seem to be the stages of the philosopher's ideal journey to the indo-iranian east, in space and time, up to the analogy of the vedic Creation Hymn (R.V. X, 129): "But from the Divine Beings thus at rest within themselves, how did this Time first emerge ? We can scarcely call upon the Muses to recount its origin since they were not in existence then—perhaps not even if they had been. The engendered thing, Time, itself, can best tell us how it rose and became manifest....." (l. c.)

[10] F. Cumont, "*Die orientalischen Religionen im romischen Heidentum*" Leipzig (Teubner) 1913, p. 13.

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In order to explain the appearance of the dual aspect of the world-process by his theory of creative contemplation Plotinus made use "indeed of a puzzling mass of various arguments and illustrations" and achieved, according to E. Bréhier, nothing more than "a paradox that he maintained for all the levels of Being".[11] This set of arguments may appear in a less puzzling light, if we compare the Indian, *advaita*, version of his theory with the share of explicitly stern traditions in it.

Without entering into further details, let us remember once more Yajñavalkya's description of the dream—consciousness as an intermediate state of existence and try to understand in the upaniṣadic light the following conclusion of Plotinus: "It is not in the soul's nature to touch utter nothingness; the lowest descent is into evil and, so far, into non-being: but to utter nothing, never. When the soul begins to mount, it comes not to something alien but to its very self.....self-gathered it is no longer in the order of Being, it is in the Supreme. There is thus a converse in virtue of which the essential man outgrows Being, becomes identical with the Transcendent of Being".

In the following quotation from the *I Ennead*, the state of contemplation is described not as spreading but as condensation of the "ray of attention" (to apply an adequate term from Husserl's phenomenology) in whose spotlight alone the world of duality can "uncoil"; the state of contemplation indicating the path of freedom, analogous to *samādhi* in its proper sense. In general lines this analogy can be reconnected also with the final part of the *II adhyāya* of *Bhagavad Gītā* and thus complete the thematic cycle of the first analogy quoted in this paper.

I Ennead (*4, 9-12*): "Wisdom is, in its essential nature, an Authentic-Existence, or rather is The Authentic-Existent and this Existent does not perish in one asleep or, to take the particular case presented to us, in the man out of his mind: the Act of this Existent is continuous within him; and is sleepless activity: the Sage, therefore, even unconscious, is still the Sage in Act.....Consequently, the Sage arrived at this state has the truer fulness of life, life not spilled out in sensation but gathered closely within itself,.....pleasure that does not rise from movement and is not a thing of process, for all that is good is immediately present to the Sage and the Sage is present to himself: his pleasure, his contentment, stands, immovable."

Bhagavad Gītā (*II, 68-69*): "Therefore whosoever has withdrawn on all sides the senses from the objects of sense his mentality is stabilized. What is night for all beings, there-in the man of restraint is awake; wherein other beings are awake, that is night for the Sage of vision."

The last two sentences quoted from Plotinus contain almost literally the essential elements of the stages of *dhyāna* in the Buddha's formulation: "...the second *dhyāna*, a state of joy and ease, born of the serenity of concentration, when no reasoning or investigation goes on.....Mindful

[11] E. Brehier, French translation of the *Enneads*, III. 151.

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and self-possessed he experiences in his body that ease which the *arahats* talk of when they say: 'The man serene and self-possessed is well at ease',: and so he enters into and abides in the third *dhyāna*.''

We have considered the theory of contemplation as an example of differential analysis of analogous theories and, before that, mentioned the criticism of Plotinus concerning a typically oriental theory of *pan-en-theism* with a view to confirm the conclusions drawn from the preceding analysis of the imaginative aspect in the structure of the Plotinian thought. Thus, the extension of analogies from occasional images to a homologous development of ideas represented by them reflects an intensive elaboration of homologous theories marked by critical distinction and specification of different possible solutions within their scope. Avoiding of superficial analogies that might suggest a symcretism in taking over bits and pieces appears evident. In the system of Plotinus consequent thinking to the end always corresponds to a coherent inspiration. Compared to typical eclectic influences of oriental views in other hellenistic schools, notably throughout the development of the Stoic philosophy, the system of Plotinus can be distinguished by the essential mark of its ideal analogies with authentic indo-iranian traditions. To what extent a reliable knowledge of those sources—whose existence at Plotinus' times seems to be confirmed by recent researches may have contributed to the ideal harmony of his system, this is a question to which a definite reply has not yet been given, though at the actual state of studies it does not any longer seem to be a definitely unsolvable one.

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THE ABSOLUTE AND THE RELATIVE

JAMES B. KLEE

XIV

Implicit in the abov is the fact that any new idea or experience is not only new in the sense that it never had occurred before in time or space but also in that it is not necessarily logically derivative from that which had preceded it. In other words as stated above the new experience emerges in and of itself, it is epiphanous. Failure to recognize this aspect of new experience leads and has led to confusion, fear, and pain. The whole fear of democracy in its many forms, both personal and social, that is so prevalent in all parts of the world today is due in part to this confusion. The frigid woman or impotent male is, among other things, unable to grasp this fact. The employer who objects to suggestions as to the management of his plant and product is likewise suffering from his own totalistic conceptions which prevent him from recognizing the value of that which is not included in his system. The people through those whom they let represent them, who do not permit a new departure in the solution of their problems because they cannot deduce the new from the old, are also in the same situation. In general, the fact that the new idea is not systematically related to the old makes it seem as if the new in and of itself is without system. Hence, even if accepted in principle, it is frequently worked out in terms of an older and more familiar system and is thus effectively castrated. It is not allowed to do what it is supposed to do. In fact, if so restricted, it may do more harm than good. Such is the absurdity of trying to legislate freedom. Such is the exaggeration which enables the satire of the "new rich". Such is the futility of a teacher when he orders the student to think for himself. This is what dooms any externally imposed system of ethics to failure.

Any new knowledge which embraces one or more points not already included by the previous system creates for itself a new context, a new dimension of consideration. This is particularly apparent in the development of the sciences where a systematic effort is made to correlate the specific items of experience into an organized whole. The physicist, because he is interested in the internal relations of his chosen field of interest, for example the atom, asks certain questions which are irrelevant to the chemist. The latter is perhaps more interested in the relations between the atoms themselves in what he terms a molecule. The idea of the molecule is not entirely derivative from that of the atom, at least not in the sense that the questions raised about the atom are the same questions raised about the molecule, and the answers to the first are not necessarily the answers to the second.

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Nor is the difference between the molecule and the atom one of complexity in and of itself. The chemist does not need to know all about the atom to ask intelligent questions in his own context, in his own dimension of discourse. In fact, the nature of atoms as such may be a constant for his purposes. The important questions about the nature of oxygen as oxygen, as an element, as a manifestation of whatever such an element might be considered to be, are not the ones which are going to be of **immediate** significance when we begin to ask about that which is symbolized as, for example, water. There is very little one can say about the two gases, hydrogen and oxygen as such, that will tell someone about the wetness of water and the fact that boats can sail on it. I am not saying that ultimately some such correlation could not be made, but that the frames of reference of the two questions are different and as such are not derivative, one from the other. And as such the complexities of the atom to the physicist are simple to the chemist, because, in actuality, such problems are never raised by the chemist.

Similarly the questions of the physiologist and the psychologist, although both refer to a living organism, are not in the same system. The former is interested in the internal relations of the organism whereas the latter is more concerned with the organism's relation to the world around him. Once again the complexities of the physiologist's data and observations are irrelevant to the psychologist whatever they happen to be. The organism still behaves as a whole to the situation and the relation of the organism and environment can be described as such. The mistake that either scientist is likely to make is that he feels he has said all about **everything** instead of recognizing that he has said all he knows only from his particular frame of reference, his dimension of approach.

This fact of dimensionality of knowledge in the sciences is little by little becoming apparent for those sciences which are well established and now have the beginnings of a sense of dignity and false (in all probability) security. Yet one of the newest of the sciences, culturology, still finds itself fighting the same old fight, struggling for recognition as an independent point of inquiry. It would be amusing, if it were not so terrible, to see that even most of the social scientists themselves refuse the responsibility of their own science and try to derive most of their interpretations from other newly but more firmly established sciences such as psychology. To day they rush to the psychoanalyst (not only as patients) to use the latter's interpersonal relation type of interpretation for what a few lone souls are trying desperately to establish as significant only in the new dimension of culture itself. Momentarily they seem to be seduced by the complexities of the relations of the individual to his situation, personal and otherwise, and forget that the cultural situation in and of itself is a useful field of inquiry. In their acceptance of the fact that Darwin found man to be an animal, they fail to realize that man has a dimension of existence which invalidates direct comparisons. In their worship of Darwin and his psychological counterpart, Freud, they seize on

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the letter of evolution and forget the spirit. Just as any aspect of bodily structure and function has an evolutionary development in time and space; just as any mind aspect such as sex has its own evolution in ontogeny and phylogeny without coming from somewhere else (Mary's thirteenth birthday must have been thought to have caused her sex from all the attention sex was given prior to that moment);so culture is its own story,it is a fact of experience and its own complexities can be studied directly without deriving sanctions from some other science where cultural problems as such are completely irrelevant in the immediate sense. Regardless of what the psychology of man turns out to be, man is a **constant** as far as the growth and development of culture as such is concerned, just as man's brain remains a constant when one proceeds to the study of his behavior as such.

However, lest this be misread, these are symbolic entities we are discussing. The foregoing is in reference to systems of language and description, not to the referent of the language. That is why the constant reiteration of "dimensionality", "frame of reference", and "point of view" has been so pronounced herein. Because that to which the word "mind" refers, and that to which the word "body" refers, and that to which the symbol "culture" refers, are all aspects of the fundamental universe of experience. "Body", "mind", "culture", all refer to the same man but refer to different aspects of our experience of that man as we see him in different contexts. It is only for the sake of consistency in our systems of discourse that such distinctions are important, but then for **humans** as such, for people who would make use of their newly recognized ability, for those who recognize the value of their capacity to use symbols in the pursuit of their happiness, such distinctions **are** important.

We seem to have been going through a "symbol revolution" in our human emergence from the apes and have not entirely recognized our own powers as yet. Or when we do, we find some opportunist has been to the fount before us and is using our most valuable property against us. And that tends to drive us away from that which might save us. We shudder when we see the way Hitler and Goebbels used the power of symbols on their own people, we are terrified before what seems at first glance to be the cynicism and worldliness of "The Prince", T. S. Eliot, Bagehot, and Leslie White, of the other political culturalists. We are afraid of our common and most powerful possession in its promise for cooperation, the ability to have and use a language, because of the responsibilities that semantics imply. We fear the positivism that has preceded almost every recent totalitarian revolution because it has enabled the dictator to turn the people's culture upon themselves for his own ends by convincing them that the familiar categories of the past are the **only** categories; that these categories must substitute for the more nebulous aspects of what is and could be.

And yet language is the tool which could most readily enable cooperation and democracy, for without it the organism is forced to rely

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entirely upon the **accidentalmu** tuality of situation and motivation as might be the case of the ant, the bird, the dog. Only the human seems to be able to give a thing a name and then talk the "name" over instead of having to resort to the situation itself and move the referent thing around. Culture in general and language in particular has been one of the greatest discoveries for relatively economical solutions of the problems of existence. So let us not be afraid to use language where it is appropriate to the promotion of our human welfare just because there has never previously been a way of so behaving in the history of living creatures. Like sex, its deliberate usage is difficult and causes troubles which otherwise we could avoid. Yet where would we be if we did not risk sleep, eating, drinking, or breathing ? There would not even have been life.

It is claimed by many that our particular culture or civilization is in imminent danger of collapse. Eliot and Toynbee, for instance, have described this crisis of our own particular way of life. Yet the problem is really nothing more than the emergence of a new way of life which is more inclusive in depth and scope than the old way which had failed to handle all the problems which it had encountered. In fact the emergence of the new is the very thing that is destroying the old. It is that man has not only seen new problems but also the solutions of them. This is destroying the old ways as well. If it were just new problems in addition to the old as the problem is usually formulated, we would merely be frustrated and a little dead instead of in conflict and very much alive. Frustration is merely failure; complete frustratian is only death, the stopping of the existence without offering a way around the difficulty. The fact that we are in **conflict**, that we are anxious, suggests that far from dead or dying, we have a choice between more and less inclusive systems of life. We have the choice of systems which will bring deeper and richer satisfactions to more people than those systems whose inadequacies are already apparent. In that sense we are in a very familiar situation, metaphorically speaking, but because of that similarity we may take hope. If a baby were not courageous enough to try to stand, it would never walk. If it took the attitude that it can creep now and has a good thing in creeping, it could never run, Yet walking and running do not come from creeping. The infant must strike out entirely on a new path of life for itself, one which it has never done before. Nor can anyone else do it for him.Walking does not derive entirely from creeping,it is a new system, it is a new dimension of activity. And the more the child creeps and is encouraged in creeping the less likely it will walk. In other words, to do more of what one is doing already is not going to produce something else in and of itself.

Yet how crude the first steps, how awkward, clumsy, and how often does the individual fall and hurt himself. If we saw only the dangers how cruel we would be to let the child walk at all. Yet was it not worth the effort to win through ? Are we not essentially in the position of the

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lighthouse keeper in Ardrey's **Thunderrock** who gave up trying to help his contemporaries in disgust because they would not listen ? And yet he found that he could take for granted in his everyday life achievements which had been despaired of only a generation before. Once he saw this he gave up despair and moved ahead, rejoined humanity with renewed grace. Do we not ultimately have to take the chance that the new may have some essential value in and of itself which we cannot see through the systems of the old ? Dare we speak and ask for the unthough of, the unpractical ?

The frigid individual is in the same position. In trying to protect that which he already has, the new type of experience cannot come through the barriers of the old. In fact, when but dimly apprehended, the orgasm is fought, circumscribed, limited, repressed, and further attempts avoided as far as possible lest it further upset the existent economy. And how many stay away from sexual behavior for fear of clumsiness and awkwardness, yet how else can one begin but in the initial crude stages. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that verbally the individual knows it could be otherwise. He has an image verbally derived of what could be. That is an additional source of frustration if he compares himself with the image instead of with his earlier but actual behavior. If he sees only the former it is likely to cause him to try harder at that which he can already do and thus increase the basic difficulty.

The logic of the new is not included in the system of the old. But when the grasp of the old is relaxed, does not the logic of the new suddenly start forth ? Is there not an implicit organization in any new experience ? Then why put the new in the framework of the old ? The new has its own questions, and answers. It has its own laws, its own procedures. And if the new is feared let these laws and procedures be observed and thus be reassured. The new only **seems** anarchistic when viewed from the attitude of the old. It is unpredictable, chaotic, lawless, only within the older system. It does not itself need additional and irrelevant administration, it can govern itself, it can only be its own justification. It need not, nay, cannot be operated within any previous totality. It requires a new totality of organization, a new economy suited to **all** its parts once the new has emerged. And this is to be already found within the experience of it. It need not be imposed from without.

XV

About one aspect of this formulation I am very puzzled and deeply disturbed. In a sense the absolute aspect of experience corresponds to democracy while the relative dimension resembles social organization, or at least what we believe about these. But this is true only as far as these are intrinsic aspects of one another and no further. Any more in either dimension would be of course an excess. As pointed out above only through new experience which in turn offers a new point of departure, a new frame of reference, can new insights occur, can reconstructurization

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and evolution occur. This does not mean that the new has to be absolutely new in the universal or transcendent sense but only new relative to the particular structure of experience before that absolute moment at which it became a part of the experience. Nothing in the transcendent sense need be considered new because that sense is essentially meaningless to experience. If it is within experience it is not transcendent and if it isn't how do you know about it ? No, newness is meaningful only relative to a particular system of a particular experience or experience referent.

In the social sense this means that as far as the organized group is concerned its source of new points of departure and new frames of reference lies outside itself for if it were entirely within, it would not have problems in the first place. The source for the new details and particular absolutes are twofold : first are those people not so organized, second is the natural environment generally (including culture) not embraced by the concept of "people". In other words it is the demos itself, particularly what Toynbee calls the "internal" or "external proletariat", which may also be under certain conditions the "creative minority", which constitutes the source for new and more efficient, more widespread social organization. It is only as the relatively new, the unorganized, in fact those whom had been previously "organized out" or ostracized are admitted into a larger organization that peoples can achieve such an aim. But the question arises, how did the schism take place in the social body in the first place ? How can the demos be new to itself ? Why was there an external or internal proletariat ? Why just the creative minority, why are not all creative ? And why did not all as an organization go forward and expand together as was potential in the first place ? Why did the one elite more "endogamously", centripetally, the other by contrast "exogamously" or centrifugally ?

Part of the answer lies in the coufusion that has existed among such terms as democracy, and totalitarianism, free-enterprise and socialism, anarchy and organization, irresponsibility and morality, which were, like absolute and relative, thought to be in conflict. What is disturbing is that perhaps they basically are not in conflict at all but merely are different aspects of the same totality of social organizationor of cultural evolution generally. Each can of course be treatrd as its own continuum but would be pointless if considered as an entity in and of itself. The horrible part is that, if the synthesis of the absolute and the relative offered above is correct, the supposed conflicts of the others are absurd. The built that would be felt once this is recognized because of the human waste created in the name of one or the other would prevent the acceptance of the argument In defending oneself against this guilt-felt waste the author may be completely misunderstood so as to be thought to be not in support of one side or the other or even worse be labeled as a fence sitter and opportunist. Let me categorically deny that any of these three is intended.

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I would like to be brash and come right out and say there are no more differences in qualitative essence between democracy and totalitarianism, anarchy and organization, free enterprise and socialism, irresponsibility and morality, freedom and authority than were found between the amateur and professional. In fact I would like to suggest that chaos is a kind of organization, authority is a kind of freedom, totalitarianism a kind of democracy, and democracy a kind of totalitarianism, free enterprise a type of socialism and socialism a type of free enterprise. The important difference is not in that there are power structures of one kind or another but about what the power is organized and who has power, who is represented in the organization. It would be impossible to have the one without the other just as something cannot be good or bad in and of itself but is always ambivalent outside a particular relationship. The point in regard to our feelings about the problem is that we are faced once again with an ambivalent situation and are trying to force it into an either/or choice. Well, we can't do so without further waste and it is time we realized it.

Let us go back for a moment to the amateur and professinal. The amateur dimension in its direct immediate love, in its epiphanous experience realizes the **suchness** or the **what** of existence. The professional aspect uses it in terms of some other what, that which would be called the direction or goal of experience. The "amateur" writer may express his direct insight as in a poem. The "professional" may never have had any particularly original insights in the form of a poem. He may wish only to communicate about that which he understands. But in this aspect he may be as much of an artist as the poet. Relative to the first, communication is accidental, the poet has expressed himself for what the experience was, not for what it may be for others. Relative to the second, the communicator is in epiphanous contact with his audience and as such is primarily concerned in this direction and may sacrifice part of what he communicates for the purpose of maintaining his contact. Both are artists after their own fashion. Both sacrifice in some dimension relative to achievement in another. There is no real difference except in terms of that which there is the primary concern.

The same would be true in the social dimension. Take for example the quarrel between free-enterprise and socialism. The free-enterprise businessman objects to the imposition of other peoples' plans upon his way of doing things and claims that planning can't work, yet his very statement is according to **his** plans. At no time is there no planning. The only differences are in what plan and whose plan it represents. For the mass of people free-enterprise means planning and distribution with negative representation, a state of affairs that is analogous to those antecedent to the American Revolution relative to colonial representation in British policy determination. One might call profit-taking on sale or service: "taxation without representation". Or again the businessman

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demands individual freedom from organization yet forms with his business associates the trade associations necessary to mutual survival and proceeds to kill individual enterprise. For example look at any new producer's troubles in getting started, with a new automobile or new airline. It is usually justified on the basis of some jungle principle but this is hardly the jungle anymore. The unions which stood once for the liberation of the working man from the company's dominance, won't let go of him in turn. A country which in the name of "Union" once fought a civil war now demands the veto to protect its national sovereignty. At the same time it has been trying to legislate "democracy" onto the people of Western Europe or its own Southlands. When we like it **and have the feeling of the initiative** we call it democracy. This is true even when to everyone else it is totalitarian because it is not as they wished if they were not given representation or the chance to cooperate in the formulation of the plan.

Similar is the problem of the individual in society. Like all the other examples this too is a conflict because of a pun or equivocation in our thinking about the problem. The individual can only conflict with other individuals, not with society. And even though other individuals outnumber him they are no more society he is. In the social dimension he is **social unit** not an individual *per se* and hence is as much society as those others were so which characterized. He is of a social organization which excludes or includes some parts of what he represents. It is his social role against their social role. The difference between cooperation and competition is in the type or nature of the organization not as to whether or not there is social organization. The social unit relative to other soual units is a social problem. The individual relative to the ot hers is a psychological problem and the two need not coincide, in fact do not. Each is an absolute in the particular frame of reference being explicated and is legitimate only in that particular context. The problems of freedom for production sexual behavior, political power, profit, democracy, etc., may be psychological problems only. If a man has done his stint he has done as much as anyone else who has done what he believed in and deserves as equal consideration and recompense equal to that of any other individual in the group. The social value is irrelevant and accidental from that point of view. On the other hand, people are in one pattern of social organization or the other whether this be marital, political or economic and questions relating to the psychological dimension are accidental and irrelevant to the culturo-logicalpoint of view. As long as two or more individuals are in contact a socialpattern emerges whether we like it or not. And this pattern can be treated as such. Once we as individuals recognize this, we to do something about it one way or another. And we are no longer innocent of the social problem. Hence there is on longer any excuse not to see what we can do to improve things. But when we attempt to improve conditions wecannot neglect the

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fact that when we do something in one dimension, the structure may be altered accidentally in all dimensions, each effect being with its own significance. We will have to move allover together witheach speciality moving cooperatively with the others but ni its own dimensions of effectiveness.

In other words the question of individual initiative versus social organization should never come up in the first place. For the one is of the other. It is only when movement in one dimension exceeeds the relative rate of movement in the other that a serious dislocation is likely to arise. It is when the authority suggests that individuals do more than is understood that the abuses start in the attempt to force the issue. And it is only when the individual with his amateur and frontier insight cannot communicate and distribute these back to his professional supports that freedom is restricted. Trouble is promoted when a minority stumbles upon something of value to all and fails to realize they were enabled to make the discovery because of the social support they received. "No man is an island", it is said, and no one lives in a vacuum. The productivity of the one, his creativeness and his originality are also functions of what is extended him and the social support he receives that enables him to reach that far. Otherwise it is like the hermit who boasts of his splendid isolation and the joys of living alone as he buys his "wheaties", and in the super-market at that, because they are cheaper there.

The problem may also be stated in terms of rights. It should be obvious that the only real rights of an individual are the absolutes of experience. For that is all that can be personal and private. All the rest, as it is available to all within their experience, too, can only be shared. Any inequality in distribution can only cause social instability, unless such a disproportionate allotments fits the individuals concerned and is compensated by similar allotments elsewhere as needed. Lenin no matter what else he has said or done, said this exactly in his slogan: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need." A wiser description of goals considering peace of mind, body, or society, has not, nay could not, be made. But considering the absoluteness of the individual, of his experience, of the social group each will have to come to this in his own way in his own time. No party line from left or right, God or Devil can force anything but a reaction against itself in complementary fashion. For in leaving out a part of the whole they are enabling the uncontrolled reservoir of forces which will destroy them or keep them engaged in constant civil warfare. This is true whether it is nation vs. nation, group vs. group, or mind against itself.

As suggested above the main social difficulties arise when the enemy is considered to be "the people" or individuals generally. For what else do we live? What matter communion or art if there be no living of it? Thus we could instead seek our solution outside ourselves in an expansion, in a centrifugal spiral or cone. The days of the myth of progress in

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a straight line are, in some minds, over. For when you are way ahead in one dimension only you are also in limbo. Lines of communication are too easily severed and the individual cast adrift, incommunicado. When and if we may catch up again with those in the advant garde we call them genius. If they are never understood we call them mad. And by then they may well be mad. The radiant splendor and loneliness of genius do nor entirely compensate the hatred and envy that he suffers himself and that others feel towards him. Only through tolerance for the love of the amateur for the new absolutes, for the new creations, will the professional continue to have the absolutes which he may profess. For the outlook of the amateur provides the insight while the professional gives him the support to look around. Only as the amateur, no matter what his genius, can feed back what he has found can the social body expand as a whole. Yet to do this we must also feed the products of the whole back to the frontiersman lest he turn his courage and abilities against us instead. We should have learned our lesson by now with our Swifts, Johnsons,Goethes, Strindbergs, Rockefellers, and "Undershafts", How much better it would have been to have their intelligence and skills working for all rather than for a few of us with the rest left in hatred and envious conflict and all of us in guilt.

In this sense we can turn to the concept of otgastic potency as developed by Reich. For whatever dimension of living we may consider,this is the measure of our attainments: to be so completely integrated that all may be mobilized for whatever is needed in that particular direction without undue reservation. When we have succeeded, temporarily, we will then have sufficient elasticity to turn anew to other things temporarily neglected, instead of finding these cutting us off because of our original barriers, which only our termendous need had enabled us to surmount and which now our exhausted state prevents us from repassing. We must be able to move without unnecessary friction inside if we are to expand our possibilities outside. The significant task out there is more control to the ends of our **living** not to the **impoverishment** of our own life to dying. We need not fear organization or authority, when the organization or those in authority no longer fears us. We need no longer fear the absolutes of experience when there is no fear of relating them to each other. We need no longer fear the future when our past fears have been understood in their relatedness. Our total goal is over-all expansion, evaluation of the whole. The Promethean challenge is for all of us from all aspects of existence. It is for all to creatively seize in our experience to mobilize and utilize the variety of energies available to us everywhere, to increase our mechanical advantage over our environment, and to increase the efficiency and scope of its application everywhere to the self-perpetuating business of an expanded deepened and enriched life experience. We are symbiotic with the whole universe and as such our task is to make it fruitful to all and our-selves fruitful for it. Yet to retain its

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significance, let us say that each must do it for himself in his own way to his own ends as he sees them for that is what each **shall do** anyway. The only social organization necessary is that which is descriptive of this; organization need not be foisted upon the social body in the hysterical search for salvation. If we wish to control our environment, to meet its challenge, then we will have to tackle it as a whole. Less can only lead to destruction through unbalance and disproportion, suicide and genocide, individual and special madness. This means especially, support for all the frontiers no matter what the dimension or the individual whose absolute representation the dimension embraces at the particular moment. It is the frontiersman in art, science, communication, politics, etc. whose epiphanous experience we are awaiting, whose information we have yet to receive. For we have no complete picture or prediction of what is possible and probable to expect. We have no idea of what else might be or to what degree it will be found or we would know all now. About it we are still ignorant although no longer innocent. About it we can say little one way or another. For all we know, we may "change all that" again, as we have time after time,in fact from moment to moment, in the past as each absolute was added or changed from one relative to next.

So let us not deny potentiality and its prospective absoluteness but where and as it comes seize it and see what each who is so interested can do with it. We have little idea where the next stroke of genius may come that could benefit all mankind through each of us in it. And let us not in pride of things done and past set unnecessary obstacles to the future. Let it come not in fear of trauma in its birth but let us fully enjoy its epiphany. Let us accept each absolute moment for what it is, relative to all the rest, to its fullest potency for comprehension, understanding and human usefulness. For there can be no more but there can be no less either.

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THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

JAMES A. GOULD

The subject of metaphysics is the oldest endeavor of philosophers in Western civilization. Even before the time of Socrates there was a group of philosophers writing down their metaphysical theories. Metaphysics thus preceded ethics in the West. Metaphysics is the attempt to give form to the flux of events in the universe. What does it mean to give form to the flux of events in the universe ? Consider one's personal life. Man not only experiences certain events, but he also chooses to experience certain types of events. He experiences pleasure and he does his duty; he does the distasteful and he experiences love; he joins political groups, right, left, and center; he seeks out art, religion, and service to mankind; he experiences births, deaths, floods, and war. He chooses some of these events insofar as he possibly can, and seeks to avoid others. The decision to emphasize certain types of events in life is to give form to the events which a person may encounter. Man needs to give form to his life. If he didn't, he really would not be a person, for then he would be a living contradiction. He would act according to one principle at one moment and another principle at another moment. Thus to give our life character—to give it significance—means that we have to give it form. And so to be a person a man must give form to the entire range of events that he experiences.

What else is a science except the application of form in a certain realm of nature ? The laws which the physicists and chemists discover give form to particular realms of the natural world. A scientist, e. g., a physicist, picks out certain aspects of the world of nature with which he deals, and relates these aspects in such a way that a law can be stated about them. He judges that these factors are the important ones. His judgment gives form to this particular area. The physicist says that if we want to know about the trajectory of an object thrown from your hand, then all we need to know are the masses involved, the initial velocity, and the direction in which the object is thrown. With these relatively few aspects of the object we can now predict the course which these objects will take. And with these factors scientists then believe they can predict the position of the object. Thus a scientist tests these factors, which he has chosen as important, according to the success of his prediction. If his predictions are not successful, then he will endeavor to find other aspects of the object or develop new concepts which will lead him to predict the course of the object. This is really the history of the development of science itself. Scientists have chosen certain basic aspects with which to explain and predict the course of nature. If the concepts which they have chosen are unsuccessful in prediction, then some great

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new scientist, such as Galileo or Einstein, will develop new concepts to aid him in his explanation and predictions. The new concepts will be a judgment as to what is important. This is the scientist's way of giving form to the realms of nature. Thus, like each of us in our personal lives, the scientist makes a judgment about what is important: the scientist's judgment hopes to bring successful prediction, while each man's judgment is concerned with establishing his major values in life.

Just as each of us seeks to give form to our personal lives, and the scientist seeks to give form to his realm of nature, so the metaphysician seeks to give form to the entire universe. His problem is much more complex than that of the scientist, because he is not dealing with just one particular realm of nature, but all events in the universe. To the metaphysician nothing is irrelevant. Thus, in order to explain the universe, the metaphysicians will have to pick out certain events—certain types of events which he deems are possible to explain the universe. When he chooses certain events which he thinks of as central, then the metaphysician is giving form to all the events. Thus a metaphysician seeks a clue which will enable him to understand the entire world of experience. His clues will be certain events which impress the particular metaphysician quite strongly.On the basis of one or more aspects of experience which impress him, the metaphysician will attempt to interpret all other facts. Plato, being impressed with mathematics attempted to explain the universe in terms of certain basic mathematical aspects. Other philosophers, such as Aristotle, have been impressed by biology, and so, like him, seek to explain the entire universe in terms of this science. The author of this paper is impressed with man's relationship to the rest of the natural universe, and with the suffering of man. In terms of these concepts the universe is thus explained. Some philosophers are impressed by logic, and so they would maintain that logic dictates a certain type of universe.

Two simple examples of metaphysical theory might make the above more clear. Consider the system devolved by one of the earliest philosophers of Western civilization, Thales. Thales was a Greek who lived on the seashore, and he was impressed with the water about him and the role of water in life. He maintained that one cannot live without water —the absence of water is death. Furthermore, water can take on all forms: liquid, gas, and solid. Semen—basis for life—is itself liquid. And so Thales thought water must be the most important aspect of life. It is the basic clue by which one explains everything in the universe. Thus Thales would say "underlying" all other appearances is water. Such a view should not seem so incredible to our contemporary mind, for the scientists today maintain there are certain electrical particles which serve as the basis for all material objects in the universe. To us the basic stuff is electrical, while to Thales it was liquid.

The most famous theory in Western civilization concerning the nature of the universe was given in Genesis.God created the universe and in

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it placed the central figure of man. Man, the most important of his creations—man was created in the image of God. God is somehow like man; he becomes the wrathful force walking in the garden in the cool of the evening. He controls the entire universe as man controls his little bit of the universe. Such a metaphysics is referred to in philosophy as animism. Aristotle has an organistic metaphysics impressed by biological functioning; Plato has an extreme rationalism impressed by mathematics. The authors of Genesis were impressed with man himself. They contend that there stands, in relation to the world as a whole, God who cares for and controls the world somewhat in a similar manner to man's control of his little world. This basic view of the universe has been the most influential theory in the entire history of Western civilization. It has given rise to much of the ethical theory that people of the Western civilization have adhered to. The aqueous theory of Thales and the animism of Genesis are two theories in Western civilization. There are many other more mature metaphysical views : those of Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, St. Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz,Berkeley,Hegel, down to such men of the present day as Whitehead and Santayana.

How is one to decide between these various views ? This is a subject of great dispute, but there are certain things upon which many will agree. There are certain criteria by which any metaphysical view can be judged. Some people will deny the possibility of metaphysics—such as the skeptic, but the criterion by which they deny this type of statement is itself a metaphysical assumption. Other people, such as certain dogmatists, will say that metaphysics is not a matter of debate. Their view is not to be scrutinized, but only to be accepted. Such a metaphysician is against the traditional philosophical position, which allows the scrutiny of all ideas. For most philosophers willingly hold out their metaphysical views for examination. These latter philosophers say their metaphysical views can be tested by certain criteria. They cannot be tested as science tests its theories—by direct and indirect verification. In metaphysics, rather, there are three criteria by which any theory can be measured.

The first of these criteria is that all experience must be able to be accounted for. There must be no experience that an adequate metaphysics can not explain **if called upon to do so.** Because of a limitation in time, a metaphysical theory can not possibly explain all events in the universe, but if called upon, it must explain a given event or type of event. And, if one's theory cannot account for certain types of events, than one's theory is subject to the charge of inadequacy. For example, consider Thales' theory of the universe. One of the central difficulties of Thales' theory is that he could not explain how water was the basis of fire. How is it that water gives rise to fire ? How is it that fire basically reduces to water ? Such a problem as this one Thales could not deal with, and hence his theory had to be discarded. The materialist

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metaphysics has a fundamental difficulty because it cannot explain mental experience itself. It perhaps might explain how conscious experience arises out of certain stimuli and brain actions, but it is unable to reduce conscious experience to material entities. Our conscious experiences are not measurable in the way that material objects are, and consequentiy conscious experiences do not reduce to material events. Consequently materialism is inadequate in scope. It cannot explain the phenomenon of conscious experience. Another metaphysical view inadequate in scope is that referred to as solipsism—the view that I alone exist in the universe. Such a view cannot explain the physical and moral encounters we have with other people. Another fact which must be explained in an adequate metaphysical theory is the suffering in the universe or, as it is commonly called, the evil in the world. Any metaphysical view which does not explain the presence of these experiences is thereby inadequate. So our first criteria of an acceptable metaphysical system is that it must be adequate in scope.

The second criteria of an adequate metaphysics is that the system must be consistent. There can be no contradictory statements within a satisfactory system. If a system is inconsistent, then, from the rules of logic, all statements follow from your metaphysical system. In this case both true and false statements follow, and such a system is inadequate. So one must not be inconsistent in his metaphysics. Many people hold this to be the most important of all metaphysical criteria. One famous charge of inconsistency has been leveled against classical theism. It has been questioned how an all-powerful, good God could allow little children to suffer in the universe. And so this problem has been one that metaphysicians from Job to the present day have wrestled with. Another type of contradiction would be a theory which holds that man is ultimately significant to the universe, and yet allows man to play no ultimate role in the universe. It allows man to contribute nothing to the universe which is lasting. Another famous alleged contradiction is attributed to Descartes. He contended that no unlike substances could interact, but that the mind and body, which are unlike substances, do interact. If one has an inconsistency in his metaphysics, this does not mean that he must give up his metaphysics, but rather it means that he must alter one part of it in order to remove his inconsistency.

The final criterion is that terms used by the given metaphysician must have some precise meaning. Concepts such as God, matter, freedom, are often so vague that they have no useful meaning for people. Pragmatism, for example, was held to have at least thirteen different meanings. If so, such a term would be too loose to use it without some refinement. Thus any acceptable metaphysician must be adequate in scope, it must be consistent, and the terms used must have some precise meaning. Metaphysics, then, is the attempt to explain the entire universe of experience by means of some basic idea in accordance with these three criteria.

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How does this conception of metaphysics correspond to other recent views ? Consider the following statement by Emory's well-known metaphysician: "Metaphysical truths may also be described in such a way that no experience can contradict them, but also that any experience must illustrate them."[1] It is true that no experience can contradict the organistic view of Aristotle or Whitehead, etc., but what has been maintained in this paper is that a given group of metaphysical statements may themselves contain contradictions. Thus a group of metaphysical statements must be consistent. The assertion that "any experience must illustrate "metaphysical truths" is to say that any metaphysical system must be adequate in scope. Professor Hartshorne has the same criteria for adequacy of a metaphysical system that has been asserted in this paper.

Many philosophers in the twentieth century have asserted that metaphysics is in principle impossible, because one cannot establish conclusions about matter of fact by means of purely *a priori* premises. But this is not what metaphysics is. Metaphysics is the attempt to explain all events in the universe through a unified conceptual scheme under which all the known types of empirical fact may be systematically arranged. Such has been the quest of the great metaphysicians from Plato to the present.

[1] Hartshorne, C. H., "Some Empty Though Important Truths", *The Review of Metaphysics*, July, 1955, p. 557.

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THIS QUESTION OF THOUGHT

ROBERT POWELL

I think "thought" is the most important and fascinating subject under the sun. See, how in its very initial consideration thought is involved, and we have to be careful in our approach, for when thought is dealing with thought, it is like dividing infinity by infinity: the result may be quite misleading or even totally meaningless. To go into this question of thought at all fruitfully, there must therefore be an element of non-thought, i. e., love; we must be fascinated by the problem for its own sake and we shall then see that in the unravelling of it there lies great beauty. We shall, however, miss this beauty if we go into the problem without real love, such as when we expect a result from it, whether this be freedom from suffering or simply an enrichment of our intellectual store of ideas. This love gives us the capacity for Fundamental Thought, implying direct perception, which is obviously required for any examination of thought, if we are not to go round and round in circles **within** thought.

First, it may be useful to look into the relationship between love and Fundamental Thought. Obviously fundamental thinking can exist on all levels. After all, what is fundamental thought if it is not thought in the broadest categories? Is not that thought fundamental which moves from the general to the particular, thereby seeing each thing through its matrix, which means to place it in a larger frame of reference? But what we are here concerned with is Fundamental Thought, with capital letters, and this must be thinking in the very broadest categories possible; which means that ultimately the terms of reference of thought itself are left behind, and thought is eliminated—and may be then love is born. After all, thought is always dividing, isolating, and love is the total elimination of all barriers.

In the second place, it is essential to understand that the above implies that like can never be understood by like, but only by unlike when the latter is more fundamental and more comprehensive. For example, if I am interested in clouds and cloud formation, I can learn a certain amount when I observe the clouds from the inside, by being "part of the cloud" (e.g., by flying through it in an aeroplane or glider). But I can learn much more and obtain a far more comprehensive picture when the observations are made from the outside (e.g., from a satellite) as well as from the inside. In other words, a thing cannot be properly understood on its own level only".

THOUGHT, RELATIONSHIP AND INDIVIDUALITY

Western philosophers usually study thought in relationship, e.g., thought *versus* matter (or in slightly different form: mind *versus* body) but

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the present author, just to be awkward, maintains that thought is possibly the only thing in the world that does not stand in relationship to anything else. To him **all relationship is within thought** and the very fact of relationship is only a thought. Moreover, to him all words are thoughts and all thoughts are symbols, predominantly words ! To arrive at this truth that thought is the stuff of which the Universe is made, we shall have to examine the relationship between the thinker and his thought, the observer and the Universe, in order to ascertain whether these much discussed relationships actually exist,or that the thinker and his thought, the observer and his World, are one.

On looking at any object, for instance a tree, how do I know that it is a tree ? Does the tree say "I am a tree" ? It is I who say this is a tree, and so the tree is in some way part of the I-cognitive mechanism.We see, therefore, that the object is always closely associated with the observer; being a mental reflection it is really part of the observer, which means part of his mind; or, more accurately, part of "mind". Objects are therefore equally empty as thoughts, their "substantiality" and other properties having been lent to them by the sense apparatus and/but, in last instance, by the mind of the percipient.

Let us now approach this question from the other end. Physicists have found that electrons and other fundamental particles (the building stones of matter) cannot be accurately located in space; an electron may appear to be here and there, but nowhere in particular; it looks as though it is out of space altogether. Is not this rather similar to thought, suggesting both being of the same fundamental nature, for can we say that a thought is in a particular spot ?

There is another thing that thought and fundamental particles have in common. Because, as we have seen elsewhere in this work, the thinker and his thought are one—the "thinker" being a creation of thought and existing solely within thought—the thought does not "belong" to the thinker or to any other "entity" (the reverse, the thinker "belonging" to thought, would be nearer the truth). Therefore thought itself has no individuality, although it may give rise to the thinker, the "individual." This was, of course, already implicit in our earlier contention about thought; that it is unrelated to any thinker or to any other "entity" (the reverse, the thinker "belonging" to thought, would be nearer the truth). Therefore thought itself has no individuality, although it may give rise to the thinker, the "individual." This was, of course, already implicit in our earlier contention about thought; that it is unrelated to any thing, and so entirely a law unto itself.

As to fuudamental particles, it was pointed out in "*Zen and Reality*[1] that we cannot expect these to have the attributes of the macro-molecular world—and "attributes" are always of the macro-molecular scale, being derived from the nature of our sensuous perception (e.g.,

[1] Publ. Allen and Unwin, London, 1961.

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form, colour, mass, etc.). Being attributeless, we cannot assign any character or "individuality" to these particles. Even the very notion of "particle" (implying limitations in space and time) must fall away; and this is exactly what experimental physics has found. Since the forementioned work was published, confirmation of its thesis has for example been provided in the following instance by a nuclear physicist. The seventh annual conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, held in Leeds in September, 1962, included a symposium, entitled "Fundamental Particles and Identity". In the course of this symposium Dr. H. R. Post to the Chelsea College of Advanced Technology, read a paper in which he explained that certain elementary particles had no individuality. This non-individuality, he said, derived from the nature of the theoretical structure of quantum mechanics. He also alleged that fundamental particles are without "secondary qualities".

Finally, is it not true that the very expression "fundamental particle" represents in itself "concept," a thought, a word—moreover, one which cannot be explained away, i.e. defined in terms of further concepts words, as in the case of the composite particles ?

So, the really creative physicist is he who can"forget"the limitations of duality in his contacts with non-duality; that is, he can use concepts like "particle", "wave", "mass", etc., merely as working tools, all the time remembering that they are merely symbols, thoughts thus never allowing them to become blockages in his understanding.

Now if all things are of Thought, then Thought is entirely on its own, and it is thus impossible for Thought to be related to any thing. Therefore the relationship between thought and matter is a false one; it is not that there is no "matter", but there is no matter as opposed to thought, nor is there thought as opposed to matter, for the two are one. And that one, which is sometimes called Mind, is itself neither thought nor matter; neither is it composed of both, nor is it the absence of both. From it all "things" and all "thoughts"emerge, and to it all things and all thoughts return: is not this the greatest miracle conceivable ?

Because thought occupies such an important position in relation to Mind, is it not surprising that we devote so little time to its understanding ? It seems to me that the key to a realization of Mind in oneself is the understanding of thought; and at the same time, that without this comprehension, we cannot fully understand any problem at all.

HAPPINESS AND THE DEATH OF THOUGHT

One more important conclusion follows from our discovery that all things are within Mind, it is that there can only be Happiness by having order within one's mind, and not through power without or within. For any action I take outwardly to change my environment in order to increase my happiness—and that is what most of us are busy with most of the time—is futile, since it can only result in a movement within thought, a rearrangement of mental pictures. And any action which I undertake

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wardly,to work upon my thought, is equally futile for the driving force is again thought—and thought as a driving force is the very cause of sorrow. There will be the end of sorrow only when there is the dying to this driving force, the evaporation of the Motive that implies a Purpose whose realization is made a necessary condition for happiness. The mind that has died to all that will be a Happy one, and it will also be an orderly mind, in which there is only place for pure thought, that is thought which has no Purpose lurking in its background. This mind is of the essence of simplicity, without wants and ambitions, ever agile, yet never growing beyond its own emptiness.

At this stage the reader may object to the suggestion that there must be an ending to thought, for can we really afford to dispense with thought ? To a large extent we function by means of thought, and this is obviously not only unavoidable but essential. But beyond the utilitarian sphere, is thought really necessary ?

There is also thought which is not functionally essential, but is only psychologically a necessity to us—this we shall henceforth refer to as "psychological thought". In this kind of thought there is a direct involvement of the psychological "me", whereas in "functional thought" there is not. To give a simple example, thinking how to obtain food when hungry would be a case of functional thought, but thinking how to obtain **a particular kind** of food—because the mind (and not the stomach) has a special appetite for it (due to conditioning, habit, etc.)—that would, in our present terminology, be called psychological thought. The difficulty is, as can be seen from the above example, that one type of thought can flow almost imperceptibly into the other. Yet it is only psychological thought that makes up the entire texture of Suffering as a mental phenomenon. Although I may suffer physically when starving, I only suffer mentally through the thoughts : "what is going to happen to me ; there is worse to come", and so on. Similarly when I have a bad toothache, or am suffering from some painful physical condition, there is physical suffering which may or may not be—but usually is—superimposed by conflict in the mind. Once Krishnamurti made a remark to the effect that, having suffered from bad health for many years, yet not once his physical condition had given rise to conflict.

What we are concerned with in this discussion is psychological thought, in which and through which we suffer[2]. We want to know its *modus operandi*, its birth and its death, and perhaps knowing that, we shall be in a position to effect its prevention so that there is only functional thought left which gives no problems.

Firstly, what does the general landscape look like in which there is both functional and psychological thought ? Just as a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, so purely functional thought is the

[2] Where henceforth the word "thought" is used on its own, it is intended to refer to "psychological thought" only.

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shortest associative distance between two propositions. It is truly a "straight and narrow path" this "thinking to some purpose" without entanglements and problems. For any deviation I make takes me through the fields of pleasure and pain lying on either side of the path, giving rise to that "discrimination" which in future will make further straight functional thought more and more difficult and bringing with it the cultivation of an ego. Still holding to this same picture one may say that meditation consists in the process of seeing where functional thought derails on the embankment of psychological thought.

Then, this question of thought is further tied up with something else, the question of life and death; and the two may well be the same problem in different guises. To most people there are only two fundamental states, life and death; but to the writer there is a third state, which lies beyond the forementioned two, although it comprises both of them. To him this is the only really fundamental state, and it is identical with the state that obtains when we have died to thought—and he does not care whether this occurs before or after the body's death, for this is irrelevant. To die to thought it is not necessary to die bodily first; and also, who knows whether after death of the body, there will be any such opportunity? After all, we suffer **now**, and that is why it is important to investigate whether we can die to thought today, and not tomorrow.

Although almost all religious writers consider the body with contempt and a nuisance, may it perhaps not be its main function to give us the opportunity to find liberation—not from the body as is supposedly to happen at physical death, but from the mind which is the real troublemaker? What I am driving at is the following : no problem in this world has ever been solved by its avoidance. Similarly, the ego can only be transmuted by becoming acutely aware of itself, of its whole complicated machinery and of the impasse in which it finds itself. This requires a firmly crystallized ego so that the strong forces which keep it intact can be utilized for its explosive shattering. Now the body is, as we have explained elsewhere, (see Window on Non-Duality, *Darshana*, No·7), the necessary agency through which this crystallization takes place.

The paradox in this matter is that the centre of individual consciousness must first be fully grown before it can disintegrate. It cannot disintegrate half-way through its formation, for at this stage full understanding cannot yet be obtained. This is reflected in the life history of the individual where the child's personality must first be fully developed and the various outward urges and desires must have their sway, before all this energy is turned inwards in the confrontation of the centre with what is. Such is Nature's law that the young will yearn for the world, because as yet all psychic energy is flowing outwards. Only after this outward movement has completed itself, will the tide turn and can self-revelation commence; or so it should be, but the tragic part is that most of us remain caught in the outward movement throughout our lives, looking for the unknown treasure in the wrong direction.

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So we see that although body in itself is not important, it has a very important part to play in the process of spiritual emancipation. After this deviation let us now return to the consideration of this all-important question of the dying to thought.

Occasionally we do die to thought, as when we fall into a dreamless sleep. When we come out of this state, how wonderfully refreshed we feel; if only we could sleep like this every night ! This is an example of what the death of thought can do for us and how a total renewal of the organism can only take place after the mind has had a complete holiday. Considering this blissful experience, it is surprising that our greatest fear is to die, to take leave of the known and break continuity. It is particularly strange that we have this terror of coming to an end when each night we go to sleep without as much as a qualm, and seeing that we spend so much of our lifespan sleeping. This shows that our fear concerns not so much the state of oblivion itself as the desire not to lose the known. Could it further be that the event of death has been overdramatized, and this is exerting a powerful conditioning influence ?

It may be objected here that the state of sleep differs in two important aspects from the state of death. First, in sleep the body carries on; and second, we have the knowledge that there is a very great probability that we shall wake up next morning. But from the point of view we are considering here, **i e.**, the dying of thought to itself, there does not seem to be a very great amount of difference between the two states. As to the first point, in deep sleep there is no awareness of the body's functioning. If we died in our sleep, we would not know it. The fact, therefore, that psysiological functions continue seems irrelevant when there is psychological discontinuity. Secondly, the idea that we shall wake up in due course may well be, consciously or subconsciously, one of the last thoughts before loss of consciousness in deep sleep or complete general anaesthesia. However, at the actual moment of losing consciousness there is a dying even to that thought, because there is an ending of **all** thought. We may remark here that nobody has ever come to grief through the ending of his thought, but that on the contrary all psychological pain is the result of an inability to end thought. Yet subconsciously, we realize the need for its ending, witness the many ways modern man seeks oblivion, such as through drugs, sex, and all the innumerable other forms of escape.

In the above example we have seen how occasionally man dies to **all** thought. Let us now consider two cases where there is the dying to **one** thought or one complex of thoughts. I don't know whether the reader has ever noticed how one fear can supersede and completely wipe out another fear ? For example, I have a fear of meeting a certain person, or confronting a certain situation. However, suddenly I receive word that after having left my house in the morning a disastrous fire has broken out and there has been considerable damage to property. Now there

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is only one thing that weighs on my mind : I do not yet know all the details, but I fear to have lost everything. The other fear, the recurring thought which caused me anxiety earlier has completely disappeared. Where has it gone ? Apparently the greater fear, the thought which has the stronger emotional significance, always ousts the lesser one. It is the thought most closely involved in the "I"--mechanism, which is absorbed by Memory ; in fact, it is this bundle of meaningful knowledge (i.e., meaningful to the "me") that reacts as the "me" to outward challenges.

The other case is the common knowledge that 'Time heals all wounds". Memory of the sorrowful thought has, of course, worn thin and is being replaced by fresh engrams.

The phenomenon described also follows logically from our consideration earlier in this chapter of the two fundamentally different types of thought, functional and psychological, where we saw that functional thought is irrelevant to our discussion. Since the thought which involves me less comes closer to functional thought, it plays a lesser part in the mechanism of suffering than the more strongly psychological thought.

Although the dying to one thought is of an entirely different order from the dying to all thought—since it is merely a movement within thought and not a going beyond—it has been brought up here because it shows so well the unreality of thought, and the mechanism by which it is the creator of all illusions. Another significant pointer may be the fact that in all the examples given above the dying to thought took place involuntarily. Just like we can not will ourselves to fall asleep, so the mind cannot end its harrassing thoughts by direct conscious action. If "effort" is not the way then may be the whole thing is far more subtle than we imagined :

Although this chapter—and in fact the whole of this work—is primarily concerned with the question of how to end thought, it will obviously help us in our task to examine in detail how thought came about in the first place. Subsequently we shall discuss how thought, once come into being, maintains itself; and finally, we shall see if there is a possibility of putting an end to thought, the desirability of which we have already discussed.

THE UNFOLDING OF INDIVIDUAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The birth of thought in the individual is, as it were, a recapitulation of its birth in Consciousness, which took place in some early stage of man's biological evolution (see the mechanism set forth in our previous article "Window on Non-Duality"). The tiny baby, soon after he is born, reacts to his having left the uniformly congenial conditions of the womb. The equilibrium is crudely broken: he has to start breathing, the temperature of the outside world may not suit him, and there is a periodical need for food. Once a certain threshold value of uncongeniality,of "discomfort", has been reached, the organism reacts instinctively by crying, which is a purely physiological reflex at this stage. Thus, through

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the shock of birth, with most babies the first action after gasping for breath, is to cry.

Consciousness is still an undifferentiated continuum; although physiologically very much alive and kicking, psychologically the baby is like dead;[3] in fact he is a mere biological automaton consisting of not much more than a tube which ingests food at one end,chemically digests it,and eliminates the decomposition products at the other end.

Soon, however, a fundamental change takes place. Because his physiological needs are always relieved by action in the outside world, together with the capacity of memory afforded by his developing brain, the baby becomes aware of himself as distinct from the outside world. This is the birth of thought and the real birth of the baby, his beginning as a psychological entity, which knows the "me" and the "not me". Soon he will know (i.e. "recognize") his mother and will discover that he can achieve certain results by the action of crying. Such crying is therefore no longer physiological, but a mentally induced action, which in a primitive way, may be the first stepping-stone of the incipient "cunning mind".

Later still in his development the child's consciousness will merge to an increasing extent with collective consciousness.[4] In addition to his own private conditioning through his sensing apparatus, i.e., his experiences of the physical, factual aspects of the world, he will absorb the multifarious ideas **about** the world. Whereas the former process signifies the building up of factual memory necessary for functional thought, the latter process represents the corruption of the child's innocence by thought.

How the child's formation is a matter of his "own" conditioning through sensuous perception plus the psychological conditioning by his environment, can be seen, for example, from his tastes is food. Although he partly discriminates according to his own pleasure/displeasure principle (which not only comprises the reaction of his taste buds, but also texture, smell of the food and the emotional circumstances prevailing during his first acquaintance with the particular food), the basis for much of the child's likes and dislikes in eating is laid by his educators. It is therefore only natural to find the child's tastes and eating habits reflecting those of his environment. Thus a Christain child may normally savour pork, but to a Moslem child the pork will usually be totally distasteful. And what applies to food, naturally applies to anything else; every possible experience the child could have is very soon labelled "nice" or "not-nice", and thus a basis if laid for rigid good/bad mentations, from which it can subsequently free itself only with the greatest difficulty.

[3] We see some correspondence with a condition sometimes occurring at the other end of the scale : the body may still be in the process of dying, when already the mind is no more.

[4] But see p. 17 for a more fundamental view.

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Furthermore, a beginning is made with group awareness and identification. Whereas initially the child was only aware of itself as an entity and others as entities, very soon this crude form of discrimination grows more sophisticated when he becomes aware of being a member of a number of groups based on certain classifications. First there is differentiation between his mother and father; those who cater to his immediate needs and those who do not;and finally the consciousness of belonging to a particular family and the emotional security which this identification brings.

All this has, however, only been the preparation for the dualistic world picture in which the child is being "educated". For next he has to accept that he belongs to a certain country, is a member of the white or the "coloured" race, is a Protestant Catholic, Jew.....or any of the other nonsense which obscures to the child the plain fact that he is simply a human being—a being, moreover, who, but for his many labels, would be psychologically nothing. The truth that he actually is nothing becomes only apparent with the understanding that there is no such thing as individual thought, but only collective thought which comprises very form of (psychological) thought. To illustrate this further, how the child psychologically grows upon the substratum of collective consciousness, we may consider here his incipient sexual development.

Although sex is physically determined at conception,psychologically the child is nothing at birth, that is to say sexually neuter.

This remains so until the patteln which the environment imposes has established itself, which means the child has been made to dress, behave and function as a boy or girl, whichever the case may be. Thus in most cases the little boy or girl is identified with one of both sexual groups,by falling in line with the various behaviour symbols, before even knowing what it is all about and upon what physical characteristics the discrimination had been made.

Once this basic sexual identification has occurred, further conditioning in the male or female role takes place as a matter of course. This will come to include the notion that the opposite sex is "desirable" and this together with the fact that the female and male psychologies are complementary as well as forming a pair of opposites (c.f , the Yin and Yang in Chinese philosophy), a basis is laid for sexual attraction which is not merely (physically) functional. This attraction is one more example illustrating the unity of opposites in consciousness, which manifests itself by the tendency to overcome their separateness and become one Whole.

What has been discussed here about the psychological origin of the sexes runs counter to the conventional outlook which assumes an inherently male or female psychological make-up in the infant. The latter view is understandable enough when one considers it has arisen from a rigidly dualistic world outlook, in which opposites are not regarded as parts of

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an underlying unity, but basic elements in their own right.

Yet occasionally, unorthodox views find unexpected support from orthodox quarters. So it is also in this case. At a lecture given to the Society of Chemical Industry on November 2, 1962, Dr. V. Petrov of British Drug Houses Ltd. recounted the results of some experimental investigations into the influence of hormone administration on behaviour patterns. The gist of these findings, in so far as relevant to our discussion, was as follows: "Man's sex drive is determined **in direction** by his conditioning; thus, a child's psyche at birth is neuter. The **intensity** of man's sex drive is determined by his hormonal production".

But what applies to the sexual desire, applies equally to any other desire. The nature of man's desire is determined by his conditioning, the intensity with which he pursues (or restrains) this desire is dependent partly upon his "sense of values" (which is also conditioning) and partly upon his glandular/nervous make-up. The important point is to see the primary part which conditioning plays in the establishment of the desire; therefore, as we have stated elsewhere, "all psychological desire is a conditioned reflex".

Thus it is that "individual" psychological thought—which **is** desire—is always repetitive,never original, for it is part of the great conditioning stream of collective consciousness. Only after the death of thought can there be true individuality.

So we have seen that the first hesitant stirring of thought occurs as soon as the undifferentiated field of consciousness—the Nothingness—has split asunder in the "me" and the "not-me", thus creating Thingness. From thereon the course of events is completely inevitable. The physical "me" leads to the psychological "me", and hence to the basic schism in which numerous mental images exercise their power to fascinate and urge on this "me". In the young child this interplay of symbols may be confined to a few basic ones, such as attention from the Mother, the fascination of the Toy, etc. Later in life duality proceeds to an extraordinary degree with, concomitantly, a virtually unlimited number of ideation symbols (fixed ideas, one might say), all capable of exciting and pumelling the "me" into some action.

It is this interplay of thought, which is the magnetism of the symbols for each other,[5] that keeps the world turning. Call it whatever you like, desire, ignorance, the search for fulfilment, it does not matter—but what matters is that it is a totally blind force which is inexhaustible. It came into being with the first split in Consciousness, leading to the duality of "I" and "not-I", and will not end before these two have merged again.

This whole marvellous and fantastic world is thus within the field of thought, the storehouse of symbols, which comprises the observer and

[5] The reader may remember how in "Window on Non-Duality" we saw how the wheel of thought is kept turning by the mechanism of thought "association".

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the observed, the thinker and his ideas, the striver and the striven for. Because of this basic duality, the play of illusion will go on forever, for combinations and permutations amongst the dualities are infinite.

Man continually creates his own attractions for fresh symbols, the new excitements. And whither this symbol be the image of naked woman, the idea of Death, or a word like Communism or Atheism, fundamentally its power to excite is as irrational and unreal as—to us—the proverbial red rag to the bull. All this goes to show the tremendous potency of conditioning, particularly in early childhood. It is hence mainly in this period that the basis is laid for the various neurotic conflicts which abound. This occurs when the conflict in collective consciousness—**i. e.**, a basic contradiction with which intelligence cannot cope—is imparted to the growing psychological memory of the child. Because there is a continuous merging between the individual consciousness and collective consciousness (so that it becomes unreal to speak of "individual" as opposed to collective consciousness) this transference of conflict occurs all the time.

To give two very simple examples of such contradictions: Sex is represented at once as something highly desirable and highly reprehensible; killing is considered evil, but it is "glorious" when it is for the sake of some symbol, such as the nation, the race, or some ideology. The damage which these contradictions impart is untold, not in the least because it forces the unformed simple mind of the child to mould itself after the sophisticated and unreal pattern of collective consciousness. In this pattern everyone is assigned a certain role and woe betide the individual who wishes only to be himself and refuses to conform. The "role" is really a rigid pattern within a pattern, all held together by tradition, the reign of the past.[6] This role-playing has become so important in this age that even a commercial company "of repute" must project its "public image", **i.e.**, it is personalized, and usualy expected to play the role of a successful, aggressive yet paternal type of individual ! Thus we see that the diseased mind of the Collective loses no time to infect the young mind, and that therefore the real crisis lies in consciousness.

MAINTENANCE OF THE THOUGHT MOMENTUM

A few serious-minded persons may ask themselves how this whole unreal structure perpetuates itself, and may wish to step out of it, if they only knew how. These people form, however, such a small minority and what is more important, even they still seek a solution within thought, that almost imperceptibly the Unreal—for that is what this whole psychological panorama represents—is taking increasing hold over us. Not only does the momentum of thought proceed unchecked, because the fundamental thought structure is never challenged, but it is ever increasing like an avalanche rolling down the mountain-side, and carrying

[6] This self-assumed role is our only identity. What is required is not as some "religious" people will have it, "the search for an identity", but the losing of identity, which is the past.

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everything with it in its destructive path. This is because duality can only give rise to more duality, and it is impossible for it ever to give rise to non-duality. As we have seen before, duality, which is thought, is not related to non-thought, which is non-duality. Therefore thought will ever give rise to more thought, and so the mind is its own prison; this is also the reason why every problem we tackle in this world appears to give rise to further problems. Furthermore, readers may have noticed how thought, notwithstanding its infinite possibilities, is very limited in scope and extremely petty, and how in the individual it is restricted to variations on only a few ever-recurring themes. Yet we are still a long way off from the time that people will begin to recognize that thinking will not solve our many problems, as long as man has not got the capacity to keep his functional thought uncontaminated by psychological thought, and so free from the tyranny of the Collective.

Now we have examined the birth of thought, it may be instructive to examine in some greater detail the process of thought continuity, the inexorable mechanism through which we are the effective prisoners of thought. It seems as though we are the victims of a Law of Inertia, which prevails throughout the Universe and governs not only the physical but also the psychological world. Thus the momentum of thought all the time engenders more thought energy; and one thought is sufficient to set the whole process going.

To understand this we must first of all, recognize that thought which is psychological and not functional has a counterpart on the level of sensation; that is, it is either pleasant or painful, and in this respect there is no neutral thought. As we have already seen in "Window on Non-Duality", the driving force behind the mechanism of thought association (which is the *modus operandi* of its continuation), is the pleasure/pain principle, which aims at the overall increase in pleasure and reduction in pain content of the thoughts.

So let us suppose that to begin with there is a thought with which pleasure is associated, i.e., its content or colouring is gratifying. This will then give rise to further thought with a view to perpetuate, intensify or safeguard gratification. On the other hand, had the first thought been painful, this would have engendered a thought concerned with reducing the pain and transforming this into pleasure. This process is thus self-activating and by its very nature destined to go on *ad infinitum*. Thus there is a continuous swinging between painful thoughts, caused by the impact of reality, of facts, on our opinions and interpretations of these facts, on the one hand; and pleasant and pleasure-projecting ("hopeful") thoughts to "compensate", on the other. Since pain always wants to turn into pleasure and pleasure always wants to continue, which is the mechanism of the "more" or the "less", there is never an end to thought, which is an eternal oscillation between dispair and hope. Even at night, in dreams, this movement continues. Man dreams about the things he has not got, but wishes for (dreams as wish-fulfilment) or fears

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(anxiety dreams or nightmares).

So it is that, at least most of us, do not know the existence of a pause in the thought process; this thought-pause is therefore a state beyond the opposites, free from Time (which is the pressure of the "next" thought). And all that because we have never gone into the question of thought, never meditated ! For if we had, we might perhaps have realized that we ourselves have initially caused this schism between (psychological) pleasure and pain, that there are only facts, and that it is the conditioned mind, which has coloured these facts, from which it has created its own gratifications and frustrations.

Perhaps it may now be appreciated that the spiritual life represents a process of disengagement from the tyrannical thought symbols that dominate our life and actions. This disengagement is not, however, the giving up of one enslaving thought habit and its substitution by another, as so often happens with those who practise mind discipline, or try to "be good". Nor is it what is popularly called "renunciation", which is no renunciation at all, in the true sense of the word. But it is rather to be conceived as the release from the tight grip of thought generally.

If I can come to an understanding why I am held by Sex, Money, Ambition and so forth, then the waking up to the entrancement produces a relaxation all round in the compulsive forces of the mind, for the mechanism of enslavement is identical in each case. Since all addictions have their roots deep in the mind, and have grown in strength as a direct result of our lack of understanding of thought, a clearer and sharper vision of the thought process in ourselves has at once a freeing effect on the mind. It would therefore be true to say that "to understand the prison is to destory the prison".

The disengagement from the various driving forces will further induce the individual to his cutting of various unnecessary commitments, which will lead to a more relaxed life and give him more time just "to sit and stare".

Thus far in this chapter we have dealt with the many varied aspects of thought, which were considered to be important for its understanding. In the course of our discussion we have dealt with the birth of thought, its continuance and we have dropped hints about the possibility of its ending. We have seen that this ending is absolutely essential for the ending of sorrow. In the final section of this study on thought we shall look particularly into the matter of its ending.

Having seen that there is not a single psychological problem that can be resolved through thought, I wish to rid myself of it; and so my problem is:"how to end thought ?"But is this stating the problem correctly ? Does not the "how" immediately lead to the continuation of thought ?

So, obviously, this question is out; I must forget it completely and immediately,otherwise I shall create more food for thought. Also out, as

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we have already seen, is the endeavour to end thought forcefully, for the only force I can apply is the force of thought itself.

This leaves me only with one thing, to remain **with** the thought but not **in** the thought. This now is the crucial point upon which everything depends, to understand fully that there is literally all the difference in the world between direct perception of thought, and **thinking along with** the thought (which is to be absorbed in thought). The two are mutually exclusive. Since thought maintains itself only because of the blind driving force behind it, the perception of the thought process in action, and the seeing of how it is based on self-interest, insecurity, and so on, destroys its momentum. Whereas thought leads to an "answer" a result, which is a continuity within thought, non-thought leads to no such answer, but to freeedom,whic his the cutting of continuity and so the destruction of thought.

This is really the exact point at which the "spiritual life" begins. Ordinarily these words are used very loosely, but in the author's view the underlying state can be indicated fairly precisely. The spiritual life becomes only a reality the moment we step out of thought.[7] Anything else is self-deception: it is merely the play of the intellect, however much this may be disguised by the use of high-falutin terms.

So, if in our meditation, we re-act to what is observed by producing more thought, at that moment we are lost to the life of the spirit, and back on the level of ideation. Are not the newspapers full of solutions to the problems of an unhappy world, and is not everyone of them based on idea and so doomed to failure ? Even psychoanalysis, which "employs" perception (of repressed thought) as a means of purification, is concerned only with the perception of certain thought symbols within the framework of other socially well-established thought constructs:therefore it is still altogether within thought and so it cannot lead to perfect freedom but only to an adjustment to Society. But to adjust to Society to "fit in" better, is to get, in a subtle way, more entangled. Furthermore, because psychoanalysis proceeds within thought, that is within time, there is no end to it; one can go on everlastingly analysing the dark recesses of the Unconscious, with its many conflicts, but who is the analyser ? Unless the analyser himself is totally free from darkness, he is not qualified for the job, because his analysis will reflect his own being and so inevitably introduce an error.

What we are concerned with here is the perception of the limitation and unreality ("emptiness") of every kind of thought structure, which is to reject thought **in toto,** so that not even one thought will arise. This frees one altogether from Society, yet at the same time maintaining normal relationships with that Society. The stepping out of thought is therefore not a stepping out of Society; the latter could only be a reaction

[7] And since thought is only kindled when there is a residue of undigested experience, this means that the spiritual life is to live without carry-over from yesterday.

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against society, and the person who is free no longer has any need to react ("to be in the world, yet not of it").

So what is required is to see the thought as thought, without ever going along with the thought, at the same time perceiving the subtle ways it touches on the interests of the ego. That is all; this sounds simple but it is extremely difficult—or perhaps "difficult" is not the right word because it implies effort, and one should rather say that it is highly elusive. Perhaps our main difficulty in right meditation is this very habit of making effort, which is the first natural reaction when we try something new. Only after having mastered something, do we seem to function effortlessly in its performance.

Now in learning any technique on the material level, effort is obviously required because there we are concerned with the cultivation of memory, and with implanting a certain pattern of skill, of "know-how", on the mind. But this cannot hold true for meditation which is not mind training; perception and comprehension are always involuntary and therefore effortless. Yet the habit is so strong, the structure of the mind is such, that effort always creeps in somehow. In this connection the effort may take a very subtle from. For example, we become aware that in a personal relationship attachement has begun to grow. We may then be inclined to "watch" this relationship with a view of preventing the attachment from taking roots. But even this presents a subtle sort of effort, does it not, for we have singled out this particular situation for our attention, which action represents a dualistic act of discrimination, which in itself binds. So what do we do ? This is hardly the right question, is it?—for the word "do' is not the correct operative term. This should demonstrate to us once again that no single problem can be solved in isolation, on its own level. Yet that is what everyone in this world is trying to do. We seek to solve the "sexual problem", the problem of war, of poverty, and so many others—without first solving the problem of man himself. But the latter requires a total revolution in consciousness, and so it is much easier to fiddle with these individual problems, all on the level of words, and much less disturbing ! Only when there is a mindfulness in all directions, which is therefore choiceless, is there a release; and because it is directionless such mindfulness is completely effortless.

THE NEED FOR PASSIVITY

To do absolutely nothing is so essential in the spiritual life because "to do" and "to observe dispassionately" are mutally exclusive. Because we are "doing" something all the time, in the process of re-action, we can never purely and simply look at anything; and if we do look it is with one eye on the possible result of our action on the fact. Therefore the total significance of that fact eludes us, which is a pity. For it is only though living totally, intensely and passionately with facts—however "unpleasant"—that the transforming and liberating factor can work

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through the mind, and that will bring its own action which is not re-action from thought.

When there is a ruthless perception of facts without fancy, an observation no longer coloured by our desires, then a strange quietness comes into being. In that quietness the usual ingoing movement from the outer to the inner, which is the acquisitive process of the ego, has come to an end; and in its place there is now a movement of a different order : an outgoing feeling, which may be the beginning of Love.

So we have seen that total passivity is of the very highest importance, an essential factor, in the ending of thought. Agitation in the mind there is and will be, but this only becomes pernicious when it is acted upon. As long as there is agitation without reaction, the centre remains unmoved, and there is no further accumulation of psychological memory; thus the energy of agitation must spend itself.

The moment, however, thought is acted upon, reality (i.e.. continuity) is given to the unreal (for psychological thought, being I-orientated, can never be the Real, which is impersonal). This acting from thought, which is therefore re-action, can be in the form of some physical action, leading to more "experiencing" and so to further thought; or, it can take the form of thought opposing the original thought (repression), superseding the original thought (escapism, sublimation), or increasing its momentum (indulgence). However, whatever from the re-action takes, the result is always a further re-action; and this in its turn will give rise to one more re-action, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Because of this mechanism there is no chance at all for the agitation in the mind ever to come to a standstill. This can only occur when the endless belt of thought images is ruthlessly intercepted and cut by the onset of meditation, that is when thought itself is passively directly perceived and exposed. Then for the first time this thought—however socially inacceptable it may be—is left to its own devices, so that it does not give rise to re-action. In this way only is real freedom possible.

FREEDOM AND MORALITY

Conventionally, absolute freedom is considered to be the possibility of unlimited un-fettered action and/or the total freedom of thought;all this is really merely the apposite of slavery.But from our point of view,Freedom is neither the possibility of unlimited physical action,nor even the freedom of thinking, but it is the freedom **from** thinking (nor is it the freedom from any particular thought, but from **all** thought). This Freedom is neither non-slavery nor slavery; it can exist perfectly will in slavery, just as in the state of non-slavery (**i.e.**, "total freedom" in the conventional sense) there may not lie Freedom at all.

The totally revolutionary principle in the spiritual life lies thus in its non-interference with thought; this is the core of its difference from the conventionally "reiigious" life. It follows that a society or community, which merely holds on to a moral or ethical code to live by, is

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therefore fundamentally irreligious and, paradoxically, in a subtle way perpetuates that which it fights as "immoral" or "unethical". In fact, we can see that the very act "moralizing" is a sociall accepted way of vicariously indulging in the immorality, since, because it is a reaction to the immorality is not free from it itself. It is obviously not the author's intention to deny or decry moral codes, but it is shown here that without anything further, i.e., without meditation, they are less than useless for all life is then firmly imprisoned within the opposities, that is within thought. Therefore such a society will always live in the unreal, and it can never know what Love is.

MEDITATION AND THE TYRANNY OF THOUGHT

The vision that all is empty, our whole world being within and from thought and that thought itself—if we allow it—will everlastingly move from dispair to hope and from hope to dispair—this perception alone wipes away our denseness, worries and provides the most wonderful mental tonic in the world. It brings with it a sense of freedam which lifts us completely out of our usual troubled existence; this is pure Joy and however short-lived it may be, one feels quite literally "out of this world", to use a much abused expression (for normally, when using it, we are very much tied up with thing worldly). However, for it to be of full value one should come to it standing in the midst of life, rather than in the "splendid isolation" of physical aloneness (which could betray a withdrawal from all relationship).

But let the reader experiment; if he does this and remains alertly passive, he will know what it is to meditate. Is not this an experiment, which the world today needs more urgently than any amount of experimentation in scientific or technological laboratories, however spectacular and however expensive ? In a sense, of course, we may consider meditation the supremely scientific experiment, for is it not the most "fundamental" of them all ? Moreover, it is an investigation in which each of us must be a pioneer, in the truest sense of the word, for there is no falling back upon the findings of others, no easy referring to textbooks.

And the "results" of meditation, are they not much more far-reaching than any scientific project, whethet it be going to the moon or rhe discovery of fundamental particles ? Whatever we do in science, we cannot get away from the "observer" who measures and correlates, and by his very presence, to a certain extent, vitiates the experiment. On the human level, we cannot escape from the "self" that struggles to achieve and suffers in that process, but in meditation the limits of space and time—and thus of the "self"—are altogether transcended. Thus there comes into being a different state of consciousness and so a different mode in which man functions.

If the reader has come as far as this, and experienced all this in his own meditation, let him be warned for the final trick which the mind can—and, undoubtedly, will—play on him at this stage.It is that thought

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will immediately endeavour to appropriate the "stepping out of thought" for its own purposes, for it is now literally fighting for its life! That is, it will not mind when the thinker extracts himself from a painful situation by ending thought, but when pleasure comes along, it will encourage the thinker once again to stay within thought in order after all not to miss the many benefits and delights that only thought can offer him. Perhaps this last snare prepared by thought is appropriately symbolized in different religious writings by the temptations offered to the Saviour by the Devil.

So, how do we measure up to this tricky situation? It seems that ultimately we have to choose between the pleasure and the excitements of emotional involvement afforded by thought and the lack of all that but the freedom which is born when we have died to thought. It is again the Law of Inertia, the magnetism of pleasure, that holds us back from attaining psychological death. Even spiritually, man wants to have his cake and eat it. Although we used the word "choice", this is somewhat misleading, because in actual fact there is no choice—and if there were, who is it that chooses? This process has to work itself out and will only do so when there is the fullest understanding of the emptiness of all the various movment possible within thought; the recognition that there is no other way and no compromise, because—one might say—Nature rigidly applies the either/or principle. According to this, something is either a fact or it is not, which leaves no scope for the mind's usual bargaining and compromising. After all, one does not bargain with Death, or with Sex, does one? However much we like to "suppress" or cover up certain disturbing facts, they are there; and no amount of cerebral activity is going to make any difference to them.

It seems to me that, if it came to the point, very few people who profess an interest in the matters discussed in this article, would be perpared to live in this utterly revolutionary way. To "take an interest" is something, but it is not enough; as Krishnamurti once said "it is not a matter of attending a few Talks", nor is it a matter of continuing to read the latest books on Zen, organizing discussion groups, and so on. What matters only is that we are sufficiently serious about these things, and such an attitude necessarily involves a class with Society, which even further strengthens the force of inertia.

To be deeply serious means to think fundamentally, and to be a "fundamentalist" in the proper sense of the word, is so very difficult because it requires the utmost simplicity. To listen to words such as God, "Buddhahood", Truth, Love, Death, and to realize that each is just a thought—one out of an infinite possible number of thoughts—and nothing more, not to be used as a basis for philosophy-building, but just left alone as thought or concept, requires a simplicity which almost borders to idiocy. This seems almost impossible with most of us, because the Word holds an extraordinary power, it hypnotizes us so that we must react, we must

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spawn more thought. The momentum of the mind is thus maintained by the continuous impetus of the Word; and so long as this mechanical process is not understood and therefore unbroken, there can be no meditation. But to take just one idea, one thought, and to look at it, to play with it, to go into it thoroughly, so that its whole background is seen in relation to the thinker—which can only be done when there is the freedom from thought—that is true meditation. That brings with it its own clarity, a unique blessing, which no amount of thinking-activity, however subtle or however noble, can give us.

However, the truth with most of us is that we live wholly within thought, and the saddest part of it is that we are not even aware how "intellectual (in the sense of "cerebral") we are. When we think we love, it is only another thought-habit. We love "because of", but never "regardless" or "in spite of". To think of the beloved is to us to love. The beloved is simply a picture of an idealized entity that we worship. We are in love with this thought structure because it is complementary to the thought structure which represents our own inadequate "me", and so it gives us a feeling of security and comfort. But the moment the other refuses to give us what we want or the idealized picture of the beloved is seen to be not according to reality, it crashes and love is no more. Thus the personal and exclusive love relationship is at present one of the main avenues through which thought pursues happiness and fulfilment. But happiness can only be when love is no longer thought, and thought is no longer seeking continuity; that is, when we no more depend for our happines on another or are crushed by circumstances.

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CHOOSING OTHERWISE

JOHN O. NELSON

There would seem to be three possible theories concerning choice: (a) choice exists but there does not exist the possibility of choosing otherwise than we do; (b) choice exists and there does exist the possibility of choosing otherwise than we do;and(c) there does not exist choice. It may be demonstrated, however, that theory a contains an inconsistency and so must be rejected. The inconsistency is this: circumstances where we cannot help doing a thing are precisely the circumstances where we have no choice. To say, therefore, that we can choose but we cannot choose otherwise than we do is to deny the very existence of choice while at the same time asserting its existence.

Later in this paper I shall demonstrate the impossibility of asserting, as a critical judgment, that there is no such thing as choice, i.e., theory c. Thus, theory b, it seems, must be true. If it is true, however, there is certainly no general agreement that it is. On the contrary, when philosophically considered, theory b is likely to appear the least plausible of the above alternatives and one that we cannot possibly want to maintain.And to show that we cannot do so three important sorts of argument might be advanced.[1] In the order in which I shall discuss them, the first of these arguments states that it is impossible to conceive a power to choose otherwise. The second holds that the methods and concepts of science necessitate the acceptance of determinism or some form of theory c and the denial of b. And the third and last says that to claim we can choose otherwise than we do is to claim what cannot in the nature of things ever be known, and hence affirmations of a power to choose otherwise must be purely empty of content and idle.

These three arguments, which I shall term respectively the conceptual, scientific, and epistemological arguments are all extremely plausible when set forth in detail and have even the appearance of conclusiveness. In spite of this appearance, the conclusion they share, that b must be rejected, has been frequently attacked and rejected on extrinsic grounds. It has been argued, for instance, that the existence of morality implies that we possess the power to choose otherwise than we do; the existence of morality is certain; and consequently the arguments in question must be fallacious. But this method of rebuttal is obviously two-edged. One

[1] I shall not pretend that these are the the only arguments, or even the only important arguments, that can be advanced in opposition to b. They are not. In a more theological Age, a number of arguments involving Divine Attributes would demand discussion, and in any very extended work on choice would still merit it. I do not, however, believe that theological arguments any longer play a great role in discussions on choice (though it may be true that they ought to), and because of limitations of space, we shall have to restrict our examination to those that do.

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might with as much justice contend that the arguments in question are irrefutable; consequently the existence of morality must be denied.

The aim of this paper is two-fold. It is, first, to demonstrate that the three arguments above are intrinsically untenable; that is, they merit on their own account rejection. And second, its aim is to demonstrate, in some sense of the term "demonstrate," that the power to choose otherwise does in fact exist and that we can know that it does. The relevance and importance of such a demonstration for ethics is evident.

For brevity's sake and because the problems of choice and freedom are inextricably connected, I shall generally refer to the power to choose otherwise than we do as "metaphysical freedom."[2] Thus, this paper might be thought of as on attempt to establish on a philosophical foundation the possibility and existence of metaphysical freedom.

I. The Conceptual Argument : **that it is impossible to conceive metaphysical freedom**

On the face of it, the claim that it is impossible to conceive metaphysical freedom is contradictory; for in saying that such freedom cannot be conceived we presumably have already admitted a conception of it. A more just understanding of this claim would therefore interpret it as saying that however we try to describe the nature of choice (or the concept of choice) we shall find it impossible to include as a consistent part of our description a power to choose otherwise than we do.

So understood, the claim made by the conceptual argument seems absolutely correct. The plain truth is: **however we try to describe the nature of choice we do find it impossible to include as a consistent part of our description a power to choose otherwise than we do.** This may appear to be a wholly dogmatic statement. It is obvious that we cannot examine, nor can we have examined, each and every such description. But we need not carry out a complete enumeration of descriptions. It will suffice (1) if we can specify a particular element, say Y, which must occur as an element in any **description** of the nature of choice and (2) if the presence of Y alone precludes the possibility of metaphysical freedom. But just such an element is what might be termed "that-in-which-choice-consists." For if there is such a thing as choosing, and choosing

[2] It will no doubt be observed that "metaphysical freedom," according to my definition, is fairly close in meaning to what Adler and others have termed "natural freedom" (see Adler, *The Idea of Freedom*, Doubleday, 1958, Part Two, Chapter 8; Part Three, Chapters 20-25). It might seem, therefore, advisable to employ the latter term instead of complicating terminology by a superfluous addition. Various reasons, however, have dictated a contrary course. (a) It has sometimes been made a condition for the use of the term "natural freedom" that it signify "a freedom that 1 all men possess and 2 only men possess" (Alder, *op. cit.*, p. 152). The question whether all men possess what I have defined as metaphysical freedom and whether only men possess it are questions that are open, it seems to me, to argument. Since I do not wish to examine these questions in this place I do not, by the same token, feel justified in using the term "natural freedom." (b) The term "natural freedom" has been identified with the concept of "self-determination" (see Adler, *op. cit.*, pp. 400 ff,). For reasons that will be gone into in the text of this essay it would seem misleading to so identify "metaphysical freedom".

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possesses a nature which can be described, then there must be "that-in-which-choice-consists" and "that-in-which-choice-consists" must be an element in any description of choice. If, though, any such description of choice is true then demonstrably there connot be such a thing as metaphysical freedom. Let us, as an illustration, suppose that "that-in-which-choice-consists" is an act of choice. Let us imagine that some act of choice now takes place, namely, the choice to raise my arm and that my arm now rises. By hypothesis I did not choose that this act of choice should occur (for we have said that choice consists in an act of choice and not the other way around). This act of choice, therefore, either A simply occurred, or B it occurred through antecedent causes, or C it itself chose to occur. These seem to exhaust the possible alternative interpretations of Y (as presently conceived). Now whatever else may be true about these interpretations of Y, according to none of them can I really R be responsible for my arm rising; but D, if I had exercised metaphysical freedom, I would have been responsible for its rising (that is, if I had chosen to lift my arm and I could have chosen otherwise). In short, A, B, and C imply R is false; D implies R is true. Consequently, since Y=A or B or C, Y precludes the possibility of D being true; and that is to say, metaphysical freedom is inconceivable (as we have decided to use the terms **conceivable** and **inconceivable**). Thus, depending on how we look at the matter, the words "power to choose otherwise than we do" must stand either for a self-contradictory notion (such as philosophers sometimes ascribe to non-philosophers) or a fatuous sound or a falsehood that pretends to describe reality but which an accurate description of reality excludes.

At first thought it may seem that any possible rebuttal of these conclusions lies, and lies only, in adding or subtracting form the description of choice which we have used to illustrate the conceptual argument. We might try replacing "act of choice" by "act of self-determination" or "self-causation" or something similar. But this way of seeing the matter is a sheer delusion. The only escape from the conclusions we have fallen into lies in a much more fundamental consideration, which seems always to get overlooked.

Tacitly, we assume in the conceptual argument that it is due to the nature of the world or to some internal inconsistency in the idea of metaphysical freedom that descriptions of the nature of choice exclude the possibility of a power to choose otherwise. Like the rabit which is already in the magician's hat and then gets produced, this presupposition of the conceptual argument then gets produced as a conclusion. Actually, however, the logical state of affairs is this : any description of the nature of choice not only does but **must** preclude the possibility of metaphysical freedom and it must solely because of the nature of **our undertaking**. Specifically, the description of a nature imposes a conceptual scheme upon our discourse which *per se* excludes the conceptual scheme of

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metaphysical freedom. Thus, the conceptual argument operates somewhat analogously to our putting green spectacles on and so finding everything green, and as little as that proves that everything is green, just as little does the conceptual argument, in spite of appearances, prove that metaphysical freedom does not or cannot exist. But let me now substantiate these claims with something more than their utterance.

As we have already noted, when we describe the nature of something, we are forced by the very terms of our undertaking to conceive it in this manner : X consists in Y. Now where X is an object composed of parts, Y, it is perhaps possible to replace X by Y without any logical miscarriage taking place. But let us instead of a mere object take the case of a person, for when we speak of describing the nature of choice it is really a person choosing that we are speaking about, and not a choice choosing (which would be nonsense). We have said that the nature of X, a choice, consists in Y. Two logical consequences immediately follow. We are now treating a person choosing as some sort of whole containing parts. One of these parts is "choice". And at the same time we are treating a person's choosing as if it were related to him as an object is related to a perceiver. Let me try to make the last sentence clear by drawing a parallel. If when I move my hand before my face I abstract what I see, i.e., the series of visual appearances of my hand, and I say that my moving my hand consists in those appearances, then I am describing my moving of my hand exactly as I might describe your hand moving before me, and it is this transposition of logic that I would be trying to depict in saying that I have treated my moving of my hand as if it were related to me as an object is related to a perceiver.

Now by reason of these two logical consequences the request for a description of the nature of choice can be fulfilled **only** at the cost of eliminating the possibility of a person's choosing, and therefore, a person's choosing otherwise than he does. First, we have redefined choice in terms of an object perceived. This redefinition makes it impossible for a person truly to assert, "I choose"; he may only say, "When I asserted, 'I choose', such-and-such is what happened and in which my choosing consisted". Secondly, in abstracting choosing from the realm of persons and lodging it in the realm of perceived objects, we have at once ensured that there really can be no such thing as choice and hence **choosing otherwise**. For objects cannot choose, any more than objects can feel pain or be conscious. And thirdly, we seal this result shut by imposing a division upon the person choosing. When a person's behavior or actions are accounted for in terms of parts into which that person has been analyzed, the very concept of choice prohibits our attributing choice to his behavior or actions. For example, if we say that a man's actions result from a tumor in the brain or from a phobia we may not say that he chose those actions. In attributing a person's actions to something which happens

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within him and which we say his choosing consists in we fall under the same prohibition[3].

We see, then, that in attempting to confirm or disconfirm the conceptual argument we are absolutely bound to confirm it, not because there cannot be such a thing as metaphysical freedom, but because the very task we set ourselves, to describe the nature of choice, precludes by its own terms the possibility of conceiving such freedom. It must, however, be remarked that in showing this we have not as yet shown either that there is anything wrong or illicit in the request for a description of the nature of choice or that metaphysical freedom can exist. we have only shown that the conceptual argument does not prove what it seems to prove. What I want now to show is that (A) we do commit a grave logical error in attempting to describe the nature of choice and (B) that once we refuse to accede to the demand made on us by the conceptual argument to provide such a description we shall find no difficulty in conceiving, in some appropriate sense of the term "conceiving", metaphysical freedom. I say "some appropriate sense of the term 'conceiving' "because it is obvious that we can no longer mean by "impossible to conceive" something like "impossible to provide a description of the nature of choice which permits metaphysical freedom", the presumption being that we have already rejected as logically inadmissible all such descriptions. But certainly the following might be taken as a workable and appropriate sense of the term "conceive", agreeing as it does both with ordinary and philosophical usages. We might say : metaphysical freedom is conceivable if it is possible to attribute metaphysical freedom to a person without falsifying the attribution of other properties unquestionably belonging to a person,e.g., predictability of action, the existence of appetites and character, motives, rationality, and so on. And we might say : metaphysical freedom cannot be conceived if its attribution is inconsistent with those other attributions. And this, in fact, will be the sense in which I shall henceforth use the term "conceive" where speaking of the possibility of conceiving metaphysical freedom.

(A) It is manifest, I think, that if we describe a concept, C, as if it possessed the character, X, whereas in fact X is incompatible with the concept, we have blundered and any argument based on our blunder is absolutely worthless (for on such a basis we could prove, if we wished, that snakes were dogs by pretending that snakes had four legs and

[3] Intimations of these logical consequences are to be found, not merely in recent writings (where they occur frequently and explicitly), but at least as far back in the history of philosophy as Berkeley. Consider, for instance, Berkeley's objection to the partition of the self which Alciphron has employed in order to enforce his attack upon metaphysical freedom (Euthphranor, in *Alciphron* dialogue seven, section 18) : "If I should suppose things spiritual to be corporeal, or refine things actual and real into general abstracted notions, or by metaphysical skill split things simple and individual into manifold parts, I do not know what may follow....." But so far as I know these logical consequences have not been connected, as they should be, with the request for a description of the nature of choice. For until we see this connection the desire to provide a description of choice will continue to haunt and corrupt our discussions of choice.

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barked). But the attempt to describe the nature of choice entails just such a logical blunder. In describing the nature of choice we are forced, it has been seen, to treat the concept of a person as the concept of something divided. But *qua* person, a person cannot be divided. For instance, in punishing a person we cannot (as a conceptual matter) punish his hand, or a part of him termed the will, or something present which did not exist in the past. We can only punish **him** (one and indivisible). And we, who punish, fall under the same conceptual restraints. We do not and cannot intelligibly suppose, for example, that our hand does the punishing but not us; or that one part of us will be responsible for doing the punishing and not another; or that any **part** of us will be responsible. Since, then, the request for a description of what the natue of a choice **consists** in necessarily attributes to the concept of a person a characteristic incompatible with the concept, i.e., division, we may without further ado reject it, along with the conceptual argument in which it is embedded.

(B) The following demonstration, it seems to me, is perfectly conclusive in showing that metaphysical freedom is conceivable; that is to say, that it may be attributed to a person consistent with the attribution of predictability of action, appetites, motives, rationality, and so on. Before proceeding with our demonstration, however, it is important to mention a possible point of misunderstanding. This is the idioms in which we commonly talk about our choices and their ground, e.g., "I chose X because of such-and-such reason," "I chose X because I liked X", "I chose X because of caprice," and so on. It may be tempting to read these idioms as if they said that a certain part of us, e. g., will, reason, appetite, caprice, were a causal element producing choice. Any such interpretation, however, plainly violates the concept of a person as something indivisible and so *a fortiori* eliminates the very possibility of choice (as we have already seen). Thus, as long as we are speaking of a person choosing, we must mean by our citations of different grounds of choice, e.g., "because of appetite," "because of such-and-such reason," a relation that in no way violates the indivisibility of the person choosing. How this relation is to be further described, or whether it can be further described, need not concern us in this place.

Let us take, then, the case of a friend who likes cheese and dislikes pickles, and who is invited to a party where he will be served both appetizers. It is clearly part of our conception of this typical situation that our friend will probably or even certainly take the cheese and not the pickles (predictability of behavior). It is a further part of our conception that although he has an appetite for cheese (the person as possessing appetites) he is, nonetheless, under no compulsion to take the cheese; that he can choose the pickles instead (metaphysical freedom); and that he can do so either for given reasons (rationality and motivation) or for no reason at all (e.g., he "just decided to"). Finally, it is part of our conception that when our friend chooses the cheese it is necessarily

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he and not some part of him who chooses to take the cheese (the person choosing as indivisible). But now, if w do not tamper with our conceptions of the things referred to, do we find any incompatibility between them ? Assuredly we do not. The entire fabric of attributions holds together and does so for any number of similar instances in human affairs. In short, as long as we conceive choice in terms of persons choosing (and not objects)metaphysical freedom proves to be perfectly conceivable.

II. The Scientific Argument : **that we must accept determinism for the sake of science**

It may be argued that although metaphysical freedom can be conceived, there are, nonetheless, good reasons for rejecting the notion; and these good reasons have to do with science. Specifically, it may be argued that if we are to apply science to human conduct—indeed, if we are to suppose that there is any homogeneity between human events and other events—we must reject the picture that persons possess the power to choose othetwise than they do and consider all human conduct as causally determined. Only by doing so shall we be able to achieve an exactness rigor, and unity in our predictions of human behavior that merits the title "scientific."

Since this viewpoint favoring causal determination has directly or indirectly inspired the triumphs and methods of the physical sciences it cannot be lightly dismissed. Even at the expense of discarding the moral category as a superstition (which we should have to do), it might seem profitable to subject all human action to causally based analyses and thus provide ourselves with a power and knowledge over human affairs that we currently lack. For though—as we have seen—we can make predictions, and even certain predictions, concerning the behavior of persons, *qua* persons, the certainty permitted is not of a sort that lends itself either to the objective demonstrations of highly developed science or to unified theory. When, for instance, we assert that it is certain that our friend will choose cheese instead of pickles at a party but limit our substantiation to purely **personal** terms, e.g., "He does not like pickles," "He has never chosen pickles before," etc., our evidence is what might be termed "impressionistic." Others may go along with us; but they are not forced to. Thus, someone might object, "But I don't see from his having always previously chosen cheese instead of pickles that it is certain he will do so this time."[4] If, however, we could interpret our freiend's behavior in terms of a causal complex of objects,then we would be able to demonstrate in non-impressionistic ways that he would certainly take the cheese, just as it can be demonstrated objectively that the moon will pass in front of the sun at such-and-such a time, given such-and-such figures and Newtonian mechanics. Indeed, it might even be possible by reducing human behavior to purely causal interpretations to

[4] Reference is not being made to the philosophical problem of induction but to the usual differentiation that we make between human behavior and that of causally determined motions.

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elevate psychology to a branch of mathematical physics, a beatification that many psychologists seem to devoutly pray for.

In spite of the high stakes that beckon, however, there are two very good reasons for not acceding to the above arguments. The first reason is that whatever evidence we actually have suggests that voluntary human conduct does not lend itself to rigid causal-type predictions. If, then, by an abstraction or turn of logic we form a causally-based picture of human conduct, that means we are dealing with a chimera and not a reality; a chimera, furthermore, that, unlike the ideal systems used in physical science, can apparently never be applied with profit to actual affairs. When we apply an ideal causal system in physical science to phenomena we do so by introducing further causal factors, e.g., friction of bodies, into our computations. In the case of this ideal system of psychology which we have imagined, we shall somehow have to introduce a causal calculus into a non-causal state of affairs. How is this to be done? It might be answered, perhaps, that some statistical connection could be established, based on the sort of statistical predictions concerning choices that we already possess, e.g., "Seven out of ten persons will choose a red-colored fabric over a blue-colored fabric." But how are these statistical predictions which we already possess to be made more exact and rigorous by extrapolating others from an ideal causal system that logically falsifies actual conduct? One should think that the resulting predictions would be less reliable than those we now have, which are based on tabulations of the actual behavior of persons.

But even supposing that statistical predictions could be improved, from the viewpoint of metaphysics the really crucial objection to the program of reducing all personal behavior to causal complexes of objects remains. If we are to be consistent, we must suppose that our very decision to reconceptualize the self as a causal complex of objects belongs to some causal complex. Strictly speaking, however, in a world consisting only of causal complexes there cannot exist decisions, considered judgment,responsible evaluation,or any of the other related concepts of critical assessment. Because, say, certain electrical impulses have the effect of making my mouth fly open and utter the sentence, "I decide to reconceptualize the self as a causal complex," that does not mean that there has been a decision; on the contrary, it precludes there having been a decision. Moreover, suppose now that as the effect of various causes, another person's mouth opens and utters the sentence, "That is the correct thing to do," and still another person's mouth opens and utters the sentence, "That is not the correct thing to do." As mere effects of causes, does one utterance **merit** more credence than the other? If, **as persons,** we could examine the causal apparatuses in question and if we discovered that one was in good working order and the other not. then we might sensibly maintain that one utterance merited credence and the other not. But it should be remembered that **we** are now also to be

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conceived as mere causal complexes of objects;we too are a causal apparatus of some sort. Does, then, the fact that our mouth opens and utters the sentence, "The first speaker's utterance merits credence" itself merit credence? Again, it only can if we introduce, somewhere along the line, a person who inspects and deliberates on **our** causal apparatus. Generalizing, then, it seems clear that when we propose the reconceptualization of the self as a causal complex we must be prepared to do away with the entire category of critical assessment, along with the various concepts contained in it, e.g., decision, considered judgment, etc., and this means that our very proposal itself can pretend to no critical backing. It can amount to no more than mere noise. The only possible way, therefore, that a person can critically propose that there exists complete causal determination in human affairs is by excepting himself from that generalization. But on what grounds can the proposer of that generalization do **that**? There are obviously no grounds. Moreover, in having to admit the possibility and existence of metaphysical freedom in his own case in order to provide for himself the basis of critical assessment, he **cannot** consistently maintain that the methods and concepts of science necessitate the denial of metaphysical freedom and the acceptance of absolutely universal causal determination. For by definition science is a form of knowledge resting on critical assessments.

III. The Epistemological Argument : **that the existence of freedom cannot be known.**

Whatever else has or has not been shown (it may be said), it has not been shown that we **know** there to exist metaphysical freedom. We may have established that its existence is not inconceivable, in the sense that there is no real incompatibility between its attribution and the attribution of predictability and motives to human conduct. And it may have been established that **if** there are to exist critical judgments there **must** exist metaphysical freedom. But even if these conclusions have been incontrovertibly established, it does not follow from them that metaphysical freedom **does** exist. A stubborn determinist, for example, might still argue : "Because a thing may exist that does not prove it does exist. And if the denial of metaphysical freedom entails that all that I am now saying constitutes mere noise, then mere noise it must be, and the impression that it is not—that there is taking place critical assessment and judgment—is simply an illusion which I am causally compelled to undergo". And this stubborn opponent to metaphysical freedom will demand, before he accepts the existence of such a thing, that there be some proof of its existence.

What I have termed the epistemological argument has its inception in this or some similar challenge to prove that metaphysical freedom does exist, or in the question, "How do we know it exists ?". In either case, our natural reaction is to turn to inner experience for an answer. The reasons and analogies that guide us in that direction seem as unexceptional as common sense. If we are asked to find out whether it is true that

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there is a chair in a certain room, we go look and see. But if we are to believe our own words, choices are initiated and occur in the mind. We say, "I viewed this and that in my mind and then decided", or "At the same time I was smiling at him I decided to doublecross him", and other persons say that they do not know whether we have come to a decision or not—they cannot tell from our expression;and in other ways they and we seem to imply that behind our visages choices are taking place. It seems the plainest truth, therefore, that if we are to confirm or disconfirm the existence of metaphysical freedom we must somehow do so through an immediate observation of our inner experiences. But when we introspect it is always with the same outcome. We discover no possible basis for confirming or disconfirming any sentence of the form, "I could have chosen otherwise than I did", or "I can choose otherwise than I do". On the contrary, on the basis of what we can observe in inner experience, we are forced to conclude that when we speak of a power to choose otherwise we describe or report absolutely nothing. For how can we confirm affirmations of metaphysical freedom when we cannot even discover in our experiences anything that could possibly pass for choosing ? For instance : introspection may discover to us a sequence of images, internal debates, feelings of uncertainty or instability changing into a posture to move in certain directions, the utterance of the words, "I choose to do X." But it is manifest that these things do not comprise a choice, either taken individually or all together. We might imagine, for example, the identical sequence of happenings taking place **against our consent and will.** In this admittedly queer psychological state we should certainly want to ask, "What is happening to me ?" or, if some action emanated from the sequence of happenings, we should certainly want to assert, and we should be entitled to assert, that it was not in the least due to our willing it.

Now our failure to discover anything like metaphysical freedom or even mere choice in our inner experiences would be a grave matter indeed if we were right in looking for them there (or any other place). It would then truly constitute a great mystery that we ever thought and talked as if there were such things and we should have to admit that our words "choice" and "choose otherwise than we do" were the merest noises. The whole point is, of course, that we are wrong in attempting to confirm or disconfirm assertions of choice and metaphysical freedom in our inner experiences. In requesting us to do so the epistemological argument is of one piece with the conceptual argument that we discussed in section one. It asks us to do what must, as a matter of intrinsic logic, preclude our inquiry's having any other than a purely negative conclusion. We do not discover an absence of choice and metaphysical freedom because there is an absence of them, but because the nature of the experiment we are engaged in—that is, introspection—conceptually guarantees their absence, as putting on green glasses (to repeat a previous simile) guarantees that what we see will be green, whether it really is or not.

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When we attempt to confirm a first person psychological assertion through introspection—for example, a statement affirming the power to choose otherwise—we are necessarily placed in the role of observing ourselves or our internal experiences; and that is to say, we effect a division in ourselves as persons, becoming both observer and object observed. Moreover, since the terminus of our self-observation is the self as an object, we must always in this experiment end up viewing ourselves as an object. It is, consequently, really no mystery why metaphysical freedom seems to equal zero and affirmations of metaphysical freedom seem to be entirely empty of reference when we seek to locate the former or confirm the latter through internal observations. In doing so, we replace persons by objects; and no more then we can discover choice in stones can we discover it in any other objects; neither in sequences of images, utterances, bodily motions, nor the entire landscape of our activities, no matter how elaborately and minutely spread out.

If, though, there are senses of 'confirm' and 'know' in which we cannot confirm or know that we possess metaphysical freedom, it does not follow that there are not other senses in which we can. Indeed, in some sense of these terms, it is obvious that we can confirm and we can know that we possess the power to choose otherwise. Consider this sort of situation. I have said that I am choosing the 'down-payment and pay in twenty years plan'. "But do you not know that you can choose a no-down-payment and pay in fifty years plan ?" I am asked. Plainly, in this very common sort of situation, I might reply, "Yes, I know I can choose the no-down-payment plan, but I do not wish to" or "I know I can choose otherwise than I am, but I shall not", or, "No, I didn't know I could choose otherwise. Are you sure I can ?" And in reply to the last question this sort of confirmation might be adduced, e.g., I might be shown the small print of the policy which says, "The buyer may also, if he chooses, use the no-down-payment plan".

Norman Malcolm in "*Knowledge and Certainty*" argues convincingly that if S (a sentence) has a correct use then it can express a true statement[5]. In the above case, we were certainly using the terms 'know', 'choose' and 'choose otherwise' correctly. If Malcolm is right, and I cannot see how he should not be where S expresses a psychological first person statement, the statements above can be true. If they are true it follows at once that metaphysical freedom exists and can be known to exist. Is it possible, then, that our statements above are not true ? I fail to see any grounds for maintaining that they are not except the ground that they contain hidden contradictions. For, clearly, no empirical evidence weighs against their truth. But they cannot contain contradictions, since then they could not be true (and we have seen that they can be true). Therefore, metaphysical freedom does exist and is known to exist.

[5] Norman Malcolm, *Knowledge and Certainty* (Prentice-Hall, Englewood, Cliffs, 1963). p. 179.

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BHAGAVAD GITA IN THE ETHICAL PLANE

K.E. PARTHASARATHY

The Bhagavad Gītā, the Song Celestial which forms part of the Bhishma Parva of the Mahābhārata is considered to be 'the most beautiful' perhaps the only true philosophical song in any known tongue.' It is at once the smallest and the most comprehensive scripture of the world. If the hold which a work has on the mind of man is any clue to its importance, the Gītā is the most influential work. Its keynote is the blending of the ethical, spiritual and religious aspects of life. It is today the gospel of the Indian revival. It occupies a top-most rank in the world of Hinduism as the four Gospels in the world of Christendom. In a very real sense, to understand it is to understand the real soul of India.

The circumstances under which the Lord Krishna delivered the Gītā are too well known to need reiteration. Under the stress of psychological maladjustments, Arjuna went out of mental equilibrium and equipoise and was at a loss to act with discrimination warranted by the circumstances. Lord Krishna took upon himself the task of bringing Arjuna round and taught him the gospel of Gītā.

The first ten ślokas in Chapter of the Bhagavad Gītā explain the circumstances under which Arjuna surrendered himself into the hands of Krishna for light.Ślokas 11 to 46 give a digest of Samkhya philosophy,slokas 47 to 60 of *Karma Yoga* (yoga of action), 60 to 70 of *Bhakti Yoga* (Path of love), 71 to 72 of *Sannyas Yoga* (Path of renunciation). In ślokas, 55 to 72, we get a clear and definite idea of the nature and attitude of *sthitha prajña* or a man of steady wisdom. In short, the second chapter of the Gītā embodies the main purport of the entire work.

The terms '*samkhya*' and '*yoga*' used in the chapter II are not used by Krishna in the sense in which they are used by the systems of philosophy known by these names. In the Gītā, '*samkhya*' means the Eternal Reality and '*yoga*' is a generic word meaning the discipline leading the realization of the Eternal Reality. The Gītā emphasises again and again the inseparable link between them as between sun and light. The spiritual life is nothing but fellowship with God through service, devotion and contemplation.

The picture of Krishna and Arjuna on the battle field of Kurukshetra, a Dharmakshetra itself presents an interesting lesson. Arjuna stands on the battle field a shattered and dilapidated man,while Krishna stands unperturbed.Here is a vital philosophy of life.The battle of Mahābhārata goes on in the mind of every-one between the good and the bad and between the positive and negative urges. Such a conflict takes place in all spheres—social, political, religious and economic. Men of *śoka* and *moha* (grief

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and delusion) suffer and decay. Men of knowledge and understanding rule aud enjoy the world.

Krishna who is no other than Parabrahman treats the disease by regular doses of Vedic and philosophical truths to revive the broken personality of Arjuna. Nothing was omitted by Krishna that the unconsoled heart requires. He also revealed his cosmic form to Arjuna. As a result, the delusion born of ignorance having been dispelled, Arjuna decided to act according to Krishna's word. Kurukshetra was the place of the great vision and the field of the Divine Illumination to Arjuna. To see God is the only thing which can make a man strong to face the world and do his bounden duty. The theme of the Gītā is in a way the discovery of the Divine Essence in man.

Acharya Śankara insists on the importance of ethics as on the fundamentals of spiritual life. Ethics is the science of conduct and its aim, the attainment of pleasure and good or *preyas* and *śreyas*. The aim of all conduct is not only the attainment of pleasure and avoidance of pain but also the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The ethics of the Gītā not only ensures acquistion of good conduct but also paves the way for the attainment of Brahman, which is the highest and greatest good on earth.

The Gītā analyses voluntary action into five factors in the following sloka :—

adhisthānam tathā kartā kāraṇam ca prthagvidhām
vividhas ca prthak cestāh daivam caivatra pānchmām.

(*B.G.* xviii.14)

The first is the adhisthanam or body since it is the locus of the *jīvātma* (soul). or the collocation of five elements. The second is the *kartā* (actor) or Jīvatma endowed with the properties of intelligence and action. The *Karaṇa* (or instruments) constitute the cognitive and conative organs, the *jñanendriyas* and *karmendriyas*. *Cesta* (functions) refers to the varied activities of *Praṇa* sustaining the body and the senses. The last and most important factor is *daivam* or the Supreme Self, who is the inner Self of the individual, the ultimate *niyantā* (controller), the prime cause of all conduct and the end of all endeavour. In chapter xv. 15 Krishna says *'sarvsa caham hridi sannivishtaḥ'* 'I am seated in the hearts of all'. The Brahma Sutra 'Verily from (Him) the Superior (for) so declares the Śruti' (II-3—33) has established that the jīvatma's actorship is dependent on Paramātmā.

The phenomenon of action can be accounted for thus. The Paramātmā grants the body and its organs and also the powers inherent in them, all being dependent on Him. The *jīvātma* (soul) so equipped and so empowered but dependent on Him, manifests His will in the shape of effort through the organs. The Paramatma who is located inside him allows him to act by His silent sanction.In Short, the soul is acting under delegated powers. 'The ruler of all has mounted all beings on the wheel

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of body and living in their hearts. He makes them go round and round with the help of attractive sense objects' (*B.G.* xviii—61).

The states of moral life outlined in the Gītā are stages in a continuous development which culminate in the realisation of the ultimate goal. Morality has its ultimate meaning in the faith that goodness is grounded in God and that He alone as Purushottama is the absolute good and is the pattern of perfection.

The Gītā stresses the purity of mind, the inner purity of motives and intentions. The sense organs should be controlled and withdrawn from the worldly objects and pleasures. The true sacrifice is the sacrifice of all actions, bodily, verbal and mental to God. One attains the eternal Brahman by sacrificing all actions to God and living on whatever he gets by His grace. The Gītā traces the progress from the ethics of *Kāmya Karma* to the metaphysical stages of *nishkāma karma* (duty for duty's sake), then through self-realisation or *ātmaavalokana* to the realisation of Purushottama. This ascent from sensibility to spirituality is the essential part of the ethics of the Gītā.

The Gita enjoins that selfish desires ought to be sublimated. Altruistic desires out to be cultivated. Narrow love for wife, sons and family should be curtailed. Universal love should be transcended. The good of all creatures (*sarvabhutahita*) and welfare of humanity (*lokasangraha*) should be the ends of actions. Those who are engaged in doing good to humanity and sentient creatures attain God. One attains perfection by doing one's specific duties with detachment and worships God by dedicating them to Him.

The ethics of Gītā is the ethics of activism and perfectionism. It is not the ethics of inaction or renunciation of action. Renunciation of fruits of action to God is true renunciation or *sannyāsa*. The life of action is better than renunciation (*B.G.* v—2).

There is some similarity between the Gītā ethics of *nishkama karma* and Kant's ethics of duty for duty's sake. Both enjoin the performance of duties for the sake of duty, without being actuated by love, hatred, fear, anger, greed and other emotions. Both are anti-hedonistic and anti-utilitarian. But they also differ in essential points. The Gītā regards the attainment of God as the highest good. Kant regards good will or the rational will as the highest good. The Gītā enjoins the performance of duties for the welfare of humanity. Kant enjoins the performance of duties for the sake of duty. His ethics is legal while the ethics of Gītā is teleological. Kant stresses on the concept of right and duty. The Gītā lays emphasis on the concept of God realisation as the highest good. The Gītā believes in super-moral perfection of the finite self which transcends virtue and vice and merit and demerit. But Kant regards virtue, good will or rational will as the highest good and virtue in harmony with happiness as the complete good.

The Kantian view of morality falls short of the synthetic ideal presented by the Gītā. The *daivam* or God plays a prominent part in the

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evolution of conduct. It is the synthesis between the human endevour and the divine grace (*kripā*) that invests the Gītā theory of morality with a completeness which is not dominant in the other schools of ethics.

The Gītā psychology of ethics is based on the distinction of the three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. No *jīva* is exempt from the influence of the above three *guṇas*. They are the basis springs of action. No *jīva* is exempt from the influence of above three *guṇas*. The mingling of these three *guṇas* in varying degrees of preponderence constitutes the driving force of human conduct and helps or hinders moral endeavour and spiritual progress.

A *jīva* becomes free from sufferings due to birth old age and death, when he transcends the *guṇas*. He remains an indifferent spectator of the functions of the guṇas. He abides in the essential nature of his self, free from pleasure, pain and delusion. He is unperturbed, by joy and grief, praise and blame, honour and dishonour. He is free from love and hatred and equal to friend and foe. The Gītā also points out that one who transcends the *guṇas*, becomes fit for becoming one with the Absolute—*sa gunnasamatityaitān brahmabhūtāya kalpate* (xiv—26).

Krishna has dealt with at length the three-fold nature of man's choice due to the three *guṇas* in regard to food, sacrifice, austerity and gifts. In fact, these three aspects of life are the pivotal points of the ethical life. The ethical life in its fullness includes our attitude to ourselves, to others and to the future. Chapter xvii of the Gītā gives an elaborate analysis in this regard.

The true spirit of the ethical life is summed up in the words *OM TAT SAT*, which is the threefold symbol of the Absolute. *Om* implies reverence for god and scriptures, *Tat* unselfishness and *Sat* permanence and goodness and auspiciousness and steadfastness and surrender to God. Hence the truly ethical life must be based on reverence, unselfishness and auspiciousness. Whatever is sacrificed or given or purchased or performed without faith is *asat*. It is of no account here or hereafter (xvii-28).

The duty of every man is determined psychologically by his *swabhāva* or his innate nature. His special vocation (*svakarma*) in life is determined by his innate nature. He ought to perform his specific duties for the sake of duty which fit in with his native abilities. He can attain his highest personal good thereby and contribute to the welfare of the world (*lokasangraha*). 'All work is worship.' '*Śreyān swadharmo viguṇāh paradharmāt svanushthitāt*'' (iii-35). 'It is better to perform one's own specific duties than to perform another's.' One is bound to be a failure and a misfit in another's field of action. The Gītā anticipates Bradley's conception of 'my station and duties'. The Gītā enjoins the performance of duties for the good of humanity and attainment of God, while Bradley enjoins the performance of duties appropriate to one's station in life for the realization of the soul.

The most distinctive contribution made by the Gītā to ethical thought

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is the idea of *nishkāma karma*. It reconciles the dualism between human and divine freedom by the idea that one may attain mastery over his self in order that his self may be attuned to the will of God who is the real self of all beings. Every one is the son of God. The responsibility for evil and sin rests with the *jīva* alone. God or Iswara is ever pure and perfect, though as the moral ruler He meets out justice in accordance with one's past *karma*. By giving up *ahaṁkāra* (egotism) and absolute self-surrender to the redemptive grace of God and the self gift to Him, who is the real Real Self, the *mumukshu* (the aspirant for *moksha* or liberation) becomes a *mukta* (free man). The sinner seeks God and is saved. God is the way and the goal. Thus the infinitesimal and infinite meet in ethical religion.

The Gītā urges on the readers the highest ethical and spiritual truth viz. we are in God and God is in us and we must regard the joys and griefs of all as our own (v—29-32). We must love all because all of us have in us God as the supreme and transcendent Reality. The love of a fellow-being is based on his being non-different from us and our being non-different from him. To help or harm another is to help or harm ourselves. The world is one family and God is its Father, its Ruler and its Soul. The doctrine of the greatest good of the greatest number which is the *summum bonum* of ethics can be satisfactorily explained by the above concept.

The Gītā begins with the word 'Dharma' and ends with the term 'mine'(*mama*).The teachings may be considered to constitute the *Dharma* of Krishna. Dharma is a concept distinctive to Hindu view of life and mode of conduct. It embodies a wealth of meaning of various shades and significances. The Sanskrit word 'Dharma' means what religion means and something more. It comes from the root *Dhṛ* which means to uphold or sustain or support and indicates the essential nature of anything without which it cannot sustain its independent existence. It signifies the force which binds us to all living creatures by the cement of compassion and to God. God is in all and all are in God and hence each is tied to all else, and to God. This is the bond of Dharma expounded by Krishna in the Gītā.

Krishna has defined *sthitha prajña* or a man of steady wisdom as one who casts away all the desires of the mind and rejoices in the full beauty and blessedness of the self (ii-55) He who is not cowed down by sorrow and who does hot hunger and thirst after sense delights and who is free from attachment and fear and wrath is a man of meditation and steady wisdom. He who is unattached and who is not elated by pleasure or depressed by pain is the man of steady wisdom. When he withdraws his senses from the objects on every side, then his wisdom is firmly set.

The *sthitha prajña* is not only a moral philosopher but also an exemplar in social life. Yogins like Janaka and Manu have taught by precept and practice that the *mukta* lives for the welfare of others. Whatever a

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great man does, the same is done by others as well (ii—21). God is also ever active with the redemption of souls though. He has nothing to gain for himself by such activity. It is therefore evident that spirituality and service are the twin aspects of ethical code of conduct.

The ideal of the '*sihitha prajña*' provides a broad vision of life and super-life and will solve many thorny problems and will result in harmony in society and the world. As the U.N. charter puts it, 'wars arise in the minds of men', it is the minds that have to be controlled. The tendencies such as lust for power, attachment to ideologies, desire for wealth etc. have to be curtailed. Further, when a man realises his oneness with humanity, then there will be no more quarrels over languages, religions, between different races etc. Man will realise that there is but one creator and sustainer of the universe. Each man will share the views of Thomas Paine "The world is my country, all mankind are my brethren and to do good is my religion."

Krishna speaking about the Eternal Principle says

yo yo yām tanum bhaktās sraddhyārchitumiccati

tasya tasyāchalām śraddhām tāmeva vidadhāmyaham (vii-21)

"Whatsoever the form a devotee worships with faith, it is I who make his faith permament and unflinching." When a man realises the truth of this,there will be tolerance and love and no more quarrels or disputes. It may therefore be considered that the Gītā inculcates universal religion and a religion of love.

In the ethical plane, the Gītā aims at impressing on its readers the paramountcy of conduct. It shows that man is capable of attaining the highest stage of perfection when he breaks through the mass of ignorance enveloping him. It is a charter for success in life for every man who lives the Gītā way of life. It is like a railway guide and everyone must travel with it in the journey of life. A Sanskrit verse sums up its greatness thus:

Gītā sugīta kartavya kim anais sastravistaraiḥ'

It means that the Gītā should be propagated. What is the use of other elaborate Śastras ?

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THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF VALUES

CHANDRANAN THAKUR

We are living through a very critical period of the world history. New innovations brought in the field of science (particulary Einstein's special and general theories of relativity), new ways of explaining human behaviour or actions (particularly brought by Freud and Jung), new ideologies brought by Karl Marx on the one hand and upholders of democracy on the other,have brought drastic changes in the life and attitude of human beings. Human knowledge, as a result, is everyday becoming unmanageable. Old trend of thought in each field is being scraped and every day a new one is taking place. It is no wonder, then,that the old values, culture, religion etc. are condemned and sometimes are blamed to have made human life miserable. A critical study of the human nature and knowledge will show as to how this criticism suffers from old habit of thinking. In the old habit of thinking we judge and pronounce judgement on the basis of a particular frame of reference. If something is in accordance with this 'frame of reference', it deserves acceptance and cheers; something which does not fit in this 'frame of reference' is condemned and kicked. The criticism presents a vicious circle Old thinking is scraped on the basis of new trends of thought and new trends of thought are known on the basis of old ones. Only where this circular thinking is found there is criticism or condemnation.Old line of thinking is a kind of ladder to visualise the new trends of thought. One who reaches once on this new concept must throw away the ladder. But unfortunately the ladder is not considered to be a ladder and thus not thrown away rather mixed up with the new trends and this gives rise to unhealthy criticism.Thus the old values are scraped on the basis of the so-called 'Frame of reference' that we get through new trend of thought. But as the thought goes on expanding the frame of reference gradually starts expanding till there is no frame of reference or there is only one frame of reference from which everything else is viewed. In the field of Philosophy this frame of reference was scraped with meticulous intelligence by Śaṅkarāchārya and in the field of science by Einstein. Thus Sankara says: "Who is your father ? who is your brother, which is your home.....thus O ignorance claped man, pray to God (Govind).[1]

In fact the Scientist-philosophers of the twentieth century have done great service in emancipating knowledge to such a level which approves of all values, knowledge etc. Instead of accepting something as objectively existing as substance, they have started knowing the very nature and status of knowledge. Epistemology has become a field of explanation both for physicists and philosophers. Thus, for example, for an

[1] *A devotional song of Samkara* sung by the priests in the temples in India.

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understanding of the 'Einstein's theory of gravitation, we have not to go any where except to know the nature of our knowledge. In Einstein's law of gravitation mind detaches from all preoccupations or hypotheses and view the whole phenomena as an objective onlooker. Suppose we want to measure the diameter of the earth we have to depend on the short standards or length. We know that the earth is stressed or strained by the tide-rising forces of the sun, the moon, etc. So we cannot measure long standard observationally; otherwise, it will also be strained. We integrate short standards and this gives rise to the possibility of long standard. But this integration of short standards cannot give us exact result. This ambiguous result is known as the "non-integrability of displacement", Professor Eddington[2] thus says because there is 'non-integrability of displacement, so there is gravitation. The result is well within our power. In Newton's law of gravitation, on the other hand, a fact is taken for granted and some hypotheses is invented to prove it. As for example,the stone is said to move in a straight line but in reality we find having a curved path. Curved path of the stone is a fact and to explain it, the law of gravitation comes as hypothesis. Einstein scrapes all such hypotheses. Newtonion laws hold good in their own sphere, so the Einstein's laws. Modern researches in Physics have shown that physicists are not concerned with the real existence of the phemomenon rather the thought processes which will explain the phenomenon.[3] Similarly ethical, religious or cultural values should be understood from the thought processes they start. Thus ethical or religious values hold good in their own spheres.

Thinkers like Jung,[4] Cassirer, E.* have shown that the same trend of thinking is found in all human societies and in all fields of knowledge. Thus in understanding the values or culture of any society we have to know the trend of thinking working in such societies. Man can never be reduced to the status of the nature. Man-kind from the very beginning has handled the nature and the tool to handle it is the symbol. Symbol is not a mere sign.'Symbols are not proxy for their objects, but are vehicles for the conception of objects[5], and it is the use of this symbol which gives rise to culture. Mythical or religious rites which give rise to culture are to be interpreted symbolically; otherwise, their true meaning can never be known. In India, we find people worshipping the 'Shiva Lingam' which symbolises the coitus as lingam is placed in the middle of the plate or stone in every temple. The original meaning,the coitus,is lost and religious significance is attached which gives rise to culture.Thus

[2] *The Philosophy of Physical Science*.–P.81 to 84—The University of Michigan Press.
[3] *The Philosophy of Personality*, by R.K. Mukherjee, Page 177, Allied Publishers; (quoted from Pascal Jordan's Physics of the Twentieth Century).
[4] *Psychology of the Unconscious* and *Contributions on Analytical Psychology*.
* *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, and *An Essay on Man*.
[5] *Philosophy in a new key*, by S. Langer, page 60-61, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.

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we have to be on our guard to see the changes in meaning and interpretation of the values.

Cassirer while explaining all aspects of man's achievements, e.g., myth, religion,science etc. has thus defined man as 'animal symbolicum'.[6] Instead of calling man after Aristotle as 'Social Animal', he calls him a 'symbolic animal'. This is to say, man's activities, behaviour etc. are symbolic. We can thus explain art, myth, literature, science etc. with the help of symbols that are used or utilised. Thus myth and religion should not be condemned as full of irrelevant, incongruous, contradictoy things but should be appreciated through symbolic way of interpreting the pnenomenon. As for example, fear is a biological instinct in all human beings, nay in the whole of animal race. A storm, epedemic etc. is to be explained and a metamorphosis takes place. Thus God or some supernatural Being is placed to explain it. Supernatural Being thus stands as a symbol for explaining such things.It is the mythical concept of the body, soul etc. which gives rise to such cultural activities as burning the body after death in the Hindu religion, putting the dead body in the grave yard by other religions. The Hindu believes that the soul deserts the body at the time of death and so the body is burnt so that it will mix up with the elements it has been made. In the Greek religion, on the other hand, it is believed that soul remains with the body for seven days. Thus the unmatched, excellent pyramids stand as a symbol of the Greek culture.

To condemn such religious or values etc. is thus proving the ignorance of the individual in not being able to appreciate the cultural values of such 'frames of reference'. Newtonion concept or laws are not false or wrong. These concepts or laws hold good in that particular field. Einstein's laws hold good in their own fields. One law must be judged from one's own angle. Swami Vivekānanda never condemned any religion. "I am a Hindu yet I am not; I am a Buddhist,yet I am not"[7]. This utterance shows the emancipated level of thinking. The true and significant role of education lies in evaluating the art, myth, values etc. from their own perspectives considering ourselves as objective onlookers and not being too much enthusiastic in smashing the old ideals or values on the basis of new ones. The real skill of a Professor or teacher lies in proper management or control over old and new concepts and then to pass it on to the students without giving any subjective touch and leave the students to form their own basis of judgement. This is in tune with the Vedantic interpretation of teaching[8]—the real business of teaching is neither legislative nor executive but only informative. Thus the role of teachers in the modern society is the highest one. Seen from this angle values should not be scraped rather a true understanding of these is essential if the human society is to exist or is proud of its past achievements and glory, particularly in the fields of Art,Myth, Literature and Culture.

[6] *An Essay on Man*, Page 26, Yale University Press.
[7] *The Complete works of Swami Vivekanand*, Vol. *I.*
[8] *A Study of the Vedanta*,by S.K. Das, page 351, Published by the University of Calcutta-2nd edition 1937.

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SCIENCE AND RELIGION

GOPI CHAINANI

These days one hears so much of Science's need to be wedded to Religion. Some have originated this idea while others merely repeat it as a phrase or slogan. But very few of us (especially in India where Scientific spirit is so little understood, rather misunderstood) really try to find out what this idea means—whether it is at all possible for Science to be wedded to Religion or is it that this idea is rather meant to convey something deeper and truer than its words on the surface convey. These obvious questions do arise in the mind if one is at all thoughtful.

It seems to me that in these modern times, the application of Science to society for utilitarian purposes has raised in its wake many social issues, for example, its effects in war and so on. As social issues have their base in ethical and moral values, obviously the need has arisen to examine and explore the base of the structure of Science too and see whether Science and Religion have any common point in their bases; and if they have it, how far does this common point extend itself all round, i.e., lengthwise, breadthwise and depthwise.

To me the examination of such a vast problem is not a matter of mere verbalization or dry, barren intellect divorced from the deeper levels of one's whole being, which includes also emotions, senses and perhaps something more. *Prima facie* this is obvious, because true religion cannot be a matter of repetition of mere so-called sacred words or acceptance of any value in terms of any opinion, dogma or superstition on the basis of any authority, however highly-placed politically, socially or religiously. As true religion would be the discovery of the real religious mind, Religion in that sense would have to be acknowledged as something **individual**. A religious mind will then have to be explored in the scientific spirit which means freedom of enquiry (i.e., experimental verification in place of authority) accompanied by objective **dispassionate** observation. The main difficulty then comes up where the question of one's own attitudes and deep prejudices due to genetic and psychological factors is concerned. In the findings of the experiments of natural science due allowance is made for "experimental and observational errors". So must we admit the errors due to the existence of "prejudice" (good or bad) of any kind at any level in the human mind, and that, it warps and distorts the findings of "the discovery" of the Religious mind. Besides this, we must also remember that in the human psyche, as in the human society, almost everything is complex, because it is the result, as well as the cause, of many inter-related issues. Anyone who is acquainted a little with the findings of sociology and modern depth-psychology and semantics will bear witness to this.

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Coming to the main issue at hand, what I want to imply is this : as haemmorrhage and loss of weight are outer symptoms of cancer (i.e., some malignant tumour growing within the body), likewise we may consider the invention and the application of scientific weapons for the destruction of humanity, to be symptomatic of some high fever, so to say, some deep crisis, within the human consciousness itself. Or maybe the "naughtiness" or the "delinquency" of "advanced" humanity is indicative of the great intelligence, which is not finding its proper expression in the higher constructive channels. Were it not so, the psychological insights that we have gained in terms of the motives, compulsive urges and so on, of the human consciousness, (which includes the conscious layer as well as the extraordinary potential of the unconscious), would not have been used for the purpose of brain-washing and other destructive ways for tyrannising the individual. The behaviour of prisoners in Russian trials during the last World War showed that it was not mere fear or torture or both, but something in addition psychological, too had been done to them, before they were brought to the court for their trial. To me, all this and other modern methods of tyrannising with the scientific weapons,speak of some potential fears having unconsciously gripped the minds of those, who find some malignant satisfaction in "dehumanising", "depersonifying", maiming and crippling the free, legitimate identities of others. These tyrants, through the cunningness of their barren intellect, tyrannise their victims, by cutting out in the latter all conscious avenues of the latter's finding freedom of heart and mind. Obviously to grant the liberty of mind and heart to the other, is not a mere constitutional reform, but is a "spiritual" matter in its essence, if one may use this word "spiritual" merely in its dictionary meaning, without attaching any emotional content to it.

Possibly the scientific discoveries such as; (a) the relativity of the "facts" of time and space, hitherto supposed to be fixed quantities,(B) "matter"identified as "frozen"energy and the solid,when scrutinised very precisely, not considered stable but subject to perpetual motion and changes, (c) discovery of atomic power, and some others, have radically altered our picture of the world, especially, as Planck too has shaken our belief, so far regarded as self-evident, that Nature makes no sudden advances. As, we have not yet given our mind and heart to grasp consciously and fully these profound changes in our structure of the world as projected outside as well as inside, **unconsciously**, we are being driven to be aware of some deep contradiction within ourselves. On one hand, so to say, as masters of creation, we have assumed enormous control over the forces of Nature; on the other hand, these very penetrative insights for obtaining control over natural forces, together with the discoveries of the forces working in the human psyche, the human society, and the societies of other living beings, make us realise our own smallness of isolation. Besides, even though empirically by intellectual stretches, we

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have established the Marxist premises that "the social process is the generator of consciousness"—i.e., the mind is the result of the environmental influences, historically as well as deep within us, we do not accept this finding as comprising the whole truth. Were it not so, we would not think and strive in terms of individual freedom against the forces of persuasion, propaganda and so on, in any form. Yet rarely has any of us, rather very few of the vast masses have known by direct personal experience, the total individual freedom, which means freedom from the collective at all levels. Since the body is an animal heritage the total freedom implies freedom from the animal impulses of lust, greed, violence and so on, as well freedom from the fetters of the Society and the word too. Freedom from the word would be the essential pre-requisite for the total freedom since the word is the collective, the social product. Seen in this sense, the really true free individual is the only real religious mind.

Reverting back to our changed world picture, I would say that now we feel ourselves confronted with the innumerable gods of the conglomerations and the constellations of the findings of the various experts in varied scientific fields, and to a careful eye, these very findings sometimes corroborate, or overlap on, or conflict with or deny each other. As it is, we have not yet understood and grasped the meaning and the significance of the momentum of this change in human consciousness, so we are confused. We feel that we have lost our bearings, yet we cannot go back to them because we see that going back would not help. Probably we feel ourselves to be on the verge of a precipice, yet we are afraid to stand alone for long on this precipice. In other words we are afraid to be inwardly free, to stand alone on our own; for this standing on "precipice", this "imbalance" implies that either we have to jump to the other unknown shore or drop down into an oblivion. So to say, our minds are in a critical phase. It is probably an unstable phase, a transition period, till we have taken stock of our new position. However, since we are getting convinced that the wheel of the clock of historical transformation of man cannot be put back and even if, by some means, it were to be put back, it is not going to solve our problems fundamentally, we are being haunted by an unconscious tremendous inward fear of non-being. To escape from this fear, contradiction and confusion we create, inwardly as well as outwardly, all types of mischief, big and small.

Therefore, realising our position, why not face the challenge of the times boldly ? Einstein identified matter as "frozen" energy. As against this,for ages the mind has been considered to be an active form of energy. Since, as science has shown, the "breaking up" of the atom, even of matter, i. e., "frozen" energy, is capable of realising such a tremendous amount of energy, power, why not take a clue from it for breaking up the mind which is the root of the creation of Man ? Mind itself is also at the end of its own tether.

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After all, it is the mind itself that has been instrumental in exploring the vast unknown outer regions, space, as well as in artificially bringing about the fission of an atom of matter. Now the same instrument is applying its own contradictory and conflicting scientific findings to the society for the benefit of its own self, be that self extending itself to its own nation. But before it does so and creates disaster, is it not worthwhile, rather legitimate, for the same instrument, i.e., mind, to examine its own structure dispassionately, scientifically, before it can consider its "values" (of any type—political, social, personal and so on) in terms of its own self-interest and self advancement to be valid ? To me the only alternative for getting out of this tremendously intricate maze and complicated jungle created, by the exploration and the emphasis of the mere "outer", is to reverse and turn the direction of its momentum of going "out" to going "in" for exploring the inner space of the mind. Probably the very integral realisation of the narrow walls of the inner space in one's own self, extended religiously, politically, socially and so on, may help to break down these inner walls which have created so much chaos and misery in the world. One may also probably then see for one's self that there is no water-tight compartmentalization of the outer and the inner, but, it is just one unitary movement of living. Possibly, thereby that vast immense energy (must be much more potent than atomic power) which man throughout the ages has been searching for, calling it "God" and so on, may come into being. Even if the clue for the extension of the scientific analogy for "breaking up" the mind be false, we must give it a trial before we reject it as false. But it must be verified in the only way in which it is verifiable by the individual—which is by delving deep within oneself.

There are already a few rare persons who, having dived deeply within themselves, have been pointing a finger towards the discovery of that immence inexhaustible source of energy called God.

Probably this very breaking up of the mind with its standards and values may be the discovery of the real "religious" mind. It may also be the healthiest and so the powerful root of the whole tree of life. Looked at from this perspective, everything in life, science, ethics, society, politics, and so on, would seem to derive its nourishment from it. Society or Science, Ethics or Morals, which may be the tree's branch, flower or fruit, has its own individual existence too. But it has significance only so far as it helps to nourish the roots of its own being. So the real scientific spirit is included in the true religious mind and not the reverse. This approach may solve the vast problems of existence that humanity is confronted with. If science is taken up exclusively, it can only multiply our problems. But if science is approached integrally, which is possible only when man has at least a bird'sview of his own entire being, then,do what you like, science can never destroy man because it will ever be his slave.

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ETHICS OF DIVORCE

H. N. SINHA

The positivistic trends in sociology may exert a compelling pressure to argue from facts to values and may come to conclude that since divorce is becoming more and more prevalent, it ought to be recognized as a social good. But Ethical considerations would never allow the 'ought' to be deduced from "is". The problems of Ethics, being the problems of values and problems of highest good, would,as valuational propositions, univocally pronounce that divorce is not a thing of worth in the social sphere.

The problem of divorce is necessarily associated with the integration and dissipation of family.It cannot now be denied or doubted that family formation is a sign of civilization. The course of social evolution is a definite evidence of the fact that more the society evolves the more it leads towards a type of Patriarchal system, since in the natural course of evolutionary process, the longer period of growth in human life puts a heavy burden upon the mother. Thus in the evolutionary process, family stands as a land-mark,concerned with the values which are the result of previous selective behaviour, (choices) and the conative conditions of present or future selective behaviour. That is why that even a dynamic transition in the status of family from omnicompetence to specialisation has not been able to minimise the importance of this institution at all, since it is that social unit which fulfills very deep and perennial demands of the humanity as a whole. Although the factors working for the dissipation of family are undermining the very basis of this ultimate social unit and trying vigorously to root out this institution completely, yet they are vain attempts as Mrs. Bosanquet says,"Even if the world could carry on without the family, it could not afford to lose the qualities which would go with it. To reject the source of so much warmth and beauty because it is sometimes fails, would be like banishing the sun from the sky because it sometimes covered with clouds." The supreme importance of the primacy of the family gives a sufficient ground for attaching certain sanctity and permanence to the institution of marriage. The ideal of marriage being in its indissolubleness, sanctions for family life should be rigid in order to maintain its sanctity. With this thing in view the family life,the Grhastha Aśram, has been recognized as the most important socialising and humanising period in the social structure and a holy, religious sanctity is attached to it. Breaking the integrity of family,therefore,is against the sacred laws. Only culturally low integration easily dissolves into the abstract poles of social unit.

The fierce attack from the enormous spread of nineteenth century Individualism may be said to have completely shattered the lofty structure of family and to have shaken the sound foundation of family. In its

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true spirit individualism professed full freedom of conduct for every individual in the society, in all matters. Community has no right to coerce the individual in any way, provided the action of that individual brings happiness to him. Between the conflicting ideologies of Individualism that individual is sovereign and socialism that social norms should be given supremacy over individual claims, the tenets of Individualism cannot, but command wide respect. The vested interests, then argue, after Mill and on the basis of Benthamite Calculus,that bonds of family should be loosened to a breakable stage to that the individuals participating in the formation of family may enjoy full freedom whenever they desire. Needless to argue that such interpretation of Individualism leads, if fully analysed, to worst type of Psychological and Egoistic hedonism which are Ethically untenable; the doctrine that nothing can act on the will of individual except his present and prospective pleasures and pains and that an individual should aim only at his own greatest pleasure, is incompatible with every moral law. To misinterpret the fundamental principles of Individualism, drags us to subjectivism. The subjective impressions cannot be taken as objective norms. The personal inclinations, wishes or impressions as the standards of individual freedom would mean a moral anarchy and ethical nihilism. Thus the crude type of individualism cannot be presented as a valid argument for the divorce or dissipation of family even when the individual feelings are suppressed for social adjustment. The family is the point of interaction of social and natural bipolarity. On Jungean thesis and Hegelian dialects, the energy flows only from the tension of opposites and ambivalence of the poles. The social progress follows only from the bipolarity of this social unit called family of which the two poles stand mutually interactive.The poles may, for pure analytic considerations, appear mutually exclusive but for social existence their bifurcation is a fictitious abstraction leading to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. The individual ceases to be a social entity, as soon as he breaks away from the ultimate social system and the outflow of the social energy stops, resulting in degeneration, as soon as the equillibrium of poles of social unit is destroyed by separating the two constituting poles. The family is not the arena of the Darwinian law of the 'Survival of the fittest", but it is the exposition of the higher course of evolution that we are heading from perfect competition to ultimate co-operation.Nietzsche temperamentally disliked the dissipation of every kind as it was a retrogressive step in the evolutionary process.

Another fatal assault on this sacred institution comes from the ultra-materialistic trends which proclaim that the marriage is merely a satisfaction of sex instinct. The radical thinkers would like to go to the extreme to justify the policy of having a new wife with every dinner suit and change of husband with every new wrist-watch. This type of frequency in the change of partners by means of divorce, sometimes twice a day, would definitely mean polygamy and polyandry with short temporal gaps. A divorce, therefore, with a definite purpose of seeking fresh matrimonial

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relations to satisfy intense instinctive needs, differs only in degree and not in kind from the polgyamy and polyandry which are pronounced as definite Social evils reducing man from the level and dignity of humanity to the Vileness of animality. Even if the material values are made to form the basis of all moral values, the social norms are yet to be placed over and above the satisfaction of psychological material instincts and Egoism. In recent thinkers, Hartman may be quoted to say, "……the moral values are the highest kind of value. The fulfilment of a higher is morally more valuable than of a lower." Even according to naturalists evidence, the nature exercise a perfect control in the form of fixed estrous cycle in the female animal, with the resulting periodicity of sex drive. In human being although there is also a menstrus period yet sex urge is also a social motive. Having perfect freedom from natural control, a positive check, which is not needed in animals, is rigidly required in man, as the freedom necessarily implies responsibility. The psychological relations in which only human beings can stand with one another, emphatically demand the establishment of a social institution where sex relations should not be satisfied just like the mating of animals where not the memory of relationship, but simply the opposite sex is the criterion of instinctive satisfaction. This mental relationship called "partnership" of which only human beings are capable,has not tolerated the Platonic concept of "Communism of wives", what to talk of perfect freedom of sex relation on the animal like principle of "all for all". This is why that unbound sex relations lead to neuroses as well as pre and post marital discords. The sex rivalry in men has been responsible for many devastating revolutions. It would lead to an unmanageable and unprecedented social chaos if sex is left unrestricted and is made the basis of social integration. Elimination of the institute of family or loosening its bonds would mean that men and women are mere instruments of sexual and instinctive pleasure; they are simply the tools of satisfaction, having no dignity—no honour. If we really want to prevent the suicide of the social order,some restrictions have to be observed with regard to marital relations, changing status of woman is something of a social problem. Progress does not depend on the mere fact that woman is allowed to change her circumstances very off and on. Rather, to stabilize her social status,some permanence ought to be granted to family. The existence of this institution expresses the funded values of many generations. Russell points out well.

"Love is prius of family relations which is far more than sex passion —Love breaks the hard walls of Ego. Nature did not construct human beings to stand alone. The instinct is not satisfied unless a man's whole being—mental quite as much as physical, enters into relation. Those who have never known the deep intimacy and the intense companionship of happy mental love, have missed the best thing that life has to give." Prima facie the feeling of indispensibility and not mere gratification of animal passions is the basis of marriage and family formation. Murdock also reckons four primary functions for which family stands (i) sexual (ii) Economic (iii) Reproductive and (iv) Educational.

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The above considerations lead to conclude that marriage on mere sexual grounds for the satisfaction of biological needs is a deliberate attempt to escape from the other responsibilities, it is, thus, to be considered as the lowest type of marriage or rather no marriage at all. The great romantic thinker, Nietzsche was crazy about the emergence of a superman to glorify the humanity; on the grounds of his moral tenets, if the aim of marriage is not the betterment of progeny, but simply the satisfaction of sex, then it is in no way better than "Reservation of women like a Rail berth" or a "reserved prostitution" which is ethically untenable. In order that progeny is improved and better races emerge, the marriage should be a life long obligation. To quote Russell,"where there are children, the stability of marriage, to my mind, is a matter of considerable importance." A human child is perhaps more helpless than the offspring of any animal. Even the physical tenderness of women during the infancy of child require a humane and compassion from her husband.

Coming to the realistic approach, we may for argument sake, admit that rudimentary non-moral values, have a prior claim, over the moral values. But this dependence of moral on material one is purely material, not axiological. The lower is the stuff on which the higher works. After constrained efforts we have come to realise that marriage is the evolution of certain moral values viz. chastity, fidality and virginty, around the primary material values of sex and economic needs. Since family is formed to realise these higher moral values, the institution of marriage is considered a sacrament. So long as we attach value to purity, chastity, fidality and virginity,the divorce will also go to the best advantage of man as the notion of chastity etc. is always woven around women. To place man in a discriminative privileged position by making divorce an ideal, is against the law of justice.

This should suffice to proclaim that divorce is a confession of failure in the realisation of social values. The success of family depends on the happiness of family life. It is a fact that the romantic marriages of contemporary world are based on the principle of seeking personal happiness in the marital relations and to dissolve that relation when happiness eludes them. Since they lack proper understanding of the social obligations attached to family, they confess their inability to adapt to the social context. If proper adjustment is not made under the value seeking social pressure, it would definitely be the disintegrating aspect of the fundamental social unit. Divorce is a symbol of lack of the adjustment and adaptability or non-recognition of values at all which cannot serve as a moral ideal. All the moral ideals are to be realised by human endeavours without any external imposition. No divine sanction is to be attached to make an ideal Sacred,Since the interference of an external power,may it be God or Angels, is an impertinent intrusion into human affairs. It is the humanity itself that should exercise moral force to strengthen the bonds of marriage to make it ideal, as the marriage is the procedure to

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get social recognition of the attempts made to realise the social ideals through family formation. It is an uncontestible and indubitable fact that individual by itself has never been recognised as a social entity. The individuality apart from a social system is a mere fiction. It is not even natural for a man to be alone and some form of social unity is implied in his essential structure. Some form of family unity, a communion of two members of different sex,is the fundamental social unit beyond which no social order prevails. It is the cordial co-operation, not the rival dissipation, that can form the essential grounds of a stable social order. It is, therefore, obligatory on the society that this order and equilliberation is not disturbed and destroyed.

Since we know that dissipation of ultimate social unit is against the social norms, it is imperative that it should not only be socially disapproved, but also legally checked. Jurisprudence, not taking cognisance of social norms, is a sin against humanity—the worst kind of moral evil. Divorce, ought therefore to be hated, condemned, regarded with abhorrence. Once the society accepts divorce,even as a hypothetical social good, it may be freely sought even when it is not desirable and will threaten the very ground on which the lofty edifice of society is constructed, with an endless disintegration. To approve divorce is an evil outrage on consecrated institution.

Let us now examine some of the fabulous and fallacious arguments put forth by the protagonists of divorce. It is argued whenever there appears an internal disruption rampant in family, in the form of marital discords, the society should not coerce the individuals to continue living in tension under the same roof. When happiness becomes a rare phenomenon and conflict happens to be a routine, when a continued tension in family reaches the neurogenic stage and when the members, instead of co-operating with each other, try to make each other a means for instinctive pleasure and to reduce each other to the status of serfdom and servitude, society should encourage them to seek separation, to break the sanctified bonds of family and to search for a better companion and congenial environments. But is it not a false assumption that future will always be more congenial than the present ? Will it not be a folly to discard one bird in the hands in a false hope of two in the bush ? On the contrary,it is psychological fact that after all the turmoils of fiery ordeals through which an individual passes in a discordant home, leads to a sharp reaction to resettle as quickly as possible in order to remove the heightened frustrati on and all the false hopes of finding a better partner prove to be a vain pursuit of mirage. The unknown is notoriously uncertain and cannot be trusted upon. It is, therefore, not necessary that one would always get a better spouse after divorce. To refute this argument of divorce-seekers, it would suffice that "if wishes were horses, only fools would ride". The absence of divorce rather helps in such cases to strive hard, not for separation, but for adjusting and co-operating

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mutually by showing respect for each other—by cultivating a sense of sacrifice.

Another strong argument which the exponents of divorce would like to advance, is that if both the parties agree to rescind the contract of marriage, the free-lancers of society should not come to check them, from doing so. These advocates of social contract theory strongly oppose any interference from society in the affairs of two parties. This sounds as the most absurd argument that the contractualists can ever propound to save their thesis. If mutual consent of two individuals is made the basis of morality, then prostitution will have to to be recognised as a sound moral standard. None would ever dare say any thing to condemn legally or morally the acts of Oscar Wilde which were done with the consent of both the parties. No civilised society with any moral standard would exalt and sanctify the religious sacrifices of human beings on the altars simply because these have been performed with the mutual consent of the martyres and the holy priests.

The main difficulty in these arguments is that they revolve round the instinctive satisfaction and a narrow sensuous individuality. The problem of children is not considered at all by these thinkers. The children constitute an integrating factor helping to hold a marriage together. Divorce effects the children most. Factorial analysis by the criminologists show that the delinquents generally come from the broken homes. By producing delinquents we break the very fundamental norm that the function of family is to rear up better social beings. Neglected children are mostly the victim of divorce. Filling the society with criminals is a definite social evil, not only condemnable, but also punishable. Family should, therefore, revolve round the children. The absence of divorce brings a moral sense of responsibility in the parents to see that all possible measures are adopted so that children are well born and brought up. The individuals are to inculcate in them an interest for the well being of their progeny and to adjust themselves perfectly around this ambivalencing axis.

Sometimes the process of mutual adjustment proves very painful when happiness is taken as psychological egoistic pleasure and in such cases personal happiness is not sacrificed for the sake of conformity to institutional pattern. Russell enumerates certain hard cases of desertion, insanity or a disease making procreation impossible. Hard cases of maladjustment may also be there. But standards of society are never made on hard cases. Making laws for sound social personalities and healthy minds on the basis of desperately diseased ones, is not a good technique to cure the social evil. Society cannot be allowed to serve as a mere means to fulfil the selfish ends of these socially perverse persons. Moreover some always suffer whenever there is a social contact on large scale. So long as social organisation of any kind exists, so long will some men have to suffer and subordinate themselves on occasions to preserve that organisation. Even the hedonistic calculus which takes pleasure as the

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ultime good and which forms a philosophical backgrounds of the modern Individualisn, would by emphasis that the interests of a smaller number of units can well be sacrificed if they come in conflict with the maximum good for maximum number.

No doubt, human beings are liable to undergo considerable changes in their tastes and in their modes of thought and feelings and such change may readily desire for a dissolution of marriage bonds. But in the course of dynamic evolutionary process, the individuals or the organism which lack adaptability of accepting the given and do not bring something in their own behaviour, and tracts alongwith the behaviour of others, into the alignment with the demands of given, are not considered fit for survival and are eliminated once for all. The evolutionary social process, like the cosmic and biological evolution also demands adjustability. If this adjustment is the criterion of social evaluation, the causes of maladjustment are definitely evil. Moral conscience and categorical imperative univocally pronounce that whatever be the consequences the evil must be punished. We cannot show any laxity for those who fail to adjust, and seek divorce, as connivance with the evil is equally evil. A positive encouragement to immoral traffic in society is all the more immoral. The cases of maladjustment ought,therefore,be punished socially in the way that they should be made to live a wretched family life if they fail to show proper adjustment, instead of giving a latitude to evil by allowing them full freedom to enjoy, despite their social crime and sin against human values. The evil of social disintegration can be checked only by a rigid application of the dynamic law of progress i.e."either adjust according to the norms or face social catastrophe by leading a wretched life."

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ON WHAT THERE OUGHT TO BE

JOHN KING FARLOW

Metaphysics may usefully be considered as the Janus with Ontology and Epistemology for its two faces. It tries to show us what there is, what the fundamental 'realms', or 'sorts', or 'modes' of Being are really like. It tries to show us what it is to **know**, or at least to **believe most rationally**, in such a way that the certainty, or at least the plausibility, of an ontological claim about the world as part of an, intelligible cosmos can be determined. Since metaphysics, so considered, is the search for a humanly attainable wisdom about reality, it turns out to be nothing less than philosophy itself—at least if we stay close to the traditional and etymological significance of philosophy. What I hope to show is that if anyone claims to be 'talking metaphysics', or more simply to be 'doing philosophy', he must agree to certain ontological and epistemological assumptions about the objectivity of value. He must agree to them, that is, or else agree that the kind of 'metaphysics' and 'philosophy' he pursues is rather too like the kind of 'philately' I pursue when I try to borrow a standard postage stamp; rather too like the kind of 'nuclear fission' I pursue when I try to crack a nut.

"Theses about the objectivity of values", some moderns might object, "do not belong to the lofty place of metaphysics at all, but only to the dustier depths of meta-ethics". This was not, of course, the view of a founding father like Plato. "But", the objectors might retort, 'Plato, however substantial his contributions to philosophy, simply did not enjoy the advantage of having read the contemporary literature on value theory. How could we expect him, then, to draw all the necessary distinctions?" Let us refer such objectors instead to the words of a contemporary metaphysician, who also fails, and fails **after** perusing the contemporary literature, to find such distinctions necessary. "Actualities", he tells us in a work of metaphysics,"provide testimony to the reality of the Ideal.Every Actuality sustains a meaning, a universal which in itself has a greater scope than that which the Actuality provides. Were there no meaning which the Actualities instanced, all classifications would be arbitrary[1]". Suppose the objectors comment that "this unfortunate metaphysician fails to see that all classifications are arbitrary; at least they are arbitrary in the sense that we may never say they are upheld either by the 'Ideal', by any awareness of an **ought to be** not fully analysable in terms of human feelings and of our basically arbitrary cultural and verbal conventions". It is my thesis that this muddy comment is not compatible with the objectors' calling themselves 'philosophers' except in a Pickwickian sense. There can be no consistent **philosophy** of Actuality which denies Ideality—be it systematic, like the metaphysician's, **or unsystematic**, like such objectors'.

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In less professional quarters it may be denied that logical and conceptual analysis should be part of philosophy at all; a man who buys a book of philosophy in order to gain a *Weltanschauung* may be exasperated by Aristotle's interest in **ambiguity**, by Wittgenstein's concern with **uses**, or even by Weiss's introduction of symbolic logic into a treatise on Being in order to make still more of these bothersome **distinctions**. When a piece of analysis is worthwhile philosophically, and when it is not, is something that needs to be clarified. And here the best question to raise first would be : 'when is analysis of ordinary language worthwhile philosophically?' It is best to raise first because Plato and Aristotle, who determined the general course of Western philosophy, spent much time analysing common terms—not because of current passions. I shall raise some questions connected with this question in Part One of this paper; in Part Two I shall try very tentatively to apply some answers for the earlier questions to fundamental problems about the construction of metaphysical systems.

Part I

PART ONE : OBJECTIVE VALUES AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE

1. Some Odd Arguments for 'Cognitivism' and Some Odder Once for 'Non-Cognitivism'

It has long been a favourite thesis among many linguistic analysts that moral judgments are not **cognitive**. Moral terms, it is allowed, may have descriptive criteria; for example to say 'Dubbs is cruel' is certainly to say something verifiable about his behavior. Nonetheless, the moral term 'cruel' also has an evaluative **force** : when I say 'Dubbs is cruel', I say that he behaves in certain observable ways **and he ought not to.** Saying that he ought not to, according to the non-cognitivist, is not stating some further fact about Dubbs or anything else. 'He ought not to' is an expression of feeling, (Early Ayer), a form of attitude—declaration—cum-manipulation (Stevenson), a sort of prescription or command, (Hare), a kind of resolution (Braithwaite), and so on. For there just is no further sort of fact I could intelligibly be meaning to state about Dubbs when I say he is cruel, other than observable facts like his ignoring his wife, beating his dog, and so on. (There is, to rephrase their view, no Ideality needed to explain moral discourse, only the Actuality of spatio-temporal objects plus feelings, language rules and other conventions, thoughts, dreams, images, and so on which we are still tragically unable to analyse out completely as more subtle sorts of spatio-temporal objects or motions thereof. The work of nominalism is incomplete, but, at any rate, no

[1] Paul Weiss, *Modes of Being* (Carbondale, 1958), p. 113; compare his critique of nominalism, pp. 376-77. On pp. 5-6 and pp. 81-82 he demands that practitioners of conceptual analysis *examine* and try to *justify* their presuppositions. I shall argue that the only forms of 'justification; which render conceptual analysis philosophical must fall under Weiss's mode of Ideality. It is *not* implied that his mode of Ideality is the same as my realm of value-facts.

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Values need be values of the formal analyst's bound variables). Sometimes the non- cognitivist stance seems too uncomfortable to admirers of of ordinary language, even to those with something like a hankering for the same would-be-nominalist ontology. It is too much not to be able to say that moral judgments *qua* moral ones are true or false, as the man in the street does. But then one can try the expedient of saying that they are true or false, provided we do not take the truth criterion to be correspondence with some transcendent (non-Actual) value-fact; moral judgments are true if they can be upheld by the reasons which people, conventionally called 'sane and sensible' in our society, conventionally say are 'good reasons' for holding a moral view. Such reasons would be promotion of happiness and of social harmony. (A somewhat rough-and-ready admirer of Toulmin might say something like this).

For the benefit of recalcitrant linguistic analysts, who want to draw still closer to ordinary men and be still more outspoken cognitivists, a new approach has now been suggested by Mr. Peter Glassen[2]. No clear answer can be given to the question whether moral judgments are cognitive until it has been properly framed. "Are moral judgments cognitive?" has no clear answer. But "Are moral judgments intended to be cognitive and are they so understood?" does have a clear answer. For most people are found to believe that moral judgments assert something, that they are true or false, that one can be right or wrong about them, that they can be proven or disproven, that they are capable of having objective validity. Thus the cognitivity of moral judgments can be established by listening to the way non-philosophical people talk.

Glassen gives a number of good examples to prove his claims about popular speech. This, in itself, is welcome since it may counteract the kind of *a priori* linguistics whereby ordinary speech is systematically misconstrued to fit non-cognitive theories. But what is the **philosophical** import of this demonstration ? Professor C. Schuster, a non-cognitivist, offers the reply that nothing philosophical is proven against non-cognitivism since this 'positivist' doctrine is a **prescriptive epistemology**, not a **descriptive sociology**[3]. The positivist's prescription rests on a decision, but not, she hastens to add, on an arbitrary one. One decides what to call 'knowledge' after weighing the **advantages** and **disadvantages** and the **relevant considerations**. These factors are far from being coterminous with the speech habits of the ordinary man, which are the property of sociologists anyway. Reichenbach is thanked for his positivist point about 'decisions'. Stevenson is cited with private evidence as being a non-cognitivist who holds his doctrines in this spirit. So Glassen's arguments, she concludes, are irrelevant to the philosophy of morals.

[2] Peter Glassen, 'The Cognitivity of Moral Judgments', *Mind*, LXVIII (January 1959), pp. 56ff.

[3] C. Schuster, 'Glassen on the Cognitivity of Moral Judgments', *Mind*, LXX (January 1961), pp. 95ff.

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Glassen seemed to offer too little to take us from the **is** of how we do talk to the **ought** of how we should. Since Glassen was addressing himself to philosophers he presumably presupposed they recognised the value of ordinary language. But Schuster seems to prove too much for non-cognitivism's good. Since 'advantages', 'disadvantages' and 'relevant' are value terms, though not necessarily moral once, **moral** non-cognitivism seems to be bought at the price of recognising **other** realms of objective value. I suppose one could slip out of this by saying that what we are to accept as **advantageous** or **relevant** is to be determined by convention; or perhaps by another prescription, resting on another decision, resting on some other conventional standard or some other prescription—until the cognitivist ceases to cry 'Arbitrary after all' in the exhaustion of an infinite regress. But Schuster tips her hand suddenly and saves the cognitivist such trouble. She cannot resist saying that Glassen is **"downright irresponsible"** to call moral propositions cognitive when he offers no testing methods for their truth. She cannot resist adding : "Ironically it begins to appear that logical positivists are the only responsible philosophers." These last two statements must seem to her to be **true**: for, as Glassen is generous enough to expect, she would surely not put them forward in a journal as mere ejaculations of abuse and adoration. Yet they also sound like to moral judgments. (a) As a matter of known moral fact, we are being told, we ought not to call any propositions cognitive without offering methods of verification. (b) As a matter of shown moral fact, we are being told, we ought to follow the example of logical positivists—of men who denied there were any testing methods for moral judgments, and so denied there were any moral facts to know. If someone decides to tease us and call thesis (b) "relative to language",[4] it must be relative to the **essentially richest** languages, to the axiomatically inconsistent ones in which we can say anything or prove anything we please. Or is it relative only to the essentially richest language of all, the one in which we can utter any contradiction and still be called responsible philosophers ?

2. 'Subjectivism' and the Value of Analogies

It may already begin to appear possible that acknowledging our common awareness, however dim, of objective value amounts to a necessary postulate of philosophical commerce. But to make this less controversial let us consider certain arguments by Mr. W. D. Hudson in favour of what he calls 'subjectivism'.[5] The concealed implications of this doctrine seem to be the 'objectivity' of **chaos**, the 'subjectivity' of beliefs about a **cosmos**. To say something about what the cosmos is **really** like, be it in obviously scientific or in obviously metaphysical discourse, is to make a value judgment about how we should interpret our experience. Although

[4] Cf. Tsu-Lin Mei, 'Chinese Grammar and the Linguistic Movement in Philosnphy', *Review of Metaphysics*, XIV (March, 1961).

[5] W. D. Hudson, 'The Alleged Objectivity of Moral Judgments', *Mind*, LXXI (Oct. 1962), pp. 530ff.

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Hudson queries the objectivity of **moral** value judgments, it is only on the exasperatingly familiar assumption that no other intrinsic value judgments are serious candidates for objectivity. For he treats non-moral value judgments like "Strawberries are nice" as self-evidently subjective "expressions of feeling or taste". Since his arguments for subjectivism rest on linguistic analogies, a certain amount of linguistic analysis is first required to see whether they are good analogies from a linguistic point of view. Then can it be determined more fairly whether the analogies also offer good reasons for his philosophical thesis. What is it for an analogy to be philosophically valuable ? The answer may illuminate many fundamental questions.

Hudson first argues, against the very odd ethical objectivism of Bertrand Russell and Paul Edwards,that the following comparison shows factual reasons to confer no more objectivity on moral judgments than on "mere expresions of taste or feeling". (*Mind*, 1962, p. 531)

"Strawberries are nice."	"Bull-fighting is wrong."
"Why ?"	"Why ?"
"Because they are sweet."	"Because it causes pain."

Hudson claims he is simply fighting Edwards with his own weapons,but he appears to assume that there is real **point** and **value** and **wisdom** in the way people around him talk about morality. If they gave factual reasons for moral judgments but not for expressions of taste, then there could, presumably, be point to the view that moral judgments are significantly like statements of fact. (Had Edwards' argument no bearing on the issue, whether valid or not, why bother to refute it ? Why not dismiss it for irrelevance ?) But if the comparison shows that we can just as easily give reasons for "Strawberries are nice" as for "Bullfighting is wrong", then subjectivism must by his lights be somewhat confirmed. Since we can show the analogy to be highly specious, then by Hudson's own assumption he should treat objectivism rather more seriously.Unless, however, he has postulated this value judgment about **point** in ordinary language as something he recognises to be true or has postulated some other value judgment that is relevant, there is no point except of love of idle logomachy in his advancing the analogy.[6] And, unless his readers believed in something like his value postulate there could be no philosophical commerce with them. It will ultimately be argued that either

[6] Hudson can reply that he himself holds no such value postulate but is simply deducing from this value postulate in Edwards (for *Edwards' benefit*) that moral judgments are no more worthy of objectivity than are 'Strawberries are nice' (by Edwards' criteria of worthiness). If he does say 'this, however, he certainly *ought* to add that Edwards may just as well be right anyway, because the success of an analogy in ordinary language is of no philosophical importance. Or again, if he does say this, he ought to explain why he thinks the failure of arguments like Edwards' leaves subjectivism at such an advantage over objectivism (cf. p. 534). *Why* should it show any such thing ? At best he will end by admitting to a value postulate like Occam's Raxor or Schuster's thesis about verification and responsibility. And these too involve either accepting some form of objectivism or admitting to a quite arbitrary decision or swallowing a most un-philosophical conventionalism. Purists will not like talk of true and false *postulates* but I think no apology is necessary.

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genuine philosophical theses depend on value postulates or they simply DECLARE them.

At any rate, the analogy breaks down for a combination of four reasons: (A) It is regrettable that Hudson's sort of subjectivism confuses expression-like utterances about feelings with statement-like utterances about feelings. It is statements and commands which elicit such kinds of "Why ?" as occur in his examples. Ayer's careful distinction of **evincing** from **stating** in *Language, Truth and Logic*, where he holds that moral judgments belong among expressions of feeling, makes him reject the misleading title of 'subjectivist'. (B) "Strawberries are nice" can mean at least four things or different amalgams of them. (i) "How I enjoy strawberries !" Where we have an ejaculative expression of feeling, the more expression-like it is, the odder it is to ask "Why ?" (ii) "I enjoy strawberries a lot." I describe or state my feelings **about strawberries** with the politely impersonal "Strawberries are nice", when asked what fruit I particularly enjoy. If a very recent, very foreign visitor, cautious about strange food, asks me "Why ?", his question is quite appropriate. He wants to know if the sort of edible thing that makes me eager or gives me pleasure is anything like what arouses and gives him pleasure. (iii) "You'll generally find that people like strawberries." I make a statement about a great many people's feelings, not necessarily my own. When someone asks my advice what to serve after the main course at a banquet, I may say "Strawberries are nice" in this sense. Some purists would prefer not to talk of **senses**, but of **uses, constructions** or **illocutionary acts**. Yet this common-sense sense of **sense** is, I hope, quite clear.[7] (iv) "Any person with good taste would enjoy them" or "You (one, they) ought to enjoy them". Here the junior gourmet makes a value judgment, quite possibly of an objectivist kind: it's a poor sort of person who doesn't like them. Just so the senior gourmet considers a judgment about which sherry is nicer, the Spanish one or the Californian, not really a matter of personal or general taste. It is a matter of decent, or cultivated, or expert taste.

(C) "Why ?" is even more ambiguous in cold type. With "Why_1?", I ask **argumentatively** for a reason. "I don't see that's so. Support your claim with a reason. **Justify** it !" With "Why_2?" I ask **enquiringly** for a cause. "I'd appreciate knowing the cause of that being so." With "Why_3?" I ask **enquiringly** for an amplification or clarification: "I'd like to hear more. What is it about strawberries that you like ?"; "I'd like to get your view clearly. What is it about strawberries that one ought to appreciate ?" There are also all sorts of **cross-breeds**—such as argumentative varieties of "Why_2?" and "Why_3?" an enquiring variety of "Why_1?", and so on. Each calls for a differing sort of "Because....." statement and a differing sense of **reason**—a word Hudson throws around with no regard for ambiguity.

[7] For a detailed clarification see my 'Senses and Sensibilia' in *Analysis*, December, 1962.

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(D) If I say "Strawberries are nice" in the subjective sense (ii) that I personally happen to like them, then "Why ?" will most naturally be taken as an enquiring request either for a cause or for a clarification. In answer to "Why$_2$?" I tell the the cautious foreigner what it is about this dessert unknown to him that causes my appetite to perk up whenever it is served. (He gets a **causal sort of reason** like the reason for my headache being that I left the gas on.[8]) In answer to "Why$_3$?" from a curious but unchallenging country cousin, who cannot abide them and never knew of anyone who could, I explain what it is about them, their sweetness, that I like. (He gets an amplifying reason). But in case (iv), we have a value judgment by which a gastronomic objectivist could tendentiously assert that everyone with any claim to sensible taste should like strawberries. "Don't throw them away ! Strawberries are too **nice** !" Here we are more likely to get an argumentative "Why$_1$?" in return. "What possible reason have you to say we all ought to like them ?" **A justifying reason is called for if argument is to be joined.** Hudson confuses the issue by repeatedly speaking of all such conversations as **arguments** (533-34). If they are understood as arguments, then they are most naturally construed in the cases of both strawberries and bull-fights as the assertions of objective value judgments, followed by an argumentative "Why$_1$?", followed by a justifying reason. But Hudson also says that, in such conversations, B is "really" pressing A to say more precisely what he is for or against. (532) If so, then the conversations are not naturally construed as arguments but as odd indicative sentences, followed by requests for amplifications, then followed by clarifying 'reasons'. When A says "Strawberries are nice", however, he is most naturally taken in this case as saying he likes them (he is **all for** them) and then explains what he likes about them and what he **is for** about them: yet when A says "Bullfighting is wrong" he is most naturally understood not just as saying he dislikes it, is against it, but as saying that everyone **ought** to be against it. He then says more precisely what it is about bull-fighting that he disapproves of and that everyone else **should** disapprove of.

Hudson's comparison of the conversations offer but a specious analogy. On the odd occasions when "Strawberries are nice" occurs in an **argument** it is most likely to have been intended and understood as a general objective value judgment, not as subjectivist's expression or description of personal taste.[9] In this case the fact that a justifying reason

[8] Writers who postulate a rigid distinction between *causes* and *reasons* need to take causal sorts of reasons more seriously. It is surprising to find G. E. M. Anscombe writing "It will hardly be *enlightening* to say; in the case of the sudden start the 'reason' is a *cause*; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion" (*Intention*, Oxford. 1958, p. 10) For she later writes: "What is so commonly said, that reason and cause are everywhere sharply distinct notions, is not ture." (p.24) And this point is highly enlightening, as Mr. Hudson's errors show. But if the statement of the point is enlightening, so is the first understatement.

[9] Objectivism about values is not a view confined *a priori* to paradigm cases of what we call peculiarly *moral* matters; politic, aesthetics, ways of reasoning and other matters are open to objectivist appraisal. Gastronomic objectivism is, perhaps, a black sheep, but it is a black sheep *of the family*.

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is naturally given for both "Strawberries are nice" and "Bull-fighting is wrong" can hardly be said to tell even linguistically against objectivism. But, while it is not very likely outside junior gourmets' circles that the conversation about strawberries will be an argument at all, it is quite possible that the interchange on bull-fighting will be an argument. When "Strawberries are nice" is advanced in its most natural sense, the subjectivist sense (ii), then 'Why ?' most naturally requests a causal or an amplifying sort of 'Because.....'statement. When 'Bull-fighting is wrong' is advanced in its most natural sense, the objectivist senes (iv), then 'Why ?' most naturally demands a justifying sort of 'Because' statement. Again, when the conversations are taken fairly naturally, but somewhat less naturally, as clarifying discussions we again find an important divergence. In one conversation, the 'Because...' statement most naturally states simply what it is about strawberries that I like; in the other, the 'Because...' statement most naturally states what it is about bull-fights that I dislike, and that I certainly **ought** to dislike, and that everyone else should dislike. Despite his attempt to solve philosophical problems by linguistic analysis,Hudson has completely missed the common wisdom which makes 'Why ?' and 'reason' shift in meaning with a context.

Thus,if we start with the tacit value-postulate that there is a certain point and wisdom in the way we talk, we conclude an analysis of Hudson's discussions with an explicit reason to believe that proper value judgments are much more like objective claims about the weather, which we back with factual justifying reasons, than like expressions and descriptions of our feelings, which we do not.

The failure of the analogy is worth establishing even if we agree with a philosopher like Weiss in **Modes of Being** that the common wisdom needs some 'purification'. For, from quite a range of value postulates about ordinary language, we can conclude that the linguistic ineptitude of Hudson's analogy offers good reason for believing no longer just in the objectivity and cognitivity of **some** value judgment (or particular value postulate), but in the objectivity and cognitivity of some **moral** value judgments. Suppose the analyst has no initial value postulate. Suppose he accepts nothing like Socrates' doctrine that examinations of our confused talk about Piety, Courage, Justice are worth attempting since they lead to clear recollection (*anamnesis*) of almost forgotten values; nor like Aristotle's belief in the language-reflectedness of human rationality when he said *cγαρ πασι δοκει, ταυτ ειναι φαμεν*; or like Wittgensteins view that everything is in order as it is; nor like Gabriel Marcel's conviction that a grasp of much which is implicit in our ordinary ways of talking is badly needed, since it leads to a more explicit,if extraordinary, account of how we should relate to other men and God. What then ? If we really discover that an analyst holds simply nothing of the kind to be true, then we wonder why he calls himself a **philosophical** analyst. Is it because he wants to glorify a new parlour game with the ancient

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title for a form of honourable employment ? But, if he does hold something of the kind to be true, then he can draw a philosophical moral from the study of many languages. Those, who agree that much wisdom is to be found in an understanding of concepts in their own and similar languages, can avoid corrupting this wisdom into a form of parochical dogma by searching for the point and purpose of very different languages. Chinese and Navaho, physicists' formulae and the technicalities of lawyers or theologians, revisionary metaphysicians, a Hoylean artificial language for contacting possible space creatures, should all have wisdom to offer. That the Greek or the Chinaman or the lawyer says something **this** way does not prove his way of speaking to be wise;but understanding why he says it this way can sometimes bring new insight and wisdom of the kind a philosopher seeks; understanding why Hudson's analogies are linguistically bad may well make us wiser about the status of peculiarly 'moral'valus.

To be Concluded

TIMES' TALENT

Time has talent,
Nature everlasting—
Infinity, eternity, humanity
Strives and struggles,
Thrives and thrusts
Its past;
In the pages of history.

And the dumbfounded Soul,
A mere witness
Of the orgies
Of time and talent
With fortitude
Seeks rebirth, to fulfill
The shortcomings of its experiences

And waits for that day
When through
The sheer force of its experiences
It fulfills its promise
And gains for itself,
The knowledge absolute
And Transconsciousness.

Shri Vijayadev

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REVELATION AND SOME ASPECTS OF INDIAN SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT

B. V. SUBBARAYAPPA

An interesting feature of the revered texts on medicine (Āyurveda), mercurial system (Rasavāda) and astronomy (Jyotiṣa Siddhānta) is the revealed nature of knowledge pertaining to the respective sciences. Introductory portions of the Caraka Suśruta Saṁhitas, Rasārṇava and the Sūrya Siddhānta speak of their origin as of supernatural revelation. The origin is traced to a divinity.

Two aspects of this rather important and peculiar characteristic of scientific thought in India deserve our attention : (1) whether contents of the texts are in conformity with the supernatural character and (2) probable significance of a divine origin to what is contained in the texts.

CARAKA AND SUŚRUTA SAṀHITAS

In the Caraka Saṁhita,the origin of Āyurveda is detailed as follows: Brahma, the Creator of the Universe, recapitulated and revealad Āyurveda to Dakṣha Prajāpati. The divine knowledge was then revealed to *Indra* through the twin Vedic gods, *Aśvins*. The venerable sage, *Bhāradvāja,* learnt the knowledge from *Indra* in the form of aphorisms. The former, in turn, imparted it to his fellow-sages among whom *Punarvasu Ātreya* was one. The Caraka Saṁhita traces its origin to one of the six disciples of Ātreya *Viz*, *Agniveśa*[1].

In the Suśruta Saṁhita, Āyurveda's flow is the same as above up to Bhāradvāja; only, instead of him, *Dhanvantari* learnt the knowledge from *Indra* and imparted it to the sage *Suśruta*, when he (Dhanvantari) became incarnate among men as Divodāsa, the King of Kāśi (Benares)[2]. It is significant that Dhanvantari (who does not figure as a Vedic god) is one of the fourteen jewels or ratnas which appear in the course of *Kṣīrasāgara mathana* (churning of milky ocean)—a mythical process[3]. In the course of that process, Dhanvantari arises with amṛta or *elixer* of immortality. He is allied with *Viṣṇu*, the Preserver of the Universe, and the principal diety who directed the mythical process.

Another aspect of the Āyurveda as divine wisdom is that it contained 10 million verses under 1,000 chapters and, later, in view of limitations of human mind, it was epitomised and compartmentalised into 8 units or limbs (*aśtāṅgas*)[4]. Now the question is whether the principal thought-structure of the Āyurveda is in consonance with the supernatural exposition as expressed in the introduction. It is well known that the two

1 Caraka, Sutra I. 2-5, 27-33.
2 Susruta, Sutra, I. 1-2, 19-20.
3 Viṣnu Purāna, Chap. IX.
4 Susruta, Sutra, I. 5.

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Saṁhitas have, as their theoretical basis, the Sāṅkhya thought-structure. It is, to be sure, the classical Sāṅkhya, because of the way in which the 24 principles inclusive of the five *tanmātras* are enumerated[5]. Further, the doctrine of five elements (pancabhūtas) appears to be the nucleus around which are built into form speculations concerning *tridoṣa*, *śadrasas* and classifications of herbals and foodstuffs[6]. In the Caraka Saṁhita, Vaiśeṣika categories are also enumerated[7]. The Sūtra and the Śāriva Sthānas of both the Saṁhitas bear ample testimony to the view that the Āyurveda must have assumed its form at the time when the two systems, the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika, were dominant modes of thinking. It must be observed that these two systems do not trace their origin to anything supernatural, as does the Āyurveda, although the Vaiśeṣika admits Śabda (Veda or Śmṛti) as one of the means of valid knowledge.

RASAŚĀSTRA

While the Āyurveda finds its manifestation in the Syambhu Brahma's recapitulation, the mercurial system, which is an admixture of medicinal and alchemical (inclusive of 'making' artificial gold) practices, owes its origin to *Śiva* who revealed the knowledge to his consort *Pārvatī*. In the Rasārṇava which is probably the earliest reduction of the Rasaśāstra, Śiva, questioned by Pārvati, eulogises the efficacy of mercury and the tantras associated with it for the benefit of the people of *Kaliyuga*[8]. What is significant is that in most of the texts of the *Rasaśāstra*, Śiva is worshipped in the form of Bhairava and the latter is associated with occult rites and demonic rituals. Bhairava says that mercury or *Parada* is the *Rasa* (hence the name of the Śāstra) or his creative principle (Vīrya or Semen)[9]. There is also a mythological story respecting it.

It appears to me that there is no thread of thought binding the all and sundry of the textual contents of the Rasaśāstra. It is an admixture of the esoteric element, superstition, tantric ideas and some chemical processes involving a good number of arbitrary substances including minerals, bloods, urines, dungs, salts, acids and the like. The emphasis is on the preparation of a mercurial remedy which would prolong life and even make one (Siddha) move in air. The texts bespeak faith rather than rational approach. Those who professed the faith were of a type to whom the higher knowledge was not readily accessible and who, therefore, resorted to tantric rituals. Rasaśāstra derives its inspiration from a tantric and superstitious frame of mind and sanction from extrapolated *Pauraṇic* legends.

THE SŪRYA SIDDHĀNTA

The Sūrya Siddhānta is regarded as the most celebrated of the eighteen Siddhāntas or astronomical treatises. Maya, an asura, performed

[5] Susruta, Śārīra, I, 3-6.
[6] Susruta, Śārīra, I. 22; Sutra I. 42.3, I.41.–3–4.
[7] Susruta Sutra, I 28-29.
[8] Rasarnava, I. 4.
[9] Rasārnava, I. 33-34.

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religious austerities in propitiation of the Sun-God who revealed to him the knowledge saying, "I will give you knowledge which is based upon time and the magnificent system of planets". It is also stated that only a part of Sun addressed Maya, as the Sun-God says, "none is able to endure my brilliancy and I have no leisure for communication"[10]. In the last chapter towards its end, it is again pointed out to Maya asura, "Thus have you been told the Supreme, lofty and wonderful mystery. This knowledge is equal to Brahman"[11].

It should be borne in mind that the other astronomical works like the *Āryabhatīva* of Āryabhata and *Siddhanta Śiromaṇi* of Bhaskaracārya do not mention anything about the origin of the science of astronomy. *Vedanga Jyotiṣa* is hardly an astronomical work in the sense in which we now understand the science of astronomy.

The cosmogony of the Sūrya Siddhānta begins with one transcendental Supreme Puruṣa and the evolution is again in consonance with the Sāṅkhya thought[12]. As the cosmogony does not contemplate the *tanmatra* stage, it would appear that it has preclassical theistic Sāṅkhya structure. The Siddhānta considers time not only as a physical postulate but also as a principle that invisibly operates through the process of creation and subsequently of evolution. Even a practical enumeration like the duration of one revolution of Sun around the earth,or nychthemeron which is referred to as "*mānuṣyahorātra*" (i.e., human day and night) is not an isolated entity by itself. It is, in an ingenious way, linked with the origin of creation; i.e with Brahma. 12,000 divine years or one Kalpa (this is also referred to as Cataryuga, a quadruple age consisting of Kṛta, Treta, Dvāpara and Kali in the ratio of 4: 3: 2: 1) is the day part of Brahma's nychthemeron[13]. Evidently, the Kalpa, as denoting a very great period of time, must have been built into the mythological lore possibly with a single purpose establishing the Creator's superintendence over time.

According to the Hindus, this has a great astronomical significance. Hindu astronomers believed that the moving celestial bodies would be in conjunction at the beginning of each Kalpa. The number of revolutions of the planets has been reckoned with reference to the period of 4,320,000 (12,000×360) years[14].

Amidst a Sāṅkhya cosmogony and a Mythological time scale, we do notice in the Sūrya Siddhānta certain astronomical results more or less corresponding to those obtained by modern observational astronomy. It is not necessary here to go into their details. Be that as it may, there do not appear any details regarding observational procedures to be followed.

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10 Surya Siddhānta I. 4-6.
11 Surya Siddhānta XII. 13-23.
12 Surya Siddhānta I. 18-19.
13 Op. Cit. 1-57.
14 See H.T. Colebrooke, As. Res. Vol. II-225.

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Even then, the astronomical results contained in the Siddhānta are not of tune with the revealed character as also with the cosmological frame.

Now, what may be the probable significance of a transcendental revelation as a forerunner to a phenomenal science ? From the history of Indian ideas in Physical Sciences, one cannot help concluding that these ideas have been always a part of philosophical, religious or mythological speculations. At no time of its development did Indian Scientific thought get itself divorced from them. Within their framework were excursions made to understand problems of matter, medicine and astronomy. The Indian thinkers believed that total knowledge was never reached in different sciences as the latter expressed only glimpses of the Absolute the quest for which was their sole purpose.

Such a frame of mind naturally would border on synoptic intuition rather than discursive intellect. Intuition more than experimentation is the fountain source of all scientific knowledge in India. But, to be effective, intuition requires sanction. It would appear that such a sanction was sought in divinity. In the name of divinity, the speculations were probably deemed to acquire an irrefutable appeal. Perhaps, it proceeded from a faith that intuition was divine and the function of the human mind was only to give expression to it. It is significant that many Indian thinkers have not owned systems of thought which originated from them. They considered themselves to be *Pravarthakas*. They always thought that they were only instrumental in receiving the knowledge from somewhere divine. It was perhaps an approach of this type that might have been responsible for elements of revealed character which we find in some of the texts. Further, such an approach was certain of popular appeal and it did happen like that.

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OBITUARY NOTES

Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru : the late Prime Minister of India for 17 years of her independence, who has recently passed away, was a unique person to describe whom is, as a Hindi saying goes, to show the sun with a lamp. Not only every person and every child in India knew him, but also all men, women and children of the world knew him. If Gandhi freed India, Jawahar Lal Nehru strived to rebuild it. He worked hard for the welfare of India and for peace in the world. Every mement of his life was consecrated to these ends. He was a prince among men but a democrat of democrats. He was a politician, a scientist, a philosopher and a literary writer at the same time. People of his calibre are rare. Heredity, environment and his personal effort combined to make him great. His passing away has created a great gap in India and in the world which is difficult to fill up. The *Darshana International* and the *Psychics International* pay their homage to his memory.

For the reader here is a brief description of the life of late Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru.

Born Nov. 14, 1889, Allahabad, of Moti Lal Nehru and Swarup Rani; educated at Harrow School, Trinity College, Cambridge, England, M.A., Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law; married Kamala, Feb. 7, 1916 (dec.), one child, Indira (Mrs. I. Gandhi). Barrister-at-Law, 1912: actively interested in active politics since he joined the bar; became a staunch follower of Mahatma Gandhi; joined the civil disobedience compaign started by Mahatma Gandhi, in 1921, imprisoned 9 times during the compaign for India's independence; served as the General Secretary of the Indian National Congress for 10 years and was its President 4 times; Chairman, National Planning Commission; Vice-President and Minister for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Interim Government of India1946-47; Prime Minister, Central Govt. of India August, 1947 to May 1964. He passed away on the 27th May, 1964. He was a great patron of Science and Technology presided over the Indian Science Congress and got several National Laboratories established in the country. He believed in Peaceful co-existence of all nations on earth. The whole world respected him.

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Dr. Nandor Fodor : One of the Editors, constant contributors and supporters of the *Darshana International* and *Psychics International* and a close personal friend of the Editor, Dr. B. L. Atreya. He was a great scholar and writer and a psychotherapist living in New York. He wrote an *Encyclopedia of Psychic Science* in 1935 and had since been writing books and articles on various aspects of Psychical Research and Psychoanalysis until he suddently passed away on the 17th May, 1964 on account of sudden heart failure. During recent years he wrote several

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books and articles in which the psychic phenomena were approached from psychoanalytic point of view. With his passing away the *Darshana International* and the *Psychics International* have lost a great academic and intellectual supporter. We pay our homage to his respected memory and sympathise and condole with his wife, daughter and grand daughter, whom recently our editor Dr. B. L. Atreya saw in his home in New York.

‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡

Kowtha Suryanarayana Row : On the 25th September passed away our great patron and friend Shri Kowtha Suryanarayana Row at the age of 85 years. He was a rare combination of a learned man, a great patron of learning, a greatly religious man and a very successful business man and an industrialist. He earned enormous wealth and spent it on very noble causes. He established the Swadharma Swaarajya Sangha (Orthodox National League) with its offices at Madras (Beehive Buildings, 95 Broadway, Madras), Secunderabad (10 Padmaraja Nagar, Secunderabad) and Vijayawada (Kowtha Buildings, Vijayawada), for the purpose of propagating Sanskrit Language and Adhyatma Vidya. He was the Founder and Managing Director of the Sangha and spent money very generously on establishing Sanskrit Pathshalas in which the highest type of Advaita Vedanta was studied and taught, on holding conferences of learned pandits at many places including Varanasi, and on the propagation of Hindu culture not only in India but also in foreign countries. Recently he founded an International Academy of Integrating Bharatiya Culture at Varanasi and chose the Chief Editor of *Darshana International*, Dr. B. L. Atreya, as its Honorary Director. He was a man of high ideals and noble character. He patronised all good and noble causes. He came to the rescue of *Darshana International* by advancing a loan of several thousands of Rupees without interest. He helped the publishing or *Dr. Radhakrishnan Souvenir Volume* by advancing a loan without interest for the purchase of paper. He was a unique south Indian who appreciated and patronized North Indian scholars and Hindi Language. We pay our reverential homage to his hallowed memory and condole with the family which has lost a great head man.

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Dr. Frederic de Havas : Director Solomon Cross School, Surrey, England, Member of the British Psychological Society and Regular and active member of the International Congress of Psychology, and a contributor to our Journal and a personal friend of mine with whom I came in contact at the XVIth International Congress of Psychology held at Bonn (1960) has passed away. In him we have lost a personal friend and a scholarly contributor. We are very sad on his death and offer our heartfelt condolences to his dear wife and other members of the family.

Prof. J. P. ATREYA
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THIS ISSUE OF THE *DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL* IS MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED TO MR. *LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON* WHO HAS BEEN ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF U S.A. WITH THE MOST OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF VOTES IN THE HISTORY OF U. S. A AND FROM WHOM THE WORLD EXPECTS THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GLOBAL PEACE. MAY GOD BLESS HIM.

J. P. ATREYA
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EDITORIAL

Pre-requisites and Pitfalls of 'One World Government'

There is no doubt that science and technology are bringing home to mankind that the world is one and humanity is no longer separated by the divisions of country, race, colour, religion or sect. Every group of humanity is now in contact with another in many respects and none can exist in isolation from another. International, inter-cultural, inter-religious, inter-linguistic, inter-marital, and inter-racial relationship among the people of the world is growing day by day. There is hardly any country on the globe in which people of other countries are not found as tourists, teachers, students, traders, religious preachers, political envoys, spies or secret agents, criminals, and married partners. Almost every big town on earth is now a world-town in which are found not only men and women of almost all the countries of the world but also articles manufactured in all parts of the world. The standard living conditions, such as sanitary latrines, bathrooms equipped with hot and cold water, electric light and electric fans, electric heaters, radios, televisions, refrigeraters, air-conditioning of rooms, shops and offices, telephones, gas or power for cooking, weighing machines, washing machines, typewriters, duplicators, printing machines, and machines for doing all kinds of 'drudgery work', hotels, restaurants, cafetarias,railways,buses,motor cars, aeroplanes, tractors, cement-concrete buildings, universities, colleges, schools, elections, strikes, and political rivalry, etc. are commonly found everywhere on earth. Tea, coffee, bread and butter are available everywhere, and are accepted from everybody without the difference of race, colour, caste or creed. Every international plane has its stops almost in every country, and carries passengers of all countries, races, colours and creeds without any hitch. There is monetary transaction or exchange between the coins and notes currency of various countries. There are many international cultural, academic, and political organizations which have membership of all nationalities. The U.N.O. in U.S.A. and the U.N.E.S.C.O. in France and the International Court at Hague (in Holland) are such international organizations which look after the political disputes, problems of education, culture, and health, and justice from the point of view of the whole world. They are set up by voluntary effort and co-operation of most of the nations of the world, and are handling many problems of the world as a whole, and sometimes very serious problems. But

Note:—*We are very sorry we have not been able to complete in this issue our article on the 4th East-West Philosophers' Conference in Hawaii, for certain reasons. We hope to complete it in the next issue of the Journal.*

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they do not yet constitute the World-government in the real sense of the word. They are like co-operative organizations, the membership of which is not compulsory, although most of the countries of the world like to be their members and contribute to their establishment and running. They do not have absolute power. The world-government, if it come to exist will have sovereignity over the world in the same way as the state governments are at present sovereign powers in their states.The world government may be a federal government in which all the states of the world have their own sovereignity within their own states so far as internal affairs are concerned and will be subordinate to the world government in so far as inter-state affairs are concerned.Or it may be a soveriegn world-state having within its jurisdiction and control over all the important affairs of the entire humanity, leaving to the various regions (not countries in the present sense) in the world only those affairs which are merely local and regional. Under the sovereign world-state there shall be no sovereign and independent states, functioning as such in all affairs of life except the international ones.

If the world-government comes into existence in the near future,first it is likely to be the federal form of government dealing with the most general questions of human rights and international problems. But this form of government will not be able to achieve as much as the Sovereign world government can, provided it is a good government. It is however, a distant dream, as the so called national state governments are not soon going to abdicate themselves in favour of the one world government.

Apart from the question of the need, utility, and goodness, of world government it has to be considered whether humanity is at present *fit* to have the world government and what, if any, are the pitfalls of such a government if we establish it in our present state of moral and spiritual evolution.

The following are the pre-requisites of the one-world government according to the present writer :—

1. Mankind should be so educated as every man, woman, boy and girl should understand, realize and feel that he or she is a citizen of the world, an inhabitant of the earth; that all human beings are members of one family, and brothers and sisters. Human fellowship, over and above one's nationality, race, colour or creed should determine our relations with one another. A new type of patriotism, namely, love for the mother earth should be cultivated. This attitude is best expressed by a Sanskrit couplet which translated comes to this: "It is the petty-minded people who think that one is a brother and another is an alien; for the broad minded the whole world (humanity)is a family". In another Sanskrit line it is said "God is my father and the earth my mother; all human beings my brothers and sisters and the whole universe of three regions is my home". All the lower belongings, such those to a caste, creed, religion, nation, country, colour or race, etc. should be transcended in the highest belonging, namely, that to the world and to humanity.

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2. Our aspirations should accordingly change and expand. Not the welfare of people belonging to our caste, creed, religion, race, colour or country alone, but that of all human beings should be the goal of all our endeavours. We should all learn to wish and pray for the welfare of all just as Sanskrit writers of ancient India did, "May all beings be happy; may all beings be free from disease and suffering; may all come across with what is good and suspicious; may none be unhappy in the world". "May all beings overcome their difficulties; may all come across what is good and auspicious; may all have a pure intellect; may all be happy everywhere in the world". "May the wicked become good; may the good attain peace in their life; may the peaceful become free; and may the freed one's help others in becoming free". "There can be no welfare state of the world as a whole as long as we wish well only for persons belonging to our family, society, caste, creed, colour, country or race, which is the case with most people at present.

3. Human beings all over the world should realize that just as all human beings have different faces from one onother so they have different ideas, attitudes, and points of view; We should learn to understand, respect, and tolerate others' views and should never try to impose our views on others. All the views, being important and valuable to their owners and entertainers, should be allowed to co-exist with ours. We should try to synthesise all the different, divergent, and even contradictory views in wider, more comprehensive and generous ones. The Jain philosophy of *Anekāntavāda*, *Nayavāda*, and *Syādvāda*, if properly understood, followed and practised, tends to bring about this attitude of universal tolerance. Every point of views including mine, may thus be true and false, effective and ineffective; and good and bad. Why then worry to convert people to one's own point of view.

4. All political ideologies should be impartially and properly studied and understood, and not down right decried and denounced. They should not become creeds. They should be tried and tested wherever conditions suitable for their application operate. The ultimate aim of all the political programmes should be peace and prosperity of the entire mankind, and not of a section of it.

5. All the churches, missions and organisations which aim at enslaving and converting people to particular rites and ceremonies and to particular creeds and religions should be disbanded. Let every body feel as free in having any religious views and beliefs as he is in eating any food or in wearing any dress. Let religious beliefs and views exist in books as all sorts of articles exist in stores; and let there be a free choice in accepting or rejecting them as it is in purchasing or not purchasing any article from any store.

6. Whatever the attitude of each person towards the unknown, towards God, or towards the nature and destiny of the soul, every human child should be practically trained to observe the golden rule of conduct, namely, of doing unto others as one wishes to be done unto oneself; and

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of avoiding doing unto others what one does not want to be done unto oneself. The golden rule of conduct should be followed and practised not only by individuals but also by groups, communities, races, nations and countries.

7. Men should learn and form habit of settling their disputes in peaceful manner, by way of understanding each other's points of view, by compromise, and by yielding the trifling and the inessential. They should learn to forgive and pardon others by being generous and large-hearted. They must always be prepared to pay the price of peace which is to surrender oneself to the right and just, and to judge impartially.

8. Men quarrel about petty things, ordinary gains and false prestige, forgetting or not knowing that the highest values of life do not involve any competition or conflict with others; that they are more realizable by giving up worldly objects than possessing and amassing them; by co-operation than by competition;by forgiving than by taking revenge;by loving than by hating human fellows. They should know that the greatest joy in life is felt in giving rather than in taking; that the greatest happiness is felt in selfless service and love. With this knowledge, men will love,rather than hate; will scatter rather than collect; will give rather that take. The tendency to quarrel, fight and wage war for petty worldly things will then lessen and cease. A deeper insight into life and the universe, born of dispassionate earnest and rational enquiry, tends to bring about this attitude.

9. All men on earth should know that the requisite change in human consciousness can be brought about by effort, education, and by utilising the press, the radio, the movies for propagating it. Human nature is not very rigid. It can be sublimated and transmuted. It can be tranformed into saintliness from criminality.

10. All men should realize that if humanity is to exist, thrive and survive in future in this age of all sorts of deadly bombs it can only do so by evolving a world-unity, a world fellowship, and a world government, and by no other way.The present-day racial,national and ideological conflicts and cold or hot wars in various parts of the world,if continued long, will bring about disaster to humanity, and the mother earth may once again be inhabited by insects, reptiles and ferocious beasts.

11. Before we can have a world government, we should create a world state, and that is possible when the present states surrender their absolute sovereignity, either wholly or partially, and give up all boundry disputes.

If without the requisite change in human consciousness, attitude and outlook, the world government comes into existenee by some patch work or by some military force, it is bound to have a number of pitfalls, some of which are the following :—

1. All the resources of the world may be utilised by officials of the world government for their own benefit and comfort in the same way as

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those of the various countries are being utilised by the administrators of the countries and the rest of the people suffer from all sorts of scarcities. The world-government will be in the hands of political exploiters, who will be supported by gangsters and criminals; and the life of the peaceful citizens of the world would be trampled over by scoundrels.

2. Political propaganda, grouping, group rivalry, opportunism will ruin the life of humanity, unless a better system of selecting the administrators of the world government is found out. None of the present forms of government and of election or selection of officers can suit the whole world. Some better system of selecting the right persons for right places should be discovered by thinkers of the world.

3. A government can be a good government or a bad government. A good government is that which is in the hands of good people. Good people are those who think of and work for the good of all and not of their own or of those whom they regard as theirs. The good of all or the welfare of the world as a whole can be realized only if truth, justice, honesty, and equitability are followed in all affairs of the government. If the world-government is manned and run by people who do not believe in moral principles, who exploit the resources of the world for their own benefit or for the benefit of those who support them or who belong to them by relation of colour, country, race, creed, or community. A Sanskrit writer of ancient India has rightly said. "That government is not a good government which is not run by wise men; they are not wise who do not follow moral principle; and those are not moral principles which violate truth; and that is not truth which involves deceit". The world government must be run on completely secular, non-communal, non-racial, and non-national basis. It must be representative of all parts of the world. Otherwise the world government will be *Chakrawarty rājya* (global reign) of one group of people, which may be worse than national governments.

4. The world government should keep under its control and management only the world affairs, with which all human beings as such are concerned. Regional affairs should be left to the regional governments which will be subservient to the world governments. The regional governments should leave local affairs to the local governments. The division of regions and localities should be remade on purely geographical basis,and not on the basis of the 'countries' as they exist now: not on the basis of language, religion, or race. Otherwise the world government will be in danger of being overthrown from time to time.

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PSYCHOLOGY FOR UNDERSTANDING AND PSYCHOLOGY FOR INDICTMENT

HENRY WINTHROP

I. The Dehumanization of Psychiatric Nosology

I very much doubt that when Emil Kraepelin took on the burdensome task of developing a classification for mental illness and disorder, he could have foreseen that a day would come when the campfollowers of modern psychiatry and clinical psychology would convert the diagnostic label into a device for character assassination. I doubt even more that the members of the committees appointed by the American Psychiatric Association to undertake revisions of the psychiatric nomenclature ever intended or expected that diagnostic terms would come to be used as an ideological thrust to dismiss, dispose of, or injure those one disapproves of or dislikes intensely. Nor could anyone have foreseen the number of young, clinical eager-beavers who would one day arise, rabid to play God, who would dispatch anguished patient, a juvenile delinquent or prisoner, or a relief case on the county rolls, by the simple expedient of attaching a dreaded label to him or to her, as the case might be. Yet all this has come to pass.

The great and powerful Russian novelists, in the humility which was so characteristic of many of them, could write lengthy novels, often consuming years of tortured effort, in which they displayed their insight into human needs and concerns by describing the self-doubts,agonies,and despair of any number of their major characters,with a profundity which is obvious to the fascinated and sensitive reader. Nevertheless, in spite of these tours de force, psychologically speaking, they were often deeply dissatisfied with their achievement in the depiction of character and stress of soul, regardless of the world's acclaim for their efforts, and often carried a sense of artistic failure to the grave. Yet many a smug clinician today, given forty minutes for an interview and a page or two to jot down his profound summaries of what makes other people tick,will have no hesitation in convincing himself that he has been able to do in less than an hour what many great novelists have doubted that they had succeeded in doing at all. Furthermore, some of these clinical *epigonoi*, still wet behind the ears. are immovably convinced that they can do it better than some of the greatest writers of our time. The effrontery of some of these soul-searchers knows no bounds. They can whip up a two-page diagnosis on some suffering soul, bristling with a standard professional jargon of "withdrawal symptoms," "passive-aggressive tendencies," "weak ego-strength," "manic-depressive trends," and try to settle

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the patient's hash for good via the psychiatric dossier.

Overlooked in the clinical *echolalia* which some of these diagnostic effusions amount to, is the fact that the patient does not exist for the clinician, whether psychiatrist or psychologist, as a ploy for terminological byplay. It is the clinician who is supposed to exist for the patient—and incidentally to help him rather than merely to characterize him with diagnostic rubrics. Somewhere Menninger has berated his colleagues for being content to find a diagnostic lable for a patient, then fold up shop so to speak, and forget that they exist to minister to human confusion, misunderstanding, suffering, and emotional upset. All this is part of the dehumanization of clinical nosology and clinical practice in some quarters—a dehumanization which passeth for wisdom, understanding, and compassion. It is curious that this process of dehumanization has taken deeper root in institutional practice than in private practice, and one begins to wonder whether it is the fixed fee in the form of the institutional salary that is conducive to that Meerloo[9] has called "labelomania." In other cases, it appears to result from professional growing pains and the proliferation of the clinical calling, following World War II.

In either case the dehumanization of the clinical enterprise via psychiatric name-calling is exactly parallel to the dehumanization of feeling as described by Ortega y Gasset[10] in a passage of deep understanding, entitled "A Few Drops Of Phenomenology." Ortegy y Gasset discusses the case of a dying man at whose bedside one finds the distraught wife, the physician, a reporter, and a painter who is there by mere chance. All are witnesses to the death scene and their involvements run from the "lived grief" of the wife, through the concern of the physician only with his professional effectiveness, the reporter's desire to paint a vivid word-picture of the scene that may move others, to the purely disinterested, perceptive attitude of the painter whose concern is not with the emotional and social significance of the scene but only with color values, light, and shadows. Distance from the event as an emotional reality with which to be involved is zero for the truly grieving wife and at a maximum for the painter.

Now the point of this reference is that labelomania and rubricization, as clinical activities which are pursed as ends in themselves, are about as distant as one can get from genuine involvement with the suffering of the patient. A preoccupation solely with and delight in the attachment of the clinical rubric is a professional form of **intellectual masturbation** in which the **terminology** represents a conceit that tickles the user's professional vanity. It verges dangerously close to the mumbo-jumbo of the 17th century medical contemporaries of Moliere whom that great satirist gave their come-uppance in "The Physician in Spite of Himself" and "The Imaginary Invalid." The clinician who haplessely prefers the sport which the diagnostic lable provides to the help and understanding which it is his function to give is like the psychologist described in

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the following passage by Ortega y Gasset:

"As an example, the importance of which will appear later, let us mention that among the realities which constitute the world are our ideas. We use our ideas in a "human" way when we employ them for thinking things. Thinking of Napoleon, for example, we are normally concerned with the great man of that name. A psychologist, on the other hand, adopts an unusual,"inhuman" attitude when he forgets obout Napoleon and, prying into his own mind, tries to analyze his idea of Napoleon as such an idea. His perspective is the opposite of that prevailing in spontaneous life. The idea, instead of functioning as the means to think an object with, is itself made the object and the aim of thinking..." (p. 17)

In short, there is no limit to the dehumanization of the clinical calling and the professional harm that can be done when the overtones in the use of psychiatric classification carry the same implications which the accusation of heresy has possessed in the past. When nomenclature and clinical theory are turned into a professional type of doctrinaire quasi-theology, we can get the same type of inhumane and bigoted atmosphere so prevalent in the heresy-hunting and heresy-labeling indulged in by the orthodox, militant clergy in the past, and so succinctly described, for instance, by Burckhardt [1] or Runciman[12].

The intellectual laziness and inhumanity which is reflected in the arrogant and sweeping use of clinical terminology to **type** the patient does not hesitate to extend itself to characterizing the allegedly"normal" subject.It involves what Meerloo calls exaggerated respect for the scientific sounding name. Finally,it is a short step from labeling the normal citizen to labeling one's own colleagues. Meerloo mentions the following story:

"Mot long ago a psychiatric colleague worked in a clinic where a different terminology was used, and the ideas of his former teachers, because they were expressed in terms other than those of the clinic, were criticized and even vilified. My colleague was a good practical therapist; yet he came to need psychotherapy himself, to counteract the utter confusion resulting from daily contacts with aggressive adepts of a different terminology,just as much as some of our soldiers released from the Korean prison camps." (p. 139)

This last tendency, the final immaturity reflected in a sort of psychiatric "everyone is crazy except thee and me and sometimes I have me doots about thee," has not escaped unnoticed. Lynn[7] has done real justice to this fatuous dehumanization of clinical practice and I cannot refrain from quoting him here. He provides the following examples from a variety of clinical settings.

"I wonder to what extent the peculiar orientation of clinical psychologists, and persons in related professions, leads to their playing official, professional roles with their associates. Do clinicians tend to be "clinical" with colleagues ? I wonder how often the clinician develops dynamic formulations of his associates, attaches diagnostic labels to them, analyzes possible dynamic motivations in their behavior and "therapizes" them. Moreover, how often, in judging his colleagues'ideas and research,does the clinician look for possible

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dynamic determinants leading to their productions rather than to evaluate the work on its own merits ?

When I first detected these practices in myself and others, I merely considered them mildly annoying but innocuous. Later, however, it became apparent that such practices could not be dismissed as harmless, childish games, but rather that they often have damaging effects professionally. When a clinical impression of a colleague is conveyed to him it is often met with a cool reception. When conveyed to other colleagues it can damage professionally the person in question. Moreover, it seems to me that such a practice is also damaging to its originator. not only insofar as it antagonizes his associates, but also in that it tends to focus attention on irrelevant factors.

Awareness of the damaging effects of being "clinical" with coworkers led me to make inquiries about this subject of colleagues in a variety of settings. From these inquiries it appears that this practice is wide-spread and that it seems destructive wherever it is found. By way of illustration a few examples taken from several different settings are presented below.

This first example is that of one clinician in high authority informing another, also in high authority, that a third colleague was "obviously schizophrenic" and therefore should be dismissed. This "diagnosis" was made on the basis of a brief interview. The clinician making the evaluation is, paradoxically, quite cautious in clinical practice and makes such diagnoses only after the most careful study. Parenthetically, the "schizophrenic" colleague has been very productive for a number of years, has published widely, and is still functioning quite well.

A second example is a clinician who seriously passes off anyone who publishes as an "exhibitionist" and anyone who does research as "a person who is unable to participate in interpersonal relationships because of his inability to cope with his hostile impulses and must, therefore, withdraw to the cloistered laboratory."

The third example is that of two clinicians, each of whom informs one in "strictest confidence" that the other is a "sick person."

A final example is that of a psychological study seminar, confounded and reduced to childish insults (in the guise of clinical interpretations) because the participants focus on possible motivational determinants producing their colleagues' ideas rather than on the ideas per se." (p. 249)

I urge the reader to read this brief paper by Lynn for the flavor it conveys of dehumanization in the clinical setting and the confirmation it provides of the new dispensation available to nosological Johnny-come-latelies.

II. Abuses Of Clinical Description

We have pointed out that Meerloo's term for the pejorative use of rubrics in order to express criticism or hostility, consciously or unconsciously, is "labelomania." One serious example of this which was brought to my attention, and which represents a particularly vicious outcome of professional rubricizing, is striking but not typical. It represents an unfortunate example of the intellectual idolatry of psychoanalysis and the

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abuse of psychoanalytic interpretation by a departmental chairman who was originally a European refugee. I cannot, of course, vouch for its authenticity, since the story comes to me second hand, but, if the uniform descriptions of the chairman which I received from those who worked closely with him can be trusted, perhaps the story is, on the whole, accurate. The deadening megalomania of this particular chairman and his strikingly vulgar authoritarianism, supported by an unbelievably stupid administration, were resented and resisted by an underling, also a European refugee. This chairman, who was extremely ignorant of the steess in this country on experimentation and methodology, possessed a background which was essentially a type of speculative psychology derived from a ludicrous and syncretic hybrid of Thomistic, Aristotelian, and psychoanalytic presuppositions. His authoritarianism was expressed in extremely annoying misjudgments in course planning, student preferences, the distribution of departmental funds, excessively tight controls over everything and everyone, and a diabolical gift for creating turmoil by playing everyone against everyone else, among both teachers and students.

It happened to be the case that the underling refugee was a Jew and that the chairman, who was neither Jewish nor German, used to boast of his collaboration with the Nazis World War II. He was particularly fond of anecdotes which indicated his cleverness and sure-footedness for survival by indicating how he was able to convince individuals on both the Axis and Allied sides, at different times during the war, that he was with them. His favorite anecdote was concerned with the manner in which he saved himself at the end of the war by climbing on the anti-Nazi bandwagon as the Allied liberators swept into Germany. The underling refugee of whom I have spoken was quite a thorn in the chairman's side. Since the chairman had already made a speciality out of psychitrically diagnosing—pejoratively, of course—every colleague who refused to give him unquestioning obedience on all matters, it was not long before he began to lable the refugee underling as a "psychopath" and "schizophrenic". This was shortly followed by taking his classes away from him, giving them to colleagues, declaring to others that the refugee in question was mentally unfit to teach, and thrusting him into a basement for the rest of the year, where he was given various makeshift tasks to justify paying him his salary under a yearly contract which had many months to run. So highhanded was this chairman in most matters, that the turnover under him probably set an academic record of some sort in this country. He had little difficulty in attaching to every associate who displeased him some damaging clinical label which was guaranteed to jeopardize his future.

In the past, individuals paid with their lives for the religious heresies which they entertained. Under the new and doubtful dispensation provided by the abuse of modern psychiatry and psychoanalysis, the heresies are now described in terms of pejorative rubrics which cast

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doubt upon the state of the individual's mental health, emotional stability, adaptability, and normality of values. The accused, however, no longer pay for their heresies in terms of their lives. They now pay for them in terms of their careers. This is done in terms of a new type of administrative "black list," consisting of confidential reports over the telephone to the effect that a given party who is the subject of inquiry is "schizophrenic," "psychopathic," "paranoid," "manic," "disturbed," or some equally injurious label. Our chairman had no difficulty in making use of this **administrative underground**. He was greatly able to impress an administration of uninformed and unimaginative souls, for whom the psychiatric label canjured up God knows what nightmares and contingencies. He was apt in leading a group of administrative namby-pambys around by the nose—administrators who, possessing the same aurhoritarian posture as the refugee chairman, himself, and being indifferent to the demands of truth and justice, accepted anything this chairman had to say without qualification. Anyone who interfered with the smoothness and placidity of administrative procedure made a wave, and anyone who made a wave, particularly if he was allegedly ill mentally, had to be dealt with harshly. It simply never occurred to these administrative self-idolaters that this ex-collaborator of the Nazis could be anything less than a saint or that there might be two sides to every issue on which they permitted him to come out on top. Nor would they ever permit his victims that confrontation with this chairman which an administrative philosophy of good and well-intentioned human relations should demand.

The status-preserving manipulative and inhumane uses of psychiatric nomenclature have been recognized by some psychiatrists themselves. These are certainly some of the unworthy motivations of many clinicians and analysts. In this connection some remarks of Szasz[14], concerning the pejorative professional use of the clinical label, are very much to the point and deserve to be quoted here. He says:

"Some psychiatric diagnoses describe a specific type of behavior —for example, conversion hysteria. In so far as this is true, psychiatric diagnoses are utilitarian in character. At the same time, many psychiatric diagnoses—the terms "psychopath" and "paranoid" are illustrative—seem to have predominantly a symbolic, in the sense of affect—and action-promotive, function. Thus, to some extent psychiatric diagnoses fulfill the same sorts of function as do flags, emblems and monuments : they generate appropriate emotions, which, in this case, are usually awe, fear, and mystification. The result, if not the purpose, is to elevate the institution and its practitioners and to debase all others, especially the patients.....

A man charged with homicide is declared mentally unfit to stand trial and incarcerated in a hospital for the criminally insane. He is neither placed on trial nor released, even though he would prefer either alternative to indefinite mental hospitalization. The psychiatrists have labeled him a "dangerous paranoid," words that strike terror in the hearts of most people, and the victim finds it impossible to obtain the help of either lawyers or psychiatrists, for

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they are reluctant to take on such cases To argue that all men, even those labeled "paranoid." should be treated seriously, as responsible human beings, is like desecrating the psychiatric flag. It flies in the face of one of the major tenets of psychiatry as a social institution, namely, that the actions of some so-called mentally ill persons need not be taken seriously—in the sense of their being held responsible for what they do. More precisely, such acts will not be "taken seriously" from a socioethical and legal point of view, but instead will be "taken seriously" only from a psychiatric point of view.....

The principal **sentiments** generated by the institutional symbols of psychiatry are aversive with regard to psychiatric patients. In this respect psychiatry and penology have much in common, a fact which, considering their intertwined origin, is not surprising.

This contention is illustrated by the language of state-hospital psychiatry: well-behaved patients have "ground privileges" and may be allowed to go home on "parole"; those who leave the hospital without permission are called "escapees" and "fugitives"; and so forth.

As an institution, psychiatry may be no more clearly aware of its **values** than, for example, is the modern family. Indeed, it may be more reasonable to infer the values of an institution from its operation than to look for them in the verbal professions of its members. There are two principal values of psychiatry as an institution: first,to insure the *status quo* and to promote the prevailing interests of society at any given time; second, to enhance its own status and power. More specifically, as a social institution, psychiatry has been enlisted as a force to curb deviance in opinion as well as in action. As such it may be regarded as an extension of the police powers of the state." (p. 3-5)

Namecalling, as an aspect of evaluative language, and its correction, has been one the serious concerns of general semanticists for years. The work of Korzybski[5], Hayakawa[4], Chase[2], and Rapoport [11], for instance, are only a few of the specific examples that can be mentioned in this connection. Namecalling in **intensional**,to use the term emphasized by the general semanticists. It is unhealthy. By contrast, a concern for facts and observation, rather than labels, is **extensional.** It is the increase of **extensional language habits** which is associated with mental health. This goes for professional clinicians, psychologists, and psychiatrists, as well as the layman. But if rubricizing psychiatrists and clinicians, of the institutional and academic variety, have been influenced by the important and socially significant work of the general semanticists, one would never suspect it from the labelomania which still continues, unfortunately, to run riot in the social and professional contexts in which they operate.

III.Poisoning The Wells Through The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

Let us assume a subject, somewhat like the one referred to by Lynn in our first section, who does very little socializing. Instead he spends a great deal of his free time either reading, writing, working in the laboratory. or interviewing and tending to patients, as the case may be. We will also assume that he is bored by small talk and unwittingly shows

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it, and that, as a result, he also avoids the chit-chat of the lunchroom and the coffee break. All this adds up in the minds of some of the local rubricizers to "paranoid schizophernia."

Now consider how many other plausible explanations of our mythical subject's behavior can be provided, apart from the psychiatric label. I am referring to possibilities which might be found on investigation to be the case, provided some questions were asked. We will neglect all those aspects of the scapegoat's behavioral repertoire which obviously would not fit the clinical entity of "paranoid schizophrenia"—traits which the subject **might** possess, and which would be neglected by his associates. These might include such traits as a sense of humor, extreme friendliness and kindliness toward patients and non-professional staff, and an eclecticism in choice of interests and expressed values which is clearly out of keeping with the **tendency** of the true paranoid schizophrenic to develop *idees fixes*. Such favorable traits will be either not observed or, if observed, ignored. The subject's social distance and the aloofness which stems from professional preoccupation will, however, be isolated and seized upon via the process of **perceptual distortion**, to emerge in the triumphant rubric of **paranoid schizophrenia**. Let me list without extended discussion some of the **non-pathological** possibilities concerning the subject's behavior which,on questioning or closer acquiantance,might be found to explain it.

(i) The subject may need time to work and to do research and is willing to sacrifice a good deal of social life in order to do so.Somewhere Harvey Cushing once said that if one wants to be a brain surgeon then one must eat, drink, think, dream, and live brain surgery all the time. If this is only partly true, surely it calls for a tolerance toward our mythical subject's choice of how to spend his free time—a choice which should not, of course, warrant a pejorative description.

(ii) The subject may be socially uncomfortable in groups of eight to ten people but not in small intimate circles of three or four persons.

(iii) The subject is uncomfortable with, bored with, and unable to indulge in small talk. He may have the liabilities of what Schutz[13] calls the **undersocial inclusion type** in his FIRO theory, but this is something else again as contrasted with paranoid schizophrenia.

(iv) The subject may be alienated from his confreres merely as a result of being much younger or much older than they are.

(v) The subject may have been willing to participate more extensively socially than he actually has done,in spite of his attitude that socialization is to a substantial extent a waste of time where one has a crowded work agenda. It may be the case,however,that he hasn't been invited to gatherings, perhaps because his inhibited address is felt to be forbidding by prospective hostess or perhaps because he is too top-heavy,and similar considerations.

(vi) The subject may possess a complex of personal traits which are in no way indicators of paranoid schizophrenia, but which prompt others

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to leave him out of social gatherings because these traits make most people uncomfortable. Such traits may include biting satire, a questioning attitude, more moral decency than typical social backbiters care to live with, conspicuous and noticeable learning, etc.

(vii) Apart from talking shop, the subject may merely possess avocational interests different from those of his associates, leaving him little ground for rapport with them.

(viii) Perhaps the subject is seen as a threat professionally and is so treated, thus being **forced** to withdraw to avoid the discomfiture of strained relations.

(ix) There may be striking differences in values and cognitive maps between the subject and his associates—differences which make smooth and comfortable relations most unlikely.

(x) His associates may be very intolerant of and hostile toward the existing differences in personality and values, and the rejection may be on **their** part rather than on his. Social *xenophobia* has been a very conspicuous disease at all times. The rejection of the subject may also be reinforced by a **failure to understand** his avocational interests, concerns, and activities.

(xi) The subject may be characterized in terms of psychiatric and pejorative terminology because that is the only terminology with which his associates are familiar. Were they acquainted with personality theory in general,a more neutral characterization,borrowed from Cattell,Murray, Sheldon, Adler, Spranger, *at al.*, might otherwise have been employed.

The subject's behavior may be more easily and readily explained as a result of any one or more of the preceding eleven considerations, or of others which have not even been mentioned here. Lack of flexibility, imagination, concern, and knowledge, however, plus the presence of one or more of the unworthy motives we have described above, results in the labelomania which is so deplorable.

All of the preceding situations with which we have concerned ourselves here, lead, of course, to what the sociologist calls the self-fulfilling prophecy. What I am saying here is that professional psychologists and psychiatrists may use nosology so glibly, frequently, and carelessly with associates that,on occasion,if the suffering thus caused is intense enough, they **may** produce precisely the behavior which they attributed to the object of the rubric in question. This, for instance, could conceivably happen to the fictitious "paranoid schizophrenic" of our previous example. It did, in fact, appear to have happened to the unfortunate psychiatrist who was a colleague of Meerloo's. It is a device which has also been used in academic life,usually by *epigonoi* of clinical psychology, and and for purposes of career blockage and career smashing. Whether in institutions or in academic life,it can be used fairly easily to take in many people who are highly suggestible and often neither too bright nor sufficiently critical socially. Among these, unfortunately, we can also find

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professional psychiatrists and psychologists. I have, in fact, always,been amazed at the ease with which the Devil of Messrs. Lewis[6] and De Rougemont[3], operating in a work setting occupied by psychologists, can manipulate people for his own purposes. If anybody ever wanted an object lesson in the immaturities of certain types of professional psychologist, these work settings are the preserves for observing them.

The neatest trick for accomplishing this result is to make use of the poisoning-of-the-wells device. Let some professional father-figure,usually someone in charge, persuade most of the staff under his jurisdiction to ignore one of their associates, on the grounds, let us say, that the employee is *schizophrenic*. Continued application of the cold shoulder or the silent treatment will almost invariably result in the victim's withdrawing and becoming marginal to the group. Then, of course, the father surrogate in charge can shout with glee, run to some figure higher in the administrative heirarchy than himself, present testimony on the withdrawal behavior, and, lo and behold, the charge is proved. This is likely to be followed by the occupational demise of the underline in question. A parallel technique consists of using the rubric of "paranoid", then withdrawing every type of communication from the prospective scapegoat, indulging in various sly devices to trap or embarrass him, and then sit back and wait. If the bewildered target starts to ask questions in order to get his bearings, the professional in charge can triumphantly declare to others "I told you so—suspicious with latent hostility," and another clinical Indian, if I may be permitted to stretch my metaphors, will bite the dust. Still a third technique is to answer an alleged psychopath's questions in an evasive and incomprehensible vein and to act huffy if he insists upon a clear-cut answer. Forced to interpret the vague information, often tendered by some administrator who is fundamentally and constitutionlly incapable of clarity, anyhow, the intended victim of rubricization will make public his interpretation in some relevant interpersonal context. This is the signal for the professional supervisor to claim, when not in the victim's presence, that at last everyone has been furnished with an indication of the subject's clear-cut psychopathy. The victim's interpretation, claims the supervisor, is a perfect example of how he twists the words, meanings, and intentions of others. He is so muddleheaded, it is further declared, that one should either speak to him only when witnesses are present or via the written communication. Keep this up, and members of an unimaginative administrative hierarchy will soon be convinced that the victim is, indeed,incapable of understanding others and must **really** be a psychopath- *Sic transit gloria sapientiae.*

The self-fulfilling prophecy is expressed in another and even clearer fashion. Associates, thinking of their reputations and careers, will avoid the rubricized scapegoat on two counts. One is that association with him may jeopardize their own public images and perhaps subsequently also earn for them the much-feared rubric which has become attached to the

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scapegoat. The other is the fear that if a job crisis of some sort arises for the scapegoat, they may have to testify to the truth or falsity of the pejorative characterization, based upon their own experiences with the subject in question. This creates difficulties. On the one hand,if they have judged the subject to have been unjustly characterised by the label and they so testify,the political strength of the accuser (a) in the work setting may subsequently be used to hurt them too,occupationally.On the other hand, if they lie and go along with the rubricizers, this may be too extreme for a reasonably active conscience. Under such pressures the only workable alternative is one based upon moral cowardice which will never be suspected.One merely avoids all contact with the rubricized victim and can therefore honestly testify that one is in no position to make a judgment of him. This then becomes an easy out, and although conscience may not be clear, it is not too accusatory. Thus we see that the avoidance of rubricized victims is a professional form of trying to escape "guilt by association."

Someday, I suppose, some humanistic psychologist or psychiatrist is going to turn out a handbook of the sly tricks, dishonest devices, and baiting techniques used in political in-fighting, which the upward-mobile in the psychiatric and behavioral disciplines is so adept at using. The few mentioned above are a mere trickle. Until this best-seller arrives on the scene, however, let us note that all professional techniques of this sort contribute to the establishment of the self-fulfilling prophecy. The **intensional** rubricizing used, however, is dependent upon the atmosphere of clinical psychology and psychiatry and upon an unethical willingness to twist that atmosphere to one's own purposes. In industrial conflict, by contrast, the labels will tend to be political, economic, or religious. Perhaps there should be more professional recognition of the fact that "self-actualizers" are relatively free from rubricization, a fact which has been confirmed by Maslow[8], while, on the other hand,the mediocre tend to resort to the rubric rather extensively. Maslow's findings should be just as cogent a warning sign for the clinician as they are for the layman. One can only hope that in the near future a professional morality and an increased public enlightenment will make the dehumanization of diagnosis a thing of the past. Until then, let us not create a self-fulfilling prophecy out of the ancient adage "whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad."

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REASON AND SENTIMENT : A DIALOGUE

RAJENDRA PRASAD

Reason : I was just now thinking of you.

Sentiment : Think of the devil, and the devil is there. I also came an hour ago, but went away finding you sleeping, or perhaps meditating. I hope you won't mind if I take some of your valuable time.

Reason : Certainly not. It is really a pleasure to talk to you. I feel terribly bored when I don't meet you for long.

Sentiment : I am glad to know that you value my company so much. This encourages me to ask the question I came with a mind to. But I would request you not to mind if you find it a little unpalatable. It is no intention of mine to offend you. I only wish to have with you a frank discussion of the roles you and I pay in human life. You must have heard of the lot of things people talk about our relationship, some of which are really insulting to both of us.

Reason : Don't be formal. I work like a machine, and machines may be broken and repaired, but not hurt and pleased.

Sentiment : I don't think you are as mechanical as you think yourself to be. Anyway, it is a good occasion for me to start the ball rolling.

Reason : Would you mind repeating your question ?

Sentiment : Not at all. It is : What sort of roles do you and I play in human life ?

Reason : I am not sure if I fully understand its import. Any concrete question is like a stimulus having the potentiality of releasing a large variety of responses, all of which the questioner certainly would not wish to be aroused. Only one, or a few, of these responses he would call relevant, and would admit that his question has been replied or justly considered only if he finds the recipient's responses to be relevant. Yours is a large question, and it is quite possible that what I say in reply to it does not even touch the puzzlement which prompted you to take the trouble of conversing with me in this muggy room. Therefore, please explain in some detail what you are aiming at.

Sentiment : My friends say it is very difficult to satisfy you, and therefore I do not know if I shall be able to. However, I shall try to explain my meaning as best as I can.

Human life may be treated as a theoretic as well as a practical venture. It is a theoretic venture when devoted to the pursuit of truth, and a practical venture when devoted to the pursuit of values. The one aims at the **acquisition of knowledge**, development of the cognitive powers, and collection and organisation of all sorts of information about all sorts of things. The other aims at the **cultivation of a good life**, not so much at the collection of information but at putting the available information to such uses as may make the resulting life satisfying to the maximum degree possible. Now I am more interested in ascertaining our comparative importance in the good life.

Reason : May I know why you do not regard the pursuit of truth as also a pursuit of value ? It is a very widely held view that the three basic values are Truth, Goodness and Beauty. Further, if you say that

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truth is not a value, one might retort by asking you the question, 'What on earth do you value, if you do not value truth ?'

Sentiment : I anticipated this objection. I do not say that truth is not valued, nor that it should not be valued. I hate lying and hypocrisy as much as you do. What I mean is that the activity of acquiring truths is very much different from the activity of doing something to help the cultivation of a good life. When a Sociologist collects information about the various methods of committing murder prevalent in a particular society, he is certainly acquiring knowledge of truths, but I do not think you would say that what he is doing is **indispensable** for leading a good life.

Reason : What do you mean by a good life ?

Sentiment : A good life can be conceived in two ways, as it may mean a morally good life or a non-morally good life. A morally good life is life led according to the principles of morality, whatever they may be. A non-morally good life is a happy, contented, life.

Reason : Would you call any happy life non-morally good ?

Sentiment : No, no. I was just going to add a restriction but you interrupted me. The happiness which a non-morally good life aims at must be one the acquisition of which does not require (or is not effected by) the use of anything immoral or morally not permissible. Further, I do not say that a morally good life cannot also be a non-morally good life or vice versa.

Reason : Coming back to the question of truth, would you say that moral or non-moral goodness can be produced without truth ? That is, can a life be morally or non-morally good if there is no truth in it ? And, can there be happiness without truth ?

Sentiment : I am sure you know that the reply to both of these questions is an emphatic 'No'. But trying to have a good life is not the same thing as trying to have a body of truths. The acquisition of truth may be a means to leading a good life, but it is not identical with it. I am also inclined to believe that human happiness does depend upon truth, though knowing the truth and being happy are different things.

Reason : I read somewhere that there cannot be either happiness or beauty in any human relationship if it is not based on truth. But what you have said just now has reminded me of the old saying 'Ignorance is a bliss where it is folly to be wise'. It now seems to me that sometimes ignorance can definitely be a bliss. Suppose C loves B and thinks that B also loves him, when in fact B does not. C is confident of B's devotion to him, and therefore feels very much enthused, does his work well, and leads a really satisfied, socially very productive and useful life. Now, if he is never let to know the truth, he is sure to lead a happy, in your sense, a non-morally good, life. But if he gets an opportunity of knowing the truth, nobody would doubt the end of his happiness. Does it support or go against your position ?

Sentiment : This is an interesting example, which, in a sense, supports my case, but I would not comment upon it right now. I am more eager to come back to my original question.

Reason : I am sorry, I introduced so many digressions, but they were really necessary. Now, tell me, what your question amounts to.

Sentiment : I am not interested in the roles we play in the knowledge of truths, nor I am directly interested in what we do in the morally

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good life, though it is closer to the question I am concerned with. I am concerned with the assessment of our roles in leading a life which is happy but not immoral.

Reason : Then, by a good life you mean a happy life ?

Sentiment : You are right. But I would request you not to ask me to define 'happiness'. It is a mere waste of time to define a term when our understanding of it is clear enough to let us proceed in the proposed enquiry. This seems to be the case with the word 'happiness'. I wonder, therefore, why some persons, specially philosophers who claim to be very logical and critical, devote so much time in formulating what they call an agreed definition of 'happiness'. I hope everybody has experienced at least some amount of happiness sometime in his life however short it may be, so that he can be very reasonably expected to understand what one means when one is talking about it.

Reason : Yes, but only if you are using the word in a sense in which it does not refer to something absolutely different from what the common man finds its referent to be. I am not going to ask you for a definition, but I certainly wish you to explain why you consider the examination of happy life as important. I am not saying that it is not a good thing, but, of all the good things on this earth, it is not clear to me why you should be so interested in discussing with me the nature of a happy life.

Sentiment : I am not sure if I have understood aright the nature of your query, but still I shall try to state the reasons for my preference. It seems to me that the ultimate objective of all human endeavours is happiness. By this I do not mean that man **always** consciously directs all his efforts towards getting happiness. If you ask a sculptor, who is working on a piece of marble, what he is aiming at, he would surely say he is aiming (not at happiness but) at making a beautiful statue. But suppose the statue he carves out makes him feel more unhappy than he was before. Will he not then regard his labour wasted ? On the other hand, suppose he feels happier after looking at the completed statue. Will he not then consider his efforts amply rewarded ? The happiness caused by the statue will make his toil meaningful and successful. That is, if a man does something and as a result feels happy, the resulting happiness will give a justification to what he has done, even if the conscious aim of his action was something else. Further, if something leads to happiness, then one does not need to know anything else about it to justify its claim to existence. If you ask 'Why X'? and I say in reply 'X is going to produce happiness', you cannot repeat the same question. You may ask other questions ,questions relating to the nature of happiness, the persons concerned,etc.You may even doubt the contention that X is going to produce happiness,but if you do not,then,I contend,you cannot ask'Why X?'. Again, if I shake off my shyness and say 'I want to lead a happy life', can you ask me why I want to lead a happy life ? You cannot because your question would be pointless. And, if you do, I cannot answer it simply because it has no answer. The feeling which it will arouse in me will be one of sheer bewilderment and not that of being confronted with an extremely hard question. This is so because cherishing happiness is the ultimate reason or justification for the doing of all that which is conducive to it; we cannot ask for a reason for cherishing happiness because it has none.

There is also another point which I would like to remind you of. Perhaps you are thinking that happiness is a very mundane sort of thing, and therefore not worthy of the significance I am attaching

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to it. But if you examine carefully the objectives of various religions, I am sure, you will discover that their primary aim is to make human beings happy. Their argument runs in effect as follows : 'You cannot be happy if you restrict your attention only to the things of the earth. You can be happy only if you direct your attention to that which is divine.' Every religion is basically individualistic, advocating the individual's happiness as his real objective which, according to it, can be attained only by leading a religious life. If you look at the history of religions, you will find that their development has been in the direction of evolving more and more simplified forms of religious practices prescribed for the attainment of religious ideals. The later religions are easier to follow than the earlier ones. All this shows that one of the important features of the development of religions is to require the disciple less and less to curtail his normal enjoyments. To conclude, it seems to me that human beings do seek happiness and it is a good thing to be happy. You might say that happiness is not the only good thing. But even if it is not, it is certainly one of the good things and one which is sought more than any other. Then why not do some heart-searching and find out what place you and I occupy in a happy life.

I have inflicted upon you a long speech which might have bored you a great deal.

Reason : It was not at all a boring speech, Sentiment. I really enjoyed it. What charmed me most was your speaking my language. What, then, you think our roles to be ?

Sentiment : ... ...

Reason : What are you thinking of ? You seem to have become very serious.

Sentiment : I was thinking how to say what seems to me the truth so that it may not hurt you. I do not want to displease you at any cost, but I am afraid what I am going to say may. It seems to me that your share in human happiness is extraordinarily small.

Reason : I must tell you, I prefer the bitterest truth even to the most pleasing falsehood. Don't try to flatter me, say what you think is the truth; only see that there are sufficient reasons for accepting as valid any claim you make.

Sentiment : May I ask you a question ? In what, according to you, does happiness consist ?

Reason : As the ancient Greeks said, it consists in the natural exercise of normal human functions. For example, thinking is a normal human activity, and, therefore, if one exercises his thinking, intellectual, ability in its natural form, i.e. in the acquisition of knowledge, in contemplation, or in conceptual manipulation, one feels happy. Happiness is the resultant of any natural, healthy, activity, bodily or mental, of the human organism. Therefore, I think you are wrong in saying that my share in human happiness is negligible or less than yours. It would not be difficult to find people who feel happier when engaged in working out the proof of Godel's theorem than when they are presented with the orchestration of Beethoven's Nineth Symphony.

Sentiment : What you say is superficially true. But if you examine closely the workings of human nature, you will see that the more intense kind of happiness results from the satisfaction of a desire, a propensity, or to put it more precisely, from the satisfaction of an **affective** need. There are people of the type you have mentioned above, but how many

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are they ? Further, even the so-called intellectuals get tired to intellectual work and it is not rare to see them then rushing to a musical performance or for a chat with their sweet-hearts. But have you found anybody rushing to work on a mathematical or logical problem after he had enough of music or amorous conversation ? Happiness derived from the exercise of intellectual functions is a secondary sort of happiness; a liking for it has to be acquired, just as one has to acquire a taste for wines. But the one derived from the satisfaction of affections is primary in the sense that both the desire and liking for it are natural. One does not have to learn to enjoy amorous talks or the company of a dear friend. If you have to persuade someone to cherish intellectual pleasures, you cannot avoid reference to affective pleasures (i.e. pleasures derived from the satisfaction of an affection) in your eulogy for the former. At some point or other, you will resort to saying that they are as pleasurable as, or more pleasurable than, pleasures obtained from the satisfaction of any human feeling or desire. This shows that affective happiness is the paradigm of human happiness. It is no wonder that mystics, in order to make the ideal of God-realisation attractive to people, claim that the happiness derivable from it is more intense and lasting than that derivable from the satisfaction of even the strongest natural emotions of man.

The naturalness and importance of affective happiness is also supported by depth-psychologists. I do not think anybody develops some abnormality or mental disease when any one of his intellectual needs is not fulfilled, but numerous examples can be found of persons becoming abnormal or insane when a dominant emotional need is frustrated or remains unfulfilled. A highly sensitive person, even in a situation in which he can exercise his intellectual functions freely and satisfyingly and is in the midst of people showering on him sincere intellectual admiration, collapses when he witnesses what may only **seem** to be an act of betrayal by someone he intensely loves.

Reason : You will never understand, Sentiment the secrets of human nature. What you have saidis true only of extraordinarily sensitive persons,not of intellectuals who are capable of losing themselves in higly abstract intellectual enjoyments.

Sentiment : Intellectual enjoyment ! I call it a degenerated enjoyment, an enjoyment which people learn to experience which they cannot have normal human enjoyments. About your 'intellectuals' also, I know facts which, if narrated, will break your heart.

Reason : But won't you agree that man is basically a rational animal ?

Sentiment : Nothing else can be a greater caricature of the truth. This error was committed by the ancient Greeks and you have been carrying it over since then because it is to your advantage. Man is basically a feeling, sensitive, animal, and he is rational only occasionally. Had there been a tape recorder to record what goes on inside a (so-called) intellectual all the time he is conscious, it will show how small a part is played by his reason in the entire drama. Further, if you accept that the achievement of happiness is the central aim of every individual, and I hope you do, then you cannot doubt that that aspect of human nature, the gratification of which offers the greatest happiness, should have the greatest dominance. Therefore, if our affections actually dominate in our life, there is nothing for us to complain against.

Reason : But won't you accept that there are both good and bad affections ?

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Sentiment : Yes, there are. But it is no problem to distinguish the good from the bad ones. Normal human experience is all that one needs to make the distinction. Moreover, to everyone is available a vast store-house of information and guidance built by his predecessors. In fact there is not much disagreement with regard to the desirability or undesirability of an affection.

Reason : But even if an affection is considered to be good, an excessive indulgence in it leads to fatigue and exhaustion, whereas even the maximum exercise of the intellectual function remains harmless.

Sentiment : This is a very old argument, and as is so often happens with age, it has acquired a fair amount of respectability. But apart from that it has no force. Firstly, I do not think great idulgence in a good affection leads to fatigue or exhaustion. Loving a friend sincerely and intensely makes one feel only happy and enthused. What you say may be true of the passions like hunger, thirst, sex, etc. But even they have been condemned more than they really deserve to be. Eating makes one feel sick only if it crosses a certain limit, i. e. if one eats more than one can digest. Your use of the word 'excessive' is very significant as it means 'more than what is required'. But the excessive exercise of an intellectual function also produces not only exhaustion but even more disastrous consequences. You must be knowing that John Stuart Mill lost his mental balance in his childhood because his father made him use his intellect to an extent to which a child of his age should not. I am sure, you would count losing one's mental balance much more deplorable than losing one's power of digestion. It seems to me that a lot of confused thinking has been done in assessing the importance of affections, passions, and intellect in the general economy of human life.

Reason : If what you are saying is true, it would only prove that satisfying an affection is on a par with satisfying an intellectual need, not that in any sense it is superior to the latter. Let me make here a distinction between the pure and practical uses of intellect. In its practical uses it performs some service functions, i.e. it is used as a tool for facilitating the fulfilment of man's practical needs. Even the satisfaction of an affection requires a lot of planning, calculation and strategy. As a matter of fact, the fulfilment of any affection of a mature person requires the services of his rational powers. Reasoning has to be used in settling all, even emotional differences. But I am sure you will agree with me that in our present discussion we are not as much concerned with the service functions of man's rationality as with its pure uses in which the intellectual activity is an end in itself. Most of the creative achievements of intellect are the results of this activity, and I do not think it is less satisfying than the gratification of any affection.

Sentiment : I am sorry if I do not see eye to eye with you on the importance of either of the two uses of intellect you have mentioned just now. I do not think the use of reasoning is as great a help in emotional situations as you think it to be. For example, if one starts arguing in order to defend or clarify his position when an emotional difference or misunderstanding has arisen, the chances of his spoiling his case are greater than those of his improving it, even when he is completely innocent. Reasoning or arguing serves only to widen emotional misunderstandings and differences They are removed by more affection, more love, not by argumentation. As a result of argument, one can win a debate but he may lose the friendship. I won't be surprised, therefore,if a good

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Collection of 76 Articles presented to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan on the 5th September 1964

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International Institute of Philosophy,
Psychology and Psychical Research

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SOME OPINIONS ON

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Souvenir Volume

.....It is a splendid collection of thoughtful articles by some of the most eminent thinkers of the world...(**K.M. Munshi**, President Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan. & Ex. Governor U.P.)

This Souvenir Volume, with its many distinguished contributors, its pugnacious meditations, its explosive brusqueries, its inflexible logic and impeccable common sense, is a fitting tribute to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan who, more than any body else, has been transplanting Indian Philosophy to new streets, brighter skies and purer airs. (**C. T. K. Chari**, Head of the Department of Philosophy & Psychology, Madras Christian College, Madras University).

.....that impresses me is the high quality maintained in the articles published in the volume. There is no doubt that the book will be cherished by lovers of knowledge not only for being associated with a great thinker but also on grounds of its intrinsic merit. (**Hiranmay Banerjee**, Vice-Chancellor, Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta).

.....It will be a precious asset to the Universities and Libraries. It is a treat to go through the rich variety of useful and instructive essays from different parts of the world. I congratulate you most warmly for bringing out this monumental work, which, I am sure, will find a cordial reception in the academic world, both in the East and the West. (**Hari Mohan Jha**, Head of the Department of Philosophy,Patna University).

.....I thank you very much for the volume which is an excellent book of reference on many aspects of philosophy. (**W. Nolle**, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, New Delhi).

.....Please accept my heartiest congratulations for bringing out this very useful volume. (**Prem Nath**, Head Phil. Deptt. Punjab University, Chandigarh).

.....It is beautifully got and is certainly a worthy offering to our great philosopher statesman. Please accept my congratulations. (**S. P. Adinarayanan**, Dean Faculty of Arts, Annamalai University).

.....It is a wonderful collection of valuable essays by eminent thinkers of the world. It may serve as a valuable introduction to current thinking in Philosophy, East and West and as a model for global co-operation. The Editors are to be congratulated for their admirable planing and execution. (**S. Vaheeduddin**, Professor and Head of the Deptt. of Philosophy & Psychology, Osmania University).

.....It is a sumptuous and impressive volume, which is going to remain and to make a mark. The Articles are on varied subjects and are full of weighty material of great philosophical interest. I heartily congratulate all concerned for the achievement. (**D. D. Vadekar**. Hony. Professor of Philosophy, Poona University).

.....The book is like a bouquet consisting of 76 philosophical flowers offered to the Philosopher President. All these flowers will not, I suppose, whither away with the passage of time, culled as they are by a team of living philosophers of various nations captained by one of the most illustrious philosophers of the day, Dr. B. L. Atreya. The work is not only a befitting tribute to Dr. Radhakrishnan, but also an anthology of philosophical contributions made by contemporary intelligentsia of the globe. (**K. D. Bharadwaj**, New Delhi).

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logician used to argumentation, inspite of his purest intentions, loses his best friend for no fault of his.

I must also confess that I have a very poor opinion about what you call the pure activity of intellect. I very strongly feel that it is a luxury, and not a necessity, of human nuture. Man can live without it, but not without at least trying to satisfy his basic affections. An intellectual, who never in his life has felt the emotion, of love, I am sure, must be experiencing an inescapable sense of emptiness and vacuity; he would, to all intents and purposes, be like a machine which grinds formulas. The miracle of transforming such a human machine into a sensitive person can be effected only by offering him opportunities for experiencing and expressing his atrophied (or sleeping) affections in a free and natural manner.However,all this is no worry because, I don't think, such a dehumanized individual exists anywhere.

Reason : what you have said does not seem very convincing to me. Would you mind illustrating your position in a more specific and concrete manner ?

Sentiment ; I do not think what I have said lacks concreteness. But if you so wish, I can give further illustrations. Let us take the emotion of love as an example. I hope you won't dispute my saying that it is, if not the most, at least a very, powerful and important human emotion. In a sincere relationship of love, one personality merges into another only to emerge richer and fuller than what it was before the merger. The experience of love is an experience of self-dedication. It consists in giving oneself wholly and fully, surrendering one's deep-seated likes and dislikes, fears and formalities, shyness and self-respect. Even one's freedom is given up. Whatever is surrendered, is surrendered spontaneously and joyously, and no feeling of loss ever arises. Rather,the more one gives, the happier one fees. Love releases all the noble feelings of the human heart. Maybe, some dirty feelings are also aroused, but they are soon either washed away or purified. Life and existence acquire new meanings and values, and the dormant or half-dormant energies of man are activated. The result of all this is a tremendous increase in his capacity for constructive and creative work.

Reason : But where does happiness come in ?

Sentiment : You are becoming too logical (or too formalistic ?). One may say that love makes one happy, but I would prefer to say that to love is to be happy. A man in love wants to make somebody else happy, and his happiness is the resultant of that person's happiness. This is the reason why a selfish person cannot experience a feeling of genuine love. To love is the most pleasant way to transcend the boundaries of selfishness, and to identify one's interests with those of others. Can you have a loftier ideal than deriving happiness from someone else's happiness ? The experience of love provides the best training for expansion and socialisation of the self.

Reason : I wish the rosy picture you have presented were a true picture of the human situation. What you have said may be true of some characters in a book of fiction, but is certainly not of the creatures of this earth. You have been claiming that man will be happy if his basic affections are satisfied, and among them you have placed love at the apex. It seems to me that affections cannot be satisfied, and therefore the attempt to get happiness by satisfying them is bound to be a failure. As you have done, I shall also use the example of human love to illustrate my contentions.

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I hope you agree with me that if love satisfied is indescribable bliss, love frustrated is unbearable suffering. You cannot deny that there **do occur** cases of pure and simple insincerity, hypocrisy and betrayal. Even if you do, you cannot deny the **possibility** of their occurrence. It is always **possible** that the person you think to be cent per cent sincere may turn out to be in fact only a successful hyprocrite,or he may transfer in natural course his loyalty from you to another person when appropriate opportunities are available to him. Such things are heart-rending because,along with the desire to give, there is also in man the desire that what is given be honoured, which, in common parlance, is called the desire for faithfulness. You referred to the noble feelings aroused by love, but you forgot the ignoble ones which are not less infrequently aroused by it. Where can you find a better record of meanness, lying, hypocrisy, deception and treachery than in the history of human love ? Further, the language of the heart, being a very difficult language, full of ambiguities, vaguenesses and unclear implications, is a very potent source of misunderstandings the consequences of which are as much devastating as those of real defections. The possibility of misunderstanding between two persons can be fully eliminated only if each of them possesses unerring powers of directly inspecting the contents of the other's heart. Only then he can avoid being misled by faulty and inadequate expressions, cultural and temperamental differences, circumstantial handicaps, etc , in having a correct knowledge of his friend's real intentions. But no human being is so gifted.

But my most important objection to your position is this. I am convinced that an intelligent and sensitive person's affections can **never** be satisfied, and I must tell you I do not care for those who are neither intelligent nor sensitive. Such a person is generally an idealist and therefore imagines what he loves to possess all perfections, the lack of even one of which in it will make him miserable. And it is sure that it will lack so many things. Moreover, the fusion of two personalities you referred to is an impossibility. No two persons are completely alike, and it is rare that of them each one is equally **capable** as well as desirous of merging himself in the other. It seems to me, then that man is so constituted that one human heart cannot be fully satisfied by another. But I won't stop here. I have still another objection which demolishes the very basis of your argument. Even if it is granted that A's love for B is fulfilled and as a result of it both of them become happy, how does it matter to the world at large ? Unless their love and happiness add to the existing good in the world, they will not, and should not, be taken note of. A satisfied person is like a well-fed animal who feels sleepy all the time. What can the world gain from him ?

Your argument is based on the assumption that it is a **good** thing to **be** happy. Perhaps it is, but it is **better** to **make** others happy than to make oneself happy. A man in love with a certain person does not see beyond his nose; he is really trying to make **himself** happy in trying to make the other person happy, because his happiness is casually dependent upon the latter's. He does not care for the rest of the world at all. In a sense he is a lost case; the world has lost him to one person, and, as his dreamings, desires, and aspirations are centered around one individual, his potentiality for social, human,extra-personal, service is stiffled and in course of time becomes dead.

Sentiment:You have not cared to observe the facts carefully.If there is insincerity, there is also sincerity in the world. Rather, the same per-

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son who is insincere to one may be extremely sincere to another. Further, there are sacrificing people who remain happy even after knowing that their friends have changed their loyalties, thinking the change would make them (their friends) happy.

Reason : I never denied what you have said just now, but it does not in any way weaken my argument. B's sincerity to A and insincerity to C will not alter the fact that B is insincere to C, nor will it lessen C's unhappiness. Rather, it might increase it. Further, B's transferring loyalty from C to A may not make C unhappy only if it is done, which is extremely rare, with grace and frankness, not if it is done deceitfully. Moreover, an affection for a thing produces so many wishes and they in turn give rise to numerous expectations, and no human being is so lucky as to get all of them fulfilled.

Sentiment : What do you suggest then ?

Reason : There is no use trying to satisfy an affection. When one cannot feed a monster to its satisfaction, the wisest course to stop it from committing its ravages is to starve it to death, otherwise it will start eating the very.....body which houses it.

A deep affection produces a feeling of emotional dependence, and deeper the affection, greater will be the dependence. This sort of dependence is more unavoidable than even physical dependence. It hinders the growth of individuality and makes one behave like the spoilt child who starts crying if his mother leaves him even for a second. You can very well imagine the fate of the man who is so dependent upon somebody else when the latter's support is taken away from him. Can there be anything more devastating for him ? And, how many people can be so lucky as never to lose the support ? It is better therefore not to be stringed to anything. Further, if one develops an affection for a thing, the matter does not end with the frustration of the affection. Rather, after the frustration, not only the desire for the thing increases, which is quite natural, but very often even the affection increases, and this, now being accompanied with the loss of hope of its being ever fulfilled, proves to be an extremely painful experience. You said an hour ago that love transforms a (human) machine into a human person. I think it does, but you should also remember that when it is withdrawn, such a man becomes something like a piece of stone which is certainly worse than being a machine. It is better therefore to remain a machine than to be transformed (in your sense) into a human being only to be turned into a piece of stone sooner or later. Affections should not be let to develop. The happiest man will be he who never feels them, but even he will remain happy who kills them the moment they raise their heads in his heart.

The best life is the life of detachment, life of renunciation, life led according to the dictates of reason, passionless and affectionless. It is free from the hazards of the life of affections, and in addition, possesses its own satisfactions and charms. The pleasures of the intellect may be less intense, but they are certainly more abiding and restful than those derived from the satisfaction of any emotion. As grammar shows, loving is a fall (and this is true of experiencing any deep emotion), a fall of the greatest magnitude, which is sure, if not to break a man's nerves, at least to destroy his sanity. In any deep emotion one is overpowered, and deprived of his self-control and powers of discrimination. Further, if it is spontaneous, which it should be if it is any worth, and let to follow its natural direction, then there is no guarantee that it will be directed towards an object from which one will get a favourable response, and if

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the response is unfavourable, the possibility of which is always there, the emotional tragedy cannot be averted. It may also be directed towards an unworthy object. Anything and everything ought not to be loved or hated. Loving the unworthy is a sign of mental degeneration. The distinction between the worthy and the unworthy can be made only by the discriminative intellect. No emotion, e.g., love, hate, anger, etc., is capable of doing that. If one loves a thing, he will, by the very act of loving it, imagine it to be the worthiest of all things. But the object adored must really deserve the adoration, otherwise it is bound to be discovered in its true light some day and then to cause a catastrophe. It is generally true of emotions and emotional ecstasies as well as shocks that they blur one's vision and hinder him from seeing things as they are.

Sentiment : Perhaps you are right in saying that affections cannot be fully satisfied, and I also admit that it is more difficult for highly sensitive people to satisfy them. But.....

Reason : You seem to be now speaking the gospel truth, but does it not amount to giving up the position you have been defending so zealously and painstakingly.

Sentiment : You inrerrupted me in the middle of my sentence. I accept your premise, but not your conclusion, i. e. not your condemnation of human affections nor your recommendation for leading the life of renunciation. I do not deny that frustrations occur, but I do not see in them only evils. A serious frustration lands its victim in a crisis no doubt, but the crisis makes him see certain things which he could never see before. If love releases ninety per cent of man's noble feelings, betrayal releases the remaining ten per cent. A betrayed man, who survives the betrayal, like the one who survives a fall from a hill-top, is assured of his strength and capacity to suffer without any damage. It is not an easy thing, but everywhere in the world only the fittest survive.

Reason : This is only a rationalisation.

Sentiment : No, it is not, **You** rationalise when you try to convince that emotional frustrations do not mean much. I say that they do; any emotional loss is a great loss. But I want to insist that what comes out of it is of tremendous value. Take the case of Bhartrihari. Had the queen not betrayed him, he would not have become what he became, and the world would not have got the yogi and scholar it got in him. Numerous examples of this type can be cited.

Reason : You seem to be now shifting your ground. What happened to your claim that man becomes happy only by satisfying his affections?

Sentiment : I still stick to that view. What you claim to have proved and what I have also accepted is that a sensitive person cannot get his affections satisfied it they are directed to something earthly, human or non-human. But the story does not end here. The emotional richness and culture, which one has acquired as a result of leading a life of affections, cannot go in vain. It is true that deeper the affection, greater will be the tragedy caused by its frustration, but greater the tragedy, greater will also be the chances for the spiritual enlightenment of the person concerned. The tragedy will open his spiritual eyes. It is for him only a short distance now to travel from the earthly object of love to the divine. Everything remains the same, and no renunciation is needed. What is needed is to detach the affections from the earthly and direct them towards the divine. Now he gets such an object of love to secure whose love he has **only** to be sincere in his love. Sincere love for the divine is bound to receive a loving response.

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Reason : You mean God ?

Sentiment : Yes, you may call it God, though I do not care what name you give. Loving God is loving no doubt, but it is free from the dangers of human love. Misunderstandings, betrayals, frustrations, are impossible here. One has only to be devoted and patient to get what he wants.

Reason : I would have been only too glad if what you are saying were true. I do not see any link between the human situation and the postulated divine. I do not understand your talk of opening the spiritual eyes, nor do I see any compelling reason for accepting that there is anything like what you call the divine. You cannot convince me of its existence by giving any number of **arguments** because I am sure to pick out holes in them. From the premise "Human affections cannot be satisfied if they are directed towards a human (or earthly) object", you cannot infer "There is some Divine Person who can satisfy human affections". Another thing which I object to is your justification of such evils as insincerity, hypocrisy, betrayal, etc., which lead to frustration. Even if an act of betrayal makes a man a yogi or scholar, I would still call it an intrinsic evil. The life of affections is not beyond all morality. If it is immoral to lie elsewhere, it is also immoral in the world of affections. If it is morally wrong for B to say he voted for C in the parliamentary election when he really voted for A, it is equally wrong for him to say he loves C when he loves A. Similarly, even if B's ingratitude does not make C unhappy, or causes him to do something great, ingratitude remains an evil none the less.

You have said that there are people who make all sorts of sacrifices and do not change even after the defections. They are to be admired by all means. But this does not make the situation in any way desirable. Sacrifices **ought** to be honoured, what is given **ought** to be welcomed. But they are not always honoured and welcomed. Rather, more sincerely sacrificing a person is more likely he is to be exploited. Further, it may be that after the defection one is disillusioned, and turns out to be a yogi or scholar. But he may also be completely broken, and then it may be impossible to restore the original unity of his being. He will then resemble broken glass, not even broken steel. The pieces of broken steel can be welded together, and even if they are not, some use can be made of them, but those of broken glass can neither be weilded together nor can any other use be made of them. I regard such a man to be a moving carcass. I am not saying that frustration never makes a man godly, but only that there is no guarantee that it will always do. Rather, there is the danger of his not being able to survive the shock, and in many cases it is real. Perhaps you are thinking of the ideal man who would not feel unhappy even after the defection But this is unnatural for a human being. If a person sincerely loves a certain thing, he cries when he finds it slipping away. If he does not feel unhappy, I would say he was not sincere at all in his affection for it. Hence I would say that your ideal man is either insincere or not human. Sometimes, one **seems** to be expressing **anger** at the loss, e.g., when one hurls bitter words against a friend who has betrayed, but though his words may give a contrary expression, it is really **extreme anguish** and not anger which he is really experiencing: he is in fact crying for his friend's company, and not wishing to hurt him or sever relationship with him.

I hope you know that to a frustrated person everything assumes a gloomy appearance. Even memories of the pleasant moments of the past

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become extremely painful and they keep rushing in almost every time. Their painfulness is in direct proportion to the pleasantness of the past they reproduce. All sorts of depressing feelings take hold of him. He considers himself to be most unfortunate and feels cheated, exploited and befooled; he feels he has lost everything, even his life-force and inspiration to do anything good and great. I compare a man in love with a sick-man surviving on blood transfusion. The moment what he loves is taken away or slips away, he collapses just as the latter does when the transfusion is stopped.

You might say that sometimes a person willingly gives to another what he likes most. But **giving** and **losing** are not identical. If C gives x to A when he himself likes x very much, he feels great because he has been offered an opportunity of making a sacrifice, and this is not losing x. He would lose x in two ways: either when it slips out of his fingers or when it is snatched away from him by somebody. In both cases he will feel tremendously miserable The experience of defection cannot be compared to that of **giving** but to that of **losing,** and it can be **losing in either way.**

The upshot of all this is that the life of affections is surely not going to be a happy life because it is bound to produce frustrations, and frustrations more often than not make man too delapidated to do anything good for himself or for the society.

Sentiment : You misunderstood me. I did not intend to justify frustration, nor did I say that nobody breaks when frustrated. I have only been saying that there is no **necessity** for the adoption of a life of renunciation or non-attachment. What is necessary is not the cessation of attachment, but its transference from the human to the divine, and the way to it is prepared in many cases by the frustration one experiences. This does hot happen always, but sometimes it does. Rather some people are so obstinate and critical of everything that their attention cannot be directed towards the divine unless they are given some serious emotional shock. Such persons in most cases possess high intellectual excellence, so much so that their spirituality is very much subdued by their intellect. I must add, however, that if they get the right shock at the right time and are lucky enough to get their spiritual eyes opened, they are sure to do something of lasting significance.

However, I fully sympathise with you when you fail to understand how the spiritual eyes open to see the divine. But I cannot explain it. I can only say one has to wait for the needed crisis in his emotional life. Sometimes an accident of a severe type activates the optic nerve of a blind man, making him see things hitherto unseen. Similarly one has to experience a shock, an emotional catastrophe, to get his spiritual vision restored. The shock engenders in him an unshakable faith in the unseen grandeur of the divine, and when this faith is established, it takes care of everything else. But I must stop here because I cannot give any recipe for getting either the shock or the faith resulting out of it.

Reason : I am not yet fully convinced by your logic, though I must say your description of the shock is much more artractive than that of happiness. It certainly has made me very inquisitive about the whole thing. I would be glad to silence my questioning nature and even to be hypnotised if the faith you have referred to is assured. I hope you appreciate my earnestness.

Sentiment : I am glad to hear this. Some mystics say that not logic

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but the marriage between intellect and emotion under the overall influence of emotion facilitates the dawn of faith.

Reason : Then let us continue to be at least good friends.

Sentiment : I assure you, you would never find me withdrawing my hand. However, I must postpone the discussion now for some future occasion to leave you free for your other commitments. I know you are extremely busy. My grateful thanks for the time you gave to me.

Reason : You are always welcome. Come again and come often. I have many difficulties in connection with the notions of faith and divine love. We shall discuss them when we meet next.

Let The Reign of Peace Begin

Nor red nor brown, nor black nor white,
Nor skin of any hue;
Nor Buddhist nor Mohammedan,
Nor Christian, Hindu, Jew.....

Nor communist nor capitalist,
Nor "ist" of any kind;
Nor warring ideology,
Contrived by mortal mind.....

Nor tiny earth, nor outer space.
Nor atom, sun or star;
Nor east or west, nor north or south,
Nor nation near or far.....

But in Life's Essential ONENESS,
proving all are One and kin,
Behold our True Humanity—
Let the Reign of PEACE begin !

Mark Halpern

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HEGEL AND THE INDETERMINACY PRINCIPLE

R. PULIGANDLA

The purpose of the present paper is to examine certain of the epistemological remarks made by Hegel in his introduction to "*The Phenomenology of Spirit*" Particularly interesting are his remarks on knowledge as an instrumcnt to the possession of Reality, when viewed from the standpoint of the wellknown Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy. The interest of this paper is primarily historical and interpretative—historical, because it undertakes to examine from the modern viewpoint certain of the views expressed a hundred and fifty years ago by a philosopher of the highest rank; interpretative, because the views are not merely examined but also interpreted in the light of present-day physics and epistemology, without doing violence and injustice to the original doctrines. The author is far from claiming that Hegel discovered or was aware of the Indeterminacy Principle as it is known to us today. On the other hand he believes, and hopes to show, that some of Hegel's reflections on knowledge and the process of knowing are certainly illuminating to modern student of philosophy. It is true that no philosophical speculation like that of Hegel's, generally speaking, can be rightly said to have discovered such an empirically discovered (or discoverable) principle such as Heisenberg's. However, if philosophical speculation is of any value at all it lies in its being able to point to some reasonable view of very general considerations, such as sense-data, perception, knowledge, etc. The author believes, and wishes to show, that some of Hegel's remarks certainly possess this merit. The author wants it to be clearly understood that he has no wish to reduce the Indeterminacy Principle to a metaphysical speculation, or to interpret it after an idealistic fashion. All he wishes to show in the lines to follow is that some of Hegel's views on knowledge 'broadly' imply the spirit of the Indeterminacy Principle and some of its relevant philosophical interpretations.

Before proceeding with the discussion, I should like to make some remarks on terminology. Hegel describes 'knowledge' as an instrument to the possession of Reality. I shall interpret the word in a somewhat broader sense to include whatever instruments, mental and material, used to understand Reality. By the word 'Reality', following one of Hegel's own meanings, I shall understand 'what is'. By adopting these meanings we can avoid such clumsy expressions as "the ultramicroscope of Heisenberg is an instrument to obtain the instrument to the possession of Reality".

With the above understanding of the words 'knowledge, instrument, and Reality,' let us consider the following lines.

.....For if knowledge is the instrument by which to get possession of absolute Reality, the suggestion immediately occurs that the

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application of an instrument to anything does NOT leave it as it is for itself, but rather entails in the process, and has in view, a moulding and alteration of it.....[1]

Let us compare the above passage with the following :

The uncertainty principle refers to the degree of indeterminateness in the possible present knowledge of the simultaneous values of various quantities with which the quantum theory deals; it does not restrict, for example, the exactness of a position measurement alone or a velocity measurement alone. Thus suppose that the velocity of a free electron is precisely known, while the position is completely unknown. Then the principle states that every subsequent observation of the position will alter the momentum by an unknown and undeterminable amount such that after carrying out the experiment our knowledge of the electronic motion is restricted by the uncertainty relation. This may be expressed in concise and general terms by saying that every experiment destroys some of the knowledge of the system which was obtained by previous experiments.....[2]

The important point to note here is that the two passages, one due to a philosopher of the past century and the other due to a twentieth-century physicist, bear striking resemblance in certain respects. Both passages say something about the possibility of knowledge, the attainable degree of accuracy, and the inevitable consequence of the very act of knowing. It should also be noted that Hegel's remarks are general and philosophical, while Heisenberg's are composed in terminology belonging to the physical sciences. For the purpose of the present paper, the last sentence of Heisenberg's passage quoted above is very important in the sense that it gives a generalized version of the uncertainty principle. It is also important to remember that it would be not to the point and futile to look in Hegel's remarks for words belonging to the terminology of modern physics. What is common to both the passages can be seen only by elevating, without doing any violence, Heisenberg's principle from one of physics to a general epistemological consideration. There could be no objection to this procedure as long as the principle is kept within the realm of knowledge of phenomena, without entering the realm of values such as ethics, religion, etc. Thus viewed, the common content can be expressed as asserting that no experiment to grasp 'what is' can be performed without altering (using Hegel's words) and destroying (using Heisenberg's words) some of what we are trying to grasp (Hegel's) and measure (Heisenberg's)

From Hegel's remarks quoted above, it is clear that to Hegel grasping Reality (what is) necessarily involves an interaction between Reality and the subject. It might be mentioned here that in variour interpretations of the Indeterminacy Principle the word 'subject' is meticulously avoided for fear of being accused of indulging in some sort of subjectivism; instead the word 'observer' is used. Even then, it is often asserted

[1] Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, English translation by J. B. Baillie, fifth impression, New York, Macmillan, 1961, p. 131.
[2] W. Heisenberg, *The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory*. English translation by C. Eckart and F. C. Hoyt, Chicago, The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1930, p. 20.

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as a solemn warning that one should keep the 'observer' completely out of picture and consider only the instruments and data. I am unable to see how anyone could conjure up this trick. That all attempts aimed at this sort of circumvention are artificial and dishonest will become clear from the following discussion. It is also argued that one often makes the mistake of thinking pictorially of the electron and assuming, consequetly, that the electron, before measurement, has well-defined position and velocity. I admit that pictorial-classical thinking is both inadequate and dangerous in the realm of subatomic phenomena, and one would do well to follow the Principle of Complementarity. On the other hand, it should also be clear that in quantum physics so far we have been unable to get rid of the classical notions of particle, mass, velocity, etc. One often pretends to have got rid of them by coining such monstrosities as wavicle. For purposes of the present paper, however, one need not bother about these subtle points of mathematical physics. It is enough to note that, no matter how the experiment is conducted and what language adopted, Heisenberg's principle has demonstrated that there is always an interaction between the system and the measuring instruments in the process of measurement. Now we ask the question : can the instruments themselves interpret the data ? It is at the stage of interpretation of data that the observer enters the picture. For what do the data mean without interpretation ? One might be inclined to argue that one could do away with the observer by entrusting interpretation to a computing machine. Nothing could be more preposterous than this seemingly plausible suggestion, for how could the computer interpret the data without certain rules and criteria relevant to the experiment and data. And who provides these rules and criteria ? It is the experimenter, the observer (if this word is consoling to some disturbed souls), and the subject. To Hegel, the fundamental principle of knowledge is consciousness. An object or whatever is being observed and experimented upon, becomes different even if it is for the simple reason that it is grasped into the subject's consciousness; by what means he grasps it, is unimportant. The alteration of Reality, according to Hegel, arises from one's attempt to grasp it into one's consciousness. In physics, on the other hand, the alteration of a state and the consequent indeterminacy arise through the quantum nature of matter, radiation, and action. At this point, it is important to remember that Hegel is approaching knowledge from broad philosophical considerations—the subject-object relation. It is true that he later tries to obliterate the distinction between subject and object. But this need not concern us here. The physicist, on the other hand, approaches the same problem of knowledge of the external world through concepts and instruments. Important as the difference between the two approaches may seem, it is equally important to realize that consciousness is involved in both of them. Only Hegel, a philosopher, makes consciousness primary, and the physicist makes instruments and data primary pushing the

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interpreting consciousness into the background and sometimes altogether forgetting it. It should also be noted that the alteration produced in Reality by attempts to grasp it is not due to any limitations on the part of the observer, or his instruments, or Reality itself. According to Hegel, it is, the alteration, an essential principle involved in the very act of knowing at the level of phenomena. In physics, too, the indeterminacy and the consequent lack of precise knowledge of the total state of a system are not a limitation imposed upon by imperfections in our measuring apparatus. It is an essential principle involved in any means of knowing the world. It might be mentioned that it is commonly believed that no physical quantity can be measured with complete accuracy. However, it is generally believed that there is no theoretical limit to the degree of accuracy attainable by improving experimental techniques. But according to Heisenberg's principle this is not the case. The quantum nature of matter, radiation, and action imposes a theoretical limit on the degree of accuracy attainable in any measurement, the limit being defined by Planck's constant. In other words, the limit is an inevitable element in all acts of knowing the world. Heisenberg himself describes a series of experiments which one might mistakenly suppose will circumvent the uncertainty relation. To quote Heisenberg.,

> Objections may be raised to this consideration; the indeterminateness of the recoil is due to the uncertain path of the light quantum within the bundle of rays, and we might seek to determine the path by making the microscope movable and measuring the recoil it receives from the light quantum. But this does not circumvent the uncertainty relation, for it immediately raises the question of the position of the microscope, and its position and momentum will also be found to be subject to equation (18). The position of the microscope need not be considered if the electron and a fixed scale be simultaneously observed through the moving microscope, and this seems to afford an escape from the uncertainty principle. But an observation then requires the simultaneous passage of at least two light quanta through the microscope to the observer—one from the electron and one from the scale—and a measurement of the recoil of the microscope is no longer sufficient to determine the direction of the light scattered by the electron. And so on ad infinitum[3].

The above passage conclusively shows that there is an unavoidable element of indeterminateness involved in every process of measurement. Thus we see that Hegel's epistemology at the phenomenal level sets a philosophical and hence a theoretical limit to the degree of knowledge obtainable, the limit originating in Hegel's principle of consciousness as the source of all knowing. On the other hand, we also see that Heisenberg's principle sets a theoretical limit in well-defined quantitative terms to the degree of accuracy of knowledge obtainable. But the common point in both of these approaches is 'ultimately', I assert, consciousness. Any account of knowing and measuring, for measuring is a way of knowing, which does not ultimately refer to interpretation and therefore

[3]Heisenberg, op cit., p. 22.

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to the knower and measurer is guilty of a grave incompleteness. The role played by consciousness enters in and becomes central at the level of interpretation. In Hegel's philosophy, it is the 'direct' participant in knowing; and in physics it is the active mind interpreting the data of instruments. One might object to this conclusion by saying that one has no use for consciousness in physics. But, then, I would only ask one to do me the favor of making sense of such statements as "the cloud chamber determined that it was a positron which left this track."

I shall consider one more remark of Hegel's which throws further light on our understanding of how close he came toward grasping the basic idea behind the Indeterminacy Principle.

> .....Or, again, if the examination of knowledge, which we represent as a medium, makes us acquainted with the law of its refraction, it is likewise useless to elimanate this refraction from the result. For knowledge is not the divergence of the ray, but, the ray itself by which truth comes in contact with us; and if this be removed, the bare direction or the empty place would alone be indicated[4].

Let us compare this remark with that of Heisenberg in connection with his ultramicroscope experiment.

> But for any measurement to be possible at least one photon must be scattered from the electron and pass through the microscope to the eye of the observer.....[5]

From the two passages it is obvious that Hegel substitutes a ray of light undergoing refraction for Heisenberg's photon scattered by an electron to the observer's eye. Cut off the single ray of light, Hegel says, we have nothing but darkness and there is no question of knowing, even imperfectly. Similarly, try to conduct the scattering experiment without a single photon being scattered by the electron, there is no question of measurement and knowledge of the position and velocity of the electron. Of course the above sentence itself becomes meaningless under such circumstances. The important point, then, is there no such thing as measuring and knowledge in the absence of at least one photon interacting with the electron. Thus when Hegel says that knowledge is not the divergence of the ray, but the ray itself, he is equivalently asserting, though in qualitative terms, with Heisenberg that there is no knowledge of the state of the electron apart from what could be measured from the scattering of at least one photon. I have no desire to press this comparison unduly, as a belligerent Hegelian might wish to, but only remind that Hegel is dealing with the problem of knowledge from a general philosophical standpoint and not as an empirical scientist who strives to formulate his findings in quantitative terms. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to expect to find quantitative formulations in Hegel; in fact, to do so would be to ask Hegel not to be himself.

The conclusion of this paper, as could be gathered from the passages quoted and their interpretation, is that Hegel had, broadly speaking, envisioned something of the nature of the Indeterminacy Principle in his philosophical speculations.

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[4] Hegel, op cit., p. 132.

[5] W. Heisenberg, op cit,, p. 21,

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MAGIC, SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

UMA GUPTA

Introduction

The publication of two books, "*Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection*" and the "*Descent of Man*", in the second half of the nineteenth century marks a turning point in the history of human thought. There was, of course, nothing very new in the idea of evolution itself; for, it had already occurred to different speculative thinkers before Charles Darwin. But its acceptance as a scientific truth, resulting from the massive and dramatic array of facts marshalled by Darwin, rudely shook the complacent foundation of the age-old faith and dogmas. Carrying his arguments to their logical conclusions, Darwin proved that man also is a product of the same processes of organic evolution, which earlier had given rise to different forms of life, still living or extinct. Consequently there followed a period of widespread and stiff opposition : few failed to be appalled at the idea of man's descent. The decision on the second fall of man, as it were, hung on the balance. Meanwhile men of science gradually connected evidences bit by bit to demonstrate Darwn's theory. Innumerable facts of comparative morphology, paleontology, embryology, physiology and psychology make it abundantly clear that man is an animal and at the same time a unique one. Modern biology and its sister disciplines thus declare that man is not only an animal but he "is the most extraordinary product of evolution"[1] and "his unique nature lies precisely in those characteristics, that are not shared with any other animal"[2]. The singularity of human evolution lies in the fact that the human species has evolved a complex body of tradition known as culture, which is the exclusive property of man.

Even in those days of intellectual tumult, following the publication of Darwin's books, the implications of his theory of evolution on culture were realised by a section of intelligentia. Just as the theory laid the foundation of paleontology or study of fossils and archaeology or study of prehistoric remains, so it gave rise to anthropology and ethnography. It did not take long, for some thinkers, to realise that if man had descended from non-human animal ancestors, his thoughts, customs and beliefs must have an origin and development and the history of civilisation must have run parallel to the history of man from savagery or a state of almost animalness to the full fledged humanness. Thus we find Tylor[3], as early as in 1860, eagerly carrying out his researches into the origin and development of magic, myths, customs and trying to trace the origin of philosophy, science and religion in the matrix of the primitive mind.

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According to him, "culture" is "the history of the condition of knowledge, religion, art, custom and the like" among tribes and nations and he believes that "the phenomena of culture may be classified and arranged, stage by stage, in a possible order of evolution", just as plants and animals of the world are classified and arranged by biologists according to their places in the scale of evolution. It is interesting to recall how modern and scientific was his definition of culture.

While digging for the hidden springs of human culture, the pioneers of anthropology stumbled on magic. It was soon realised that contrary to the prevalent view, the belief in magical arts and rites is not only firmly entrenched in the mind of primitive tribes and races, it is quite widespread beneath the surface of the mind of the modern civilised men. Formerly magic was supposed to be "belonging to the lower level or even to the pathology of mind or society".[4]

When the scientific investigation into the nature and significance of magic on the evolution of human thought was carried out [5],[6], it became obvious that the previous views on magic were superficial and prejudiced. The record of the ideas and achievements of primitive men of ancient and modern time, unearthed by archaeology, anthropology and ethnology, and illustrated in the cave paintings of the stone age, in the papyri and mud bricks, in the bronze and copper tablets, as well as in the customs and folklores, have amply documented the interesting fact that just as the remotest known condition of human life has been of the savage type so belief in magic has been the fundamental characteristic of primitive thought. The implication of this discovery is tremendous in the history of the evolution of human thought: for, it logically follows that magic being found to occupy the lowest strata of thought, must be at the root of later intellectual development of mankind and as such it must have played some vital part in shaping religion, science and philosophy of the later stages of civilisation. In this connection Frazer thinks it quite fair to say that "just as on the material side of human culture there has everywhere been an Age of Stone, so on the intellectual side there has everywhere been an Age of Magic".

Origin And Nature of Magic

Belief in magic can be traced back as we have already noted, to our pre-historic cave-dwelling ancestors. Prof. Dampier points out that from the cave pictures drawn in the palaeolithic age we can get some ideas of the kind of life lived by men of some thousands of years ago and "even an insight into their thoughts and beliefs", because some of them are thought to represent sorcerers "as do frequently recurring carvings indicating fertility magic and fertility cult"[7]. We can reconstruct these beliefs of the paleolithic age by camparing the extant pictorial records of those days, with the magical beliefs found in ancient Egypt, Babylonia, Greece, China and India, and also in the primitive people still living in the various parts of modern world. Frazer has collected a huge amount of such material in his famous work, "*The Golden Bough*".

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Magic in its simplest expression is "the use of materials, rites and spell, which are believed to be automatically effective for the fulfilment of desire"[9]. Magic usually begins in its sympathetic form in which men, either, wish to bring about their desired effect through achieving control over nature by imitating the process of nature, or by acting a drama in which the fulfilment of desire is represented. For example, in one form of rain-making ceremony, the savage dresses up like a frog and croaks to bring the wished-for rain. In some other fertility-ceremony, he performs rites acting the drama of the year, 'with death in harvest and resurrection in spring', in order to produce fertility of crops[7],[8]. Frazer has shown that the various magical rites and charms may be based on either of the two sets of principles : (1) the law of similarity, according to which like produces like, and this is the basic principle of imitative or Homoeopathic magic and (2) the law of contact which is the basic principle of contagious magic, according to which "things which have been once in contact with each other continue to act on each other at a distance after the physical contact has been severed".

Obviously, the object of magic essentially is the attainment of a desired result. A closer analysis of the objects of desire such as rain, fertility, death of the enemy etc., clearly points out that all of them are connected with the vital problems of life : Magic therefore is the most primitive attempt of man to solve the problem of life which consists in gaining material well-being.

Though these notions of the savage may appear absurd to us they were neither wild nor capricious. Tylor has pointed out that magic is "based on the association of ideas, a faculty which lies at the very foundation of human reason", yet it is based on the mistaken association of ideas in the mind of the savage.

He says, "man as yet in a low intellectual condition, having come to associate in thought those things, which he found by experience to be connected in fact, proceeded erroneously to invert this action, and to conclude that association in thought must involve similar connection with reality". The savage thus attempted to discover, to predict,and to cause events by means of processes, which we can now see to have only assumed significance. Taking his cue from Tylor, Frazer went a step further and analysed different kinds of association of ideas. He thus affirms that magic has the merit of logical consistency. Magic in its pure, unadulterated form assumes that in nature one event follows another necessarily and invariably "without the intervention of any spiritual or personal agency". Thus we find that underlying the whole system of thought, behind the belief in magic, there is a faith implied and firm; in the order and uniformity of nature. Frazer, in agreement with Tylor, declares that the flaw of magical system lies not in its reasoning but in its premises. The premises are supplied by false analogy and symbolism. Thus such acts as the rain-making ceremony to produce rain and acting the drama

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of the year, symbolising the death in harvest and resurrection in spring, for the cause of fertility, are based on the idea that like produces like. The notion of uniformity in nature operates in savage mind not as that the same cause produces the same effect, but as that similar causes produces the same effect.

The foregoing analysis reveals that the savage mind operates in an essentially rational manner. It is conscious of the rudimentary laws of uniformity and causality in nature. This view gets its confirmation when we examine some of the beliefs of primitive races living in the modern world. A Bechuana chief told Casalis, the African Missonary, "one event is always the son of another, and we must never forget the parentage"[5]. This remarkable statement clearly demonstrates how the analogy of parentage is mentally connected or associated with the instinctive notion of causality. The faculty of association of ideas lies at the very foundation of human reason. For, reason in the primitive mind is the simple instinctive notion that every object of experience is connected with some other object or objects. The world of experience of the savage comprises objects connected together. This notion of causal connection determined all the forms of primitive thought beginning from magic. Yet though having their origin in the rationality of the primitive mind in search for causality, they failed to grasp the scientific causation because it was too early for human mind to determine the invariable unconditional antecedent along with the immediate one in that limited span of experience. Nevertheless magic is the first rational response of the primitive man to his environment and for the same reason the magical ritual is the earliest rational effort of man to have control over nature to ensure not only his survival but also his supremacy over others.

Magic and Science.

For the characteristics of magic as discussed above, it is quite evident that magic contains the germs of science. Frazer describes magic as "next kin to science", because both have in common—"the general assumption of a succession of events determined by law". Thus both magic and science start with the laws of uniformity and causation in nature. Both aim at discovering causes of natural events and controlling them by human will. Both start as a necessity for man's survival in the struggle for existence. Both represent man's reaction to and interpretation of nature.

Magic comprises certain practices which are supposed to bring about the desired effect. The magical system then constitutes performances and actions with no theoretical background other than analogy or symbolism. Being of immature phase in the evolution of human reason, it fails to discover the real causal connection, among natural events; Science, on the other hand, has been able to do so only through a process of the unfolding of the reasoning faculty of man through accumulation of *a posteriori* facts of experience in course of thousands of years. Having

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been fully differentiated from his non-human ancestors, only recently, man in the primitive stage was too close to his immediate environment to have a detached view and wide comprehension of nature. Hence in his interpretation of nature, though he starts with laws of causality and uniformity of nature, he commits the fallacies of non-observation and mal-observation and his generalisation is bound to be barren and futile. Frazer rightly points out that "All magic is necessarily false and barren; for, were it ever to become true and fruitful, it would no longer be magic but science".

Prof. Needham[10] even goes a step further and says that in its earliest phase science was indistinguishable from Magic,and hence he calls the latter "Pre-science or protoscience". He points out that in ancient and medieval period people did not recognise much difference between jugglers, alchemists and mechanicians. In Nalanda and in other great monastries of India, medicine, astrology, astronomy, mathematics and magic were all studied together. Pliny, in his *Naturalist Historia*, an encyclopedia of the whole science of his period, describes different branches of science and practice and special utility of various forms of magic "all with equal acceptance". According to Farrington[11] and Sarton[12], Greek science is not only the continuation of the older positive knowledge of Mesopotamia and Eygpt, it can even be traced back to the remote prehistory. Science in antiquity was "woven in an inextricable manner with magical concept"[8]. This significant phase of a "magico-scientific tradition" which in its earliest phase "crystallized around the nucleus of primitive shamanism"[10], has left its unmistakable imprint on scientific literature even after the birth of modern science. According to Prof. Needham, the early Royal Society found it difficult to distinguish between science and magic and in the sixteenth century, science was called natural magic. The famous astronomer Keplar was also an astrologer and Newton has been called the last of the magicians.

The close relationship between magic and science may further be appreciated from an examination of two significant facts : (1) the relation between theoretical and practical aspects of science and (2) the historical sequence between the two.

The relation between science and technique is an intimate one. In modern science, the theoretical knowledge and its practical application are not only inseparable, but the latter also depends upon the former for precision and certainty, so that there is little chance of failure to achieve the required goal. It may be argued that the goal of the latter is practical and that of the former is theoretical; yet science did originate from practical problems. It was the practical problems which stimulated Archimedes to invent his screw, the system of pulleys and the idea of specific gravity. Farrington thus rightly points out that techniques are a fertile seed-bed of science. The process from pure empiricism to scientific empiricism is gradual and therefore imperceptible.

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Here we find a clue regarding the relation between magic and science. From the point of view of historical sequence, we find technique developed before science, which owes its origin to the former. Thus tracing the history of science we find that science originated as a problem-solving mechanism and in its earlier phases practical problems were solved with manual operations having little or very vague theoretical knowledge. The gulf between magic and science can easily be bridged if they are viewed in the background of the relation between man and nature, his interpretation and reaction to it through the ages. Magic therefore is a necessary stage in the evolution of human thought that culminates into science. Both magic and science, having arisen as the rational responses of human mind to the challenge of environment threatening human survival and happiness, constitute two distinct stages of knowledge. Knowledge, being emperico-rational, starts with an initial capacity for rational comprehension, but its development into an organised system of generalisation as in science depends not only on facts gradually accumulated by observations of untold generations, but also on a long process of trial and error in which the right lead is reached only when the wrong leads are explored, tried and finally rejected. Hence the early phase of science is characterised by the absence of theoretical knowledge leading mostly to barren or uncertain results. Magic and science are thus two phases in the evolution of human reasoning in search for causality in nature in order to control it, for achieving solution of vital problems. The former is chronologically earlier, where man, because of crude undeveloped reasoning, assumed that his imperfect understanding of causality was the real one and thus took a "Universally wrong path". Yet it was a necessary step leading to the correct one. Prof. Sarton thus says that science began whenever and whereever man tried to solve the innumerable problems of life. The first solutions were mere expedients but that must do for the beginning. They were imperfect, yet perfectible.

In the second phase, we find the science of the prehistoric man, where he has succeeded in unravelling connections which led to certain fundamental discoveries such as making of fire. Next we find astonishing achievements of techniques in ancient civilisations such as building of pyramids, pottery, glass and paper making, weaving, ship-building etc. But here we also find that the artisan, however expert he might be in his skill, can not, like the magician, explain the scientific theory behind his technique. Even at a later stage of science we find "a mystical phase"[10], where the scientist recognises that effects may be brought about by "specific manual operations" without being able to explain the theoretical ground, which was understood much later through prolonged experiments and hypothesis."

Now, so long as the theoretical knowledge is absent or vague, there is no certainty for the ritual or technique or even of the "specific manual

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operations" to produce the desired effect. Hence these manual operations, though they "contain the germ of science", are magical in character. Prof. Needham remarks, "lacking the fruits of scientific analysis to productive processes, the ancient artisans had to holdfast to the emperical tricks, which were hardly explainable. They were helped by a background of legend and myth and they had to cultivate, by technique of meditation and imagination, a state of tense iron will to successful accomplishment. Religious rites often preceded the work."

Thus V.G. Childe in his article, "Science in preliterate societies and the ancient oriental civilisation", points out that today natural science has established permanent sovereignty over the techniques of production, out of which it had itself largely arisen; craftlore and magic ritual and technique were all present at its origin.

In the light of the foregoing discussion it may be concluded that science did not develop in a vacuum of ignorance but from the "noisome jnugle of magic and superstition." The possibility of distinguishing between magic and science does not arise until a relatively late period; it depends on "sufficient continuity of test conditions and sufficient experimental scepticism" to know the "unflinching" causal connection, by distinguishing the real cause from the superficial condition.

Magic, Science And Philosophy

The conclusion reached by modern thinkers that "Magic is the matrix of science and religion"[7],[8] makes the study of origin and nature of magic highly interesting to the student of philosophy. Philosophy is as old as humanity. Man's quest for knowledge comes from his very essential nature, his rationality. As Prof. Stephen [13] remarks, the question is not one of philosophy or no philosophy, but one of good philosophy or a bad one, because every rational being has a philosophy of some kind. In this sense, as Paulsen observes, even the primitive people have their philosophy. We have already seen that savagery is the stage of intellectual infancy of man and magic represents the most rudimentary stage of human reasoning. Hence the place of magic in the history of the development of philosophical thinking in man, or of man's rational attempt to know nature, from savagery to modern civilisation, is highly significant. The relation between magic and science is particularly important for modern philosophy. In this age of science, philosophy is regarded as the knowledge of the highest generality (Spencer), it is the sum total of all scientific knowledge (Paulsen) or the science of sciences (Comte).Now-a-days philosophy can not dissociate itself from science;for it has a responsibility towards the modern scientific truth established by experiment and evaluation. And this has always been the case when we go through Greek and modern European philosophy, where the great thinkers always felt that philosophy must have the "ever renewed,fructifying close contact with the progressive natural sciences" (Zimmer). The new development in modern physics,astronomy and mathematics brought

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an intellectual revolution in modern philosophy, leaving its significant marks in the philosophical works of Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz. The manyfold developments of the nineteenth century science found its counter-part in the positivistic and empiricistic philosophy of Comte, Mill and Spencer. In the twentieth century, science has virtually crushed all boundaries, and through its vastly improved techniques of enquiry as well as of communication, it has tremendously increased the tempo of acquisition and dissemination of knowledge through out the world. This all-embracing scientific knowledge has made a frofound impact in the sensitive mind of all thinkers and, as a result, a new philosophic trend has been initiated by men like Russel and Whitehead.

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A TOURIST'S VIEW OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSONALISM

WILFORD O. CROSS

Existentialism and Phenomenology

Perhaps there have been periods in human culture when people did not wake up in the morning and wonder who they were. Many literary monuments, however, frequently record this uneasy question. The Psalmist asks, "What is man that thou art mindful of him?" and he seems far more sure of the nature of God whom he has not seen than of the nature of man whom he has seen. He places man a little lower than the angels but like unto the beasts that perish. Man's life and death, his coming into being and perishing, has always been an enigma to himself.

Today neither psychology, sociology nor anthropology have succeeded in giving us final definitions of human personality. Certain schools of thought such as Existentialism, make a great deal of the human person but curiously often assert that man has no nature and is therefore not subject to definition. Yet such schools of Existentialism affirm the priority of the value of the human person. This seems somewhat strange for it should logically be rather difficult to affirm the priority of something that is rationally inexplicable. We are told, however, that all that this means is that man has an existential existence rather than an essentialist existence. His personality is an existence; it is not an essence.

Obviously there is an element of contradiction and of paradox in such a statement. The term "essence" has a number of meanings, but ultimately it reduces itself to its logical and epistemological meaning of a construct in the human mind. Behind every concept there usually stands some structure in nature which corresponds more or less to the concept. The concept of man is representative of the structure of man. That is the definition of man has presumably some counterpart in the characteristic nature of man. But the existence of man is another matter. Here we have no concept or definition but only a judgment that man exists,or that a certain man named Brown exists. It is impossible to make a concept out of the experience of existence.

That something exists is a judgment, at best a notion. It does, it is true, carry with it certain complementary notions. For instance, the judgment that something exists does adumbrate the notion of duration, for existence must be in time, even if that time is a mere flicker. The affirmation that a thing exists also carries, usually,the idea of existing "somewhere", so that place is usually involved in the statement that something exists. The judgment of the existence of anything therefore carries a vague aura of time and location. Generally also when making this

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judgment of actual physical things some sense of contingency is involved. The possibility and almost certainty that mundane existence is temporary haunts the affirmation that anything exists, or at least the possibility is open that it has not always existed and will not always exist. This is because the word "existence" has a shadow, the term "non-existent" which it cannot get rid of.

The notion of existence, then, carries with it intuitions of time, location and perishability. This is not true when the existence of God is affirmed, for this postulation usually absolved God of the burden of time, place and perishability. In dealing with actual physical things, however, duration, place and perishability seem to accompany any judgment that something exists. Suppose that on a forest path in the dark of the night I stumble over something. Outside of a notion of solidity, my idea of the thing comes very close to being reduced to the judgment that it exists. It is merely "something I fell over". I have a minimum conception of thing, but a sharp sense of its existence, including its duration through the moment of my stumbling and its location; but I have no idea whether it is a stone or a log. This comes about as close to a judgment of sheer existence as we can achieve in ordinary experience. The thing does have a construct, of course, but that construct is merely "that solid thing I tripped over."

Now if man has no essence but only existence, it does seem rather a feat of athletic contradiction to affirm the rich warmth of the human person as descriptive of man. Even with the help of Husserl's phenomenology, which tends to resolve the distinction between subjective knowledge of one's self and objective knowledge of others, an Existentialist philosopher has a lean time trying to squeeze personality out of an existential notion of man. He must finally resort to essentialist notions and affirmations, to postulating structure and character to the human person. He may want, of course, to avoid a universal definition of man as a member of a species or class and stress only the uniqueness of each person. This, however, is like a physiologist avoiding a description of the general form and structure of a finger and stressing only the uniqueness of finger prints.

Nevertheless the protest of Existentialism that man is a person rather than a cog in a collective machine has its pragmatic values in a world in which totalitarian regimentation has threatened in some places and industrial "togetherness" has menaced the autonomy of the person in other cultures. This sort of personalism began with Kierkegaard's cry against the collectivist tendencies of Hegelian philosophy and it has been true to its mission of affirming the worth and autonomy of the human person.

The present writer's objection to some trends of post-Kierkegaardianism is that no real doctrine of the person can be postulated without a firm definition of the meaning of the term "person" and this implies an

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understanding of man's structure as well as affirmation of his uniqueness. If he has no essence he cannot be talked about, understood, experienced or recognized as a person. Man must have some essence or we would be unable to decide that chimpanzees must be kept in cages and that men should be allowed to perambulate.

The deep contradiction in Existential philosophy between : (1) denying that man is a typological animal, understandable according to species; and (2) the existentialist assertion that every man is a radically unique person, is bound, in the long run to split the hull of this philosophy upon the reef of the principle of non-contradiction.

Apparently in an effort to avoid this inherent contradiction, some contemporary Dutch and French theologians, working in the tradition of Husserlite phenomenology, have postulated an existential core of personality at the center of man's being. This is a theological postulate, though put in philosophical terms. Basically it is not a judgment about existence but a statement of essence, for it affirms that the basis of man's existence is a hard existential core of being that is central to man's self-consciousness and to his behaviour. This postulates a nature or essence rather than sheer autonomous existence though that nature is characterized chiefly by self-awareness of its existence. In much the same way Heidegger, when he sought to deal with the ontic fact of the human person, deserted existentialism for an essentialist, metaphysical view of man's being. For Heidegger the central fact about man is his being as a metaphysical entity rather than his psychological awareness of his existence.

Paul Tillich who has been quickened by the existentialist stimulus says, "Neither in theology nor in philosophy can existentialism live by itself. It can only exist as a contrasting element within an essentialist framework. There is existentialist philosophizing but there is not and cannot be an existentialist system of philosophy."[1] We find, therefore, that every attempt to describe man in existential terms must resort to definition, to the essentialist postulation of concepts, and to some estimate of man's nature.

The essentialist philosophy that many existentialists have embraced in order to give conceptual ribs to Existentialism is the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. The Husserlite phenomenology has been very stimulating, but its background in German idealism renders it finally somewhat incapable of a clear-cut definition of the human person. This is illustrated by the story of an interview between Husserl and F. H. Heinemann in which Husserl said, "I have become the transcendental Ego." And Heinemann adds, "This was true. He did not talk as his natural self, but as an anonymous transcendental ego, as consciousness in general, as *Bewusstsein uberhaupt*[2]."

[1] Paul Tillich, "Existentialism, Psychotherapy and the Nature of Man" is *The Nature of Man*, edited by Simon Doniger, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1962, p. 44.

[2] F. H. Heinemann, *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953, p. 53.

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When Husserl began his distinguished phenomenological quest he was influenced by Brentano's philosophical psychology and by William James. By studying the phenomena, that is experience as it appeared in the human mind, the stuff of consciousness, he hoped to transcend that dichotomy that Descartes had created at the beginning of modern Western philosophy by the Cartesian gulf between subjective mind and objective material reality. Husserl sought to fill in this gulf by stating that the data upon which the mind worked was phenomenological existence in consciousness. Some part of this data was clearly representative of external reality. The labelling of this externally orientated stuff in the stream of consciousness as external and objective was called intentionality. Intentionality was an act of declaring the extrinsic significance of certain experiences. The green of grass was a subjective experience but it was intentional in that it referred to Central Park or some other strip of green. Grass, though registering in consciousness as a mental phenomenon was intentional in that its reference was to the actual, physical, external world. To use Husserl's own phrase it was "hylic" (a Greek word meaning matter). Edmund Husserl, however, like so many philosophers in the German tradition could not resist a Kantian inclination. His early effort had been dedicated to a solution of all the muddled problems of idealism, realism, pragmatism and naturalism that had muddied the waters of Western philosophy with epistemological murk. Huserl, however, was not content to lie at the gate and have his sores of puzzlement licked by the dogs of psychologism; he was taken up into the Abrahamic bosom of Kant. He discovered the notion of transcendental reductionism. He began to distinguish between "natural phenomenology" which recognized an objective, materialistic world discovered in intentionality and a "pure" phenomenological universe in which everything was reduced to consciousness. The mountains, the trees, the valleys full of corn and the lark at heaven's gate disappeared into a Kantian mist of sheer absolute consciousness. "Husserl enters upon the fundamental meditation of phenomenology, which is to yield the pure and unadulterated phenomena that cannot be attained in the naive or natural attitude"[3].

Phenomenology rapidly became increasingly idealistic and ethereal. To save the theory from the solipsistic predicament of an individual monad of consciousness, Husserl had to elaborate an intricate and subtle theory of inter-subjectivity. In his *Cartesian Meditations*, delivered as lectures in Paris, he felt it necessary to prove that other persons existed. The objective, physical realm, despite the doctrine of intentionality, had already disappeared. "The objective world was ultimately the achievement of the transcendental subject constituted by his intentional acts".[4]

[3] Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, Vol. I, p. 133.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

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After a while the transcendental subject, the experiencing person, disappears also into the transcendental ego, an anonymous realm of generalized, collective, idealistic consciousness. Personality is only partially salvaged by the theory that "the transcendental ego constitutes other egos as equal partners in an intersubjective community"[5]. Husserl's world becomes a universe of conscious monads.

In the Husserlian Phenomenological philosophy as Edmund Husserl developed it there is little room for a personalistic doctrine but only for a final doctrine of transcendent, collective consciousness. This is the strange fate of idealism in that often in stressing consciousness as sole reality it tends to reduce the stuff of consciousness to a psychic flux. This happened also in Indian Philosophy, particularly in that of Shankara's version of the Vedanta. The Vedanta stresses the final absorption of the atman or soul of the individual into the cosmic Atman, the conscious, psychic reality of Brahman. This absorption of the person is equally true of Buddhism, for once the cord of the will to live is loosened the skandhas, or ingredients of the soul, melt into that universal conscious flux which is Nirvana and no longer maintain personal existence. Idealism tends towards the absorption of personal consciousness into the transcendental ego into which Husserl thought finally retreated.

It is at first sight strange, therefore, to discover Existential philosophy adopting the phenomenological methodology of Husserl as its technical apparatus and at the same time maintaining a doctrine of radical personalism. Martin Heidegger, whom Husserl hoped would be his heir, and who succeeded him in the chair of philosophy at Freiburg, deserted the Husserlian method of transcendental reduction to sheer consciousness and developed an ontology of being based upon man's experience of his own existence by denying the reduction of existence to the transcendental ego. Sartre also in developing his existential anthropology, stuck stubbornly to the unit of the individual person, despite his refusal to grant that person an essence other than that made by his own decisions. The essence of man, Sartre insisted, was his freedom to make himself in his own image. Max Scheler, likewise, in his development of a sociological ethic, though he used Husserl's earlier phenomenology, does not follow the transcendental reduction of Husserl to an idealistic field of consciousness. All of this brought personal hurt to Husserl for he was one of those philosophers who find confidence in their ideas by their ability to convert students into disciples. He was deeply disappointed by what he regarded as the betrayal by Heidegger of a disciple's allegiance.

Phenomenological Method

This sketchy hisory of a special corridor of philosophy has been necessary because today there is a Christian anthropology of the human person which is based on phenomenology as a method and upon Kierkegaardian personalism as a first principle. We hear the term "Phenomenological

[5] *Ibid.* Citing *Cartesian Meditations.*

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nological Personalism."The implication in theology is that the phenomenology of Husserl and the existential incentives of Kierkegaard can be combined to create a modern apologetic for Christianity and to elaborate a Christian doctrine of man.

This is not only a program which is being promulgated in theology but also in psychoanalysis, and other disciplines. Perhaps it would clear the air to place these other disciplines first. Husserl was at war with what he called"psychologism" and he rejected the science of psychology and his teacher Brentano, whom he regarded as a victim of psychologism. His own approach to philosophy had been from mathematics via logic to the epistemological problem. Sartre has carried on Husserls war with technical psychology and psychiatry and set up his own xistential form of psychoanalysis. He is sharply critical of "orthodox," Freudian Adlerian and Jungian psychoanalytical systems because they build generalized models of man's structure. Out of Husserl's phenomenology with some incentive from Sartre's unstructured psychoanalytical theories, a school of phenomenological psychiatry has grown up. Paul Tournier has preffered a Christian form of this new venture in therapy, making use of techniques of prayer and meditation as well as the usual techniques of analytical probing.[6] On the secular side, Eugene Minkowski and Ludwig Binswanger were pioneers in existential analysis and phenomenological psychiatry. The editors of *Existence, a New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology*, Rollo may, Ernest Angel and Henri F. Ellenberger, in their introduction to this monumental work, say, "Can we be sure, one such question goes, that we are seeing the patient as he really is, or are we seeing a projection of our own theories about him ?"[7] The writer insists that abnormal man is not the same thing as a generalized *schema* of humanity. That is precisely why he is in the psychiatrist's office. "And does not this patient, or any person for that matter, evade our investigations, slip through our scientific fingers like seafoam, precisely to the extent that we rely on the logical consistency of our own system?"[8]

In our parsimonious account of Husserl's impact upon philosophy we were interested primarily with the awkwardness of his flight back into the Kantianism of pure consciousness, the transcendental ego, through his elaboration of the transcendental reduction. There is, however, an intervening reductionism in Husserl, and this seems to have proved most fruitful. Husserl's first operation is the "phenomenological reduction."[9] This is a matter of bracketing the phenomena as a bundle of

[6] Paul Tournier, *The Meaning of Persons*, transl. Edwin Hudson, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1957,

[7] *Existence*. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1958, p. 3.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 3. See also p. 35 for a discussion of Freud's surrender to "technical reason." Existential psychotherapy "protests against the tendency to identify psychiatry with technical reason."

[9] The new method of suspension of belief as the way to secure phenomena in their pure and indubitable form." Spiegelberg, *op cit.*, Vol, I, p. 120.

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facts in consciousness. Bracketing means cutting off from theory and making an analysis of the facts-in-consciousness themselves apart from all extraneous or schematic presuppositions. This analysis results in an intution which is an understanding of the evidence. The same sort of bracketing has always been asked of a jury when its members are told to go by the evidence alone quite apart from preconceived opinions or newspaper editorials bearing on the crime being examined. With a similar methodology, Husserl overcomes that curious dualism that Aristotle noted between talking about things and understanding things intuitively by involving one's self imaginatively in their process of development, the distinction between *dialekitos* and *physikos*, between logician and physicist. Aristotle concluded that observation was the method of discovery and logic the method of demonstrating what had been discovered.[10] Linguistic philosophy in our own day has moved towards a mere examination of talking about things, while the various extensions of Husserl's method have been concerned with an intuitive grasp of the nature of the phenomenon. The Husserlite method puts the pertinent facts, the phenomena, in a frame, so to speak. It is a new Ochamite razor that shaves off the crustrations of theory that prevent us from seeing facts as they are.

Obviously this is precisely what is needed in those intellectual disciplines in which wars between conflicting theories have tended to an inevitable selectivism, that is an artificial picking out of facts that support the theory and a consequent neglect of pertinent angles. In psychoanalytical theory, the Freudian *schemata* of the human person, the id, the ego, the superego, eros and thanatos, in all the embattled deviations and developments of Freudianism, had weighted the understanding of human beings with a complex technical apparatus. The deviations from the main stem of the Freudian *schemata* of man that appeared in Otto Rank, Karen Horney, Erich Fromm and others added to this complexity of apparatus. A sailing vessel can be slowed down by too much top-hamper. This weight of rigging was made more complicated by the rival *schemata* of Jung and Adler. It was inevitable that technicalism in theory would invade and complicate therapeutic contacts with patients in the clinic. Are we, ask the existentialists, "seeing the patient as he really is or are we seeing a projection of our own theories about him ?"[11]

In the medical field of psychiatry then, phenomenalism, combined with an existential principle that every patient psychologically is unique, has given a fresh look and a new *elan* to a somewhat jaded psychiatric performance. Husserl's motto of "back to the phenomena" has framed or bracketed symptoms as characteristic of the person rather than as bits of evidence to advance a theory. The Aristotelian distinction between

[10] John Herman Randall, *Aristotle*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1960, pp. 35-46.

[11] Rollo May *et al op.cit.*, p. 15.

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"talking about" and "understanding the thing itself" has been in part overcome.

Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the present generation of existential and phenomenalist psychiatrists have been trained in one or other of the older theories and the question must now arise as to how the next generation of psychiatrists are to be trained and how they are to be taught "to see." There seems to be some risk in trusting doctors who have discarded anatomy and physiology. However one is encouraged by the painstaking thoroughness of phenomenological practitioners. They do not allow Husserl's ideatic intuition to flash too suddenly. The last case recorded in the phenomenological study *Existence* covers sixty pages of careful scrutiny, and the author does not prevent his new theory of existential immediacy of consciousness to rule out a sessilistic conclusion, quite in the Freudian manner, that the patient, who had a compulsion to murder women, was influenced by the fact that he had as an infant slept with his mother on the night that she died.

Also the psychoanalytical wing of Existentialism pitches its tent upon the ground of Husserl's phenomenological reduction, not upon the more ethereal transcendental reduction to pure consciousness. It will be remembered that it was from this basis in the epistemological development of Husserl's thought that Heidegger moved into his ontology and Schaler into his sociological philosophy. It is sometimes said that Husserl who was then at the Freiberg stage of his development and Heidegger who was at Gottingen passed each other, like two people on trains, Husserl going back to Kantian idealism and Heidegger travelling further away from it. It is significant that Rollo May says,

> Martin Heidegger is generally taken as the fountain head of present day existential thought. His seminal work, Being and Time, was of radical importance in giving Bingswanger and other existential psychiatrists and psychologists the deep and broad basis they sought for understanding man.[12]

Indications seem to point to the fact that existential psychiatry has followed the Husserlite road only to the boundaries of Idealism and has remained in the more objective camp with Heidegger's increasingly classical ontology. The tendency of Sartre towards nihilism in his doctrine that man's essence is freedom has not given secure anchoraae for the new psychiatry. A great deal of Freud is still accepted but his limitations are recognized.

> Freud deals only with the *homo natura* and that, whereas, his methods fit him admirably for exploring the *Umwelt*, the world of man in his biological environment, they by the same token prevented him from comprehending fully the *Mitwelt*, man in personal relations with fellowmen [intersubjectivity], and the *Eigenwelt*, the sphere of man in relation to himself.[13]

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 34, citing Binswanger in an address given on Freud's eightieth birthday.

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Over against these limitations the new fashion in psychiatry ...protests against the tendency to identify psychiatry with technical reason. It stands for basing psychiatry on what makes man the human being; it stands for defining neurosis in terms of what destroys man's capacity to fulfill his own being.[14]

Phenomenology and Comparative Religion

Another discipline which has been fertilized by the phenomenological approach is the enterprise of comparative religion. Here, as in psychiatry, there is a rapidly developing field over-laden with warring theory. The interpretation of the history of religion is full of battle cries. Animists, who follow Tyler's thesis that religion begins with a logical process that leads from the facts of dreams to a notion of the separable soul and thence to ghosts and then to spirits and gods, interpret the findings of anthropologists and archeologists in the light of this theory. The followers of Durkheim find the source of religion in social cohesion. The Dynamists, on the other hand, over-working the discovery of the primitive notion of an occult force know as mana (Polynesian word for myterious Power, interpret the beginnings of religion as a recognition of the impersonal forces of nature and claim that spirits and gods appear later on the horizon of man's religious life. Over against this theoey Primitive Monotheism asserts a hypothesis of a pre-literal idea of a Father-God, worshipped by all people, and a subsequent degeneration of this notion into diverse forms of polytheism. This primitive monotheism of the Viennese School of Father Schmidt has in part reasserted itself recently in a theory of the *Dema* divinities (remote, ancestral spirits who created the universe and human culture) in a work called *Myth and Cult Among Primitive Peoples*.[15] Added to this is a whole sea of confusions created by the entry into this field of Depth Psychology, reducing religion to projections of the Father Image or the Mother Image, and to manifestations of the Oedipus Complex, or to archetypes of animus and anima, divine child, magician and witch. Works like Freud's *Totem and Taboo*, Jung's innumerable works on mythology, Otto Rank's *Beyond Psychology* and Neuman's *The mother Goddess*, gave valuable insights into religious influences arising in the unconscious, but the tangle of theory was becoming a somewhat overproductive jungle. Here again the phenomenological method proved refreshing, cutting through the net of conflicting interpretations, emphasizing the data and looking anew at the appearances of religion and its influence upon human mentality and emotions. G. Van Der Leeuw's *Introduction to the Phenomenology of religion* appeared

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 35. This is a curiously Aristotelian approach since it invokes the Aristotelian concept that the good is the fulfillment of man's being. This doctrine of fulfillment is growing in status both outside and inside the Existential movement. Note Erich Fromm's "Man's main task in life is to give birth to himself, to become what he potentially is." (*Man for Himself*, New York, Rhinehart & Co., 1947, p. 237). There is also Gordon Allport's statement that, in the moral sphere we may say that becoming depends upon the development of a generic conscience which, in turn, depends upon the possession of long range goals and an ideal self-image." (*Becoming*, Yale University Press, 1963, p 75)

[15] Adolph E. Jensen, *Myth and Cult*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963. Translation by Choldin and Weissleder.

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in 1925 as the first of a numerous tribe in this *genre*; and this slender volume was expanded in 1933 into *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*. This time the philosophical instigator of the task was neither Husserl, Heidegger nor Sartre, but another existential philosopher, Karl Jaspers, under the influence of whose teaching the task was begun. Van Der Leeuw says, "I have tried to avoid, above all else, any imperiously dominating theory, and in this volume there will be found neither evolutionary, nor so-called anti-evolutionary, nor indeed any other theories.[26] However, Van Der Leeuw discovers, in his phenomenological analysis that the notion of "Power" is dominant in primitive and pre-literate cultures and the weight of his data falls in the scales on the side of Dynamism as over against Animism. Nevertheless, he is not led, as the Dynamists were, to interpret Mana (Power) as a purely, impersonal occult force, but he finds the evidence hospitable to the notion that Mana in the primitive mind can be both personal and impersonal; for things,men, ghosts and gods can manifest the mysterious power of Mana. Naturalistic presuppositions, from which Van Der Leeuw is free, have tended to emphasize Mana as an impersonal, quasi-physical cosmic force, the mystique side of matter Van Der Leeuw works in freedom from the naturalism of this interpretation and is equally unchained from the idealistic philosophical presuppositions of Animism. Up to this point phenomenological surveys of the history of religion have produced a fresh untrammeled outlook, but certainly that outlook shows signs of being subject to Existential presuppositions in its turn since it is inclined to view religion as an answer to man's anxiety and his spiritual malaise,overlooking in primitive situations that it is often an answer to man's need for social cohesion and sometimes the even simpler need for food.

In New Testament studies Rudolf Bultmann has shown how provocative a personalist, existential approach can be. He tends to strip away not only some of the techniques of historical and textual criticism, but also, to a considerable extent, to disvalue the historic claims of Christianity. An over-simplified summary of his work would indicate that he places the value of the Christian narrative in its personal phenomenological effect upon the believer. It is less important that Christ died and rose again in history than that the individual man of faith should experience phenomenologically within himself a death and resurrection experience. This is, in part, in harmony with the spirit of many ancient liturgical collects. The Christmas Collect, for instance, goes straightway from the Nativity to its personal effect in human lives. "Almighty God, who hast given us thy only-begotten Son to take our nature upon him, and as at this time to be born of a pure virgin; Grant that we being regenerate and made thy children by adoption and grace, may daily be renewed by thy Holy Spirit...[17] The Collect passes at once from the historical event

[16] G.Van Der Leeuw, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*,translated by J.E. Turner New York, Harper & Brothers,1963, (first pub. 1933 in Tubingen) Intr. p. vi.
[17] Book of Common Prayer, American, 1928, p. 96.

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its fruit in the life of the believer. However, as far as the methodology of Phenomenology is concerned, the historic event does not seem to be important. It is "bracketed" along with all other extraneous natural and historic considerations by the phenomenological reduction. Christianity would very well have been but another of the Hellenistic mystery cults apparently. And one also wonders how long, among the generations to come, the death and resurrection experience will vividly occur phenomenologically if the historic primal happening of Calvary is a symbolic, ancient tale to be demythologized. This is putting Bultman's thesis too rawly, but not indeed so rawly as it is often understood. Sometimes perhaps the intensity of experiencing afresh the data within the frame of phenomenology may be too great a price to pay.

Charismatic Existentialism

The discipline of Moral Theology has accumulated throughout the centuries as the systematic guide of confessor and counselor a great deal of technical apparatus, and one would expect that modifications would begin to appear within its discipline from the incentives of the Phenomenological-Existentialist movement. So far, however, Moral Theology seems to have been mostly modified and modernized by influences from Depth Psychology. This is particularly true in the whole realm of compulsions such as alcoholism, dope addiction and homosexuality where ancient allowances in Moral Theology for conditions, emotions and compulsions which prevent the exercise of real moral choice have always played their part. The old distinction between the matter of sin (objective blame) and the form of sin (subjective blame) has been particularly useful in rending the rigidities of moral theology situational and adjustive to the peculiar condition and circumstances of the individual.

The impact of Phenomenological Existentialism so for is a factor added to the traditional discipline rather than a transformation from within. Karl Rahner, S. J. has appeared as the champion of Roman Catholic modern theology at the recent meetings of the Vatican Council. Rahner suggests a new dimension in the traditional discipline of Moral Theology. In an article "Uber der Frage einer formalen Existentialethik" and in a book *Gefahren im heutizen Katholizimus*,[18] Rahner has stated the thesis that "man is so individual as to enjoy an absolute, unique, incommunicable and unclassifiable individuality..... not comprehensible under general laws, norms and rules.....and that God gives imperatives that proceed from the I of God to the particular Thou of man." *(vom ich Gothes auf das je einmalize Du des Menschen geht)*.[19]

[18] "Uber der Frage" appeared in *Schriften dur Theologie*, Vol. II, 1958, pp. 227 ff. *Gefahren* was published by Benziger & Co., Eisseideln-Koln, 1950.

[19] *Gefahren*, p. 16. I am particularly indebted here for an interpretation by William A. Wallace, O. P. in "Existential Ethics," *The Thomist*, April, 1963, Vol. XXVII, pp. 493 ff. This material is also available in Karl Rahner, *Nature and Grace*, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1963, translated by Dinah Wharton, pp. 61 to 64. I feel that this translator has considerably modified the existential impact of Rahner's language.

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In Rahner's writing there is considerable polarity between the norms of Moral Theology and man's uniqueness. He says, "A private sphere exists which is not the concern of general law."[20] This private sphere of morality is the field of operation of charismatic discernment, which like Husserl's ideatic intuition is a direct path to truth. The conscience hears the unique call of God, (*das diese Individualsittlichkeit als fordernde norm erkeunt*).[21] While Rahner upholds the laws and norms of moral science, he stresses also this charismatic dimension of personal morality.He firmly insists upon the traditional framework, saying "If it is not to degenerate into a merely private, subjective voice, the Christian conscience has the duty to order itself by the objective moral norms.[22] But in contrast to this buttressing of the tradition he also says, "This spiritual and personal uniqueness is not subject to norms and rules.....And so there is a sphere of individual morality, a sphere of moral duties and objectives, which, while it never conflicts with the universal moral law, nevertheless has the decisive word over above it and can no longer be contained within it."[23]

This could mean no more than the traditional but often neglected teaching of the autonomy of the individual conscience. As for the charismatic element the Church has always recognized in peculiar situations, such as the call to the priesthood and the vocation to the religious life, a charismatic discernment. St. Thomas left the Gifts of the Holy Spirit within the discipline of Moral Theology and did not confine them to Ascetical Theology as a later more legalistic tradition in Moral Theology did. However, for St. Thomas, the work of the Holy Spirit was an influence, and the prudence or moral judgment of man was left free to make autonomous choices. Rahner's charismatic influence seems more direct and imperious, being an imperative that proceeds directly from the "I of God". This would tend to make the moral act, which is the foundation of moral science, a divinized act. The impression exists that Rahner is recapitulating the Kierkegaard suspension of the ethical when Abraham was commanded to kill his son. "The ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he would murder Isaac;the religious expression is that he would sacrifice Isaac."[24]

Rahner has no intention of reducing morality to "the art of discerning spirits[25] but he has opened the gate and given incentive to less balanced people who may over-emphasize one side of the polarity with which he so creatively wrestles. Rahner has set up a polarity between spirit and law, between charisma and legalism. This is because he interprets traditional Moral Theology as "norm" and "law"—almost in a Kantian sense of duty. But this is not central to the true tradition of Christian

[20] *Gefahren*, pp. 16, 17. "Existential Ethics", p. 495.
[21] *Gefahren*, p. 17.
[22] *Nature and Grace*; p. 100.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 62.
[24] Soren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, New York. Doubleday & Co., 1954, p. 41.
[25] "Existential Ethics", pp: 510, 511 and *Nature and Grace*, pp. 78, 79.

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morality as it came down from Aquinas, for in St. Thomas' thought the emphasis is upon the more flexible, more situational and autonomous judgment of prudence. It is true that seventeenth century Jesuit Moral Theology moved in a legalistic direction. The tradition from which it moved does not depend so much upon law as upon the autonomous, personal conscience guided by reason.

Personalist Estrangement

I have called this article a "tourist's view" because of the brief nature of the survey. Even so sketchy a look at phenomenological existentialism at work reveals however an Ochamite tendency to shave away theory. It has appeared also that this constitutes a fresh start in fields that have become hampered with unverified theories. A return to the phenomena is often the only recourse when hypotheses have not been thoroughly vindicated, or where presuppositions rather than data have dictated the hypotheses. But observation and analysis of data is in itself a worthless enterprise if it does not lead at long last to classification and to an understanding of causes. No doubt existential psychotherapy on the clinical side is correct in insisting upon an exhaustive study on the patient, but on the scientific side it is bound, if it is to be intelligible, to create its own classifications, generalizations and interpretations of causation. Otherwise it remains bogged down in analysis and cannot go on to remedies. Tillich and Heidegger are obviously right when they insist that essentialist interpretation must follow existential analysis. No science can be based on a radical nominalism that recognizes only the particular. A student of forestry who looked only at trees and made no sort of effort to classify them as oaks, maples, etc. and was not concerned with the type of soil and climate suitable to each type, would be a tree-watcher but never a scientist. A theologian who merely studied subjective religious experience in the particular would have little to teach. A moral theologian who saw every human act as a "suspension of the ethical" in the Kierkegaardian sense, and who abolished law to make room for charisma, would end in the anarchy of antinominalism. Indeed, in its own very different way phenomenology as an isolated method, takes us back to Francis Bacon's observationalism, and it must be remembered that it was not Bacon but Galileo, with his training in the essentialist mathematical methods of the University of Padua, who has become the symbol of the advance of scientific knowledge.

The revolution that has taken place in modern science in its emergence from Newtonianism has not been an abolition of concepts, but a shift from the cogwheel essences of Newton to the more abstract constructs of mathematical explanation. Schroedinger equations have replaced the eighteenth century billiard balls. It is true that relativity theory has brought back the observer and reintroduced into science a subjective element, the mind of the scientist. It is equally true that some philosophies of science have interpreted scientific knowledge as a purely mentalconstruct

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construct rather than a description of nature. Even in so radical a view, however, the idea of correlations between the flux of reality and the scientific view are assumed, just as Husserl was forced to assume intentionality and intersubjectivity in order to establish contact between his "stream of consciousness" and the actual world. Radical personalism and nominalistic phenomenological reductionism isolates the existentialist enterprise from the mainstream of intellectual life, the domain of science. Some existentialists rejoice in this exclusion of "scientism". This, however, is a romantic attitude that destroys the cultural viability of such an isolated philosophical position.

One feels that the usefulness of the phenomenological method depends upon its overcoming its inherent subjectivity by an extension of the idea of intentionality. There are so many ways in which the human mind is passive before the world. Nature by its stimuli through our nerve endings actively produces in us awareness and response. There is correlation and correspondence between the natural world and man's consciousness. This capacity for response makes it possible for man to survive in nature and to be its dominating animal. Husserl came to call this view "naive," but it seems more naive to question the pragmatic reality of our contact with external nature. Man is an ecological creature whose very thought is derived from his social and natural environments. Apart from the social environment, for instance, he would have no language to give words to Husserl's phenomena. Without words and language consciousness would be indeed pure. This purity would be ethereal, dream-like, like the consciousness of an infant through whose mind the vague wordless shadows of reality succeed each other without meaning.

The weakness of Existentialism is that in asserting a vivid postulate of the uniqueness of the person, it loses grip upon the ecological nature of man, upon the fact that man is a creature and that his life is rooted in nature and society. A new form of the Hobbesian man appears in philosophical anthropology, a man who was modeled by Hobbes upon the atom of Democritus, and who could only relate himself to his fellows by artificial contracts and conventions. This Hobbesian man was designed to replace the Aristotelian man who was a social animal and who signed the social contract, so to speak, with the first suck of his mother's milk. Existentialism does not accept the atomic image of Hobbes' materialism, but it does present an analogue to it in the sense that man is a monad of existential, conscious stuff, locked up in the loneliness of his own personality, and he must break through, artificially, by the roads of a forced intentionality and an ethereal intersubjectivity to make contact with nature and his fellowmen. This personalist estrangement is not true to the biological and social facts of man's existence. It does not describe the rootedness of man in nature and in the nature of his society. The first step in the doctrine of man must be the description of man as a creature not as an estranged "stream of consciousness." The Phenomenalist-Existential doctrine of man inevitably becomes Gnostic in its alienation of man from his earth and from his fellows. We can appreciate its many contributions while recognizing that it can give no final stability as long as its idolatry of the person does not properly account for the contextuality (**Dasein**) of man in his world.

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ON WHAT THERE OUGHT TO BE*

JOHN KING FARLOW

Part II

METAPHYSICS AND THE OBJECTIVITY OF VALUE

The Objectivity of Value and Philosophy as a Circular Enterprise

The very way I have put all this may still sound like an invitation to dogmatism. "It is", one may well say, "not good enough for a philosopher simply to have a value postulate about ordinary language like Socrates', Aristotle's, Wittgenstein's or Marcels's. Nor is it good enough also to be aware that one believes it to be true and rather clearly true, that thus one holds at least one value judgment as an objectivist and cognitivist. If one holds such a fundamental value postulate and wants to argue philosophically, or wants even to state one's philosophical beliefs to others, one generally has a further obligation to **state** or **declare** what one has postulated"[1]. These are value judgments with which I would readily concur : it is true and clearly true that responsible philosophers must declare their fundamental assumptions.Nor would this be a crushing objection:"it cannot be **clearly** true,because it is quite conceivable that someone we would call a responsible philosopher would not agree that we have any such obligation". The objection sounds attractive, but it is every bit as unsound as : "It cannot have been clearly true that Nazi racial policies were immoral, because many a responsible German politician sincerely believed after careful reflection that they were not immoral". Many highly responsible politicians in Mississippi do not see that Governor Barnett could have acted otherwise if he were to do the right and uphold the dignity of man—politicians devoted to duty, who sincerely attempt to reflect dispassionately on their assumptions and to justify them by reference to their knowledge of men and affairs.[2] Yet it remains quite clearly true that Barnett's policies were mistaken; it was clearly true at the very time he made certain decisions that these were unwise and unfortunate ones to take, though this does not imply Barnett took them irresponsibly. Scientists and detectives are not irresponsible because they often follow very doubtful leads, as the best available, and wind up kicking themselves because the correct solution had been "**staring at them** in the face" all along. There will always be responsible people who have eyes but do not see, do not see what is clearly the case.

Not everyone would be so happy to call a philosopher fully responsible even if he did openly acknowledge his value-postulate, saying that

* *In continuation of the part first appeared in 'Darshana International' Vol. IV No. 3 pp. 101 to 109.*

[1] Cf. *Modes of Being*, p. 83.

[2] Such men do not fit into Weiss's class of merely 'reasonable' men nor into his class of 'rational' men. (*Modes of Being*, pp. 132-34).

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it seemed to him to be clearly true. Paul Weiss has made a claim that must be considered. "But no philosophy can be satisfactory which does not at least allow for the examination and justification of every one of its presuppositions". (*Mode of Being*, p. 85) And compare : "Nothing less than a critical examination of all these presuppositions, with a consequent speculative and systematic inter-relating of the results, will protect one from a precipitate dogmatism, and permit of an acknowledgment of the purified wisdom of the race, of the good sense of the day, of sound criteria for acceptable knowledge, and of the being of ourselves and of what we know".[3] (83)

Two points need to be distinguished in appraising Weiss's stand. First, our sense of what is 'right', 'satisfactory', 'responsible', 'a great work of art', and so on, is fallible. So is our sense of what is 'very distant',or 'praise designed to please',or 'missing from the room', or coming back into New York fashion', or 'the sort of measure Khrushchev hates to impose'. And, since some claims about what is intrinsically valuable are more likely to meet disagreement among responsible people whom we respect than are many value-neutral claims, we have good reason to look carefully for objections to our value claims, less reason to be surprised or indignant if other people disagree. Saying this about value claims is, of course, quite different from the subjectivist view that there is no such thing as intrinsic value to disagree **about** and seek clear awareness **of**. Just so, saying that we can be mistaken about things, real distances and people's real intentions is quite different from accepting an Argument from Illusion that quite likely material things and other minds are creatures of my imagination. So far,I hope, Weiss would be largely in agreement.

Second, it does not follow simply because we should be especially cautions about our value claims and especially tolerant of those who disagree (**as long as** they too practise tolerance),that every value claim ought to be upheld by justifying reasons other than those of a type I shall call Awareness Assertions. And Awareness Assertions are not what Weiss seems to mean by 'justifications' at all. A philosopher may make a value

[3] Weiss, in the last paragraph of *Modes of Being* unfortunately lends an air of paradoxical respectability to the belief that builders of metaphysical systems and those interested in the less general sorts of fact have ground to *criticise* one another. He writes; "philosophy provides those fundamental characterizations which always apply to the real, Cosmic in reach it is incurably abstract. With justice it criticises every other enterprise as too narrow and unsystematic, and they with equal justice criticise it as too pale and narrow". (548) The notion that there is something about philosophy itself worthy of *criticism*, and something about all other enterprises in themselves worthy of a different sort *criticism*, results from talking once too often in terms of abstractions. If a *man* thinks almost entirely about metaphysical systems, then his thought becomes too pale and narrow; if a *man* thinks almost entirely about other things, then his thought becomes too narrow and unsystematic. The moral is, perhaps, that we need to be concerned with systematic philosophy, with a limited number of other areas which we can get to know well and really care about, with philosophical analysis of the concepts in those areas with other people (especially non-philosophers), and with enjoying a shockingly amateur interest in as much else as time allows.

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claim **P** and be asked by Weiss "Why do you say that?"; the philosopher may reply with the justification that it follows from **Q**, only to be asked "Why do you claim **Q**?" The interchange may so proceed down to **W**, when the philosopher stops the flow : "Don't ask me why I claim **W**. I'll tell you. I claim **W** is true because it is as clear to me as anything I claim to know that **W** is true. I've listened to endless objections, to all sorts of intelligent people who don't find it clear to them. If you want reasons of a kind for **not rejecting W**, I can refute quite a number of leading objections. But, if you want my reason for **asserting W**, it is simply this : it seems as clear to me as anything can be. I'm prepared to change my mind if you can somehow get me to **see** I'm mistaken. I don't expect everyone who's responsible and reflective to agree. Certainly I'm fallible. Yet I feel justified in asserting **W** because I can honestly say I think I am **more aware** that **W** states a fact than I am that 'We are talking together' states a fact. So it would be absurd for me to "allow for the justification" of **W** as **Modes of Being** demands. For nothing I could cite by way of justification is more clearly true to my knowledge. I could cite what is more clearly true to you and you might consider it a justification for **W**, but I wouldn't consider it a justification at all".

If a man's philosophy partly rests on fundamental value claims backed only by such Awareness Assertions, and if that philosophy is entertained in such a cautious, reflective, tolerant way, then Weiss's claim that this philosophy is not "satisfactory" is perhaps itself not satisfactory. For maybe it fails to distinguish what is **satisfactory** from what is **most satisfactory**—to distinguish "what one has in fact a right to be satisfied with as a complete philosophy" from "what one ought ideally to be most satisfied with as a complete philosophy". It is quite possible, though I sometimes feel I would be as disappointed as would Weiss to be convinced of it, that there can be no philosophy of the most satisfactory sort—only of the satisfactory and the more satisfactory sort. One can put it like this. (A) A philosophy based on declared presuppositions, including at least one value presupposition, is **satisfactory** if it is systematic, even if some of the presuppositions have no other justification than Awareness Assertions—provided they are put forward in a consistent, reflective and non-dogmatic way. (B) The fewer presuppositions backed only by such Awareness Assertions, the **more satisfactory** the systematic philosophy. (C) The **most satisfactory** sort of philosophy would be a systematic one in which the philosopher can justify to himself any and every fundamental presupposition both by an Awareness Assertion and by reference to some other presupposition of whose truth he thinks himself equally aware, but not **more** aware—provided, again, the Awareness Assertions are put forward in a consistent, reflective and non-dogmatic way. If a systematic philosopher like Weiss could and did succeed by these criteria, then his philosophy would indeed be a 'circular enterprise' and not viciously so. (84)

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Objection Concerning A. "It is possible that there can be no really **satisfactory** philosophy within man's creative grasp. Perhaps human knowledge already embraces too many sorts of facts, **philosophically important** sorts, for an individual to be able to master all the relevant concepts, let alone relate them in a philosophical system. For a philosophical system must both yield a sense of the harmonious intelligibility of reality **and** cover all the important sorts of fact. Perhaps the only humanly attainable wisdom about reality must be too limited, too fragmentary, and too unharmonious in its features to be called a systematic philosophy. We ought to be content even with an unsatisfactory philosophy, however, since it is obviously better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a satisfied Television addict". This objection might be open to the reply that even a system of philosophy is still a personal business, not an Ersatz-Encyclopedia. Thus we might hear some sense in a rejoinder like this. "A philosophical system makes claims about the most general and basic things that ought to puzzle us. What, if anything, should be called most general and basic is for each philosopher as a person with his own insights, obligations and emotions to decide. The system offers a way of looking at the world and invites us to find our own harmony within its harmony. That is, it invites us to relate the less general concepts and less general sorts of facts, that purticularly interest us, to the more general features of reality the system has sketched. Concepts of legality, well-confirmed theories of physics, Godel's Incompleteness Proof for certain sorts of formal systems, counter-factual sorts of fact, ideals of love, Communist or Cubist or Freudian manifestos—whatever matters concern us most **within** the world in particular, after the system has told us important things about the world in general—all can be grist for our own mill inside our own system. And because it is **ours**, not **theirs**, and both sides have good reasons, this does not mean that there are no objectively best or better reasons".

Objection Concerning C. "Perhaps no consistent and reflective philosopher can successfully build an adequate system on presuppositions all of which he will find to be justifiable not only by Awareness Assertions but also by reference to some other presupposition which he finds to be just as clearly true. If so, then there is no **most satisfactory** philosophy—indeed by Weiss's criteria there is no 'satisfactory' philosophy at all. You have claimed that to be philosophical a piece of analysis must rest on a value postulate. And you believe that there is such a thing as philosophical analysis of human discourse distinct from the **intendedly** value-free analyses of many linguists and social scientists. Presumably, then, it is distinct because it is based on some value-postulate they do not share even implicitly—whether or not they also have to hold some cognitive value-postulate to 'do science' is another interesting question for objectivism. At any rate, if you hold that there **is** such a thing as philosophy, then you can't just mean that there are people called

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'philosophers' who happen to speak as would-be objectivists, and to believe in value-postulates. You must mean that we know philosophy to be possible, because we **do** have awareness of values, however fallible and dim. So you hold at least two basic philosophical propositions : (i) philosophy is possible for men, if and only if there is a human awareness of value which makes it possible; (ii) we do have an awareness of value. So (i) and (ii) entail a third basic proposition : (iii) we **can** do philosophy. moreover (ii) can be used to support (i).For if there is such a value awareness, and if it indicates that a responsible use of the word 'philosophy' is desirable, then if a value-free concept of philosophy seems to our value awareness to be irresponsible, there are grounds to accept (i). But what is as clearly known to be true as (ii), as the fact that we are aware of values ? It is all very well saying like Weiss that the Ideal presupposes Actualities **and** Existence **and** God; if his proofs of this are valid and cogent, it only shows the assertion "the Ideal is a mode of Being" to state something far less clearly known than does "we have an awareness of value". For example, Weiss begins his remarks on Ideality by asserting "Whatever is possible must be internally coherent" (105). He offers reasons for accepting this which must be intended as understood as **good** reasons to make his point. He offers reasons for saying at the beginning of his remarks on God and elsewhere that the modes of Actuality, Ideality, Existence and God are ingredients in one another, need each of the others, provide testimony for one another, presuppose one another and so on. But, if these are to be accepted as good reasons by a philosopher, he must be or become aware of their value as arguments, and of his obligation as a responsible philosopher to take them seriously, even if he dislikes the conclusion they seem to warrant. Unless Weiss's system is to be treated as a pure calculus, as a game, whose pieces signify nothing but are manipulated according to certain conventional rules, each presupposition and each proposition must be seen to be **worth** holding either intrinsically or because of reasons which are themselves seen to be **worth** accepting. To say an argument about reality is **valid** is not just to say it meets certain formal and value-free criteria : it is, as linguistic analysts should have learned from one another, to say it meets them and so can be seen to make its conclusion worth holding.

"It may be replied that if we did not exist and did not have actual things to make value judgments about, we could not be aware of value; that value judgments must be about something, hence an **ought** presupposes an **is** which falls short of it. But the reply fails. That we exist, and that there are actual things to make value judgments about, would be premises which entail that there are values. The premises that we exist and that there are actual things of which it could be true to say they have 936 sides, would not entail that anything does have 936 sides. But what is it to say as philosophers that we are clearly aware of the truth of **these** premises : that we exist, and that there are actual things ?

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It is to say we are clearly aware that the once buzzin 'bloomin' confusion of experience can be rightly or **justifiably** ordered according to a certain set of CATEGORIES (or certain alternative sets of categories) in **rational** discourse about a cosmos. So the premises do, after all, imply the conclusion that there are values; they do presuppose, the implication shows, what they were alleged not to presuppose.

"But it may be said that awareness of **ought** also presupposes **is** because awareness of **ought** offers overwhelmingly good reason to believe that something exists. Of course, it offers overwhelmingly **good** reason ! Or it may be repeated in an anguished voice that if nothing existed there would be no values, and if nothing existed except values there would be no human awareness of values; that, therefore, the objectivity and cognitivity of values must be justifiable by reference to the existence (being ?) of actual things and *vice versa*. But where does this talk of **good reason** and **justifiable** take us ?—back to values and awareness of values ! Nothing is more fundamentally, more clearly known, than that we have value awareness. It is impossible to "allow for its justification" since it is epistemologically prior to the complex value concepts involved in justification—at least as "justification" is to be understood *apud* a sophisticate and systematiser like Weiss ! As for the value-postulates about ordinary language which were attributed to Socrates, Aristotle, Wittgenstein and Marcel, what could they **possibly** use to justify them ? Surely no reasons could be found that did not invoke their original postulates all over again, **or** still more fundamental ones. There can be no **most satisfactory** sort of philosophy, even if we drop the requirement that it be systematic. Some value-postulate or value-postulates will always be too fundamental to be justified by any other".

What is the weight of the objection ? To say that there is a world, that there is consciousness may not seem to imply very obviously that there is value and value awareness. But if we can truthfully SAY "There is a world", "We have experience" according to recognisably **rational** criteria of truth, then we do seem to have justification for asserting the existence of values which we see, if sometimes only through a distorted glass very darkly. The existence of the world and the occurrence of the many things stuffed under that umbrella word 'experience' make it **possible as a matter of fact** that we find values. The finding of values and obligations makes it **possible as a matter of rationality** to grasp and **understand** in some measure what there is. We grasp, in some measure, our participation in a cosmos. Talk of the existence of worldly facts may NOT seem to presuppose very obviously the existence of values transcending a 'world stuff'. But talk (talk as rational human discourse) about existence does seem to presuppose very obviously willingness to acknowledge the existence of values. We cannot rationally say "There is such a thing as **rational** human discourse" without being willing to acknowledge the existence of values. Like it or not, this might be what the would-be

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Wittgensteinian should take to be the crucial upshot of Wittgenstein's attack on private languages and his emphasis on the concept of 'rules'. If so perhaps something like Weiss's circular enterprise is to be proven possible. Then the sting must be taken from the **Objection Concerning C.** Perhaps this can be done very simply—by pointing out that 'There Are OBJECTIVE VALUES' and 'There **ARE** objective values' are two among the metaphysical elephants that must stand on top of one another at the very bottom of things ! ("If **is** and **ought** are not in an important way independent, then they could not be in an important way interdependent, and if **ought** does not depend on **is** as a matter of complex **interdependence**, then both of these apparently basic metaphysical elephants would turn out to be trivial semantic white elephants".) I am not entirely sure. At any rate, it was not a waste of time to consider such a labyrinthine objection : for it helps one to see more clearly than ever that where human discourse is fully rational, rational enough for doing philosophy among other things, the speakers must acknowledge value postulates which they believe are at least as clear as what they take to be value-free postulates. More important, it **may** also serve to show, though here I am again uncertain, that in an important sense Weiss's circular enterprise, or a **most satisfactory** sort of philosophy, is probably NOT POSSIBLE. The reality of the world and of experience makes value awareness **possible as a matter of fact.** The finding of values makes it **possible as a matter of rationality** to grasp and understand in some measure what there is. Thus value awareness may deserve to be given an epistemological priority (the 'priority' we assign to necessary conditions) even over any rationally structured world awareness, (that is, even over awareness of what there is **as a cosmos**)[1]. This could amount to a priority so clear-cut as to thwart Weiss's grand 'dialectical' design. For it would make sense to try **justifying** a world view by reference to our knowledge of certain values; whereas talk of justifying our knowledge of values is doubtful talk indeed. Yet to say this is not to place 'We are aware of values' beyond **all** justification : it is to restrict its ultimate justification to our own very real awareness of values and to the *reductio ad absurdum* of any philosophy which denies it.

[1] Weiss says of Moore-like "this is a hand"; "to make the assertion is to maintain that one is *qualified* to speak for all, precisely because one is making a *normal* use of power daily used by all" (545—the italics are mine). Weiss also uses the further value terms *competence*, *honesty* and *knowledge* in connection with "This is a hand". He goes on to make the correct points that man can be fallible even about such matters, and that an ordinary man's present way of talk, need not coincide with what he would say "had he fully exercised" his "powers". But even so, Weiss's words, if correct, would lend through their value terms a degree of confirmation to the notion that value-awareness is epistemologically prior; that hence an adequate system of philosophy must have a value postulate known more clearly—and seen to be known more clearly, as we become more aware of the nature of world awareness—than other presupposition of the system. Yet this seems to conflict with Weiss's insistence on allowing for 'justification' of everything in the system.

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Postulates. Justification, and Satisfactions

An important question was raised (in the last paragraph but one) concerning the status of value postulates, when ordinary language analysis is practised for philosophical reasons. The postulates I attributed to Socrates, Aristotle, Wittgenstein, and Marcel, can be construed, as open to further justifications. Socrates' belief in the value of examining our confused talk about Piety or Justice for the sake of inducing 'recollection' of all but forgotten values is justified if either some victims of the dialectic or at least Socrates himself will finish with a clearer awareness of how to live—the central philosophical question according to *Republic* I. And the question of **how to live** is the question of how to see the world intelligibly as a cosmos in Socrates. It is to know the right relation of oneself, as a person with open possibilities, to the challenge of a rational order. If everyone Socrates converses with becomes an Aleibiades or a bloody-minded amateur sophist in later life and Socrates gets no clearer himself, then there will be very strong evidence that the postulate is false. Aristotle's belief that what almost all men agree to say is extraordinarily well worth our backing can be given an Aristotelian justification by reference to the doctrine that man is a rational animal, which in turn can be supported by reference to the doctrine of the epagoic extraction of essences: after I see so many particular men I grasp the distinguishing human essence. If a later epagoge were to show that all men born after the first atomic tests were *zoσγμαιωδεις* and intellectually stunted, then Aristotle would presumably change his view of the value of his original linguistic analysis for—years after 1945. Wittgenstein's belief that in ordinary language everything is in order as it is will be justified if increasingly painstaking analysis of usage shows that the way we ordinarily talk is well suited to the activities and purposes of ordinary life; that the variety and vagueness of many words' uses reflect the **wisdom** of having our discourse supple, rich in functions, and some times highly elusive in order to cope with the world of human aims; that if men could be forced always to speak a rigidly structured artificial language, life would become intolerable, cramped and frustrating. The postulate will be shown to claim too much if we find legitimate activities relative to which a philosoper *qua* philosopher is entitled to **prescribe** a regimentation of ordinary language—for instance, if we find that doing speculative metaphysics is a legitimate activity. But the admirer of Wittgenstein is entitled to insist that, even if doing speculative metaphysics is sensible, it is not sensible to say that therefore ordinary language is not worth careful study by any philosopher worth the name; if the collective wisdom of language needs purification, it must come from the man who understanding the many roles of language, bewares of washing out braces of babies to remove a drop of Bourbon in the bathwater. The success or failure of Marcel's analyses of language can be appraised by a similarly religious person for their usefulness in

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giving him a clearer sense of the dignity of the person, in helping him achieve 'disponibilité', closeness to God, and so on. If the result is merely terminological anarchy and general confusion then Marcel will have to reconsider his postulate and revise or retract it.

There is still another problem which arises concerning Weiss's insistence that "no philosophy can be satisfactory which does not at least allow for the examination and justification of all its presuppositions and propositions". (85) It does seem to be the case that the value postulates of several philosophers who analyse ordinary language can be construed or reconstrued as allowing for justification. Whether they will turn out to be justified is another matter. Yet in the case of certain ethical beliefs I find it extremely hard to believe that a philosophy should be called **not satisfactory**, if it contains them without allowing for any other justification than Awareness Assertions. Let us fail in charity a little further and return briefly to our old whipping boy Mr. Hudson. Hudson is anxious to show that there is nothing objective about moral judgments although we expect them to be **universalisable.** He tells us that "to say that 'Bull-fighting is wrong' is universalisable is to say that there is a universal moral principle which, together with a true statement about certain of the non-moral characteristics of bull-fighting, entails the judgment."[5] He offers a new conversation in which **A** begins again "Bull-fighting is wrong",B retorts "Why do you say that ?", and **A** finally brings out the increasingly restricted general principle that"acts,which cause pain that is avoidable without great harm resulting,are wrong."It is alleged that there is something importantly similar philosophically about a gramm atically similar conversation which proceeds from"Strawberries are nice"through a series of increasingly restricted generalisations to "I consider things which are sweet, succulent, and red in colour to be nice."But,for the very same sorts of reasons that we considered before, the universalisability test shows that there are philosophically interesting comparisons between upholding "Bull-fighting is wrong" and upholding a paradigmatically 'objective' statement like "this daisy from Denver is radioactive." The most impressive analogies do not apply to subjective expressions or descriptions of feeling.For we do not see much **sense** in justifying the latter, whereas the statement applying a theoretical term to the daisy can be deduced from a theoretical generalisation about cosmic rays affecting things at certain altitudes,and a true statement about certain non-theoretical characteristics of the daisy. And this is much more interestingly like the justification of "Bull-fighting is wrong."

Weiss's insistence on allowance for justification of **all** propositions seems in a curious way to endorse some of Hudson's illegitimate conclusions after he has 'compared' the new discussions of bull-fighthing and strawberries. "Matters which we discuss in the universe of moral discourse are matters about which we want to argue, "Hudson explains.

[5] *Mind*, LXXI (October, 1962), p. 532.

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(533) Hence we have the **conventions** of reason-giving and universalisability which "make it.....**possible always to open an argument**, when someone has delivered a moral judgment...**impossible to refuse to join in argumeut**, once one has delivered a moral judgment oneself". Moreover arguments like the one about bull-fighting can go on indefinitely: "as long as the list of non-moral characteristics is not so complete that it will fit only X and nothing else, the possibility of the counter-instance, and so of continued moral argument, remains open." Thus we can dismiss our moral passions to the realm of subjectivity since our ways of talking fit the hypothesis that man is simply argumentative about certain matters and introduces suitable conventions.

Hudson is, unlike Weiss, purporting to describe our actual conventions. I do not find them very **actual** since in many authoritarian circles moral matters are those about which men want most to pontificate and be pontificated to, least of all to argue. In many more liberal pastures we often find men who will fight to let men **disagree** about moral matters and to **state** their views, if not too loudly and too often; yet argument is not considered very valuable, since people may be wounded by knock-about discussion of what they feel most deeply. If someone asks me why I believe the pound is going to be devalued again, I may well be considered irresponsible to refuse any explanation or imply I would have none if I cared to give it; if someone asks me to state and then tells me to justify my views on abortion, I may often be considered a sensible person if I say, "Don't let's argue. You either see things my way or you don't. It's just my **philosophy** about these things." Weiss seems to be saying, by contrast, that we **ought** to be ready to give and demand reasons for all propositions we call parts of our philosophy; that something like Hudson's argumentative conventions **should** obtain. Only with Weiss unlike Hudson the process of justification can go on indefinitely because it will turn out to be circular.

Yet I would find it odd to call a philosophy **not satisfactory** in the following case, A, having justified "Bull-fighting is wrong" with "acts, which cause pain that is avoidable without great harm resulting, are wrong," is again asked by B "Why do you say that ?" A simply refuses to justify his generalisation but offers an Awareness Assertion and adds: "If anyone can't see that gratuituously inflicting pain is utterly immoral, he ought to have his head examined. Why I know that as clearly as I know there's a nose on my face." Of course A might think some form of the Golden Rule[6] or the Categorical Imperative could be used as justifications. But quite possibly A finds even modest forms of these very

[6] Weiss, p. 522 ; ".....so far as the others are different in nature and need from ourselves the rule can serve to distort and frustrate rather than to help and illuminate." One would wish he had extended this to the Categorical Imperative here and to the *passion* of some modern analysts for insisting that EVERY moral judgment be generalisable, fall under a principle, become universalisable, etc. On this topic see my 'From GOD to IS and from IS to OUGHT' *Philosophical Quarterly*. 1957.

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hard to apply to actual moral situations and so they are impossible to formulate helpfully. Nothing that could be remotely thought of as rational justification would seem anything like so obvious as what he says about gratuitons brutality. Of course it is logically possible that **B** will find Hudson's indefinite sequence of counter-instances and make **A** contract his principle further and further; it is logically possible that **B** will show **A** that the 'nose' on his face is really an artificial one or a hypnotically induced illusion.[7] But these possibilities do not interest **A** very much, especially if he thinks he can **do** something to reduce the cruelty in the world.

John Stuart Mill would surely not have been *ipso facto* an **unsatisfactory** philosopher, had he rather untypically introduced a very clear formulation of his moral views on pain and pleasure with no more backing than an Awareness Assertion. Although, like Weiss, I think that even a general moral truth like A's can be justified by appeal to other truths at least as clearly known, (truths about man's dignity as a social being, for example), I would find it hard to call A's an unsatisfactory philosophy just because one of his postulates did not, by **Weiss's** criteria, allow for its own justification. A's could still be a satisfactory philosophy by my criteria, though not a most satisfactory sort of one. Perhaps satisfactory ones are the best we can have.

[7] Compare Weiss (542) : "If the assertion is mistaken it may be due to a distortion possible to any man; it could be the result of a kind of tribal error....." To the would-be Uebermensch who suggests that A's belief in the value of avoiding senseless cruelty towards anyone, however inferior, in strength and talents, may be the result of a kind of tribal error, it is well worth repeating Weiss's point that such a possible objection applies to 'this is a hand.'

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ARE THERE LIMITATIONS TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM ?

ALBERT VAN AVER

NATURE

Three possible approaches to the study of life or the interpretations of phenomena exist : religious, humanistic, and scientific[1]. These approaches, dissimilar as they doubtless are, pivot on the meaning of nature. In attempting to answer the question, are there any limitations to the philosophy of scientific naturalism, ? I shall deal, therefore, with the question of nature and concomitant problems as they are related to the three interpretations.

The simplest view of nature is that it stands for all that is. Thomas Huxley held this view : ".....'Nature' means neither more nor less than that which is, the sum of phenomena presented to our experience; the totality of events, past, present, and to come. Every event must be taken to be a part of nature, until proof to the contrary is supplied. And such proof is, from the nature of the case impossible".[2] Again he states : "For myself, I am bound to say that the term "Nature" covers the totality of that which is".[3] He does not, like the religious and humanistic dualist, hoist phenomena above nature : "The world of psychical phenomena appears to me to be as much part of 'Nature' as the world of physical phenomena; and I am unable to perceive any justification for cutting the universe into two halves, one natural and one supernatural".[4]

Man is a part of nature, and the supernatural, if it exists, merely exists in the imagination (also natural). Lange similarly regards nature as "the great whole of which man is a part and by which he is a part and by which he is influenced. The beings that we place outside nature have always been creatures of imagination, of whose character we can form an idea as little as of their abiding-place and modes of action".[5]

[1] August Comte makes a corresponding, though not an identical, division : theological, metaphysical, and positive. *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, translated by Harriet Martineau, (London : George Bell and Sons, 1896), I., 2.

[2] Thomas Henry Huxley, *Hume* (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1878), p. 129.

[3] *Loc. cit.* For a more recent but similar conception, see Irwin Edman, "The New Naturalism", *The Nation* CXXX (April 16, 1930), p. 447.

[4] Thomas Henry Huxley, *Science and Tradition* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1900), p. 4.

[5] Frederick Albert Lange, *History of Materialism and Criticism of Its Present Importance* (London : Kegan, Paul. Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., 1892) II, 98. "Man", proclaims Sellars, "is a part of nature, although a self-directive organism adapted more or less adequately to his environment". (Roy Wood Sellars, *The Next Step in Religion: An Essay Towards the Coming Renaissance* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918), p. 165. Sellars says further : "The complexity and autonomy of nature thrusts all thought of a superpersonal agency into the background". *Ibid.*, p. 124).

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He concludes that "From defective knowledge of nature man has imagined deities that became the one object of his hopes and fears, without thinking that nature knows neither hate nor love, and works on and on, producing now weal now woe, according to invariable laws".[6]

What are these invariable laws ? What is "natural law ?" According to Herbert Dingle, "A law of Nature" "is simply an expression, in the most suitable terms, of what we observe". "A law of Nature is not some ruling principle inherent in the texture of things". Since "Nature is the sum-total of our common experiences and an event is one of those experiences, it is a contradiction in terms even to speak of a violation of a law of nature".[7] Natural law is not "prescriptive" but "descriptive". Says Huxley : "We have succeeded in finding out the rules of action of a little bit of the universe; we call these rules 'laws of nature'. not because anybody knows whether they bind nature or not, but because we find it is obligatory on us to take them into account, both as actors under nature, and as interpreters of nature".[8] It would follow from all this that the laws of nature have merely an abstract reality. According to Edward Caird, Comte, positivist though he was, held this view : "The articles of the laws of nature.....like all metaphysical principles, are merely principles of insurrection and revolt. They have no positive validity; for they are just the ultimate abstractions.....speculative phantoms....."[9] To characterize natural law as abstract does not necessarily militate against the tenability of the naturalistic point of view, nor can the humanist or religionist derive much comfort from such a characterization; for this characterization does not ignore the underlying physical nature of the universe, nor support the view that the abstract exists in a world apart. Nature operates without consciousness of law except in the one form when it manifests itself in the mind of man. Awareness, however, of the abstract is itself the result of a physiological-mental process[10]—and is in turn natural. Nature remains physical, regardless of whether its laws are conceived as abstract or not.[11]

Even though one grants that natural law is abstract, and that nature is physical, are natural law or nature and "order" identical ? From Huxley ws have had an intimation that they are. He maintains, in fact, that "The fundamental axiom of scientific thought is that there is not, never has been, and never will be, any disorder in nature".[12] Moreover, Huxley views nature not merely as order, but as harmonious beauty[13].

[6] Lange, *op. cit.*, p. 98.
[7] Herbert Dingle, *Science and Human Experience* (London : Williams and Norgate Ltd., 1931), p. 127.
[8] Huxley, *Science and Christian Tradition*, p. 81.
[9] Edward Caird, *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte* (New York : Macmillan and Company, 1885), p. 18.
[10] David Hume, *The Philosophical Works* (Boston : Little Brown and Company, 1854), II, 153.
[11] Lange, *op. cit.*, p. 98
[12] Huxley, *Science and the Christian Tradition*, p. 13.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

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But how are we to explain this conception of harmony and consonance in view of the suffering and pain which Huxley intimates man has the capacity to experience and does experience ? Plainly, it is not moral but mechanical harmony which Huxley means, for he infers that man's capacity for physical and moral suffering, far from fitting into the cosmic order, stands in the way of man's discerning that order. (Here Huxley, paradoxically, implies a dualism between the natural and the moral, although not necessarily between the natural and the supernatural). The idea that there is no effect without a cause applies, of course, equally to the moral and material spheres; but mere logical sequence of events does not make for "order"—neither from a moral or a naturalistic standpoint; for it seems essential that order, if it is at all possible, should include the quality and purposefulness of the event as well as its mere inevitability.

Not all naturalists, however, believe that nature and order are synonymous. The whole idea of order and harmony and purpose in nature is challenged by Morris R Cohen, for example, who regards such a view as naivete. The notion "that nature does nothing in vain" is "naively rationalistic and anthropomorphic....."[14] Nature is lavish and destructive—prodigal. "Nor is the matter mended by urging that the species rather than the individual is the end of every biologic act".[15] In fact, nature has no ends.

This argument, convincing as it may be, provokes the objection that Cohen is regarding the universe biologically, while Huxley, in the passages quoted, is viewing it physically and astronomically. Huxley, however, was first of all a biologist and in describing the universe as harmonious it is unlikely that he ignored the data of biology. A more plausible explanation for his ascribing order and harmony to the universe may lie in the fact that, far from speaking as a physicist, he spoke as a biologist, that as a champion of Darwin's theories of natural selection, he accepted uncritically their philosophical implications of cosmic unity. Cohen, of course, is criticizing the teleological view of life, but the essence of his criticism applies to the whole of existence, or to any view, whether half-mechanistic and half-aesthetic like Huxley's, or frankly teleological like Comte's.[16] His criticism casts doubt upon any view which would interpret life or nature as an "arrangement of.....exquisite beauty and symmetry....."

SCIENCE

What is the relation of science to nature ? Bertrand Russell defines science "as the power of manipulating nature".[17] He says that this view

[14] Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature : An Essay on the Meaning of Scientific Method* (New York : Harcourt, Brace and Company 1931), p. 267. Feibleman also questions the idea of nature as order: "Were nature altogether orderly there would be no conflicts. But instead, animals eat other animals and galaxies collide". James K. Feibleman, "The Scientific Philosophy", *Philosophy of Science*, XXVIII (July, 1961), p. 253.

[15] *Loc. cit.*

[16] Caird, *op. cit.*, *p.* 54.

[17] Bertrand Russell, *The Scientific Outlook* (London : Allen and Unwin, 1931), p. 16.

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is gradually replacing the conventional one that "science is primarily knowledge.....knowledge of a certain kind.....the kind, namely, which seeks general laws connecting a number of particular views".[18] Herbert Dingle defines science as "the recording, augmentation, and correlation of those elements of our experience which are actually or potentially common to all normal people.[19] This is the conventional view, but he joins Russell when he says that science "is not a revelation of Nature but an instrument for making Nature intelligible to our minds".[20] The inference from the position of both Russell and Dingle is that nature itself is "knowledgeless" ("**The external world is independent of the knower**"),[21] that there is no wisdom in it, but that it is a great resource, which the scientists, using seience as a "technique", can exploit in the interest of man. Obviously the business of the scientist is with nature—or natural law.[22] The supernatural is his concern only because it happens to interest man, himself a natural object, and therefore a legitimate subject of the scientist. It follows that an explanation of man's conduct falls within the dominion of natural law.[23]

Does science include the whole of experience ? If the chief concern of science is with nature, which is, as we have seen, all-inclusive, it would follow that science does embody the whole of experience. But on this point there is disagreement—even among the interpreters of science themselves. Dingle is self-contradictory on the question. First he says: "Science selects its field as that of the experiences which are common to all normal people. but it makes no assumption that the field includes the whole of experience....."[24] Then he says : "The whole of common experience is open to scientific treatment....."[25] Nevertheless, "The fact is that Science is fitted to deal with all experiences which are common to all normal people".[26]

As we have seen, Bertrand Russell would place no limits on the scope of science. The following statement shows that he also contradicts himself : "If.....a scientific civilization is to be a good civilization it is necessary that increase in knowledge should be accompanied by increase

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[18] *Loc. cit.*

[19] Dingle, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

[21] Feibleman, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

[22] "*Science is the experimental search for natural law*". *Ibid.*, p. 241.

[23] "Nor does the progress of scientific investigation afford any evidence that the behaviour of living matter is governed by anything other than the laws of physics and chemistry". (Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 128). Bavink amends this view as follows : "The new physics demonstrates strikingly that all our discovery of natural law... is simply following HIS tracks. To put it crudely and plainly : to work in physics consists fundamentally in nothing else than counting the elementary actions of God. (Bernhard Bavink, *Science and God* (New York : Reynal and Hitchcock, Inc., 1934) p. 135

[24] Dingle, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

[26] *Loc. cit.*

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in wisdom. I mean by wisdom a right conception of the ends of life. This is something which science in itself does not provide".[27] This is another way of saying that science can furnish no philosophy; and if it cannot, it does not include the whole of experience; for philosophy constitutes one of the major and one of the most inescapable experiences of life. Russell and Dingle might absolve themselves from the charge of contradiction by maintaining that, though they believe the scope of science is limited, the use of the scientific method or technique is not. The test comes when they philosophize themselves. Does Russell employ scientific method or technique in the following statement ?

> Science is in essence nothing but the systematic pursuit of knowledge, and knowledge, whatever ill uses man may make of it, is in essence good. To lose faith in knowledge is to lose faith in the best of man's capacities; and therefore I repeat unhesitatingly that the unyielding rationalist has a better faith and a more unbending optimism than any of the timid seekers after the childish comforts of a less adult age.[28]

Except possibly for his definition of science, Russell is here philosophizing in the orthodox manner—and in the worst orthodox manner because he is dogmatic when he should be conjectural. It would seem that there are certain questions which by their nature are neither "scientific" nor amenable to scientific treatment. As is to be expected, it is a philosopher and not a scientist who admirably champions the view that science is all-sufficient. Comte had that view : "Renouncing the theological and metaphysical interpretations of things, which have been proved to be either inconsistent with facts or at least incapable of being verified by facts, we must now base our effort to improve man's estate upon the laws of resemblance, the coexistence, and the succession of phenomena as these are determined by science".[29] We may conclude that science is complete, that it represents the whole of experience, only when it includes or is a philosophy—when it opens up a way of life. Divorced from philosophy, it stands on one leg.

This view, of course, is far from universal. Huxley, though not always consistent, would by no means grant second place to science; for him science was the supreme authority and the supreme way of life. "No one", says Robert Shafer, "has made loftier claims for the supreme authority of science than Huxley....."[30] Shafer's qualification of this statement is significant :".....but he has based those claims on the position that the scientist can produce just warrant for his authority, whereas the priest's claim to authority rests on fraud and humbug".[31] For Huxley, indeed, there was no appeal from science or nature: It is certain

[27] Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 138.
[29] Caird, *op. cit.*, p. 22. Caird quoting Comte.
[30] Robert Shafer, *Christianity and Naturalism : Essay in Criticism.* Second Series (London : Humphrey Milford, 1926), p. 81.
[31] *Loc. cit.*

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that nature is the expression of a definite order with which nothing interferes, and that the chief business of mankind is to learn that order and govern themselves accordingly".[32] Between the authority of supernaturalism (or humanism) and science or nature there can be no choice.[33]

Freud similarly gainsays the authority or usefulness of supernaturalism, and at the same time intimates the strength and power of science with the simple affirmation that science is not an "illusion", but that "It would be an illusion to suppose that we could get anywhere else what it cannot give us".[34] Science, therefore, for some, can become a way of life and a mode of adjustment to its complex problems without losing its identity—without becoming a philosophy or a religion.[35]

RELIGION

"Workers in different sciences can unite in a definition of Science", says Dingle, "but devotees of different religions cannot unite in a definition of Religion; there are only religions".[36] Leuba rejects the view that there is not a common understanding as to what constitutes religion. "Social relations with superhuman beings", he says, "unless that be devils, is, by common consent, called religion".[37] Religion, then, must include a supernatural agent. Thus to make naturalism into a religion, as Bavink does, (see f. n. 23), is not only to use terms loosely, but to confuse the understanding in regard to certain human experiences which the terms symbolize. Similarly when Sellars says, "Religion is loyalty to the values of life",[38] he is confounding the various approaches to the interpretation of life—scientific, religious, humanistic, and overlooking the fact that science and humanism, though they are not religions, may also stress loyalty to the values of life. Freud's definition of religion is especially valuable because it is based on psychological acumen, and because of its implication that religion blunts the critical powers of man. "..... religion", he says, "consists of certain dogmas, assertions, about facts and conditions of external (or internal) reality, **which tell us something that one has not oneself discovered and which claim that one should give them credence**".[39].

Whether Freud's interpretation of religion is right or not, it has the merit of being challenging. Religion is universally accepted as a normal

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[32] Thomas Henry Huxley, *Science and Education* (New York : D. Appleton and Co., 1894), p. 151.

[33] See Huxley, *Science and Christian Tradition*, p. 32.

[34] Sigmund Freud, *The Future of Illusion*, Translated by W. D. Scott (London . Leonard and Virginia Woolf, 1928), p. 98.

[35] This is Feibleman's View ; "Pure science is of course eithically right and good. Pure science is search for truth, and the truth itself cannot be anything other than right and good "(*op.* cit., p. 257). Also, "*The primary effect of science is to intensify social behavior.....*" *Ibid.* p. 258.

[36] Dingle, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

[37] James H. Leuba, *God or Man ; A Study of the Value of God to Man* (New York ; Henry Holt Company, 1933), p. 6.

[38] Sellars, *op. cit.* p. 7.

[39] Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 42. Antics added.

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and wholesome experience. Freud characterizes it as a disease—a neurosis. ".....the residue of these repression-like processes", he says, "which took place in antiquity, has long clung on to civilization. Thus religion would be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity".[40] Freud's characterization of religion as a neurosis is somewhat modified by his attribution of a certain good to religion : "As they (religious dogmas) give information about what are to us the most interesting and important things in life, they are particularly highly valued. He who knows nothing of them is ignorant indeed, and he who has assimilated them may consider himself enriched".[41] This statement, however, is not representative of Freud's attitude toward religion; essentially his view is that religion must be cast off, as a snake casts off its skin, that humanity in its adult stage will outgrow it. "One might prophesy", he says, "that the abandoning of religion must take place with the fateful inexorability of a process of growth, and that we are just now in the middle of this phase of development".[42]

To Freud, further, religion is not only a neurosis. but it is the type of neurosis that results in illusion. Religion is belief, and a belief is "an illusion when wish-fulfillment is a prominent factor in its motivation, while disregarding its relations to reality, just as an illusion itself does".[43] Again : Illusion is "the psychical origin of religious ideas. These, which profess to be dogmas, are not the residue of experience or the final result of reflection; they are illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most insistent wishes of mankind; the secret of their strength is the strength of these wishes".[44] This view that religion is illusion, or is based on illusion,is significant because it has an essential correspondence to Kant's theory accounting for the existence of God. Freud says : ".....it would indeed be very nice if there were a God".[45]; so we create one in accordance with our wish, and delude ourselves with thinking that he actually exists. Kant says : " 'We cannot think and make intelligible the purposiveness which we are compelled to consider as presupposed by our knowledge of the inner possibility of many things in nature except by representing them and the world in general as produced by an intelligent cause', that is, by God".[46] The difference, if it is a difference, between Freud's notion and Kant's, is that Freud says we create a God because we **wish** to, and Kant says we create a God because we **have** to; but Freud would not deny that we wish what we have to: he would not deny that at the time the victim is suffering from an illusion, he is under

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 76.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 43.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 76.
[43] Freud, *op, cit.*, p. 41.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[45] *Loc. cit.*
[46] Clement C Webb, *Kant's Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford : At the Clarendon Press, 1926), p. 75.

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compulsion; for the necessity to wish for a god is as compelling as the necessity to have a god. Further, Kant makes "supposition" the basis of religion when he says, "we must act as though there were a God to whom we are responsible".[47] The gap between "illusion" and "supposition" is not wide, unless by illusion we mean a higher reality, but such a conception might itself be a supposition—though a needful and an exalted one. Freud exposes religion more successfully than Kant defends it, and Kant's defense of it turns out to be a support of Freud's position; for there is no religion without the "Absolute" and Kant's "as if" approach is as unreal as illusion itself.

Of course, the orthodox view differs from both that of Freud and Kant. "The universal phenomenon of religion", says one orthodox writer, "has originated in the a priori apperceptions of reason, and the natural, instinctive feelings of the heart, which, from age to age, have been vitalized, unfolded, and perfected by supernatural communications and testamentary revelations".[48] Again this writer says : "Religious systems have changed, but religion remains as changeless as the being of God. Religious systems have become extinct; but, like integuments of the chrysalis, they have infolded a living germ, the law of whose development implies the casting-off of its effete accessories".[49] The analytical mind might deal with these statements by declaring that there is more conviction in them than truth; that as a definition of religion they would serve equally well as a definition of superstition; and that the "living germ" of religion which will not die merely testifies (in Freud's sense) to man's chronic obsession and diseased mind. On the other hand, we have another type of "analytical mind"[50] which would contend that the statements above champion the undeniable truth, and that no amount of scientific analysis can uproot the fact of man's eternal tendency toward religion.

SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Can science and religion be reconciled ? Hogben believes that they cannot, and agrees with Freud that religion is disappearing. "It is doubtful", he says, "whether there was ever a time in the history of western Europe where a secular outlook was more widespread, and when the hope of finding a rational basis for a universal religion was less forlorn".[51] Sellars does not agree. He believes that religion has a future, and that the next step in religion is one without the supernatural :

> We want a religion of present use, a religion not concerned with mythological objects and hypothetical states of existence, but with

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 210.
[48] Alexander Winchell, *Reconciliation of Science and Religion* (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1877), p. 271.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[50] It would be sheer dogma and one-sidedness to maintain that only the "scientific mind" is analytical—that a Plato or St. Thomas Aquinas is not so analytical in their own right as, say, a chemist or a bio-physicist.
[51] Lancelot Hogben, *The Nature of Living Matter* (London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., 1930), p. 263.

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tasks and needs of human beings in society. Will not the next step in religion be the relinquishment of the supernatural and the active appreciation of virtues and values ?[52]

Leuba has even more extreme expectations. He believes in an ultimate merger of science and mysticism, that science should improve upon and incorporate the mystical technique into his own. "It remains for science", he concludes, "to improve upon the mystical technique of the religions in order to succeed for beyond them in enhancing life".[53] Such a commingling of the respective aims and methods of science and religion Dingle condemns because religion and science do not have a common ground. Religion "is made up of individual experiences" whereas Science "operates only with common experiences". "Science and religion", he maintains, "are essentially independent".[54] There can be no reconciliation between science and religion because they represent two diametrically opposed attitudes, two antipodal domains of thought. This historical dichotomy, championed by Dingle, was crystallized be Coleridge in the following words :

> Every man is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist. I do not think it possible that anyone born an Aristotelian can become a Platonist; and I am sure no born Platonist can ever change into an Aristotelian. They are two classes of men, besides which it is next to impossible to conceive a third. The one considers reason a quality or attribute; the other considers it a power. I believe that Aristotle never could get to understand what Plato meant by an idea.....With Plato ideas are constitutive in themselves.[55]

Metaphorically, Coleridge sums up the hopelessness of a reconciliation between religion and science. The scientific temper, represented by Aristotle, and the religious, represented by Plato, are fundamentally in conflict. To try to make religion over into a science, or science into a religion, either by relinquishing the supernatural, or by making the natural supernatural, is to overlook the fact that the minds of men, on this question, inherently gravitate towards opposite poles.

Possibly a solution is for religion to limit its sphere to what it regards as spiritual matters and science to confine itself to the boundaries of matter. Such a division of aim and objective, however, is imperilled by the fact that science in the main seems unwilling to admit the possibility that spirit, even if it exists, is indistinguishable from matter, and that the proponents of religion, for the most part, maintain that religion is not amenable to empirical methods.

Further, even if science admitted that the world is purposive, that nature, its proper province, is teleological in design, it would have to admit that man is a mere fragment among fragments in a relativistic universe, and such an avowal would be small encouragement to religion

[52] Sellars, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
[53] Leuba, *op. cit.*, p. 248.
[54] Dingle, *op. cit.*, p. 121.
[55] Shafer, *op. cit.*, p. 38. Shafer quoting Coleridge.

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which is negligible without the anthropocentric view. Morris R. Cohen takes this position. He says :

> For the purposes of currently prevailing religion, it is not enough that the world should be merely purposive. It must be purposive in the interests of humanity and in accordance with a definite scheme as to what our best interests are. A purposive world in which the fate of humanity is a mere incident, in which this whole earth of ours plays no greater part than a stray chip from a statue which an artist is perfecting, offers little more support to current religion than a dogmatic materialism.[56]

Religion and naturalism are therefore antithetical because in religion man is central, his life is purposeful, and supernatural authority is supreme. Naturalism deposes man from his egocentric throne, and takes away his assumed special prerogatives. A thorough-going naturalism precludes religion because a thoroughgoing naturalism precludes the supernatural.

HUMANISM

Humanism may be briefly defined as the philosophy of dualism. The humanist, especially the twentieth century humanist,[57] contends that man is not only different from the animal in "degree" but also in "kind". This view, of course, is unacceptable to the scientific naturalist. "The truth of the matter is", says Leuba, "that the difference between the average human parent and the higher animals.....is not one of kind but of degree".[58] John Watson, interpreting Darwin, maintains that the "whole tendency.....of the Darwinian conception is to deny that there is any fundamental distinction between different orders of existence. The mineral exhibits in an implicit form the same characteristics as are presented in man in an explicit form".[59] To such arguments as these the humanist replies :

> Man is certainly an animal, linked ,with the 'animal creation' and even with the'vegetable creation,'as the doctrine of evolution teaches us. Thus far man is purely a product of, or a part of the natural

[56] Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

[57] I have in mind such neo-humanists as Irving Babbitt, Paul Elmer Moore, Norman Foerster, and Robert Shafer. For a history of the term and the justification for the neo-humanists' appropriation of it, see Irving Babbitt, *Literature and the American College* (Boston : Houghton Mifflin Company, 1908), Chapter 1. Also, there are different kinds of dualism (See James Bissett Pratt, *Matter and Spirit* (The Macmillan Company. 1922), p. 7. Dualism, however, as the neo-humanist conceives of it, is meaningless within a monistic context. The higher nature of man is qualitatively different from the lower nature. Irving Babbitt uses Emerson's verses to illustrate this point :

> *There are two laws discrete*
> *Not reconciled,—*
> *Law for man, and law for thing;*
> *The last builds town and fleet,*
> *But it runs wild,*
> *And doth the man unking.*

[58] Leuba, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

[59] Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

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world, and thus far we are in agreement with the contention of naturalism. But at the same time, whether it is explicable or not, man is obviously, indubitably something more and other than an animal, and it is this difference, this otherness, in terms of which he characterizes himself as a human creature and which to him is the crucially significant fact about himself.[60]

The whole argument between humanist and naturalist pivots on the "nature" of this "otherness." Not all humanists will go the length that Shafer goes in maintaining that this otherness has a "divine origin"; it is a distinctly human quality, from which humanism derives its name, and by which it differentiates itself from supernaturalism. But even in designating the distinguishing quality as "human" the problem still remains of establishing its non-naturalness by other means than that of mere assertion and the test of thousands of years of belief, sincere and profound though this belef may be. The naturalists, perhaps, are on no surer ground in maintaining the opposition; and it would appear that often they too subscribe to a dualism, although they do not, like the humanists, hoist this differentiating quality of man above nature. For instance, Bavink says:

> The total life of the organism is...never a simple summation of the individual lives of the single cells composing it; is an integration of a peculiar kind, for which no example exists in the physico chemical world, with its simple play of forces. **For in the latter the whole is always the sum of its parts, whereas in the living world, it is always more than this.**[61]

what is the "element" or "quality" or "substance" in the living world that is more than physico-chemical ? Bavink says again:

> The series of higher and higher organic forms...differs from the corresponding series of inorganic forms (electrons, protons, atoms, molecules) in that we have not any longer a form spatially limited and self-sufficing (apart from certain general conditions of existence) but rather the setting up of Gestalt which includes the living being together with its environment.[62]

To be sure, the naturalist says the "Gestalt" is natural, but if, as Bavink intimates, it is not physico-chemical, what form of "natural" is it ? Bavink says again: "Man seeks the causes which he does not find in himself, outside himself. **The animal neither** seeks them within nor without."[63] Here it is clear that Bavink holds with the humanist that there is an "otherness" in man.

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[60] Shafer, *op. cit.*, p. 290; also *Ibid.*, p. 258.

[61] Bavink, *op. cit.*, p. 27. Antics added.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 152. Antics added. Even so patent a naturalist as John Stuart Mill concedes that man has a quality which distinguishes him from the rest of creation—a quality different in "kind" rather than in degree : "Why is it that there is a preponderance among mankind of rational opinions and natural conduct ? If there really is this preponderance—which there must be, unless human affairs are, and have always been, in an almost desperate state—it is owing to a quality of the human mind, the source of everything respectable in man either as an intellectual or as a moral being....." John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (Boston : Ticknor and Fields, 1863), p. 41.

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To such contentions, however, that man is different from the animal, the naturalist has his own answer. "Existence," he says, "is one, not two." Bavink, despite his insistence on the fact that man is different, concludes that "This contrast lies in the realm of values, not that of existence;"[64] and Leuba supports this monistic view by maintaining:"...mental forces are Psychophysiological forces,—man is a psycho-physiological being."[65] Sellars is similarly monistic in his contention that "mind is just a term for certain capacities of control exercised by the brain."[66] Hogben sustains this monistic view, and tries to settle the problem raised by Bavink's contention that the "otherness" is not physicochemical by claiming the whole of existence for physics. He says:

> Surely, it is evident that a signal advance towards a more monistic interpretation of nature has been made, when the analysis or any biological phenomenon has been achieved with the aid of traditional physical concepts, and when concepts once peculiar to biology, as affinity was once peculiar to chemistry, have been translated into the traditional language of physics. **Physics today is seeking a new synthesis to take into one system of equations all the old data, and many new which have lately accumulated.**[67]

That is, physics is to include all, and everything is to be explained in terms of physics, even the "Gestalt"—pattern? We must notice, however, that this view is conjectural, and that there is still no scientfic evidence to contradict the humanist's view that man's difference from the animal cannot be explained in terms of physics, chemistry-or biology.

SCIENCE AND HUMANISM

Are science and humanism equally as irreconcilable as science and religion ? The humanist answers that from his standpoint science and humanism are not intransigent, for he is not hostile to science except when it denies the existence of the human law. Irving Babbitt expresses the attitude of the humanist toward science: "I hold that one should not only welcome the efforts of the man of science at his best to put the natural law on a positive and critical basis, but that one should strive to emulate him in one's dealings with the human law; and so become a complete positivist."[69] Science, the humanist further maintains, is an arm of humanism, which should be used for the enhancement of human value.

The difficulty begins, as we have seen, with the naturalist's refusal to cut existence into two. "...Science": says Dingle, "is pledged to monism; Dean Inge will express it for us effectively. 'Of one thing we may be certain," he writess 'Science will never renounce the attempt to bring

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[64] Bavink, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
[65] Leuba, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
[66] Sellars, *op. cit.*, p. 94.
[67] Hogben, *op. cit.*, p. 99. Antics added.
[68] Louis J. A. Mercier, *The Challenge of Humanism : An Essay in Comparative Criticism* (New York : Oxford University Press), p. 174.
[69] Irving Babbitt, *Rousseau and Romanticism* (New York : Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919), p. XI.

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everything under a single syetem of laws. Science must be monistic, for under any other dispensation science could not exist. The dualism of nature and supernature is intolerable to science."[70] And Dean Inge might have added: The dualism between nature and the humanist's "law for man" is equally intolerable.

This antithesis, however, science will uncomplainingly forego, but will not relinquish the possibilities of a humanism within its monistic confines or as one of its legitimate spheres of intellectual activity. Hogben considers that Science has suffered at the hands of the traditional humanists and philosophers and should declare their independence from them. "Darwin," he asserts, "laid the foundations of a new humanism akin to science..."[71] "Darwin's *Descent of Man*, "he declares, "precipitated a new phase in the revolution which was replacing classical humanism by **a humanism which draws its inspiration from the success of natural sciences and looks to the scientist to supply it with the first principles of method**"[72] The possibilities of the new humanism based on biology are next contemplated:

> The aesthetic satisfaction derived from contemplating Man's place in Nature will itself endow the study of biology with cultural value for a few people. But as a school subject biology can make a more general appeal to consideration as the basis of a new humanism.[73]

It should be noted, however, that Hogben does not want man to resign his humanity in favor of the brute, but that he simply wants him to play his distinctive role of humanity **within the natural order.** Hence he says : "Whatever disadvantages the Christian cosmogony imposed upon the study of human society, it possessed the merit of emphasizing the proper study of man is man";[74] and he complains because "To Huxley and Spencer the important fact was that Man is a brute",[75] although he excuses them on the ground that "It was necessary for them to emphasize man's genetic similarity to other animals in opposition to the traditional view which placed man in a special category apart from the other natural objects".[76] The humanistic values remain desirable; and he criticises the scientists for failing to provide a substitute : "Those who have pressed the claim of scientific education have concerned themselves very little with providing a substitute for what the advocates of classical humanism honestly attempted to achieve".[77]

The substitute, however, though calculated to achieve humanistic values, should have a biological foundation—the new humanism should

[70] Dingle, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
[71] Hogben, *op. cit.*, p. 220.
[72] *Ibid.*, p. 251. Antics added.
[73] *Ibid.*, p. 282.
[74] *Ibid.*, p. 194.
[75] *Loc. cit.*
[76] *Loc. cit.*
[77] *Ibid.*, p. 276.

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have its roots in biology, because biology "is more fundamental than the pursuit of moral philosophy".[78]

It is needless to say that to the humanist Hogben's conception of a biological humanism is a contradiction in terms, for humanism begins where biology and physical science end. Robert Shafer substantiates this view :

> It is clear that exact science, working as it must with objective data such are susceptible of quantitative measurement, can deal with human beings only so far as they are animals and things, while it must remain silent about their specifically human characteristics. During a brief space this silence was taken, both by scientists and philosophers, as equivalent to denial, but that time has quickly passed. For it is now generally realized that by no means all of the data of experience are susceptible of scientific treatment, so that we no longer feel obligated, from loyalty to the cause of knowledge to shut our eyes to certain of the experienced facts of human life, or to attempt to explain them away by vehemently asserting that they 'must' have arisen from causes which bear no resemblance to them.[79]

That the scientist "must remain silent about" the "specifically human characteristics" every psychologist will, of course, deny; but even if we grant that Shafer is partly wrong here, can psychology, strictly as a science, enunciate value ? The humanist says that science cannot give ultimate value. Shafer says :

> The truth which is always being forgotten and which must ever be rediscovered, through the hard lessons of experience,is that the exact sciences cannot of themselves give us anything that is ultimately valuable. They are means, not ends, and they are means, moreover, only to the use of the kind of material with which they can deal. He who loses himself in them, and attempts to limit his life by their limitations, loses himself indeed in a death-like unmeaning flux.[80]

Shafer, again, is perhaps extreme in his statement that science gives nothing ultimately valuable; but it is almost a commonplace that artistic values[81] are almost exclusively humanistic,[82] and are different from any

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[78] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[79] Shafer. *op. cit.*, p. 287.

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 299. Even a spokesman for the scientist agrees that science does not furnish ends though, to be sure only its pragmatic aspect is here stressed; "*Science insofar as it is applied endeavors to supply the means and not the ends*". Feibleman, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

[81] It is just such a commonplace to which Hogben takes exception : "It sounds very impressive," he says, "to state that science leaves out of account man's religious and artistic experiences, that religion and art satisfy deeper experiences and so forth..." (Hogben, *op. cit.*, p. 252) The inference is that the cravings which science satisfy are as profound as those which art and religion satisfy, However that may be, the fact remains that science and art are different and elicit *different values*. Bertrand Russell, who can speak on this point with some authority because he is both a critic and scientist infers as much when he says : "Science as the pursuit of truth is the equal, but not the superior of art." (Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 10.) Russell does not mean that they pursue the same kind of truth, nor does he maintain as Hogben seems to do, that science can serve the same purpose as art, for his next statement is: "Science as a technique, though it may have little intrinsic value, has a practical value to which art cannot as-

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of the values which pure science can achieve. While maintaining that science and humanism are dissimilar, Shafer at the same time succeeds in showing their only ground of reconciliation—science as a means, as an instrument of humanism. Moreover, science and humanism can unite in a way that science and religion cannot, because they both exist to serve, not God, but man.

THE WILL

"The world of phenomena," says Lange, in stating the determinist's position, "to which man belongs as a portion of them, is thoroughly governed by the law of cause; and there is no action of man, not even the supreme heroism of duty, which is not, physiologically and psychologically considered, determined by the antecedent development of the individual, or by the shaping of the situation in which he finds himself placed."[83] That is to say, cause is both initial and ultimate and circumventing or modifying it is impossible; and since everything that we do is **necessitated**, even the cause we think we are **creating**, there is no freedom. Hume spoke shrewdly on this point: "We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and dispostion."[84] That is, we give ourselves credit for achievements, whereas, if we were honest and penetrating, we should credit the circumstances which produced them. Following this line of thought to its logical conclusion, we may say that a man inherits the strong will which he uses in combating, for example, a disease; and that while he is using his will to its full capacity he is simply enacting what could not have been avoided. There is no way of escaping inheritance—or cause, or intervening between the cause and the effect.

Moreover, will, the power to choose and to control our actions, even when we suppose we have it, is subject to nature, and is determined by nature. On this point C.M. Williams, in his treatment of evolutionary ethics, says: ".....that which is generally regarded as the greatest independence of nature is, in reality, the greatest subjection to nature considered as a whole, although this wider subjection means an increasing independence of the mere excitation of the moment. The ability to weigh all sides of a question, sometimes termed Freedom, is rather the widest adaptation, which means the widest determination by nature."[85]

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pire" (*loc. cit.*)—nor wishes to aspire, he might have added. The point is that the aspirations of art and science being different, the realization of these aspirations would result in equally different values.

[82] I mean "humanistic" in the sense of the "humanities"—as a family name including all the arts.

[83] Lange, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

[84] Hume, *op. cit.*, II, p. 86.

[85] C. M. Williams, *A Review of the System of Ethics Founded on the Theory of Evolution* (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1893), p. 347.

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The so-called freedom of the will is rooted in the anatomy of the human being; the exercise of this will is a physiological—a natural process. There is no basic difference between voluntary and involuntary action. Willing to do a thing is as physiological as elimination, digestion or indigestion, all equally natural functions. Bertrand Russell maintains that ".....it is difficult to show that the causes of our bodily behaviour are not purely physical. It seems to introspection as though there were something called the will which causes those movements that we call voluntary. It is, however, quite possible that such movements have a complete chain of physical causes to which the will (whatever it may be) is a mere physical concomitant. Or perhaps, since the subject-matter of physics is no longer matter in the old sense, it may be that what we call our thoughts are ingredients of the complexes with which physics has replaced the old conception of matter. The dualism of mind and matter is out of date; matter has become more like mind and mind has become more like matter, than seemed possible at an earlier stage of science."[86]

Furthermore, what we commonly call will is an emotion—a special kind of feeling. Herbert Spencer speaks of their identity thus :

> We speak of Will as something apart from the feeling or feelings which,for the moment, prevail over others; whereas it is nothing but the general name given to the special feeling that gains supremacy and determines action. Take away all sensations and emotions,and there remains no Will. Excite some of these, and Will, becoming possible, becomes actual only when one of them or a group of them gains predominance. Until there is a **motive** (mark the word) there is no Will. That is to say,Will is no more an existence separate from the man occupying the throne.[87]

Hume anticipates Spencer in the conception of will as a feeling: "I desire it may be observed," he says, "that by the **will** I mean nothing but the internal impression **we feel**,and are conscious of,when we knowingly give rise to any motion of our body, or new perception of our mind.' "[88]

For Huxley, however, will is not a feeling or an emotion; it is law. Man is free not as he is chaotic, the victim of chance, but as he is obedient to law—natural law. Freedom, far from being an impossibility, is a **necessity**, the inevitable effect or result of a causal premise. That is to say, freedom is possible within the law of cause and effect. Because freedom itself is determined by previous circumstances does not alter the fact that it is **freedom**. A king is a king regardless of the fact that his father before him was a king. Freedom and determinism, are not, as the critics of naturalism contend, antipodal.

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[86] Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 131. It is interesting to note that Hume as a Philosopher somewhat anticipated this view: "I do not ascribe to the will that unintelligible necessity which is supposed to lie in matter. But I ascribe to matter that intelligible quality, call it necessity or not, which the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to belong to the will." Hume, *op. cit.*, II, 160.

[87] Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1895), II, 503.

[88] Huxley, *Hume*, p. 91. Huxley quoting Hume.

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This view is amply supported by Hobart, who contends that man has free will in the full and unrestricted sense of the word. He says in part: "That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis. It is therefore surer than the deterministic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to be."[89] Free will and determinism are not inconsistent: ".....there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism"; for "the two assertions are entirely consistent," and "one of them strictly implies the other."[90]

Further, Hobart's "free will" has the utmost latitude. An act of free will does not appear to be limited by the specific nature of its cause; for he says:

> I mean free will in the natural and usual sense, in the fullest, the most absolute sense in which for the purposes of the personal and moral life the term is employed. I mean it as implying responsibility, merit and demerit guilt, and desert. I mean it as implying, after an act has been performed, that one 'could have done otherwise,' than one did.[91]

And again he says :

> I can will anything and can will effectively anything that my body will enact. I can will it despite an inclination to the contrary of any strength you please—strength as felt by me before decision. We all know of cases where we have resisted impulses of great strength in this sense and we can imagine them still stronger. I have the power to do it, and shall do it, shall exercise that power, if I prefer.[92]

It would seem that neither religionist nor humanist could ask for greater concessions to his view, but there is a very important difference betwen it and Hobart's conception. That difference is that to Hobart freedom is the product of the whole self, whereas to the humanist or religionist freedom is the product of the higher self, of a self which is the master of self. "Self is the lord of self," says Buddha. This is a fundamental maxim of both humanist and religionist. To such a view Hobart would object because it "is simply setting up one character within another,"[93] or separating the self from the character, which is "the sum of a man's tendencies to action..."[94] The indeterminists try to solve the problem, Hobart says, by simply asserting: "There is a self inside which does the deciding."[95] But the self cannot act independently of the whole character, or cannot get on the outside and push it, as the indeterminists

[89] R. E. Hobart, "Free Will as Involving Determinism and Inconceivable without It," *Mind*, XLIII (January, 1934), p. 1.
[90] *Loc. cit.*
[91] *Loc. cit.*
[92] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[93] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[94] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[95] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

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somehow assume. Freedom is possible, possible as the issuance of a monistic, and not of a dualistic personality.

How is it possible ? The answer is simple. I, the whole of me, my character, produces volitions. "My volitions are produced by me." "Determinism," Hobart adds, "is free will in the passive voice." [96] Why call this free will "determinism" ? Because I, me, man, am specifically a self-responsible moral being, the fountain and creator of all my acts.In other words, freedom of will is the freedom of self-determination.

Carrying this line of thought to its logical conclusions, we may say that nature produced the mechanism man, who in turn produces freedom in the same way that nature has produced the sun, which in turn sheds light; or, stated in another way, man is an automaton producing freedom "The determinist," says Hobart, "need not, but may, of course hold the doctrine of automatism, of a physically complete mechanism in human action." [97]

Again, the humanists and religionists object because, despite any alternatives to mechanism that the naturalist might offer, as vitalism, for instance, these alternatives have a naturalistic basis, whereas to them the will is a force contrary to nature. Even if one should grant that there is a mechanism capable of producing freedom, can it function without an operator ? The answer that the mechanism operates automatically is not satisfactory, for even an automaton has to be "wound up"—needs the application of an external force. "The inner check," (or will) says Paul Elmer More, "is not the mere blocking of one impulse by another,which is a quality of the confusion of the flux itself, but a restraint upon the flux by a force contrary to it." [98] Although the figures "mechanism" and "flux" are mixed,we have brought here to our full view the impasse that exists between naturalist and humanist or religionist on the question of will—as well as upon all other questions.

The affirmation of a free will on the part of the naturalists removes one of the chief props of the humanists, and drives them farther and farther away from the realm of pure psychology, into that of metaphysics, a sphere that Irving Babbitt at least, tried to abjure. There is little likelihood, however, that the humanist, critical though he affirms his position to be, will hearken to the evidence which the naturalist produces to refute the thesis of a non-natural will.[99] In this respect he

[96] *Loc. cit.*

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[98] Paul Elmer More, *The Drift of Romanticism, Shelburne Essays, Study of Religious Dualism* (London, New York: Longman, Green and Company, 1905),p. 248.

[99] An excellent refutation of the humanistic and religious position that will is not will if it is naturalistically based is to be found in a small but prodigious work by C J Herrick, *Fatalism and Freedom, A Biologist's Answer* (New Yoek: W.W. Horton and Company, 1926). His conclusion: ".....control is real. It is *no* illusion to mock our anguished striving." (*Ibid.*, p. 65.) His position is further supported by Warren and Carmichael. *Elements of Human Psychology* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1930), p. 251.

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allies himself with the supernaturalist who can always protect his particular views by the claim that they are not amenable to scientific investigation. On the other hand, the naturalist is equally culpable, for he too is one-sided in maintaining the strength of his position by refusing to admit the legitimacy of evidence other than that which has an empirical basis.

MORALITY

Is morality possible without dualism ? The view is widely held that it is not. The severest criticism brought against naturalism is that in being monistic, it makes morality impossible. "It is the commonplace of every powerful writer on ethics..." says Caird, "that the immediate untamed and undisciplined will of the natural man is not a principle of morality..."[100]

In line with this view, Lange, in his criticism of Lemaitre's "System of Nature,"[101] makes the following challenge to the naturalists :

> Where does nature produce the unnatural ? How can the eternal necessity that governs all development produce perversity and wrongness ? Upon what rests our hope of a better time ? What shall restore nature to her rights if there is nowhere anything but nature ? There are questions to which the 'System of Nature' vives us no sufficient answer. We have attained to the perfection of Materialism, but also to its limits.

Watson is equally concerned with the difficulty of developing a system of morality under naturalism. He raises the question: "How can we be at once under the dominion of natural law, and free from natural law ?"[102] He answers his question by maintaining that "It is only by rising entirely above my impulses and acting purely from the law of reason" that one "can be moral."[103] Again he says :

> ...the true nature of man is reason, and reason demands the complete liberation of man from all the passions that enslave him. Thus it was held by the ancient Stoics,at it has been held in modern times by Kant, that morality consists in acting purely from the law of reason, as distinguished from the law of desire.[104]

Is it true, however, that Kant maintained that this law of reason—the moral law—is an unnatural one ? According to Lange, he did not. In agreement with Watson, Lange first says: "Quite independently of all experience Kant believes that he can find the human consciousness, the moral law, which as an inner voice commands absolutely, but is, of course, not absolutely obeyed."[104] But then, in further explanation of Kant's view, Lange adds the following:

> The conception of the moral law we can only regard as an element of the mental process as matter of experience, which has to

[100] Caird ,*op. cit.*, p. 220.

[101] Lange ,*op. cit.*, p. 123. The same criticism would apply to naturalism, although I do not wish to infer that the two terms are necessarily identical.

[102] Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

[103] *Ibid.*, p. 197.

[104] *Ibid.*, p. 202.

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struggle with all other elements, with impulses, and inclinations, habits, momentary influences, and so on. And this struggle, together with its result—the moral or immoral act—follows in its whole course **the universal natural laws to which man in this respect forms no exception.**[105]

If Lange is right, there is little sanction for an orthodox religious or humanistic dualism in Kant. Apparently his moral law is a **natural moral law.** This idea is admirably expressed by Hume, who is supposed to be Kant's chief intellectual forbear. Hume says: "And indeed, when we consider how aptly natural and moral evidence cement together, and form only one chain of argument betwixt them, we shall make no scruple to allow, that they are of the same nature, and derived from the same principles."[106]

If religion and humanism receive little advantage from these statements, naturalism, on the other hand, receives decided support. Kant and Hume seem to say that naturalism provides a moral law, and a moral law which can command as much obedience as the distinctly supernatural law of religion. Webb emphasizes the supreme authoritativeness of Kant's moral law in expounding Kant's philosophy of religion:

> ...to Kant the moral experience, in which he held Religion to be rooted, and apart from which he acknowledged no experience to be truly religious, although it is an experience of social rights and duties, presents itself in the first place as a command, confronting the individual conscience with an **authority which it cannot fail to recognize.**[107]

And still further Webb says: "The moral experience is presented by Kant as always, in the first place, one of the infinite and absolute claims of the moral law upon our obedience."[108]

But—and this is the important point—in order to explain this moral experience or moral law, we do not, as Lange has just shown, and as Webb shows us again, depart from nature. Webb, using Kant's own words, says: "Kant accepts, as a principle to be borne in mind in our explanation of phenomena, **'that all things take place according to the order of nature...'** "[109]

Kant thus succeeds, as I have intimated above, in making possible for the naturalists to meet the theologians on their own ground, to confront them, without departing from nature, with a morality which rules as powerfully over the human conscience as their own.

That is, Kant can furnish the naturalists with an answer to the criticism that they have no disciplinary morality, provided they **were willing**

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[105] *Loc. cit.*, Antics added.
[106] Hume, *op. cit.*, II, 156.
[107] Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 209. Antics added.
[108] *Ibid.*, p. 59.
[109] *Ibid.*, p. 122. Antics added.

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to tamper with metaphysics; but metaphysics and naturalism are antithetical, so that the metaphysical rationalism of Kant is, despite its ultimate naturalism, utterly foreign to the scientific morality which modern naturalists wish to develop.

"The modern ethical thinker," says Sellars, "is convinced that morality is but the harmonious adjustment of an individual to his social group."[110] This is but the application of the theory of evolution and biologic law to human conduct—and is a far cry from Kant's metaphysical approach to morality. Sellar's view is, in fact, an attempt to formulate a morality upon a scientific basis—on the critical findings of biology. "**Moral philosophy can no longer claim**", says Hogben in support of this view, "**that there is any distinctive aspect of the nature of life, which lies beyond the province of physiological enquiry.**"[111] Leuba further reduces morality to a pure physiological or biological level: "... it is in any case incontestable that a broad foundation for human morality is present in emotional responses made by the animal to his social milieu."[112]

The position of these writers is unmistakably clear: morality loses its special human or divine heritage; it is delivered from both humanism and religion and handed over to biology. If biology is the science of life or living organisms, and if these organisms, as Leuba asserts, are potentially moral, then biology includes the study of morality. In short morality becomes a natural science—a view which is not altogether acceptable to humanism and religion.

CONCLUSION:

Limitations of Scientific Naturalism ?

First, it is almost universally agreed among scientists themselves and among those who treat with sympathy the scientific view that science is limited as to aim and purpose. Says John Theodore Merz in further amplification of this view :

> ...it is important to note that the result or aim of scientific inquiry does not dictate the methods,—the purely scientific inquirer does not know where the path will lead him: it is sufficient that it be clearly marked. Modern science defines the method, not the aim, of its work. It is based upon numbering and calculating—in short, upon mathematical processes...[113]

Leuba also maintains that science does not furnish a "goal". "Science...does not," he says, "decide what is good or bad, does not set goals for humanity : it merely offers means for securing that which is desired."[114] "Let it be repeated," he says again, "that science does not

[110] Sellars, *op. cit.*, p. 180.
[111] Hogben, *op. cit.*, p. 95. Antics added.
[112] Leuba, *op. cit.*, p. 290.
[113] John Theodore Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (Edinburgh and London : William Blackwood and Sons, 1923), *I.* 30.
[114] Leuba, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

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tell us **what** is worthwhile, it does not provide us with the ultimate goal; science is not a guide, but a tool of life."[115]

Further, science does not give us wisdom. We may recall that Bertrand Russell expressed this view: "If a scientific civilization is to be a good civilization, it is necessary that increase in knowledge should be accompanied by increase in wisdom. I mean by wisdom a right conception of the **ends** of life. **This is something which science in itself does not provide.**"[116]

Neither does science include esthetic or moral values. This view was stated by Dingle *(atie)* and is further expressed by Merz: "Unity of knowledge, order and harmony, even completeness and symmetry, truth and beauty,are indeed no longer of direct use as cannons for the scientific inquirer, any more than the mysteries once supposed to be inherent in certain numbers."[117]

The foregoing briefly represents the views of men who are friendly to science. These views show that critics are not justified in condemning the scientists for presumption and arrogance, because many scientists agree with them as to the main limitation of science, namely, that it does not furnish aim and purpose.

The important question, however, is, does "naturalism" have the same limitations as "science" ? My study has brought me to the conclusion that it has not, and that while science has the congenital limitation of not being a philosophy, naturalism does not have this limitation, and that, therefore, it can include those aims and objectives which religion and humanism have come to regard as exclusively their own. Science cannot furnish those objectives because, to reiterate, science by definition is "means" and not "end". It is descriptive, analytical, and it excludes pondering the purpose of life—of creating abstract and philosophical values. On the other hand, naturalism can undertake this function, because as a philosophy, it can include non-metrical experiences—specifically, the intangible human, the natural-human. The word "scientific" prefixed to naturalism simply means an attempt to systematize, to use as much as possible the empirical method and the results of the exact sciences in the interests of the objectives which the philosophy of naturalism has set up. It further implies **the kind of approach** taken to the study of life, and it does not mean that the results of this study are on the same qualitative level as that of chemistry or physics. In short, scientific naturalism is a philosophy which presupposes that human values are rooted in nature and can be achieved and tested empirically.

The criticism has been frequently made that since naturalism precludes free will, it precludes morality (and therefore philosophy). No

[115] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[116] Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
[117] Merz, *op. cit., II*, 31.

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morality is possible without self responsibility, which in turn is not posible without free will. It is true that often in the past this criticism against naturalism was largely justified, but that it is no longer pertinent is also true. I have shown that some naturalists do believe in free will; that Huxley and Mill, outstanding naturalists, believed in it—and that naturalism in the main now affirms a free will. The naturalist's conception of free will is of course different from the humanist's conception of an "ethical will" and from the religionist's conception of a "divine will," but it may very well be that this quarrel arises from the inherent difficulties of language and communication rather than from basic differences in meaning. If the naturalist exercises "self-control" with a "natural free will", will the results be different from those achieved by the humanist when he exercises his "ethical will," and from the results achieved by the religionist when he, through self-discipline and concentration invokes the "divine will" ? After all, naturalists, humanists, religionists, are all men; the psychological mechanism in each is the same, so that they are likely to achieve the same effect by exercising "self-control". The Stoic who interprets self-control as a natural phenomenon may be as self-disciplined as the humanist who interprets self-control as a genuinely human process and as self-disciplined as the religionist who interprets self-control on a supernatural basis.

The desire to give naturalism its due, however, must not lead us too far away from the indeterminist's view that a distinction must be made between a spiritual free will, the roots of which are anterior to man's experience, and a pragmatic free will, the roots of which are said to be materialistic and conterminous with man's concrete experiences. Free will, to be genuine, at least the religious thinker will argue, must have supernatural authenticity; it is distinctly non-natural. The danger, this type of thinker will further maintain, that attends a free will that has a purely physiological basis is that, deriving as it does from that part of man which passeth away, from that part of man which is evanescent and fluctuant, it will yield a morality which is unstable, emotional, and volatile. Morality must have firm foundations, and it cannot have such if the will which produces it issues from a belief that all life is unending mutation. In other words, genuine free will must have the blessings of the eternal. Will, as Matthew Arnold might have said, is the power **not ourselves** which makes for righteousness.

Continuing our analysis of the limitations and qualities of the three approaches to life, in the matter of ultimate objectives, we may say, with our eyes toward the future, that the religionist will doubtless continue to have for his objective the glorification of God, the humanist the glorification of man—and I take it that the scientific naturalist would rise above the criticism of the humanist that he is primarily interested in things and have for his objective the welfare of man, with the attending emphasis that the spiritual and the physical are an indivisible entity.

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There would be other differences, such as different psychological effects resulting from the pursuit of different types of culture. Thus the naturalist who would make biology fundamental in his philosophy would be a different type of individual from the humanist who would make literature his fundamental study, and from the religionist who would make theology his. Theoretically, the humanist would suffer least, because "the well-rounded life" is one of his primary ideals, and he would avoid the specialization which characterizes the naturalist, and the contempt for earthly things which traditionally characterizes the religionist. But the main point to be made here is that "scientific naturalism" does not necessarily have to be without aims or objectives—that in this respect it can take its place by the side of religion and humanism, though religionists and humanists may still retain their privilege of disagreeing with the kind of objectives scientific naturalism may set up, and the further privilege of being sceptical as to whether it can achieve its aims by means of a "natural free will."

Both naturalism and humanism have a limitation which religion does not have. Neither of them supplies the absolute faith which explains religion's hold on humanity. Humanism,for some people,furnishes something finer—an opportunity to develop high standards on the basis of pure human effort and responsibility. If scientific naturalism should take for its point of departure man and not the brute, it would, if it can overcome the limitation which I have above indicated, have an equal opportunity.

The chief limitation of religion is that it makes impossible demands on one's credulity. Credulity, Freud notwithstanding, may be more wholesome for the race than its alternative, scepticism, but it is not a better substitute than the kind of illusion which one can critically sanction. If, as some assume, life is ultimately illusion, and a dream within a dream, and we have no alternative except in our choice of illusion—or "dis-illusions," as Irving Babbitt put it, then the illusion which dominates the imagination of the humanist or naturalist may, in the ultimate scale of values, be rated as highly as that of the religionist.

Should scientific naturalism attain the full stature of a philosophy,it would still have the serious limitation of concerning itself with the purely physical aspects of life to such an extent as to hamper and stunt the growth of art and literature. Art and literature cannot afford to ignore the sciences, but in their highest form, their boundaries begin where those of science end. Science may attempt to explain the phenomenon of art, but it is doubtful whether scientific naturalism can include art. Art based on the methods and techniques of scientific naturalism would necessarily be limited, because it would lack the exalted imaginative quality indispensable to art. The scientific temper is a limited temper; it is critical as to physical phenomena but not necessarily incisive as to human experience because of its cold allegiance to empirical fact. That is to say, the

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scientific temper is restrictive in the sense that it confines itself to the computable and excludes the speculative and the highly problematical. The philosophy of scientific naturalism characterized by the scientific temper would of course suffer from its limitations.

Moreover, regardless of what the future may hold, the past shows that humanistic and religious dualism is the cardinal tenet underlying great art. One has only to compare Thomas Hardy's tragedy-novels or Ibsen's plays written under the influence of a naturalistic philosophy with the tragedies of Shakespeare or Sophocles to appreciate the importance of dualism in art. Of course, Thomas Hardy's naturalism is far different from that which Hobart, for instance, is expounding, for Hardy's naturalism did not include free will. If free will and determinism are not incompatible, as Hobart contends, this conception, if it takes hold on the minds of artists in the future, may lead to a wholly new type of art. Whether it can duplicate in quality the art created under a dualistic dispensation is a question the answer to which is still largely in the future.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF BERTRAND RUSSELL

A CRITIQUE OF COMMONSENSE ARGUMENT

LAKSHMI SEXENA

DECENTRALIZATION OF MIND:

The philosophy of Bertrand Russell emerges on the contemporary scene as a vigorous defence of the empiricist's claim towards a faithful articulation of the constitution of the universe. It, therefore, is an effort to philosophize as close to commonsense as is logically possible and is imbued consistently with the belief that the preceding school of thought viz,the idealistic school,has not done justice to the nature of the universe, not only that it has positively misrepresented its character. Its excessive preoccupation with epistemology and its efforts at giving an undue importance to its conclusions in a final evaluation of the relative significance of the basic features of the universe are both wrong and need to be corrected. Therefore, Russell assiduously tries to construct[1] a picture of the universe in which epistemology and metaphysical considerations emanating out of it are held at a discount.

Russell's philosophy accordingly takes up a position which is diametrically opposed to the idealistic conception of the universe in which mind occupies a unique and privileged position. It is the centre of the universe in a very important sense and all entities revolve around it deriving whatever meaning and significance they possess from it and because of it. Russell argues arduously against this conception of the universe. He argues as any positivist would, belittling mind because of the vast immensity which envelops it on all sides. His attitude is resonant of the attitude of his senior contemporary G. E. Moore who went in for a downright denunciation of idealism in his well known atricles : On "Refutation of Idealism" and "Defence of Commonsense." Belittling the idealistic view, Russell says:

> "I think that these who profess such views have not realized all their implications.....Everybody in fact, accepts innumerable propositions about things not experienced, but when people begin to philosophize, they seem to think it necessary to make themselves artificially stupid."[2]

Speaking likewise in his volume "*Human Knowledge*", he says:

> "The electrons and protons—assuming it scientifically correct to believe in them–do not depend for their existence upon being perceived; on the contrary, there is every reason to believe that they existed for countless ages before there were any percipients in the Universe..."[3]

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[1] Russell, *My Philosophical development* 1959, Page 131.
[2] Ibid.. p. 131,
[3] Russell, *Human Knowledge*, Ed. 1951, p. 21.

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The Berkeleian doctrine which presents the universe as depending for its existence on the perceptual activity of a conscious subject is accordingly dismissed by him as a doctrine completely out of harmony with the facts of life and with their interpretation given to us by science. He, therefore, proceeds build up a picture of the universe in which mind is made coeval with the other realities of the universe. Mind is just a complex of events compresent with other like complexes of events constitutive of the so called physical universe. Russell's universe, as we shall see in the sequel, is a universe akin to the universe of physical science, and is as far removed from the commonsense world as is the picture presented to us by idealism.

DEMENTALIZED VIEW OF THE UNIVERSE:

The universe presented in the most objective manner is comprised of events of all kinds. These events are the minimal space-time or point-instant units and are not what commonsense takes them to be.

Events broadly speaking are of two kinds. Firstly, there are original events which ultimately are the primal constituents of the physical universe. These original events or "prototypes"as he calls them are never directly experienced by any one. They are only mediately known as the sources from which originate in all diverse directions an infinity of intermediate series of events which are also mediately knowable. Secondly, we have the second order events or as Russell calls them "offsprings" which constitute the terminus for the series of intermediate events. These second order events are always directly experienced by us, and are ordinarily known as mental events when they originate in a human subject. Antecedent to these mental events invariably we shall find a series of physiological events which melt into physical antecedents as we go back tracing the series. The mental events are conditioned, therefore, by physiological and physical events and are themselves directly experienced by the human subject. These are technically called 'data' or 'Sense-data' signifying the fact of their relatedness to a percipient subject. When on the other hand the series terminate not in a human organism but in a mechanical apparatus the same terminal events are called by Russell "Sensibilia". There is not much of a qualitative difference between the two kinds of second order events sense-data and sensibilia. Only they are termed differently because while maintaining their basic qualitative—non-difference Russell wishes constantly to keep before his mind the fact that the difference relates simply to the difference in the intervening media which arrest the series. The sum-total of sensibilia and sense-data emanating from a single event tend towards infinity because of the various perspectives, real or imaginary, taken up by human subjects or mechanical apparatuses. Each one of these again can be the source of another infinite of series and so on ad indefinitum. The original events themselves are infinite and so the entire universe comprises of encircling, overlapping infinities. This phenomenon of an infinite series emanating from

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a single source in an infinity of directions corresponding to the various perspectives from which it can be viewed, Russell calls, its "prolific heredity". All these second order events emanating from a single source bear very close structural or family resemblance to one another. These, therefore, can be collected together into families. These closely resembling events following each other in close contiguity to one another is, as we shall see, our only basis[4] for our belief in an objective universe comprising of original events. Stressing the priority of data over the objects of the physical universe in the knowledge process he says "The order for knowledge is inverse of the causal order."[5]

EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUALISM DEDUCED

The conclusion which closely follows this account of the universe and the reference unavoidably made to the order in which events are knowable is devastating to commonsense belief. It must, however, be said to the credit of Russell that despite his empiricist predilections he draws the conclusions with a consistency which is amazing. He rightly maintains, therefore, that despite the fact that sense-data are our only basis for our knowledge of the world outside us—these do not and cannot have a point to point substantial congruence with the physical events conditioning them. Therefore, the material congruence upheld by commonsense is not acceptable to Russell. There can be no resemblance of that kind between the mental and the physical events. Some kind of a correspondence, however, has to be admitted in the interest of the facts of everyday practical life which testifies in a very assuring manner of some kind of a similarity between the two. What then is the kind of correspondence which can legitimately be upheld in regard to the two kinds of events ?

The first answer of Russell, in response to the aforesaid question, is in the negative. There can be no resemblance between the two exactly as there can be no similarity between the impressions on the gramophone record and the music elicited therefrom, says he :

In a subsequent effort to understand the riddle of life Russell, however, maintains that the correspondence between the two kinds of things can be understood as some kind of a structural correspondence. The mental complex of events which constitutes the world of percepts is distinguishable from the physical complex of events which constitutes the world of physics. The two worlds differ materially and consequently qualitatively but the correspondence is one of structure. Analogically it may be understood as the correspondence which exists between the map of a building or of a country and the building or the country itself. The two resemble only in a kind of basic structural correspondence, but beyond that the two have no resemblance of any kind. The one is a notation[7]. the other is its elaboration: and the elaboration is done in terms of certain

[4] Ibid., p. 21.
[5] Ibid., p. 22.

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principles—which principles have been called by Russell postulates of experience.

Elaborating further his conception of a difference between the two worlds—the world of percepts and the world of physics, Russell repudiates the belief of naive realism that somehow the two are identical. If physics is right,says he,the world of my percepts is within me in my own private space. It only appears to be out there just as the dream universe appears to be projected out there. His position at this stage is amazingly reminiscent of the position of Berkeley when he reduced the universe to Ideas and declared the most unpalatable of doctrines: Its *esse is percipi* Russell goes to the length of saying "Our percepts are in our heads" meaning thereby that the world experienced in terms of the primary and secondary qualities is nowhere in physical space,it is within our own private space. There are two kinds of besidedness, contiguity of percepts within my own private space, and contiguity of physical events in a physical space of which my own physical body is a member compresent with other members.

Russell repudiates the Lockean conception of the physical universe being interpretable in terms of the primary qualities and the Thing-in-itself as the underlying substance holding the primary qualities together. There is no ground for this conception if physics is right in explaining the nature of perception. The primary qualities, as also the secondary qualities, are both events within our own mental complex and the physical complex is linked up with them through an intermediate series of physical and physiological events. Conditioned by physiological antecedents the mental events are specifically human—acquiring their special features because of the unavoidable fact of a human organism as the intervening medium through which the physical series has to traverse its course before it ends up in a mental event. And this condition since it is the very *sine-qua-non* of an experienced world, can never be eliminated in real life to enable us to have an objective, impersonal view of the universe. The obvious conclusion which follows from these considerations is that the physical universe can only be negatively announced to be different from the universe of percepts—the universe of commonsense. Russell's position in regard to this world is one of physical and physiological subjectivism, the world of experience is the world presented under the delimiting physical and physiological conditions. If both were different—if physical conditions and organic conditions under which the universe is made available to us were different, the universe would have been very different to us.

This important conclusion has serious repercussions on the naive realistic belief which identifies the two world and fails to see that the two are different. The position taken up by Russell also has serious repercussion on the classical notion[6] of mind and matter as diametrically

[6] Russell, *Human Knowledge*, p. 216-17.

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opposed substances,—matter distinguishing itself from mind, in as much as the latter does not possess the defining quality of extension. It also goes ahead of the Berkelian univer.e, which is retained by Russell as the world of percepts, by positing the physical universe as the conditioning, originating source of the latter.

Repudiating the naive realistic and Berkeleian identification of the world of percepts and the world of physics as an unsatisfactory conclusion and out of harmony with the facts and conclusions of physics, Russell says :-

"The sun of the physicist is not identical with the sun of my percepts——"[7] Again,

"Commonsense...says: there is an object which is round and bright and hot; the kind of event called "seeing the sun" consists in a relation between me and this object and when this relation occurs I am "perceiving" the object. But at this point physics intervenes in an awkward way. It assures us that the sun is not "bright" in the sense in which we usually understand the word; it is a source of light-rays which have a certain effect upon eyes and nerves and brains, but when this effect is absent because the light rays do not encounter a living organism, there is nothing that can be properly called "brightness". Exactly the same considerations apply to the words **"hot" and "round" at least if "round" is understood as a perceptible quality.** Moreover, though you see the sun now, the physical object to be inferred from your seeing existed eight minutes ago; if in the intervening minutes, the sun had gone out, you would be seeing exactly what you are seeing. We cannot therefore identify the physical sun with what we see.[8]

This universe of physical events subsisting independently of the world of percepts and yet correlated to it in a very important sense remains for ever an inferred world. It is the 'that' to which we refer whenever we have an experience of a particular kind—but its content or 'what' for ever remains unknown and consequently indefinable. All definition would proceed on the basis of the experienced data and that would not be a correct representation of its true character. The position Russell takes up here is reminiscent of Locke, but with a positive difference. The 'that' of Russell is no longer the substrate of primary qualities. It is the complex of physical events (by 'physical' Russell means inferred events) but the like of which is never experienced by any human subject. The notion of a permanent unchanging substrate is also not welcome to Russell. For him, there are events this side and events on the yonder side —the former amenable to experience and the latter conditioning them but for ever inaccessible.

QUESTION OF CORRELATION RAISED AND ANSWERED :

Certain questions arise at this stage: Do the two universes continue

[7] Ibid., p. 217.
[8] Ibid., p. 219.

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to remain for ever disparate entities ? Or is there some kind of a correlation between them. If so what kind of a correlation can possibly be conceived ? And what picture of the physical universe can we form on the basis of the said correlation ?

We have already anticipated and to a fair extent defined the position of Russell on these points. Obviously they cannot be two entirely disparate worlds for they are linked together by the causal chain as cause and effect. The inference from the mental world to the physical universe is almost of the same pattern as is normally prevalent in our commonsense thinking when on the observation of a specific event 'A' we infer in regard to its conditioning antecedent 'B' both of which have been found to be invariably together in past experience In this case it is different because the two—cause and effect are never found to be compresent in experience. Inference in regard to cause is made on the basis of the observed resemblance of the effect. With other known effects whose antecedents have occurred in experience. The inferred cause remains for ever an hypothetical reality. It is analogous to what in Sāṁkhya metaphysics has been called the sāmānyatoḍrsta anumana. The entire metaphysics of Sāṁkhya rests on this argument where from taking the world as an effect we come to regard Prakrti as its First Cause. Just as Prakrti for ever remains in Sāṁkhya an inferred hypothetical principle, the entire physical universe remains for Russell an inferred hypothetical existence with only the admitted structural resemblance.

The analogy drawn by us just does not stop at this point. Furthermore, we can say that just as Sāṁkhya philosophy leans on Satkaryavada doctrine for its elucidation of the notion of Prakrti Russell also depends for his treatment of the physical universe on certain postulates and the most important of the several postulates admitted by him is the principle of causality. They are the principles on the basis of which we can infer the existence and the structural character of the physical universe. Russell is cautious to add at this juncture, the qualifying clause, that the universe constructed in deference to the principles or postulates of inference is at best an object of an increasing probability. But this probability can at no stage be converted into an absolutely certain demonstrative knowledge the like of which we have in logic or mathematics.

To these principles of inference we shall return in the sequel. For the present we revert to the problem of structural correlation between the two worlds—the physical and the mental,—as it has been raised answered by the philosopher. He says, the correlation between the two worlds cannot be adequately defined. The relation is "vague, approximate, and somewhat indefinite". "There is no precise sense in which we can be said to perceive physical objects."[9]

Then, in effort to reconcile this extreme position logically deducible from the conclusions of physics with commonsense faith in a world in

[9] Ibid Page 223.

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which, somehow, the cognitive mechanism of the human organism is adjusted with the world in which it happens to be placed, Russell modifies this extreme position and says with reference to physical objects such as the physical sun:

> "The only legitimate inferences as regards the physical sun are structural; concerning a property which is not structural, such as brightness, we must remain completely agnostic. We may perhaps say that it is unlikely that the physical sun is bright, since we have no knowledge of the qualities of things that are not percepts. "Continuing further he says: "I conclude that, while mental events and their qualities can be known without inference, physical events are known only as regards their space-time structure. **The qualities that compose such events are unknown—so completely unknown that we cannot say** either they are, or that they are not different from qualities that we know as belonging to mental events.[10]

POSTULATES OF INFERENCE:

Having discussed the problem of the correlation which exists between the two worlds—that of the percept and that of the physical events, as it has been raised and answered by Russell, we proceed to elucidate the nature of the principles or the postulates accepted by him in his effort at a reconstruction of the physical universe on a Solipsist premiss. All that we can ever have recourse to directly are the data which our own experience presents to us. Those data on analysis turn out to be merely sensory in character. They are, as Kant would say, of the nature of the manifold. Even the existence of another self possessed of like data, what to say of physical complexes, is the result of a process of construction which involves besides induction a host of principles none of which are empirically derived. These principles are consequently *apriori* in character because they are not generalizations born of experience. They are, however, not even strictly *apriori* in the sense of being self evident and axiomatic. They are hypothetical principles, bearing affinity to scientific hypothesis, and yield accordingly only knowledge of ever increasing probability—a knowledge which at no stage reaches a definiteness which may be comparable to mathematical or logical certitude.

The principles accepted besides induction by Russell in an effort to account for our common belief in an extra-personal or public universe are five in number. The number may still be reduced but he prefers to retain all the five. They are as follows:—

(1) Principle of quasi permanence
(ii) Principle of spatio-temporal continuum
(iii) Principle of separable causal chain
(iv) Principle of structural resemblance
(v) Principle of Analogy.

Each one of these principles presupposes alike the validity of the law of causality. Russell is not oblivious of the fact that in the recent development of physics this law has been challenged. He has, therefore, made a

[10] Ibid Page 247.

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mention of the classical conception of physics and the modern conception of phyics and listed the points on which the latter has diverged from the former. Old physics centred round three fundamental ideas:-

Firstly, it believed in the two varieties of space and time instead of the present conception which is that of a four dimensional manifold of events.

Secondly, it believed unquestioning in the validity of the of law causality which has seriously been questioned in the recent developments of physics. It has atleast been very seriously restricted in the sphere of its operation if not completely abandoned. It restricts itself for the present simply to a determination of "Statistical distributions" not to the course of individual events.

Finally, it believed in the conception that change could not but be continuous. This conception also has beeen seriously overthrown by the latest development of the quantum mechanics.

The new physics accordingly has in its enunciation of the theory of indeterminacy and quantum theory severely challenged, may uprooted completely, the two conceptions 'b' and 'c'. In the light of these developments of the physical science Russell rejects all the three postulates enumertaed above.

But Russell finds to his relief that these developments in the form of quantum mechanics and the indeterminacy principle are true only in regard to microscopic events. Macroscopic events or event complexes still can be subsumed with in the old law. Since he is dealing in his reconstruction of the physical universe with macroscopic events he can safely accept the aforementioned postulates.

What then are these principles ? And what kind of a world do they help us construct ? The first principle of quasi-permanence tells us that there is no basis, whatsoever, for the ordinary view that the world consists of permanent, enduring, objects. Where uncritical belief tells us we have such objects, scrutiny tells us the reverse is the case. The truth about these objects is that they are simply complexes of slow imperceptible changing events. Permanence, therefore, is explained by Russell exactly in the way it was explained ages ago by Heraclitus in ancient Greece and by Buddhism in ancient India over two thousand five hundred years ago. Every event persists only for a moment and is closely followed by another event of similar structure, so that, we mistake similarly for sameness. Events follow one another with such rapidity—that our perceptual apparatus fails to take cognisance of succession. The analogy commonly given by thinkers of this school of thought is of the running waters or the flame.

The question which follows closely such a description of the universe is : How are the continually successive states bound to constitute a single discernible complex of events ? What, in other words, is the unity which permeates the members of the series.

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The association by which they are linked up is one of contiguity alone. It is one of besidedness—an external bond between member of a particular series. Besides contiguity, they must be closely similar also to form a series. No intrinsic bond, however, is recognized by Russell at this stage. On the basis of this postulate all that we can legitimately posit is a universe comprised of seemingly permanent objects which on analysis turn out to be complexes of slow imperceptible mutations following closely one another. The entire postulate is summed up by Russell in the following words : "Given any event A, it happens very frequently that, at any neighbouring time, there is at some neighbouring place an event mery similar to A".

Turning to the second postulate we find it is the postulate of 'separable causal lines.' Having dismissed the concept of a permanent, enduring, substance. Russell through this postulate tries to bring the members of a particular series to a closer unity. The members of a series which distinguish themselves from members of another series (and this is a fact of every day occurrence) are knit together not by the simple relation of **antecedence and sequence** but by a more intimate bond and this he calls the bond of causality. This bond is different, he says, from that of mere sequence[11]. The whole thing comes to this that not until the members forming a series are bound by this intimate association can they be said to belong to a particular series. A casual intrusion can immediately be detected because it cannot find any place in the series for it is not linked up with any event in the series by the causal relationship.

The doctrine is amazingly reminiscent of the Buddhist doctrine of Pratītya Samutpada or dependent origination, which explains in like manner continuity both in the physical as also the mental realm. The language is the same, the purpose is also the same. Both conceptions have been introduced into the systems to account for the seemingly permanent character of things which commonsense attributes to the presence of underlying substantial permanence but which has been unequivocally denied by both systems.

Closely following this conception is another which is attached to it as its corollary. If such be the case, then, it is also true that on the basis of our knowledge of one or two members of a series so intimately knit by the bond of causality we can predict something in regard to the nature of the remote or distant antecedents in the series even though we may never be in a position to know them directly in life.

The conception is important in the case of perception. In the case of perception, all that we directly know is a mental event, the physical is only known as the remote antecedent. The physical for ever remains an inferred something in Russell's philosophy but it does not remain for ever an inaccessible 'X'. Russell distinguishes his position from Kantian Phenomenalism with the help of this postulate of separable causal lines.

[11] Ibid Page 509.

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A causal line is a separately discernible series, members of which are knit together by the causal connexion.

The postulate has been summed up by Russell as follows : "It is frequently possible to form a series of events such that, from one or two members of the series, something can be inferred as to all the other members..."

The third postulate enunciated is one of spatio-temporal continuity. According to this postulate action from a distance is not conceivable. It rests on the veracity of the previous conception of a separable causal line. When one perceives two members sufficiently resembling one another but not linked up with one another by the relation of contiguity then the mind immediately thinks that the two are interlinked with one another through an intermediate link or chain of contiguous events with the ends of which both the disparate members are directly associated. For example we see an event A on one occasion and then we perceive another event A 10 having very close resemblance with A—the difference between the two being almost imperceptible then we immediately are inclined to conclude that A is interlinked with A 10 through an intermediate series.

This postulate rests as we can now see on postulate No. 2 and is the basis of our belief that objects or event complexes subsist even though they are not perceived. Speaking of the postulate Russell says : "It asserts that "when there is a causal connexion between two events that are not contiguous, there must be intermediate links in the causal chain such that each is contiguous to the next, or (alternatively) such that there is a process which is continuous in the mathematical sense".

The next postulate of which Russell speaks is the structural postulate. It is a very important postulate in the sense that it is the ground for commonsense and scientific distinction between what is private and subjective and what is otherwise public and objective. It says, that when at a particular instant of time a number of events are found contemporaneous with one another each possessing the same structural pattern and removed from one another only by difference of position and perspective then it is very likely that all of them, if their ancestory is traced, have a common "Causal ancestor".[12] People going to observe a theatrical performance hear the same sounds and perceive the same display of colour series and the difference in their perceptions can be conveniently accounted for in terms of the difference of position and perspective. Such a parity in regard to contiguous perceptions—parity of structural pattern,—can only be explained by positing a common centre from which originate the lovely display of colours and the sweet symphony of sounds. The percepts of sound and colour are connected, each one of them with the originating centre through independent causal lines. The **fourth postulate** presupposes the veracity of the second one. Further-

[12] Ibid Page 483.

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more, Russell states, that the more the number of instances of structural parity in events and the more complex the structure, the greater is the probability which can be assigned to the almost instinctive inference we make regarding the existence of the said originating source. The postulate is expressed as follows : "When a number of structurally similar complex events are ranged about a centre in regions not widely separated, it is usually the case that all belong to causal lines having their origin in an event of the same structure at the centre".

The last postulate accepted by Russell, viz, the postulate of analogy is very important because it enables us to infer in regard to the existence of the mental experiences analogous to our own. We cannot directly preceive the physical realities corresponding to our percepts of tables and chairs, so also we can never have a direct access to the minds of other selves. They remain for ever inaccessible to us as ours remain to them.

What then is the basis of our belief that mental experiences analogous to our own exists? The postulate says, that, whenever in our experience we find a particular event A followed by another event B, and further if we have reason to believe that the two events are causally interlinked with one another, then, if A occurs and if we have no available means of observing that B also has occured it is most likely that B has occurred.

Applying this truth to the particular case in hand we find that in our individual experiences invariably certain physiological antecedents are followed by mental experiences of a particular kind e.g. stomach ache or body ache makes us mentally dull and unhappy. Again, we find that on receiving a very sad news or a very happy news we are in a specific mental state either of grief and despair or of joy, and our whole physical body is attuned to that mental state. Causal antecedents of a physiological order are invariably followed by corresponding mental sequences and vice versa. Taking the first order of sequence into account the physiological antecedents causing mental sequences, we may safely conclude on the perception of a like physiological antecedent elsewhere that a similar mental experience, the like of which we often experience in ourselves, has also occurred. It is true that this belief in the occurrence of an analogous mental experience remains for ever a belief which can never be conclusively established. The inference, therefore, remains basically the same in regard to its conclusion as the earlier ones which enabled us to infer in regard to the existence of physical realities. Belief in regard to the mental experiences of selves analogous to our own also is of the same type as the one which centres around the existence of animate and inanimate existences which do not possess experiences analogous to our own.

The postulate is summed up as follows : "Given two classes of events A and B, and given that whenever both A and B can be observed,

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there is reason to believe that A causes B, then if, in a given case, A is observed, but there is no way of observing whether B occurs or not, it is probable that B occurs; and similarly if B is observed, but the presence or absence of A cannot be observed".

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHY :

This brings to a close our account of various postulates accepted by Russell, on trans-empirical grounds, in a last effort to get out of the solipsism in which any consistent data philosophy would ultimately find itself involved. These principles despite being *apriori* in the sense that they are not the results of empirical generalizations, continue to be hypothetical in character. The world constructed with their help also retains, therefore, the same hypothetical character. Russell talks constantly in terms of probability in regard to the physical universe and at no stage in the analysis is this probability ever convertible into demonstrative certainty. The assurance we get from his analysis of the nature of the universe is true to the findings of science and is as far removed from the heart's desire as is the idealistic philosophy which it has sought to replace. In fact, if we do not take Russell for what he says but for what he wants to say, we shall find to our bewilderment that Russellian philosophy in so far as the broad conclusions are concerned is perfectly consistent with the phenomenalism of Kant, of course, with a certain amount of difference too. But phenomenalism as it takes its shape at the hands of Russell becomes in an important sense invincible for it is amply substantiated by the fast accumulating testimony from the findings of the empirical sciences especially physics. If what science says is true in regard to the nature of perception and the antecedents conditioning perception then we can never know the physical reality in its true essential character save whatever little of its 'structure' we can capture in terms of our own experience which comes to us in the form of a manifold and is knitted into a universe of quasi-permanent objects in terms of certain laws which have been called postulates. There is ample justification for some kind of an ineliminable agnosticism in regard to the extramental universe.

Apart from coincidence in phenomenalistic and agnostic conclusions between the two admittedly extreme positions of Russell and Kant we find a more deep seated resemblance in their conception of the nature of the world of percepts. Both in their own language argue that the world of percepts is woefully conditioned by the percipient activity of the human organism. I would not say of the human subject, because Russell does not believe in any permanent enduring principle which he could call the "Ego" nor does he admit any underlying permanence out there in the physical world which he could call the object. The old conception of perceptual act being a "relational occurrence" linking two things or entities is abandoned for good. The position is reminiscent of Buddhist Nairātmyavāda doctrine and its underlying conception of pratītya-Samutpāda. The account given of the self sustaining complex series of

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events on either side is literally the same in the two philosophies. Perception, memory, conation all are explained in an identical manner.

That was a slight digression but important in our opinion. To this we shall revert again. For the present taking up the conception of the world of percepts we find Russell pledging himself not to the kind of subjectivism we are familiar with in Berkely but with a kind of physical and physiological subjectivism and lands himself into a predicament analogous to the one in which Perry thinks idealism finds itself and from which it never seeks to get out. Russell however, still retains an instinctive belief in a world outside the world of percepts—a belief which is never convertible into an unquestionable assurance born of logical conviction.

Russell's philosophy accordingly is dualistic. The world of percepts and the world of physics both stand as disparate worlds linked up by the causal tie in the form of antecedent and consequent. He tried to save himself from an extreme form of agnosticism by admitting some kind of a structural parity between the two worlds. What actually he means by structural parity he has nowhere positively explained.[14] All that he has maintained is that by the term 'structure' we can signify something which is other than what we originally mean by that term when we use it in reference to a quality which comes within our experience. Actually the admitted structural parity is a face saving device. It is admitted on considerations which do not strictly follow from the premises admitted at the start.The sole reason why some kind of a parity has to be accepted is the evidence which our practical life itself presents. Had there been no basic parity between our world of percepts on the one side and the physical universe on the other we would not have met with any kind of success in life at all and we would have perished in an instant.

The last point, which we promised to take up before bringing this account to a close was the fact : whether this conception of a continual succession of contiguous events was ultimately satisfactory? Both the physical as also the mental reality is reduced in Russell to a bare succession of states bound together by contiguity and causality.

We are reminded in the present context of a very subtle distinction drawn by Green in his Prolegomena to Ethics between the two distinguishable facts of our life, viz (a) a succession of consciousnesses (b) consciousness of succession. It is true that if we introspect within ourselves all that we are capable of encountering within ourselves is a continual succession of psychical events. No permanent abiding soul substance enduring throughout the flow of states is perceivable. Yet the ineliminable fact which makes its appearance at this stage is : If we are simply a continual flow of successive states of consciousnesses, could we ever have known ourselves as such a changing complex of contiguous interlacing events ? The question, in other words, comes to this : What more is

[13] Ibid Page 492.

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needed to account for the phenomena of self-consciousness besides the fact of psychical events ?

The answer to this question brings us once again to the idealistic school and the profound analysis of what is implied in knowledge and experience—given to us for the first time in Western philosophy by Kant. The transcendental unity of apperception accounts not only for the synthetic character of knowledge regarding physical events, it also explains in the best possible way the fact of self-consciousness. Almost all the Indian schools of thought, save the Buddhist schools, uphold the view that some form of a 'unity' or 'self' has to be postulated over and above the empirical series of successive mental states. Schools differ in their interpretation of the fundamental character of this principle which alone makes possible the theoretical as also the practical life of man but there is a concurrence of opinion on the fact of its acceptance. They further agree in the belief that such a transcendental principle is not amenable to cognition or sense experience.

This point has nowhere been given the importance it deserves. Russell's philosophy is important for one thing, viz, it provides the readers with a scientific basis for the rejection of the naive realistic belief that the world of percepts is coincident with the world of physics; and prepares them to receive finally the truth of idealism which speaks in an uncompromising manner that the seeming world is not what it really is.

As an important transitional link between the uncritical realism of commonsense and the world of idealism Russell's philosophy will continue to hold a very important place in the history of philosophy more so because he has drawn copiously from the evidence collected from the findings of empirical sciences.

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THE CONCEPT OF GOD AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS

JOHN DE LUCCA

Most contemporary points of view with respect to the existence of God as a problem for philosophical reflection owe their generating principles to the critiques of Auguste Comte and Immanuel Kant. In the positivism of Comte the question of the nature and existence of God is immediately denied any legitimate philosophical status. Comte's scientism would not allow him even to ask the perennial question of the radical origination of Nature, namely the question which Leibniz had put as follows: Why is there any world at all rather than none?[1]. Positive knowledge seeks to learn **how** things happen, but it never asks the question **why** things happen. From this point of view we surrender the very right to speculations concerning the ultimate origin of all things.

It is to Kant, however, that one must turn for the most influential of all critiques of the concept of God. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant presents trenchant analyses of various arguments offered in proof of the existence of a Supreme Being and concludes to the impossibility of any proof based upon **speculative** reason. The first argument considered is the one which, since Kant, is known as the **ontological** argument for the existence of God. In our minds we associate this argument with the names of St. Anselm of Canterbury and René Descartes, but Kant does not attach responsibility for the argument to either man. Kant interprets this argument as proceeding from the concept of an absolutely necessary being to the existence of an actuality corresponding to it, in short, in moving from the concept of God to the assertion of the existence of God. In this form of argument, says Kant, we are maintaining that we could not have the idea of a Supreme Being unless this Being necessarily existed. We take it to be a contradiction to affirm that we possess the idea of God and, at the same time, to assert "There is no God". In criticism, Kant argues that "existence" does not itself belong to the set of predicates of a concept and, hence, it cannot be analytically derived from the concept. Kant alleges that the content of a concept is not enriched by the addition of "being", that the word "is" adds no new predicate to the subject. While it is contradictory to say that God is not omnipotent **if** one posits the concept of God, it is not contradictory to disallow the concept altogether. In Kant's view, contradiction is a characteristic of the relation of predicates to a subject. For instance, if one says "A triangle

[1] "On the Radical Origin of Things", November 23, 1697, in Gerhardt, *Leibniz. philos. Schrift.*, 7, pp. 302-308; also in Duncan, G. M., *The Philosophical Works of Leibniz.* New Haven, 1890, pp. 100-106.

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does not have three sides" this is a contradiction. But, if one removes the subject together with its predicates and says "There is no God" there is not the least contradiction in such a judgement. Consequently, if one thinks of an all-perfect, Supreme Being, the question still remains whether He exists or not.

The second proof discussed by Kant is the one denominated as the **cosmological** proof. Kant states this argument as follows : "If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being must also exist. Now I, at least, exist. Therefore, an absolutely necessary being exists".[2] The fatal weakness of this argument, according to Kant, is the fact that in its inference from the contingent to a cause for the contingent reason oversteps the boundary of the sense-world. We fallaciously attempt to apply the principle of causality, which is applicable only in the sensible world, outside that world, where it really has no meaning whatsoever.

Finally, Kant turns to what he considers the most popular and, in some respects at least, the most impressive of the proofs for the existence of God. He refers to this as the "**physico-theological** argument", although it is more commonly known as the teleological argument, or more simply still, the argument from design. This argument is one from analogy, which moves from the works of human art to the things in nature. Just as art works presuppose an intelligent designer, runs the argument, so too does Nature presuppose a Supreme Being. Kant objects that even if we are willing to admit an analogy of natural products with the works of human art, the most that such an analogous argument can yield is an inference to an intelligent author of the purposive **form** of the world, but not of the **substance** of the world. The most that this argument can prove, therefore, is an **architect** of the world and not a **creator** of the world. This argument is unable to prove that the purposive and harmonious adaptation of so much in nature is, in fact, contingent and that it could only have been produced by an intelligent being and could not have been produced by the natures of things according to general mechanical laws. Kant concludes by adding that, at best, this argument can prove only a very wise and wonderfully powerful, but not an omniscient and omnipotent, designer, and hence can say nothing definite about the actual cause of the world.

Kant's refutations have been widely accepted, even by those claiming no fondness for his general theory of knowledge. Yet Kant's rejection of the arguments he examines is consistent with, indeed dictated by, his fundamental views respecting the contents and limits of human knowledge. In terms of his basic principles respecting the sources and nature of knowledge, Kant is correct in denying validity to the arguments for the existence of God in the forms in which he examines them. No given fact answers to our notion of God. Since God is not apprehended through what Kant calls the pure from of sensibility, space and time, He is not

[2] Kant, I., *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by N.K. Smith, London, 1950, p. 508.

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an object of empirical knowledge. Hence, we can have no genuine concept of Him. Yet, in his Preface to the Second Edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says that he has had to deny knowledge in order to "save" the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality. After contending that speculative reason can provide no demonstration of the existence of God, Kant still insisted on keeping "God" as at least a unifying idea in the order of speculative reason and as a postulate in the moral order of practical reason. While God is not and cannot be an object of cognition, Kant feels that the idea of God may serve us well as a general principle of the unification of our cognitions or as a postulate required by the needs of practical reason, i.e., the sphere of morality.

More than five hundred years before Kant, St. Thomas Aquinas similary exam ned various conceptions of God and arguments put forth as proofs of God's existence and found them wanting. Among other things, Aquinas rejected as being completely untenable St. Anselm's formulation of the so-called ontological argument. Should not this situation give us pause and lead us to inquire into the causes for division on this issue between two devout believers ? Surely, St. Anselm believed in the existence of the Christian God just as fervently as did St. Thomas and, just as surely, Aquinas did not question the sincerity and depth of St. Anselm's belief in the existence of God. Yet, not even Kant or any of our contemporaries have a more pointed criticism of the ontological argument than did Aquinas. Nevertheless, Aquinas himself, after rejecting St. Anselm's argument, proceeds to offer arguments of his own intended to demonstrate the existence of God.What I am suggesting is that the concept of God accepted by a philosopher,the proofs for the existence of God which are rejected and those which are accepted,is a function of that philosopher's intentions and of his theory of knowledge.Kant could not accept any of the traditional arguments because they did not fit in with his epistemological doctrines. Aquinas rejected St. Anselm's argument because the two thinkers' starting points and methods are entirely different and opposed to one another. We can see clearly how a philosopher will offer a demonstration for the existence of God which is dictated by his theory of knowledge and will construct a conception of God which can be best accommodated by his metaphysics in the case of Descartes. It will be illuminating, therefore, briefly to examine Descartes' concept of God and then to look more closely at the issue between St. Anselm and Aquinas.

In his various works, Descartes offers at least three arguments for the existence of God,but they all are pivoted on the supposed innateness of the idea of God. The common base for the Cartesian arguments is a clear and distinct idea of an infinite, immutable, uncreated, independent substance, which idea is naturally innate within the mind. With respect to all finite, created things we make a distinction between their essences and their existences. Sometime we are wont to apply this distinction to

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the infinite, independent substance we call God and are inclined to say that God can be conceived as not actually existent. However, when we think more attentively of the idea of God we find that the nonexistence of God is truly unthinkable. Our innate idea of God is that of a supremely perfect being. Since, for Descartes, existence itself is a perfection, to think of a supremely perfect being to whom existence is wanting is to think of a perfect being to whom some perfection is wanting. But this is contradictory. Consequently, since we see that it is impossible to separate existence from our concept of God, God must exist.

Two points merit attention. First, it should be noted that the God of Descartes at this stage of his philosophy is an unmistakably Christian God. As an all-perfect being, this God would meet the minimal requirements of Descartes' Jesuit masters of his youth. But Descartes enlarges into universal innateness the Christian idea of God that had been implanted in his mind. Even if it is the case that all men have had an idea of a Supreme Being, they have not all had the Christian idea of God.

The second point, even more important, involves a fundamental premise of Descartes' theory of knowledge. Beginning from his methodological universal doubt, Descartes proceeded to the indubitableness of the proposition *Cogito ergo sum*. But having once established the unquestionable fact of his own existence, Descartes could not rest there. For, to be certain that I exist but to be in doubt about the existence of anything else is, to say the least, a lonely and meaningless existence. Further, in his deepest self Descartes did not at all doubt the existence of a world not of his own making. He had employed a methodological doubt in order to discover the criterion of truth. But, in so doing, he had boxed himself in. Now he had to find a way to escape from the distasteful solipsistic consequences of his procedure. The only way left to him was to claim that whatever ideas were clear and distinct in his mind must have as their causes actual, independent realities corresponding to these ideas. Hence, the most important of all the principles of Cartesian philosophy is to go **from ideas to things**, rather than from things to ideas. Existences are given to a Cartesian only through, and in, essences. That is why, since we cannot separate existence from the **idea** of God, God must exist. Of course, it is in this one instance only that essence guarantees existence.

Philosophically, the function of Descartes' God was to be a cause; the cause not only of the idea of God in the mind of Descartes, but the cause of the coming-into-being and the preservation of the entire world as Descartes conceived it. Etienne Gilson has put it very well in writing:

> Since the ultimate philosophical function of his God was to be a cause, the Cartesian God had to be possessed of any and every attribute which was required of the creator of a Cartesian world. Such a world being indefinitely extended in space, its creator had to be infinite;such a world being purely mechanical and devoid of final causes, what was true and good in it had to be such because God had created it by a free decree of his will, and not conversely: the mechanical

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world of Descartes rested upon the assumption of the conservation of the same quantity of motion in the universe; hence the God of Descrates had to be an immutable God and the laws established by his will could not be allowed to change, unless this world itself be first destroyed. In short, the essence of the Cartesian God wa largely determined by His philosophical function, which was to create and to preserve the mechanical world of science as Descartes himself conceived it.[3].

In the Cartesian conception of God, His creative function not only overshadows but actually swallows up the rest of the characteristics attributed to a Christian God. To conceive of God as no more than the supreme cause of Nature is, in effect, to collapse the radical distinction between God and Nature. In fact, Descartes does not restrain himself from making such an identification. In his Sixth meditation, Descartes writes: "...for by nature, considered in general, I now understand no other thing than either God Himself or else the order and disposition which God has established in created things;...[4] Thus we see that Descartes begins with a Christian conception of a perfect being, which enables him to avoid solipsism, but he ends with an idea of God which is non-Christian but which satisfies the requirements of the Cartesian physics.

What links the Cartesian version of the ontological argument for the existence of God with the earlier formulation by St. Anselm is the epistemolonical principle of going from the conceptual realm, that of our ideas, to the existential realm, that of independent things, and never *vice versa*.. For St. Anselm,as for Descartes, the proposition "God exists, is taken to be self-evident. A proposition is said to be self-evident if it is known to be true as soon as the terms are understood. According to St. Anselm, as soon as the meaning of the name **God** is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by the name **God** is meant that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists both actually (extra-mentally) and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. But, since as soon as the name **God** is understood a concept exists mentally, it also follows that what is meant by this name exists actually. For, if what is understood by the name **God** existed only mentally, it would not be that which is named by the name **God**. How could "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" be conceived not to exist in reality ? Hence, God must actually exist. Hence, too, the proposition **God exists** is self-evidently true.

On Aquinas' analysis, this argument has two fatal weaknesses. The first is to suppose that by the term **God** everyone necessarily intends to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought: Aquinas objects that the definition of the name **God** offered by St. Anselm is not, as a matter of fact, universally accepted, nor need it be so accepted. The

[3] E. Gilson, *God and Philosophy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941, pp. 87-88.
[4] R. Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy* in "The Philosophical Works of Descartes" edited by Haldane and Ross, Dover Publ. edition, p. 192.

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second weakness in St. Anselm's argument, according to Aquinas, is that granted that everyone understands that by the name **God** is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not follow from it that he understands that what the name signifies exists **actually**, but only that it exists mentally, i. e., that it has a noetic existence. In other words, from the fact that we may understand the definition of **God** given by St. Anselm, it follows only that "God" exists for our understanding, as an idea, not that He exists in reality (extramentally). Moreover,says Aquinas,it cannot be argued that that which is signified by the name **God** actually exists unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought. But Aquinas adds, it is precisely this that is not admitted by those who hold that there is no God.

What separates St. Thomas Aquinas from St. Anselm is not their difference **in belief** as to the truth of the proposition **God exists**, rather it is the means that each employs to justify his acceptance of the proposition. What they differ on depends upon a theory of knowledge; more specifically, what is at stake is the question of method. St. Anselm, as Descartes, wants to proceed from the level of conception to the level of actuality, from essence to existence. Hence, we have to look for the proof of God's existence in the notion or idea of God. St. Thomas, on the other hand, always wants to proceed from the world of material things to the conceptual realm, from existence to essence. Hence, on this latter view, we have to use evidence of the existence of God to form the notion, always inadequate, of God's essence.

As already noted, Aquinas denies that the proposition **God exists** is self-evident. If it were self-evident then it would be such because we could see what is God's nature and could see that He could not **not** exist. But this would require that the mode of understanding capable of seeing the self-evidency of the proposition to be that of God Himself. However, granted the mode of understanding of finite, created beings, the proposition **God exists** is not self-evident. Hence one must show the truth of the proposition **God exists** in a discursive manner through modes of argumentation which start with the things of our experience. Aquinas maintains that what is first in the intellect of man is *ens*, "that which is", i.e., the actual things constituting Nature. Since the human intellect is restricted to the natural things which exist, nothing in experience itself can give us St. Anselm's notion of God.

But cannot the existence of God be demonstrated ? St. Thomas proceeds by distinguishing two types of demonstration. One of these is to argue from what is prior relative to us to its antecedent, i.e., from effect to its cause.

When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated. so long as its

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> effects are better known to us; because, since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.[5]

Through this mode of demonstration, however, we can demonstrate the existence of the cause, but no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Thus, we can demonstrate **that** God exists, but not **what** He is. For the latter we must await that "intellectual vision" of God which constitutes beatitude.

Aquinas proceeds to develop five proofs for the existence of God in accordance with his own strictures. It is not the purpose of this paper to present a detailed critical examination of these arguments. Yet, a few remarks may be in order merely to illustrate Aquinas' application of the method which he advocates.

The first argument for the existence of God offered by Aquinas is the argument from motion. Aquinas begins **here** on the ground that "it is evident to the senses" that at least some natural things are in motion. The reality of motion is in the moved, that which is in motion. The mover is involved only incidentally. That which is moved (and 'motion' must be understood to encompass all forms of change) acquires some attribute or characteristic not yet possessed. The moved, however, must be potentially capable of acquiring this attribute or characteristic. The mover merely actualizes this potentiality in the moved, but it does not itself pass on or lose this attribute. This doctrine of motion, however, does not pretend to be an historical or genetic explanation of the **beginning** of motion in the universe. The unmoved prime mover is not the first element of a series. Rather, it is its generating principle, external to the series itself. To explain motion we need the fact of motion and a principle of intelligibility. The principle of explanation cannot itself be one of the facts, in this case, one of the motions. For the intelligibility of the series of facts as a whole we must locate an explanatory principle outside of the series. A simple parallel to this situation may clarify the point. Consider a numerical series. The rule of progression of this series which defines it and renders it understandable is certainly not an element of the series itself. Instead, it is that which generates the series. Aquinas' position with respect to the argument from motion is similar to that of the mathematician with respect to numerical series. The principle of initiation of the series of motions is not within the series, it is that which accounts for the **being** of the series itself.

The general point of departure for Aquinas' proofs for the existence of God is the order of nature itself. The first argument assumes that there is motion, i.e., that nature changes, and, moreover, that such change is intelligible. The second proof recognizes the multiplicability of things in nature and takes up the character of the intermediate principles or

[5] T. Aquinas, St., *Summa Theologiae*, I, Quest. 2, Art. 3, *Resp.*

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movers. The third proof recognizes that because natural things are multiple, each thing is contingent. Hence this proof takes up the relationship of the moved to the mover, i.e., the relationship between contingency and necessity. Since each thing is contingent, it will depend upon another for an explanation of its being. Thus the fourth proof is based upon an analysis of the variety of natures of things moved; that is to say, the gradation found in things is a statement of their capacities for realized, actualized, motions or changes. Clearly, all four arguments are intended to begin with obvious facts and to conclude to that which will make these facts intelligible, namely, the existence of God. The fifth proof, however, inverts this order, starting from the principle of intelligibility, God, and ending with a statement of fact. In this last proof Aquinas in effect is saying that the source of motion is the same as the principle of intelligibility, or, put otherwise, that the prime mover guarantees both the fact of motion and the intelligibility of the series of motions.One final point which remains to be noted is that in each of the five proofs there is a hidden premise. Aquinas assumes that an actually infinite series would be unintelligible.

In this paper I have not intended to attack or to defend any one of the arguments for the existence of God or its proponents. On the contrary, what I have tried to do has been to show some of the relationships between these diverse arguments and certain methodological principles presupposed by the arguments and forming their contexts. Too often criticisms of one or more of these arguments are presented without explicit or implicit recognition of their bases. But is it not idle for anyone to discuss any of these arguments apart from a consideration of their philosophical presuppositions and the uses to which they are put? Is it not a mark of philosophic immaturity for one to deride these arguments without making a genuine effort to understand their bases and without taking explicit cognizance of the starting points from which the comments are launched? To be sure, no one need grant the premises, and hence the conclusions, of any of said arguments, but surely to take any argument for the existence of God out of the whole framework of principles within which it has its setting and to which it is accommodated is a vicious form of intellectualism. Our common task in life is to try to understand. But neither things nor arguments are as simple as they may sometimes appear to be.

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SRI AUROBINDO AND ASCETICISM

MOHD. RAFIQUE

A generally prevalent notion in India and elsewhere is that Sri Aurobindo, the great mystic, poet and philosopher of modern India, was an ascetic. If not an ascetic, his philosophy, at any rate, teaches asceticism. But it is a mistaken view as it will be clear from a study of his life and works.

But before we proceed on to remove the above misunderstanding about Sri Aurobindo, let us see, who is, after all, an ascetic. An ascetic is one who practices extreme self-denial for spiritual realisation. For this purpose, he also observes severe austerities, keeps himself aloof from worldly affairs, avoids matrimony and is usually a recluse. Such ascetics have been found in every age and in every country. Generally Brahmins, Buddhists, Christians, Stoics, Egyptians and certain Sufis have been practicing asceticism in one form or in other.

In the above sense of the word, Sri Aurobindo cannot be regarded as an ascetic. The confusion regarding Sri Aurobindo's actual position is, perhaps, due to the word 'Yoga' which is the soul of his teaching. G. H. Langley also remarks that the Western minds are apt to take the meaning of 'Yoga' in the sense of asceticism, renunciation of the world and the observance of physical austerities.[1] And they will not be wrong in their belief; for, in the long history of Indian thought, there were times when 'Yoga' was interpreted to mean asceticism. But this is not the only conception of Yoga found in Indian philosophy. The definition of 'Yoga' as given in *Bhagvad-Gītā* is as old as Indian civilization itself. Here Shri Krishna explaining the true meaning of Yoga to Arjuna says 'Yoga is skill in actions (works)'.[2] This definition gives no chance of interpreting Yoga as life—shunning asceticism.

Similarly, the use of the word 'Yoga' by Shri Aurobindo is very peculiar to him. The very sentence, 'All life is Yoga'[3] gives a very wide connotation to Yoga. According to him, the real use of Yoga lies in reorganising and perfecting the human life in this world. Illucidating his concept of Yoga, Sri Aurobindo says:

> 'In the right view both of life and of Yoga all life is either consciously or subconsciously a Yoga. For we mean by this term a methodised effort towards self-perfection by the expression of the potentialities latent in the being and a union of the human individual with the universal and transcendent Existence we see partially expressed in man and in the cosmos'.[4]

In this way, according to Sri Aurobindo, one,Ineffable and Absolute

[1] G. H. Langley : Sri Aurobindo, p. 60.
[2] Bhagvad-Gītā, Chapter II, Shloka, 50.
[3] On Yoga, I (The Synthesis of Yoga) p. 7.
[4] On Yoga, I (The Synthesis of Yoga) p. 4.

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Brahman has involved itself in the inconscience of Matter in the form of Sachchidānanda.[5] The process of manifestation of this world begins with the evolution of this Sachchidānanda out of this involved state. As to the question, why One Inalienable Brahman subjects itself to the processes of involution and evolution, separate discussion is needed. Suffice it here to say that it is the delight of existence, the delight of struggle and strife, the joy of coming victorious out of the battle with its opposites that Brahman takes to self-manifestation. Thus, to Sri Aurobindo, the world is a real manifestation of the real Brahman. Hence, there exist no illusory or unreal world.

The whole of Nature is engaged in this work of manifesting explicitly the involved Sachchidānanda—her inherent potentialities—the evolution being her instrument. Thus we can say that Nature has got her own peculiar Yoga by which she is striving to realise perfection through being a true and exact manifestation of Sachchidānanda, the involved infinite Brahman. In the emergence of man on earth, she has got a self-conscious and thinking collaborator in her mission. Hence as Swami Vivekananda called 'Yoga' as a means of compressing one's evolution, it is an intensified and effective effort of the individual at the perfection of the body, mind and soul. Thus Yoga accelerates the evolutionary process as Haridas Chaudhury says:

> "...Yoga is a concentration of centuries of slow evolution into a few years of revolutionary march to capture the 'Kingdom of Heaven' "[6]

Thus the real object of Yoga is to unite man with God through the perfection of the human life. Unless every part of human being, viz., body, mind and soul, is transformed perfection cannot be completed. That is why Sri Aurobindo preaches Integral Yoga in which besides the perfection of the soul, the perfection of the body is given adequate place. In this way the Integral Yoga is a life-long process of perfecting human life in every detail. Sri Aurobindo's Yoga syntheses the three methods of Yoga[7] which were previously pursued in isolation with each other. Moreover, it is not the perfection or salvation of one or two individuals but of whole human race that is envisaged by his Integral Yoga. Thus we can rightly say that the sense in which Sri Aurobindo has used the world 'Yoga' does not imply asceticism. On the contrary, it aims at the fulfilment of the inner potentialities of body, mind and soul to that a human being may succeed in being a truly realised Sachchidānanda in miniature. For this purpose, his Yoga encourages all forms of co-operation of the individuals living in a society.

Sri Aurobindo regards the denial of the development of inherent possibilities of the body, mind and soul as an escape. This kind of escape

[5] The triune of Sat (Existence), Chit (Consciousness) and Ananda (Bliss).
[6] Sri Aurobindo: The Prophet of Life Divine, p, 42.
[7] These three methods of Yoga are: Yoga of Divine Knowledge (Jnāna Yoga), Yoga of Divine Works (Karma-Yoga) and Yoga of Divine Love (Bhaktl-Yoga).

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defeats the purpose of the creation. The purpose behind the creation has been the constantly increasing realisation of the potentialities of the Sachchidānanda hidden in this universe. The fulfilment of this purpose lies in the exact realisation of the Sachchidānanda in the human being. This is the greatest goal placed before us. This goal will be achieved by the Superman and the divine life will be established here on earth.

Sri Aurobindo's ideal of human life, is, in fact, an integral one in the sense that there is sufficient and legitimate scope for the perfection of both the worldly life and spiritual life. He criticises in this connection the blunder of both the East and the West. The East in quest of the spirit neglected worldly life and material progress altogether. In the same way the West devoted its whole attention to the betterment of worldly life at the cost of spiritual aspiration of man. They have generally tended to regard Matter and Spirit as two irreconcilable opposites. However Sri Aurobindo holds that they are not two contradictories but the two ends of one and the same chain interlinked by such terms as Life, Mind and Supermind and that the perfection of the spirit on the one hand, and the perfection of the life in world on the other, are the two phases of the intended manifestation of the Sachchidānanda in this world. Thus he says :

"....they (Spirit and Life) are not incompatible with each other, rather their divergence has to be healed and both have to be included and reconciled in our view of the future."[8]

The very definition of life by Sri Aurobindo proves that there can be no contradiction between life and spirit. Thus he writes:

"Life is surely nothing but the creation and active self-expression of man's spirit, powers, capacities, his will to be and think and create and love and do and achieve."[9]

Thus we see that Sri Aurobindo always stood for vigorous and all-round development of life. Sri Aurobindo's definition of Yoga not only excludes asceticism but also regards it (asceticism) as 'an offence to the reason, almost a crime.'

As a matter of fact the tendency to renounce worldly life is born in the wrong attitude that this world is illusory or unreal. The natural consequence of such an attitude is the search for liberation from the bondage of the physical world and to seek bliss in some one state of self-extinction such as Nirvāṇa or Moksha. Most of the spiritual seekers have cherished this attitude. Sri Aurobindo questions this attitude and presents his ideal in the following words :

'One man or another may get indeed this featureless Moksha, but what is the gain ? The Brahman, the self, God are always there. What God wants in man is to embody Himself here in the individual and in the community, to realise God in life'.[10]

[8] Messages of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother (II Series) p. 21.
[9] The Foundations of Indian Culture, p. 210.
[10] 'Bulletin of Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education' (Pondicherry), Vol. XIV, No. 3, (Article : A letter of Sri Aurobindo, p. 4.)

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Similarly Sir Mohammad Iqbal explaining the philosophical basis of his great work 'Asrār-i-Khudī' says :

'The moral and religious ideal of man is not self negation but self-affirmation and he attains to this ideal by becoming more and more individual, more and more unique. The Prophet said, 'Takhallaqu bi-akhlaq-Allah', 'Create in yourselves the attributes of God'...He who comes nearest to God is the completest person. Not that he is finally absorbed in God. On the contrary, he absorbs God into himself.'[11]

Thus, according to Sri Aurobindo, a spirituality which preaches self-extinction or escape from this world as the goal of life is not a true spirituality. A true spirituality embraces practical and vigorous life in full. He says that as the mountain peaks cannot stand on clouds, so also spirituality cannot flourish in a void of life. Life is the base on which the spirituality survives.

The fact, that spirituality has been the dominating factor in India's culture, has been interpreted by some adverse critics of India such as Mr. Archer, to mean that India has never been civilized and that she has been the home of asceticism. In reply to such false charges, Sri Aurobindo says that though India has been largely spiritually disposed, her spirituality did not mean 'a remote metaphysical mind or the tendency to dream rather than to act'.[12] Metaphysics combined with the vigour of life and action was the real soul of the Indian spirituality. However, here Sri Aurobindo also admits that there were no doubt, some periods of decadence in India as they are, as a rule, faced by every culture after each period of prosperous flourishing. During such periods of decadence, certain misconception about spirituality took hold of people's mind. Consequently they resorted to ascetic life. It is on this point, that Sri Aurobindo explains his own conception of a true spirituality. He says:

'Spirit without mind, spirit without body is not the type of man; therefore, a human spirituality must not belittle the mind, life, or body or hold them of small account'.[13]

It is interesting here to note that although both the materialist and a true spiritual seeker regard life, mind and body as indispensable, the difference between the two is very vital. The spiritual seeker regards them merely as means to a yet higher end, but a materialist treats them as ends in themselves.

Sri Aurobindo preached the gospel of the Divine Life on earth. The perfection of the lower being of man, i.e., body constituted the essential part of this life. He had also fully realised the need of a corporate life in a society. As we learn from his writing, ever since 1910 he was thinking in terms of establishing a spiritual commune in one form or other.[14] The

[11] Introduction to 'The Secrets of the Self' being the translation of Asrār-i-Khudī by R.A. Nicholson, pp. XVIII—XIX.
[12] Sri Aurobindo : The Renaissance in India, p. 42,
[13] Ibid , p. 64.
[14] Sri Aurobindo Circle Number 8th (Bombay) A.B. Purani's article 'Sri Aurobindo and His Yoga' p. 151.

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Ashram at Pondicherry which Sri Aurobindo has left behind is the fruit of his efforts. This Ashram is striving towards the realisation of such a divine life. Together with spiritual Sādhanā, the proper development and education of physical body forms the very important part of the Āshram-life. Besides this, the Āshramites are carrying on all the activities of a modern industrial world. Explaining the life in his Āshram, Sri Aurobindo writes :

> 'A total perfection is the ultimate aim which we set before us, for our ideal is the Divine Life which we wish to create here, the life of the Spirit fulfilled on earth, life accomplishing its own spiritual transformation even here on earth in the conditions of the material universe. That cannot be unless the body too undergoes a transformation.....'[15]

Thus we see that to interpret the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo as implying asceticism is wholly erroneous. As to the misconception that Sri Aurobindo was an ascetic, the following statement of his own will, I hope, suffice to remove it. He says :

> But I had thought that a Yoga which required me to give up the world was not for me. I had to liberate my country. I took to it seriously when I learnt that the same Tapasyā which one does to get away from the world can be turned to action...' June 22, 1926[16]

In this way we see that Sri Aurobindo's greatness lies greatly in his refutation of the renunciation of life which had taken root for some time in India due to the wrong conception of spirituality. In fact, the ascetic attitude has largely been responsible for regarding India's scientific and industrial progress. Sri Aurobindo's attempt at refutation of asceticism is the most forceful in the whole history of modern India. The posterity will always be honouring Sri Aurobindo for this great service to humanity.

In the end I confess the inadequacy of this article. Many points which required elaboration have, as such, been neglected.

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[15] Sri Aurobindo and the Mother on Education, p. 43.
[16] Quoted from A.B. Purani's book "The Life of Sri Aurobindo" p. 120.

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REVIEWS

Beatrice K. Rome : *The Philosophy of Malebranche* pp. 438, Price $ 12.50, Published by Henry Regnery., Co., 14E Jackson Blvd, Chicago 4, Ill. U.S.A. (1963).

It is a study of Malebranche's integration of faith,reason, and experimental observation. The writer of the book is a lady who has been a pioneer in experimental investigation of large social organization and is deeply interested in philosophy. She has studied the philosophy of Malebranche particularly in its aspects of the conciliation of science, as it was in the 17th century, reason and faith. Malebranche made a unique contribution to scientific method by combining together a pure Cartesian apriorism with the Laboratory procedure of Bacon. The book consists of Seven Chapters on (i) Scientific Method (ii) Vision in God (iii) God as Being (iv) Occasionalism (v) The Self (vi) Sense, Faith and the External World (vii) Faith.

The presentation of the author of the use of Malebranche is reliable and interesting. Towards the end a detailed bibliography is appended and extensive notes on all chapters are added. Language and style of the writer are excellent. The book throws light on the problems of Self, God and Scientific Knowledge which still remain unsolved. Every philosophy student is bound to be benefitted by its study.

Ananda Coomaraswamy : *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism*, pp. 370, Price $ 10.00 Published by the University Books, Inc., 1601, Jericho Turnpike, New Hyde Park, New York, N.Y. (U.S.A.)

Dr. Coomaraswamy is well known as an Interpreter of Indian Culture and Religion to the West. One of his first books was this and it was published in 1916 and reprinted in 1927 in England. The present edition has been published in U.S.A.

The author Dr. Coomaraswamy was born in Ceylon of a Hindu father and English mother. He was educated in sciences at the University of London and returned to Ceylon as Head of the Minerological Survey. Soon he bacame interested in the ancient, religious and philosophical heritage of India and desired to preserve it and place it before the world. He was really a great bridge over the gulf between the East and the West. Although a great Hindu and admirer of Hindu Religion and Philosophy, his first book was on Buddha and the Gospel of Hinduism. He regarded Buddhism as a fruit of Hinduism and not in any way a deviation from its origin in Hinduism. On his death at the age of 70 in Boston, where he lived for most of the later years of his life. Aldous Huxley spoke of him as "a mediator between East and West."

In this book he has tried to set forth in a simple and intelligible language the life and teachings of the Great Buddha. In its treatment he has tried to relate Buddhism to Brahmanism systems and he has also compared it with Christian Mysticism of later times. He deals with both the earlier Buddhism and the Mahayana Buddhism as well as with Sankhya, Vedanta and Yoga systems of Hindu Thought which were prevalent at the time of Buddha. In the last chapter of this book he treats of Buddhist Art in the form of literature, scripture and painting. The work has already established the reputation as a classical work on Buddhism. The publishers have done a great service to the cause of evolving world culture by bringing out a new edition of the work in America. They deserve our congratulations.

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S. C. Chatterjee : *Classical Indian Philosophies, Their Synthesis in the Philosophy of Shri Rama Krishna* pp. 152, Price Rs. 5.50. Published by the University of Calcutta Press, Calcutta (1963).

The author is a well known writer, having to his credit several books on General Philosophy, Philosophy, Indian Philosophy & Religion. He was King George V Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Calcutta and a Visiting Professor at the University of Hawaii.

In this book the author has very clearly and intelligibly described the general and essential features of the well-known systems of Indian Philosophy, viz., Charavaka, Bauddha. Jaina, Nyya-Vasisheshika, Sankhya-Yoga, Mimamsa and Vedanta with a view to synthesize them into a comprehensive system of philosophy in which each fiinds a unique and proper place. In this attempt he has been inspired by the philosophical ideas of Swami Ramakrishna Paramhansa expressed in his sayings, parables and stories. He believes and perhaps rightly that the reality is many-faced and so truth is manifold; but each system of philosophy represents reality from some particular point of view or level of experience and so embodies some aspect of truth: that all of them can be synthesised and reconciled as complementary parts of one comprehensive system of philosophy.

We agree with the author that it is possible to synthesise and reconcile all the systems of Indian Philosophy, nay all the systems of the world. It was not only Rmakrishna Paramhansa in the present age who showed us the way but the Jaina thinkers in very ancient times paved the way by expounding the doctrine of Anekantavada and Syadavada. Still the author deserves congratulations on his attempt which is very valuable in an age of the evolution of a common world culture.

Hari Mohan Jha : *Bharatiya Darshana Parichaya.* Parts I & II pp. 240 & 218, Price Rs. 7.50 each. Published by Pustak Bhandar, Patna-4.

Prof. Hari Mohan Jha is a well-known Professor of Philosophy at the Patna university. This edition of *Bharatiya Darshana Parichaya* by Prof. Jha is a reprint of an older first edition which was published in 1940. It deals with Nyaya and Vaisheshika philosophies. In these two books the author has given a promise of dealing with the elements of Indian Philosophy in a very simple and lucid form in a series of books, others of which are promised to follow. The author has tried to be very clear and systematic and has based his treatment on the original Nyaya and Vaisheshika Sūtras. If all the systems of Indian Philosophy are treated in this way the readers will understand them better than they do them from books writen in English. Every student of Indian Philosophy who can read Hindi should go through them before reading other books. We earnestly hope that similar books on other systems will be completed and published soon.

Y. Masih : *Freudianism and Religion.* pp. 356 Price Rs. 17.50. Published by Thacker Spink & Co., Pvt. Ltd. 3 Esplanade East, Calcutta-1 (1964).

The author Dr. Y. Masih is a Professor of Philosophy at the Magadh University, Gaya in Bihar. He is a well-known teacher and writer and has to his credit many good books in Hindi and English. This is perhaps the latest and the best production of his mind. He is a great student and admirer of Sigmuud Freud and his Psychoanalysis, yet he is not

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a blind follower of Freud like those who consider Freud's writings as the last word on the psychology of human nature. He knows how to differ and where to differ. In this book he has tried to examine Freud's views on Religion and to point out their shortcomings and inconsistencies. It is a very thoughtful work and deserves to be read by all the students of Religion, Philosophy and Psychology. We congratulate Dr. Masih on his production of such an excellent work.

The Questions of King Milinda, (Translated from the Pali by T.W. Rhys Davids) in two parts. pp. 320 and 388, Price $ 2.25 each. Published by Dover Publications. Inc., New York.

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Saddharma Puṇḍarīka or *The Lotus of the True Law*. (Translated by H. Kern,) pp. 454 Price $ 2.45 in Paper Back edition. Published by Dover Publications, Inc., New York.

Saddharma Puṇḍarīka is a great Sanskrit work of Mahayana Buddhism which must have been composed as early as the beginning of the Christian era. It is held in high esteem in China and Japan and represents the Northern School of Buddhism and its later developments. It deals with most of the doctrines of the Mahayana Buddhism. Dr. Kern has done a great service to Buddhism and Indian Culture by translating it into English from the original Sanskrit work of such a great importance. It was published as Volume 21 of the Sacred Books of the East Series and for sometime it was out of print. Dover Publications have rendered also a great service to the readers of Buddhism by publishing the work which was out of print in the paper back edition. It is a very nice edition and we recommend it to every lover of Indian culture.

The I Ching (Translated by James Legge), pp. 448 Price $ 2.45 published by Dover Publications, Inc., New York, (U.S.A.)

The *I Ching* is a very famous text in Chinese which was prepared before 1000 B. C. In English it is called the *Book of Changes*. It was greatly respected by Confucius and edited by him. It is a text respected and used by Confucianists as well as Taoists. It represents a synchronistic concept of the universe. It is avery important work with reference to History of Religions and History of Philosophy. It was long ago tanslated by James Legge a great Sinologist of his times and was published as Vol. XVI of the Sacred Books of the East Series. The Dover Publications have done a great service to Sinology by republishing this great work in Paper back edition. They deserve the gratitude of all lovers of Eastern Culture.

Archie J. Bahm : *Philosophy*: *An Introduction*.pp. 441 Price Rs. 8.00. Published by Asia Publishing House, Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta (1964).

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The author of this book Dr. Archie J. Bham, is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico. The book which deals with major problems of philosophy and their main types of solutions was formerly published in U.S.A. and now has been republished in India. It has already become a text book of Philosophy in several Indian Universities. It deals in a simple and clear introductory manner with some important problems of metaphysics which are classified by the writer under those of Knowledge, Reality and Values, technically called as Epistemological, Ontological and Axiological problems. With reference to 1st type of problems, viz. those of knowledge he refers of the views of Commonsense, John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume, Immanuael Kant, Hegel, Auguste comte, Bertrand Russell, R.W. Sellars, Henry Bergson and William James.

With reference to the Second type of problems, viz., those conected with reality he describes the views of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Democritus, Plotinus, Lloyd Morgan, Boodin, Whitehead and his own, which he calls "Organicism". Under the section of values he deals with Goodness, Beauty, Righteousness, Religion, and with philosophies of Society, Politics, Economics and Education.

The book is more comprehensive than the generally available text books on philosophy and is written in a very simple and interesting manner. We recommend to all those who are interested in general problems of philosophy and to the students who begin to study courses in philosophy.

G. Yacorzynski : *Frontiers of Psychology*, pp. 229, Price $ 5.00 Published by Philosophical Library, Inc. 15 East 40th Street, New York (196).

The author is a Professor and Chairman of the Department of Psychology in the Medical School of the Northwestern University. The present work is not a mere text book of Psychology dealing with the traditional problems in a traditional manner. Its approach is quite new and original one. The author lays great emphasis on the reality and inner feelings of self and its values, and creativity which are generally neglected in the Behaviouristic type of scientific psychology. This work will be helpful to both the students of philosophy and psychology in understanding the working of human personality both in health and disease. It deserves to be read by all students of human nature. We congratulate the author on such a fine production.

Quis Separabit : *A Gesture of Co-operation with Krishnaji's work "The Riverness"* and *Supplement to "The Riverness"* pp. 312 both volumes Price Rs. 3.00 each. Published by R.R. Rayrikar, 361 Shukrawar Peth, Poona.

Krishnamurty is one of the greatest saints and teachers of the world today. What he teaches is not philosophical doctrines, moral principles or religious dogmas. He teaches man to be himself to be simple, to be direct, to understand himself and to live in the present without any worry about the past and the future. He does not attach any importance to any values to be realized in distant future or in a life beyond. Although he has not been able to put his own philosophy of life in a systematic, consistent and clearcut manner, he has always something to say which for the time being enchants and charms the listener. The present two volumes are based on his teachings and are composed in the imitation of his style. They are pleasant to read and meditate on. The author who has not given his name deserves congratulations for very successful imitation

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of Krishnamurty's thoughts and expressions in a simple and clear manner.

Prem Nath : *Towards Universal Humanism*, pp. 32 Price Rs. 2.00 Published by S. Nagin & Co., Publishers, Jullundhur City, (1964.)

This booklet embodies 4 articles of the author previously published at different places and times. viz., (1) Some Basic considerations towards Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, (ii) Role of Philosophy in East West Understanding (iii) Humanism as a Philosophy and a Movement (iv) Philosophy and Social Change.

The author has made a plea for a universal fellowship of mankind and obliteration of differences between East and West with the help of philosophical approach. In this age when a world culture with no distinction of Eastern and Western Elements is being evolved.The book makes an interesting reading. The author is Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Punjab, Chandigarh.

Christopher B. Hills : *The Power of the doctrine*, pp. 53. Price 18 Shillings. Published by the author himself at 10, Harcourt Street, Jamaica, West Indies.

The author is a dynamic personality who is working for a deeper understanding of human nature without which the humanity will not achieve a peaceful and co-operative existence which is the greatest need of today. It sems the challenge of modern scientific and technological advancement of today is *love or perish.* Love is impossible unless man realizes an underlying unity in all beings. All ancient sages and Modern Researches in Parapsychology have pointed out to a deeper, finer, more extensive and powerful self underlying all separate and surface personalities. Mr. Hills take his stand upon that deeper self and from that point of view he appeals to the mankind to unite and to love each other. The book is inspiring and should be read by all those who think of the future of humanity.

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Ernest Wood: *Vedanta Dictionary*, pp.225, Price $ 6.00. Published by Philosophical Library, Inc. 15East 40th Street, New York 16, N. Y. (U. S. A.)

The author is well known student and writer on Indian Wisdom and he has to his credit a large number of books on Yoga, Vedanta and Zen Buddhism. In this book the author has tried to present the concepts of Vedanta in alphabetical order. Although the range of the book is not very wide, considering the vastness of the Vedantic Ideology, it is a good help to the beginners and western students of Vedanta. The author deserves our congratulations in bringing out such a systematic book as this.

Troy Wilson Organ : *The Self in Indian Philosophy*, pp. 184, Price 22 Dutch Guiders, Published by Mouton & Co., Publishers, Hague. London and Paris (1964)

The author has attempted a study of the concept of Self in various systems of Indian Philosophy particularly as it is conceived in the Rig-veda, the Upanishads, Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya-Vaisheshika, Advaita Vedanta, Vishishtadvaita Vedanata and Shri Aurobindo. The work evinces a thorough knowledge of the Hindu Systems of Indian Philosophy and is a good introduction to the idea of Self conceived in India for a western reader.

The author deserves congratulations on a very clear exposition on a difficult subject which is very much required to be studied in the West. The Western Philosophy has devoted more attention to the study of Not-Self (objective world) than to that of the Self. We hope that the present study will evoke some interest in a problem to which India in all ages has devoted more time than to anything else.

Charles S.Seely: *The Philosophy of Science*—Essays in Contemporary Realism, pp. 140, Price $ 3.75. published by Philosophical Library Inc., 15 East 40th Street New York, U.S.A. (1964)

The author in this book tries to expound materialistic philosophy of life which he calls realism. He treats the subject matter under several heads such as Ancient Materialism, Materialism under counter-attack, Renaissance Materialism, Marxism, Mechanical Materialism and Modern Materialism and towards the close of the book the author discusses the objectives of materialism. The author takes materialism in its very wide sense and thinks, "Materialism is now advancing in all areas of thought, and this situation may be expected to continue until science has been fully accepted as the cheif guide of the human race" (p. 116).

The author is a very widely travelled and experienced man. He says in his notes, "the conclusions, set forth in this book are based mainly what I saw".

Materialism according to the author is a theory that mater existed before mind and is opposed to Idealism which believes that mind existed before matter.

The book according to the author, "is designed to provide a means by which a clear comprehensive understanding of Materialism can be easily obtained. It explains, in simple terms, all of the principle features of materialism. It shows how Materialsim aided humanity in the long hard struggle against ignorance, superstition, and mysticism in the past, and what it can do in the future to aid in this struggle. It shows why and how materialism was opposed in the past aud why it is now opposed." Materialism according to the author "holds that the world, and everything in the world operates by natural law; that this law is explained only by science; that appeals for supernatural intervention to change natural law

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have no effect whatsoever on this law." He tries to "help man free himself from all anti scientific beliefs. "According to him the objectives of materialism are Peace, Security, Health, Education, Justice,Opportunity, Democracy and Freedom.

The author shares the common belief prevalent in the West today that science is the only way to know everything in the universe but he forgets that science as it is today knows very little of Man and the Universe. That is why even in the predominantly scientific age speculative philosophy and religious faith thrive.There is much more in the man and the universe than what science has been able to reveal, and unless science changes its present day methods it will not be able to know man and the universe completely. The Materialist who decries the superiority of mind over matter should know that mater is a concept of mind and as such a creation of it.

To say that matter is the primary reality is absurd when its very existence is revealed and conceived by mind. How can the universe which has given birth to mind be the material in its texture.The author confuses realism with materialism and scientific positivism and Naturalism with materialsim of which he seems to be very found. The objectives which he regards as those of materialism are really idealistic in their origin.How can, for instance freedom be an objective of materialism. In a materialistic univese governed by natural laws there cannot be any freedom for the individual.

However the book makes an interesting reading and should be read even by the idealistic thinkers to be aware of the present day trends in western thinking.

A. K. Bierman : *Logic* : *A Dialogue* pp.426 Price $ 7.50, Published by Holden-Day Inc. 728, Montgomery Street, Sanfrancisco (1964).

The author is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at San Francisco State College. He has been a teacher at the University of Arizona and the University of Hawaii. He is a member of the American Philosophy Association and has written a number of articles for Philosophy Journals.

In this book he chalks a new line of writing in a popular way on difficult and technical topics of philosophy. He has introduced Logic, to beginner in the form of a dialogue which makes it very interesting. From very simple concepts of logic it proceeds gradually to the concepts and symbols of advanced formal logic. In this very book he discusses Philosophy of Language and Meaning and thus introduces the Language Philosophy which is so current in the West today. The book is recommended to all teachers and intelligent students of Logic and Semantics.

Jwala Prasad Singhal : *The Sphink Speaks* pp. 165 Rs.4.50,Shillings 5, or $ 1.00 Published by Sadgyan Sadan, 7—A, Pindara Road, New Delhi—11.

The author is a retired Principal and teacher of Philosophy and a Scholar by habit.He has written several books on several subjects mainly—Religious and Philosophical. This book is a great adventure in the prehistoric past. He disbelieves the current belief among scholars that the Indo Aryans lived together somewhere in Central Asia and the former separated and came to India is a myth according to Dr.Singhal. Dr.Singhal supports the traditional belief current in India that the Vedas are very very ancient scriptures dating back millions of years. He has supported this belief on Archeological and Geological grounds. He takes us very far back to the hoary past and tries to show the state of affairs in the world even before the great flood described in all the scriptures of the world

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occurred on the earth. According to him the internal evidence of the Rigveda proves the existence of seas in the Gangetic and Rajputana areas. The Rigveda and the Ramayana according to him show that the Aryans originally lived on Hindu Kush slopes and the Mongoloids in Burma or Brahma Loka. The Sematics arose in Armenia as daityas, and negroids Leymuria or Africa. According to the author the Rigveda describes the Tethys sea. The great flood according to the Rigveda and Puranas occurred at the time when the Tethys sea was in existence. This the author supports by geological and geographical accounts. The author deseribes in detail, on the basis of evidence in the Rigveda and the Puranas and also in the literature of Zorostrians,how the Aryans spread westwards from the Hindu Kush range on account of the great flood and how they branched into Persians and others. Who went westward and also long after the flood was over and the sea was filled in how they spread Eastward and southward in India. He describes also in details how they were related with other races at that time. The book is very interesting and scholarly and opens our eyes to the falsity of the myth that has been created and propagated by the Western scholars of the 19th and the early 20th century that the Rigveda is only a few thousand years old and that the Aryans were invaders of the Indo-Gangetic plane from Central Asia. It supports the ancient Indian tradition of the hoary antiquity of the Vedas and of North West India being the original home of the Aryans.It deserves to be read by all the lovers of historical truths and by the Hindus whose pride was shaken off by the Western Scholars and their followers in India.We may add here that there is no evidence whatsoever in Indian Literature down from the Vedas in support of the myth mentioned above.

Shanmuga Velan : *Siddhar's Science of Longevity and Kalpa Medicine of India* pp. 216, Price Rs. 15.00, Sakthi Nilayam, 8 Umayal Street, Alagappa Nagar, Madras 10. (1963)

The author in this book has described very ancient system of Yoga practiced by Ancient Tamil Yogis of Southern India. He has also described in details the particular method of prolonging human life of earth which the ancients practiced. One of the methods well-known all over India for perpetuating youth and prolonging life is what is called *Kāyā Kalpa.* This method is described in details by the author in this book. Keeping in line with the Indian tradition. The author maintains that a yogi can live healthy and long without even liquid or solid food. He has given a picture of a yogi of Mummidivaram who has been living for the last 18 years without taking any food.The whole book is very interesting and should be read by all those who aim at physical immortality, about which some western authors have begun to talk and write.

The Best of Gracian (Translator : **Thomas G. Coryan**) pp. 84, Price $ 3.00, published by the Philosophical Library, Inc., 15 East 40th Street, New York 16, N. Y. (U.S.A.) (1964).

Balthasar Gracian was a Spanish thinker and writer who lived about 330 years ago. He was a teacher and towards the end of his career became the rector of the College in which he taught. He died in 1658. He wrote dramas, poems, allegories and essays and aphorisms, the last being the most popular. The world knew very little about him until the great German philosopher Schopenhauer brought him to light by translating and publishing his works in 1832.. The present collection is a selection from Gracian's work translated into English by Thomas Coryan who is a distinguished Attorney in New York. It has three sections : First about Fate, the Second about Ourselves and the third about others.The thought

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of Gracian are worth reading by all those who want to understand life. It throws some light on some important problems of life.

Christopher B. Hills : *The Power of Inner Peace*, pp. 52 Price Shillings 18. C.B. Hills 101 Harbour Street, Kingston, Jamaica, W.I.

Christopher B. Hills has recently come into prominence as a great enthusiastic worker in the field of more and more knowledge of man. He is not only a student of deeper knowledge of man but also a great worker in the cause of greater and deeper knowledge of man. He has travelled in many countries in the world and made acquaintance with most of the persons of the world who are working in the same line. He believes in the solidarity of man and one world government. He has started an Institute of Research into the Creative Faculties of Man. In this small book he expresses some of his ideas about violence and love and pleads for the latter. The book is worth reading.

Brun, Jean, *La Main et L' Esprit* pp. 174. Presses Universitaires de France, 108 Bovlevard Saint German Paris,France (1963)

This is a most curious work. It is the contention of the author that the hand is, as much as the brain or the eye or whatever organ you prefer, the instrument of knowledge and existence. The hand, he reminds us, is that by which man assures himself of the existence of the external world; it is that through which he communicates feeling and emotion; it is the sign-instrument for many of his ideas. The history of Western Philosophy from Plato to Heidegger is canvassed for passages supportive of this thesis. The use of the hands in the classical dance of India is introduced in evidence. Nor does the author confine himself to the epistemological or sociological significance of this organ. The anatomy of the hand is examined at length and in much biological detail; its relation to similar organs in other species is indicated, and the ontological and soteriological implications of this plamistic philosophy are explored in extenso.

Is the author serious ? Indubitably. His professorial rank as well as the reputation of his publishers testifies to the sincerity of his thesis. Withal, the book is a puzzle. And I think that it will likely remain such for those who, like this reviewer, have been (mistakenly ?) trained to regard the brain rather than the hand as the philosophical instrument par excellence

Robert Whittemore

Caraco, Albert, *Essais sur Le Mal.* Neuchatel : Editions De La Baconniére, 34 Rue Jean Giraudoux Pairs-16, (1963).

What is évil ? The question does not lack for answers. The history of wisdom is largely devoted to the matter and its resolution. One takes his choice of theories and wonders what remains to say about a subject which has for four millenia and more preoccupied the minds of the best and worst of men.

Enough it seems, since each of M. Caraco's essays is a booklet in itself. He thinks the source of every evil is incoherence and he does not lack for evidence of such in the contemporary condition of man alone and—or in society. He has small respect for the shibboleths of libertarian existentialism,nor is he reassured by the easy rationalism of those who would have us believe that incoherence is a mirage which vanishes on our acceptance of ecclesiastical authority and dogma. Like Jung he is fascinated by the problem of Job, which, like Sartre, he tends to envisage as the Jewish problem per se. Unfortunately,the beauty of his style cannot quite hide the fact that his treatment of this and other problems ancillary to

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the question of evil is not comparable in depth or insight to that offered by these masters of the psychology of the sublime.

Hence his ultimate answer to the initial question, which, like the ending of a mystery story, should be left for the reader to discover for himself, is not such as anyone familiar with the literature of evil will find especially novel. There are, he maintains, nine new principles to which he who would cleanse his spirit must subscribe. For the most part they are the mixture as before, but this is not to say that as such their present reexpression is not of value. On the contrary, it is in the author's felicitous manner of their reexpression that the chief worth of this work lies.

Robert Whittemore

Shibata, Masumi, *Le Sermon de Tetsugen sur le Zen* Translated with Introduction and notes by Masumi Shibata. pp. 87. Tokyo : Risosha Ltd., (1960).

Of the three Zen Masters responsible for the transmission of esoteric Buddhism from China to Japan, Tetsugen (1630-1683) Founder of the Obeku School of (Japanese)Zen, is the least known in the West. The reason is simple enough. Unlike his famed predecessor Dôgen, founder of the Sôtô (Chinese, Ts'ao tong) School, and his celebrated successor Hakuin, founder of Rinzaï (Lin-tsi), Tetsugen published very little. The sermon here translated, some letters, and a few poems are the only witnesses to his teaching.In his own times he was chiefly known as the editor of the first Japanese edition of the *Tripiṭaka*. He himself conceived his task as that of a missionary.Much of his life was spent in wandering over the face of Japan preaching and ministering to the needs of the poor. In the course of these wanderings this sermon was delivered.

Those students of Zen for whom Japanese is a closed book have good reason to be grateful to Professor Shibata for the lucid translation he has given us, for this sermon is no more curio but a document of considerable doctrinal importance, Comprising some fifty printed pages, it shows forth clearly the Indian foundations of Zen, effectively refuting the contention of those who claim that Zen is not Buddhism. The emphasis of the preacher is throughout intellectual.He makes no concessions to the presumably limited intelligence-level of his peasant congregation. To the reader it is obvious that here is a first-class mind at work. In brief, this is a work which no conscientious inquirer into Zen can safely afford to ignore.

The translator has contributed a brief Introduction, to which is appended an equally brief account of the three Japanese Masters of Zen. A chronological table of the Masters of Chinese and Japanese Zen has also been provided. **Robert Whittemore**

Sjöberg, Yves, *Pour Comprendre Delacroix,* pp. 229. Beauchesne et ses Fils, 18 Rue De Folin, A Biarritz, Le 31. Paris, France (1963).

Eugéne Delacroix, the famed French Romanticist painter, died in 1863. To commemorate the centenary of his death by reminding those for whom Romanticism itself is but a name of the importance of Delacroix and his work is the aim of the author, and in the opinion of this reviewer he has ably accomplished his object. The format of the book is simple : an introduction to the Romantic milieu is followed by a life of the artist. The last half of the book is devoted to an analysis of the artist's work. The tone throughout is didactic. The significance of the subject is recognized without being overemphasized. For those who wish either to make the acquaintance of a great painter or to revive their memories of a man and work half-forgotten this unpretentious but competent volume will suffice. **Robert Whittemore**

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Andrew Reck, *Recent American Philosophy*, New York, Pantheon Books. p. 334, $ 5·95 (1964).

Hegel in a famous passage likens philosophical understanding to the Owl of Minerva which begins its flight when the evening shadows have begun to fall. The world has been slow to recognize America's coming of age in Philosophy with its more than a dozen recent thinkers of outstanding insight and merit. The verdict of history is yet to be written though there has been a fine beginning in writing the history of American thought since the turn of the century. Unfortunately much of this writing has a strong naturalistic bias if not actually hostile to Idealism which was then dominant. The tradition of Bowne, Royce and Hocking gets scant attention, little attention is given to many works of profound thought that have appeared between the last two wars. And yet many important works appeared in this period, on which Professor Reck centers attention in this survey.

This pioneering volume repudiates the common view that American philosophy unduly preoccupied with logical analysis is essentially pragmatic, that Idealism died with World War One. Naturalism and Realism are seen here as less impressive, less monolithic movements. For as Professor Reck writes : "No recession of philosophical concern with religion has accompanied the ascendancy of science. Through out the period Naturalism and Idealism have proved to be vigorous philosophical tendencies, Naturalism being allied with the party of science and Idealism with the party of religion." As a Fulbright Scholar Professor Reck was a research student at University of St. Andrews, Scotland. He is at present Associate Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University and editor of George H. Meade's *SELECTED WRITINGS*. He presents us with intensive studies of ten outstanding American thinkers, Ralph Barton Perry, Edgar S. Brightman, Arthur O. Lovejoy, William E. Hocking, who are well known abroad, and George H. Meade, De Witt H. Parker, Roy Wood Sellars, John Elof Boodin, Wilbur Marshal Urban and Elija Jordan. The latter is an extraordinary thinker whose philosophy is presented here in detail for the first time, as well as the fine interpretation of the thought of John Elof Boodin of whom very little has been written. William E. Hocking one of the two living philosophers treated is known to readers of this journal and a contributor to the *Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Souvenir Volume*.

This is not a conventional narrative survey with stress on the four usual themes of Naturalism, Idealism, Pragmatism and Realism. "The story of recent American Philosophy supplies no simple plot but rather a numerous cast of versatile figures who, while maintaining consistency of intellectual character, step in and out of movements."

Bernard Mollenhauer

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